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Abstract 
 
 
 
This is an analysis of the contribution of civil society to democratisation in 
Turkey through participation in the political decision-making and legislative 
processes and its degree of success in exerting an influence on policy 
outcomes. It aims to uncover the causal processes and variables, which work 
between civil society and the political processes and investigates the 
relationship between the efforts of civil society to promote democratisation 
and the policy outcomes related to democratisation. This is an intensive case 
study for which ‘process induction’ approach of ‘Process Tracing’ method 
is applied. It focuses on two ‘issue-areas’ for investigation: security sector 
reform and judicial reform. Four civil society organisations—two domestic 
and two transnational—with specific democratisation programmes have 
been selected as cases to study. It has found that the influence of civil 
society on policy outcomes—particularly on those related to 
democratisation—in Turkey is negligible. Based on the findings of this 
research, it can only be argued that there is a ‘start’ or a ‘beginning’ for the 
civil society to have an influence, if anything, on the democratisation 
process in Turkey in general and on policy outcomes—related to politics—
in particular. It is simply a modest positive step, slowly moving forward. 
Neither the Turkish political system allows this, nor the dominant political 
culture is prepared to relinquish a place, let alone a role as an actor in 
politics, or to accommodate civil society otherwise. Civil society, as a 
legitimate partner, is not recognised nor respected.  
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Preface 
 
 
 “The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night 
are gathering.” 
 
     Hegel, in Philosophy of Right, explains the purpose and essence of a 
preface as “to speak only externally and subjectively of the standpoint of the 
work which it introduces”. Also, criticisms, other than those which proceed 
from the scientific and objective treatment of the essential content, too, 
“must be viewed by the author as unreflective convictions […]. […] a 
matter of indifference” (2001: 20) he says. This is exactly what I needed to 
write this preface for.  
     My generation has been part of the baby boomers of the post-war period. 
They—we—are known with a tendency towards rejection of traditional 
values and a claim to a search for a redefinition and, if possible, imposition 
of them on societies. In the 1960s, this ‘crusade’ for a ‘new’ social—and 
economic—order based on ‘redefined’ values, sometimes took violent 
forms.  However, since this ‘redefinition’ hardly materialized, the struggle 
remained stuck in—and limited to the rejection of—the existing order, 
whatever it was. Turkey, then, a third wave democracy in its infancy, was 
still striving to recover from the travails of the first reverse wave of the 
Turkish democracy. In a country trying to navigate a safe course through the 
uncharted waters of multiparty political regime, industrialisation, 
enlightenment, ‘reformation’ and perhaps above all nation-building—all at 
the same time—this ‘rejection’ was even more painful and took different 
forms. In the course of fifty or so years the Turkish army directly or 
indirectly—most of the time directly—intervened in politics and, vowing—
and, apparently, believing so—to deliver the country out of all these 
travails, even took over the complete responsibility of running the country 
in 1960 and again later in 1980.  
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     So, Turkish baby boomers grew up through a completely different life 
experience. As a young boy of a modest, lower-middle income family, in an 
era of pre-television, pre-internet, pre-social media, the memories of ‘family 
gatherings’ to listen to the ‘Yassiada’ trials of the early 1960s, broadcast 
live on the radio are still vivid in my mind. The newspapers with pictures of 
the deposed prime minister on gallows haunted me all these years; it was 
certainly not like the ‘Magpie on the Gallows’1. The 1960s left deep 
wounds, in one form or another,  in the souls—if not bodies—of many in 
Turkey, and these wounds became even more infected rather than being 
healed as time passed.  
     In the summer of 1961, when I was a boy then, immediately before the 
constitutional referendum, running after the American-made GMC military 
trucks (which introduced the word ‘cemse’, for any military truck, into 
Turkish), for collecting the propaganda leaflets scattered by armed 
soldiers—in steel helmets—like confetti and piling them up as if we were 
making a stamp collection, was real fun. They looked like daisy flowers, in 
various bright colours and featured the words “YES to the Constitution” in 
large letters. I had wondered why the army needed propaganda and in such a 
way.  
     Joining the military did not make the experience less traumatic. The 
military intervened in 1971 again. This was coincided with the cholera 
outbreak in late-1970, in Sagmalcilar, which later became Bayrampasa to 
erase the unwanted memories of this dreadful happening, as if changing the 
names would make the problems go away
2
. Prime Minister of the time 
explained the outbreak as “the will of God against which one cannot say 
anything.”3 At this time, the whole city of Istanbul, as well as two other 
                                                          
1
 ‘The Magpie on the Gallows’. By Pieter Bruegel the Elder. 1568 
2
 By the same token, Taslitarla had transformed into Gaziosmanpasa in 1963. 
3
 Senate of the Republic, Minutes of the Proceedings. 31 January 1971, Session 1, p 557. 14 
September 2012. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/CS__/t10/c063/b033/cs__100630330577.p
df.  
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cities to its east, following the disturbances orchestrated by labour unions, 
had been put under martial law from mid-June 1970 on. I heard the Martial 
Law Commander
4, for an explanation, suggesting “the communists, if it 
[was] a heaven, [would] open the doors to it [Socialist World] and 
everybody [could] see that it [was] really a heaven”. But wouldn’t 
explaining an epidemic with ‘the will of God’ also be representing a 
‘mental’ door firmly shut, I thought. Besides, what was it that all these 
labour unions exactly wanted? Perhaps there was a connection between the 
cholera outbreak and the grievances which forced thousands to streets to 
protest, I speculated. 
     In 1974, military intervention by Turkey, in Cyprus, in order to save the 
Turkish Cypriot community from extermination looked like a perfectly 
justified action. Because the attempted military coup had been clearly 
instigated and orchestrated by the military junta in Greece. But soon after 
the operation ended, while the muzzles were still smoking, the Ecevit-
Erbakan coalition government in Turkey collapsed, in November, over the 
differences of opinion about which course of action to follow to ‘solve’ the 
Cyprus problem. But, if they—two coalition partners—did not already know 
how to solve it even before the army landed on Cyprus, then why did they 
direct the army to land on the island in the first place, I questioned. The 
problem remains ‘unsolved’ in 2014, after 40 years.  
     When it came to 1977, main opposition party CHP leader Ecevit, had 
two private meetings, in deserted resort hotels—in the middle of winter--
outside Istanbul, away from the public eye, with twelve MPs recently 
resigned from the governing AP.
5
 He managed to convince them—but 
two—to support his party in return for chairs in the cabinet. As a result, the 
                                                          
4
 Gen Faik Türün during a visit to Kuleli Military High School in Istanbul, addressing 
cadets, in April 1971.  
5
 This is known as the Günes Motel affair in Turkish political history. One independent—
former AP—MP Cemalettin Inkaya (Balıkesir) did not participate in the vote of confidence 
due to heavy pressure from his former colleagues and Orhan Atalay (Konya), while voting 
against his former party, refused a cabinet post in CHP government.  
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government lost vote of confidence in the Parliament, on the New Year’s 
Eve. But wasn’t this morally, even politically reprehensible? How could this 
political party, its leader—and these MPs who betrayed their 
constituencies—possibly expect to gain from such an obvious, gross 
violation of ethical behaviour. But, one MP did refuse to accept a ministerial 
post as a political ‘kickback’. So, despite all odds, ethical behaviour was 
indeed possible. 
     When President Korutürk’s term ended in April 1980, the Parliament 
started a marathon of one-hundred-and-fourteen tours to elect the new 
President of the Republic. But political parties failed to reach a consensus 
over the candidates in the course of five months, while an internal strife—
almost tantamounting to a civil war—continued. The impasse was 
‘resolved’ by the military take-over in September. Both candidates 
nominated by the majority party and the main opposition party were well-
known retired generals. So actually it did not look like a matter of principle 
but that of conciliation and compromise between the political parties, 
overcoming their differences, perhaps also some animosity—even 
temporarily—and move on. But why didn’t this happen, I asked myself.   
     The Constitution of 1982 was antithetical to the 1961 one in many 
respects. It reversed all democratic gains and depoliticised the society as a 
whole. All political parties were closed and several politicians were banned 
from politics for extended periods. But wasn’t it the same armed forces who 
inspired both texts? Soon, when the country went into a referendum for 
lifting the ban on former politicians, it was the ‘civilian’ governing party 
leader who openly opposed this lifting. Perhaps being a ‘democrat’ had 
nothing to do with what one wore—civilian suits or military uniforms; if so, 
then, was it related to something else? Yet both constitutions received an 
overwhelming approval from the Turkish people—61.7,% and 91.4% 
respectively. It was puzzling. 
     Even more puzzling was the Atatürk Peace Award nomination in 1992, 
as announced by the Turkish Government, to be presented to Nelson 
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Mandela—but refused by him.6 What was puzzling was not his refusal but 
the expectation of those that he would accept it. Established in 1986, in 
1990 it was awarded to Gen Evren, leader of the 1980 military take-over 
and President of the Republic. In 1991 there was no nomination. So, 
Mandela was supposed to follow Gen Evren and, quite naturally, he did not.  
     The next episode of the military rule in the 1980s, rather than healing the 
wounds and scars left by previous administrations—civilians and military 
alike—opened new ones and further alienated large segments of society. In 
1997, when the military orchestrated the effort to force the ‘conservative’ 
government out of office, new segments were added to this huge chunk of 
estranged groups. And finally, in the course of thirty or so years another 
element of the ‘Turkish’ society—Kurds—joined the club. When it came to 
2007, the whole story of almost half a century appeared to have been 
reflective of an eclipse of reason, common madness based on an ideological 
blood feud.   
     The spokesperson for the government, in an April morning in 2007, held 
a press conference and said that “The General Staff [was] an institution 
answerable to the Prime Minister and [this institution] making statements, 
on any subject, against the government [was] unthinkable in a democratic 
state where the rule of law [applied].”7 This was in response to a ‘press-
release’—which would later to be known as the e-memorandum—posted on 
the official web-site of the Turkish General Staff, the day before, around 
midnight. “All those who [had] responsibilities should refrain from actions 
that would be incompatible with democracy and that would open wounds in 
the conscious of the Turkish nation” he added. This was like Caesar 
                                                          
6
  The ANC explained that “Nelson Mandela has spent his whole life in the service of 
democracy, human rights and freedom from oppression”. Mandela, seven years later, in 
1999, did accept the Atatürk Peace Award. 6 March 2013. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20061001161737/http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1992/pr041
2a.html.  
7
 Cemil Cicek, spokesman for the Turkish Government. 28 April 2007. Press conference. 
14 September 2012. http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/406662.asp.  
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crossing the Rubicon; things would (already did ?) completely change, 
forever, in Turkey. The die was cast in 2007. Three years later, in 
September 2010, the constitutional referendum effectively ended an era 
which continued about half a century, if not eighty or so years, as many 
would refer to it. However, in late 2010, immediately after the referendum, 
when I was to make a decision on which subject to write my dissertation, 
the Turkish political system was giving clear signs of a new reverse wave—
albeit of different nature—rather than a progress towards democratic 
consolidation. The political system had certainly—and apparently 
irreversibly—been demilitarized but it was not getting democratised. 
Explaining this phenomenon looked like a major challenge and I decided to 
take this challenge. 
     Starting the very first day I stepped in the Istanbul Bilgi University—
Kustepe campus—in 2005 (when I had to use all my persuasive ability to 
convince the taxi driver that it was safe to drive there), I was often asked 
two basic questions: Why a doctoral study, as a retired military officer, after 
a long and active professional life? Why Istanbul Bilgi University? And I 
had to answer a third question in the long and arduous uphill battle, first to 
find a subject for my thesis—four times by the way—then to decide the 
topic and a working title, and finally to defend my proposal for a 
dissertation: the basis of my preoccupation with political culture—either as 
the main impediment or the primary facilitator for civil society—and 
political psychology. Sometimes the way these questions were posed—
implied, hinted, voiced or expressed otherwise—out of curiosity, was just 
natural, but sometimes it was troubling, even confrontational, but they 
certainly were fair.  
     Having served in an institution which traditionally—and, until recently, 
constitutionally—considered itself as the ‘guardian’ of the ‘Republic’ for 
over thirty years, I wanted to explain what went wrong and why, in Turkey; 
in an objective way, detached from the institutional culture I had been 
exposed to, adding the facts and perceptions from outside—i.e. from the 
‘non-military’ world—to my insider experience and observations, using 
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scientific tools to blend them meaningfully, making the social phenomena 
related to democratisation in Turkey as understandable as possible.   
     The second question is relatively easier to answer. Because, I thought 
Istanbul Bilgi University would provide a much favourable environment in 
terms of academic freedom and freedom for making mistakes, teaching—in 
other words, leading the way to—how to think critically, rather than what to 
think, which is—I am not happy to state that—more or less common in 
majority of universities in Turkey. I was largely proven right in this 
expectation. Istanbul Bilgi University represents one of the very few oases 
of genuine academic freedom in Turkey. However, in perspective—and in 
fairness, at least based on my years in the Boston University in the 1990s, 
there is still some space for improvement even in Bilgi University.   
     You will find my comprehensive response to the third question, in this 
dissertation, as you can already imagine now, in quite a lengthy fashion I’m 
afraid. To make life easier for those who may not have that much time and 
patience, simply, I believe that ‘civil society’, in the widest sense of the 
term, is both the missing and the critical link in Turkey’s struggle for a 
genuinely world-class democracy. The dominant political culture simply 
does not accept civil society as a legitimate player, let alone an equal 
partner, particularly in politics.   
     This research is about civil society and the concomitant processes of 
political decision-making and legislation in Turkey, as their interaction is 
reflected on the political decisions related to democratisation.    
     I talked to many actors—and others—who directly or indirectly 
participated in the decision-making and legislative processes—including 
those in the bureaucracy, supporting these processes or taking part 
otherwise. The starting point was the members of domestic and international 
civil society organisations, active in Turkey, which had clearly-delineated 
‘democratisation’ programmes. I also participated in their activities—
sometimes actively—made observations, reviewed their publications, read 
reports, press statements. I spent quite a lot of time in the Parliament, 
visiting MP offices, having tea with advisors or staffers, attending 
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Parliamentary Committee meetings, watching debates, taking notes, 
reviewing committee reports, draft legislation, tracing them through the 
labyrinths of politics. I visited foreign embassies which are active in 
supporting civil society in Turkey and encouraging more participation. My 
research even benefitted from working travels outside Turkey to get a real 
sense of the main 'trust’ of international civil society organisations with 
government backing, and visits to the Dutch Parliament and MOD.  
     One of the senior academics I talked to, once exclaimed; “A field study 
in the (Turkish) Parliament, by a retired officer..! How come?”. He was 
right, it was not an easy task. However, I am truly indebted to all those, 
across the spectrum, who did not save any effort, even under the constant 
pressure of time, short deadlines and chaotic political life, to answer my 
questions and share their experiences, ideas, perceptions, concerns, worries, 
even sometimes stories of their private lives as related to their functions in 
the Parliament. Based on this first hand—direct—experience, now I have 
full confidence that Turkey soon will be heading towards a world-class 
democratisation; it is just over the horizon. I’m proud of being accepted as 
an honest person and having been provided access to so much intimate and 
perhaps—if not handled properly—sensitive information, I feel privileged.  
     One important caveat is timely here and the statement of it is a must for 
academic clarity. Many, if not most, of the individuals whom I interviewed 
were active in politics and/or are still in bureaucracy; many were well-
known by the general public, hence naturally too concerned about their 
public image and/or career opportunities and potential risks involved. 
Therefore, there was an absolute need to assure them of the academic nature 
of the study and that it would be carried out in an honest and anonymous 
fashion, their privacy and confidentiality would be maintained both for 
individuals and institutions they were representing, if they chose so. In order 
to facilitate communication free from concern, tape recording was seldom 
used throughout the research and only hand-written notes were taken during 
interviews. However, despite repeated efforts, telephone contacts, face-to-
face attempts for securing an appointment, it has proven impossible to have 
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access to the current or active members of the governing party (AKP) of any 
title and at any level, particularly—and most importantly—their MPs. 
Although I did have ample opportunity to talk to those who served in the 
Justice and Development Party as MPs or cabinet ministers or advisors or 
who had first-hand experience as bureaucrats in the recent past, still I 
consider this lack of direct access to information—more importantly, to a 
unique ‘perspective’—a major weakness of the research which, I have to 
restress, was beyond my control. Also, some state institutions and 
bureaucratic organisations, again, which were critical for the purposes of 
this study have not been forthcoming for interviews or been accessible; 
among them, prominent is the Justice Academy of Turkey.  
     The findings of this research are based on a wide range of views 
expressed during about seventy interviews, talks listened to, meetings 
observed and many documents, reports, studies either signed or provided by 
various individuals. But the findings themselves, they are all my own. The 
conclusions based on these findings may or may not reflect—fully or 
partly—the views of individuals interviewed or of those 
organisations/institutions they were representing. In some cases the findings 
of the research are in clear contradiction with some commonly and 
explicitly stated views. In any case, any conclusions that may be reached, by 
the reader, as to the likely origin of the findings and conclusions of this 
research are completely accidental and do not reflect the views and official 
positions of neither the individuals nor the organisations—particularly civil 
society organisations and political parties—in any way.    
     Finally, I neither sought nor received funding from any source or 
assistance in any other form from any organisation, institution of any sort, 
or from an individual for this research.  
     As for the Istanbul Bilgi University which furnished me with the 
academic tools and the academic competence to run this research, I am 
indebted to Prof. Dr. Aydin Ugur—former Rector of the Istanbul Bilgi 
University, Mr. Oguz Özerden—Chairman of the Board of Trustees, and 
Prof. Dr. Sule Kut—Vice Rector, who supported my application to the 
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programme in 2005. I’m grateful to Prof. Dr. Ilter Turan, Prof. Dr. Nihal 
Incioglu, Prof. Dr. Gareth Winrow, Assoc. Prof. Murat Borovali, Asst. Prof. 
Dr. Murat Özbank and Mr. Soli Özel in whose classes I learned—and 
enjoyed—so much. I am also grateful to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yaprak Gürsoy 
Dipsar who, along with Prof. Turan, in the thesis monitoring jury, provided 
much-valued guidance and suggestions. And, of course, I thank a lot to my 
thesis advisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Senem Düzgit, for her valuable inputs, 
ideas, tips, notes of caution and advice.    
     Let me close this unusually long preface also with Hegel: “The owl of 
Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering” (2001: 
20). Similarly, this study aims to understand the role and effect of civil 
society in ‘democratic transformation’ in Turkey by looking into its 
participation in the political decision-making, at a virtually historic critical 
juncture, as an episode of history unfolds and passes away, as the events, 
choices and actions of various actors are disclosed, with hindsight, rather 
than in a prescriptive or speculative way.  
     Now it is time for the owl to fly—as the dusk has already fallen—in a 
bright, gleaming darkness which came after the longest shadows of a very 
long day.  
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Glossary 
 
 
 
Accession Partnership: Document that defines the framework of the EU  
accession process by setting out key priorities—in which candidate 
countries need to make progress—and pre-accession assistance.  
Acquis communautaire fre.: Cumulative body of European Community  
laws.  
Act (tur. kanun): Legal instrument of writing that has probative value and  
executory force. It is passed by a legislature—Parliament. 
(Legislative act) 
Board of Spokesmen, TGNA (tur. Danışma Kurulu, TBMM): It is  
established by the Rules of Procedure, not the Constitution. It is 
composed of the Speaker and one representative from each of the 
party groups. They draw up the plenary agenda, allocate time for 
debates, questions and inquiries and other legislative business.  
Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation (BST): A grant-making  
programme of the German Marshall Fund. BST operates in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, 
and Russia. It promotes, among other aims, strong, effective civic 
sectors.  
Bureau of the Assembly, TGNA (tur. Başkanlık Divanı, TBMM): Consists  
of the Speaker, four Deputy Speakers, eight secretary members and 
five administrative members—currently total of 18 MPs. It is 
established by the Constitution (Art 94), but it has basically an 
administrative role; monitoring plenary votes and elections, 
correcting irregularities.  
Bylaw (tur. yönetmelik): Rules issued for ensuring the application of laws  
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and regulations related to a particular field of operations or affairs. In 
the hierarchy of norms, they are below regulations.  
Council of State (tur. Danıştay): The highest administrative court. 
Court of Appeals or Court of Cassation (tur. Yargıtay): The last instance for  
reviewing verdicts given by courts of criminal and civil justice. 
Court of Accounts (tur. Sayıştay): The court that carries out regularity  
(financial and compliance) and performance audits and prepares an 
enquiry into any losses to the public purse.  
Decree (tur. kararname): Legislative text issued by the government—as  
authorised by the Parliament—according to certain procedures 
established in the Constitution, with the force of law. (Decree law). 
Deputy (tur. milletvekili): Member of Parliament-MP.   
Department (tur. daire): Division of a larger organisation such as a ministry.  
Directorate (tur. başkanlık): Sub-division of a government ministry—or  
rather autonomous organisation—in charge of a particular activity in 
a particular field.  
Draft Bill (tur. kanun tasarısı): Legislative initiatives submitted by the  
Government. 
Ex officio lat.: by virtue of holding another office. (By right of office) 
First-Instance Courts (tur. Birinci-Derece Mahkemeleri): Initial courts in  
which legal proceedings are begun or first heard.  
FRIDE (spa. Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo  
Exterior): European think-tank to inform policy and practice in order 
to ensure that the EU plays a more effective role in supporting 
multilateralism, democratic values, security and sustainable 
development.  
Laws and Resolutions (tur. Kanunlar ve Kararlar): Department responsible  
for drafting and/or staffing or handling otherwise legislative texts. 
Legislative Expert (tur. yasama uzmanı): Parliamentary employee  
specialised in legislative and law drafting procedures, working 
mainly in Parliamentary committees.  
MATRA: A bilateral assistance programme of the Netherlands with the aim of  
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supporting social transformation in countries neighbouring Europe by 
contributing to development of an open, pluralist and democratic society.  
modus vivendi lat.: an agreement between those whose opinions differ— 
agree to disagree. 
Obligatory right: A right in the protection of an interest through the  
obligation upon somebody else.  
Plenary (session), TGNA (tur. Genel Kurul, TBMM): Session of the  
Parliament attended by all members of the parliament, MPs, in order 
to directly participate in decision-making and legislative processes. 
posthumous lat.: occurring or published after death. 
Potestative right: A right whereby a party may unilaterally affect the legal  
rights of another party/counterparty. 
Presumption of innocence (tur. masumiyet karinesi): Unless a prosecutor  
can prove—beyond reasonable doubt—one is guilty, one is entitled 
to be acquitted or found ‘not guilty’. It is the responsibility of the 
prosecutor to prove one is guilty. 
Primary Committee (tur. asli komisyon): The committee whose report is  
taken as the basis for Plenary debate, as designated by the Speaker.  
Proposal of law (tur. Kanun teklifi): Legislative proposals submitted by  
deputies. 
Quorum lat.: The minimum number of members necessary to conduct the  
parliamentary business. It is intended as a protection to 
unrepresentative action by a small number of members. TGNA 
convenes with at least one-third of the total number of members 
(184) and takes decisions by an absolute majority of those present. 
The quorum for decisions can, under no circumstances, be less than a 
quarter plus one (139) of the total number of members (Constitution 
Art 96). quorate adj.    
Regulation (tur. Tüzük): They govern the mode of implementation of laws  
or designate matters ordered by law. In the hierarchy of norms they 
are below laws—or acts—and government decrees.  
Secondary Committee (tur. tali komisyon): The committee that provides   
 xxii 
views to the primary committee on relevant aspects or articles of the 
legislative text at hand, as designated and indicated by the Speaker.  
STGM, Civil Society Development Centre (tur. Sivil Toplum Geliştirme  
Merkezi): STGM was formed in 2004, by a group of activists active  
in areas such as human rights, environment, women, youth, at  
national level. It aims to help improve civil society organisations to  
play a more effective role. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 “The die is cast”. Caesar, 49 BC. 
 
 
     Democratisation, that is, transition from an autoritarian or less than 
democratic political regime into a more or less democratic one is a complex, 
open-ended process. It is complex because many actors—with inequal 
powers, authority and legitimacy—are involved in this process and they are 
in a constant interaction under the fluctuating influence of various factors. 
Frequently shifting alliences between these actors make this interaction even 
more complex. It is open-ended because none of these actors—even the 
most powerful ones—can possibly have an absolute control over the factors 
under the influence of which they operate and a multiplicity of 
developments they—singly or in partnerships—are to respond in one way or 
another.  
     This study is about ‘one’ particular actor—civil society—and its role in 
the overall democratisation process in Turkey. Since democratisation 
process essentially—although not exclusively—takes place, at least is led 
through political decisions, I primarily aim to find out the influence of civil 
society on policy outcomes. Policy outcomes are decided through iterative 
interactions of domestic, foreign and transnational actors and/or coalition of 
actors, under the influence of domestic, international and global 
environmental factors. Civil society organisations—both as part of the 
domestic civil society and that of the global civil society—play a role in the 
policy-making process and/or exert influence otherwise, on policy 
outcomes.  
     I am not interested in any ‘civil society’ organisation but in those with 
clearly delineated ‘democratisation programmes’ because policy decisions 
related to essentially politically sensitive—i.e. potentially conflictual—
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issues such as ‘democratisation’ and the processes through which they are 
made, I posit, are subject to completely different dynamics, involve different 
set of actors and develop under the influence of, and sometimes in the grip 
of distinctive factors than other issues of non-political nature, i.e. not 
primarily related to governance and politics.  
     However, because policy outcomes in a democratic political system 
come about through overlapping and mostly concurrent, even circular 
processes of policy-formulation, legislation and decision-making, I intend to 
arrive at some findings by ‘tracing’ these processes through which civil 
society organisations, in their democracy-enhancing role, function to 
influence these processes and eventually policy outcomes. Based on such 
findings, I will attempt to describe and explain; how, in what ways and to 
what degree civil society has been instrumental in affecting democratisation 
(if at all) in Turkey. If not, then why? Therefore, in terms of its goals this is 
a multi-purpose study: descriptive, exploratory, explanatory and evaluatory. 
It seeks to find out how the decision-making process works, how 
‘individuals’ taking part in decision-making give meanings to their 
actions—both their own and others’, what issues (personal versus 
‘institutional’ and role) concern them primarily, what effects—and how—
will flow in response to and/or as a result of civic activity. It will also have 
an evaluatory outcome in terms of civil society’s democratisation 
programmes.  
     Two selected areas for research are security sector and the judiciary, 
particularly the cases of the National Security Council (NSC), integration of 
the Turkish General Staff (TGS) with the Ministry of National Defence, 
reorganisation of the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors (HCJP). This selection is not arbitrary. Security sector is 
not limited to NSC, TGS and MOD, nor the judiciary is only composed of 
the Constitutional Court and HCJP. However, during the period of 2001-
2013 which this research is focusing on, the political scene in Turkey has 
been dominated by political decisions and actions (and conflicts) in these 
areas, democratisation has been judged to a large extent by the perception of 
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success in these reforms and Turkey’s European Union accession process 
has been largely affected by the security sector (2001-2007) and the judicial 
(2007-2013) reforms respectively.  
     This research—in terms of political decision-making—benefits from 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) concepts such as operational code, image of 
the other—mirror image, cognitive mapping, attribution theory etc. for 
determining “the actual contents of the beliefs and images held by individual 
policymakers” (italics added) (Rosati 1995: 60-64) or “analogies and 
metaphors in decision-making” (Shimko 1995) because they are equally 
applicable to domestic decision-making processes as well. Kaarbo (2003) 
also finds such an approach “particularly amenable to using insights from 
foreign policy research regarding […] domestic politics” (162). These 
concepts I consider helpful for the study of domestic decision-making 
because—although in a different context—after all it is the ‘individual’ or 
groups of individuals who operate in relation with others, under very similar 
conditions. FPA concepts are particularly relevant in the Turkish context 
where politics is believed to be conducted—mostly—in a ‘state of nature’ as 
it has come to be practised.    
     Apart from—but in connection with—idiosyncratic concepts common in 
both foreign and domestic politics; as suggested by Putnam (1988), among 
others, I also attempt to combine the domestic and international levels of 
policy-making. Describing his “two-level game”, he argues that 
“international negotiations sometimes enable government leaders to do what 
they privately wish to do, but are powerless to do domestically […] enabling 
them to achieve otherwise unattainable objectives” (Putnam 1988: 433-34). 
For example, Hilman (1980) mentions negotiations, in 1974 and 1977, 
between Italy and the IMF, when “domestic conservative forces exploited 
IMF pressure to facilitate policy moves that are otherwise infeasible 
internally” (qtd. in Putnam 1988: 457). A similar observation can well be 
related to the two major reform areas studied in this research in the context 
of EU-Turkey relations. 
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1.1. Conceptual framework 
     Democratic development can occur in different directions and even 
established—consolidated—democracies may turn more liberal, inclusive or 
more illiberal, exclusive and unresponsive. This is related to what Dahl 
(1992) calls “civic competence”, that is, the ability for periodic reform and 
renewal. Weak civic competence leads to “hollow, poorly institutionalized 
democracy” (Diamond 1999: 49) or to O’Donnell’s “delegative democracy” 
(1994: 55-69). Almond (1989) argues that for a democracy to be 
consolidated, elites, organisations and the mass public must all believe that 
the political system they actually have in their country is worth obeying and 
defending. Consolidation thus takes place in two ‘dimensions’—norms and 
behaviour—and on three ‘levels’—elites, organisations and the mass public. 
This is part of the process what Almond calls “political socialization” (144-
47).  
     Democratic socialization necessarily aims ‘internalisation’ of a 
democratic culture. This involves both attitudes and behaviour. Attitudes 
matter, but behaviour, as argued by Greenstein, “is a function of both the 
environmental situations in which actors find themselves and the 
psychological predispositions [attitudes] they bring to those situations in a 
kind of push-pull relationship” (1969: 7, 29).  
     Numerous domestic and international factors influence policy behaviour. 
However, these influences are channelled through the political apparatus of 
a government. Here, civil society in general and civil society organisations’ 
democracy programmes in particular have come into playing an increasingly 
vital role in inducing democratic norms, values and behaviour at all three 
levels. Civil society plays this role by influencing judgements about what is 
good, right and desirable. Therefore, I focus on the role of civil society, as a 
‘democracy-enhancer’ on the ‘behaviour’ of decision-making politicians, 
i.e., the Government, political parties or individual MPs, and government 
policies as ‘outcomes’. The focus on behaviour does not necessarily mean 
that attitude is of less importance. I simply aim to focus on the 
processes/mechanisms by which civil society influences—or fails to 
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influence—the political behaviour hence policy outcomes, at the 
‘Government’ and Parliament levels as reflected by ‘laws’ passed by the 
Parliament.  
     Here, in addition to the three levels referred to above, I postulate, a 
fourth—individual, idiosyncratic—level comes into the equation. And also 
there is a longitudinal dimension in attitudinal and behavioural change 
which works at all four levels, temporally, in a graduated, stratified and 
asynchronous fashion. Behavioural change precedes attitudinal change; at 
the elite level, change—any change, no matter it is behavioural or 
attitudinal—comes before that of the mass level; and yet, mass level cultural 
change is far more difficult, more painful and gradual to bring about and 
equally difficult to sustain unless it develops into an attitudinal change, i.e. 
internalised. Since mass level cultural change spreads across generations, 
civil society’s democratisation efforts in Turkey, in short to mid-term 
necessarily concentrate—as simple logic suggests—on the most promising 
segment of the political society, that is elites—in bureaucracy, political 
parties, the Government and the Parliament.  
     Nevertheless, civil society may mobilize the mass public for support—
and pressure—that is critical for reforms, such as those related to 
democratisation, that may not be too appealing to politicians. Diamond 
(1999) argues that by disseminating the relevant information, civil society 
empowers citizens ‘against’ the decision-making elite—above all political 
leaders—who need—or are in need of—not only the support of, in general 
sense, but also the ‘stimulus’ from a mobilized public. But in order to 
achieve this, public must be “organized, structured and principled, 
committed not just to its myriad narrow interests but to larger, common 
civic ends” (220-221) in the forms of unions, human rights and other 
advocacy groups, social movements, think tanks—essentially becoming 
what we call civil society. The media, in the context of ‘public journalism’, 
must be understood as part of civil society rather than the private sector. 
Public journalism, by exposing facts, provides the information citizens need 
to make informed decisions and can cover public deliberation. The media, in 
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this sense, are better understood as part of civil society than of the private 
sector.  
     Diamond, among others, suggests “a parsimonious model of causal 
arrows running from elite negotiations to institutional democratisation”, and 
then, eventually “to democratic habituation”, at both elite and mass levels 
(1994: 21, 239). This involves civil society as both an ‘actor’ in the 
decision-making process with regard to democratisation, and also a ‘factor’ 
having an influence on policy outcomes hence the democratisation process. 
Civil society, by its ‘civic’ functions, would either directly intervene and 
take part in the policy-making process at the elite (individual, institutional) 
level as an ‘actor’, or indirectly influence the process at the society level. 
The processes and mechanisms involved also include ‘external’ actors and 
factors, coalitions of actors and movements, making the overall picture 
complex, multilevel and multi-dimensional. Thus, it is also important to 
understand the importance of ‘coalition-building’ capacity of civil society 
organisations, the opportunities available and the legal basis for such 
coalitions, but, most importantly, the prevailing civil society culture since 
the success of democratisation programmes would largely depend on this 
capacity.  
     Most of the time, there are attitudinal pressures or interventions from 
other actors and/or environmental factors stronger than those of the civil 
society organisations that may lead to a different course of action which 
may or may not be reflective of ‘democratic’ values. Weingast (2002), in 
rational-choice-institutionalist context, argues that “democratic 
consolidation is centrally concerned with incentives” in the sense that “all 
actors have incentives to adhere to the rules” (679). Risse (2002), writing in 
international relations context, explains three types of rationalities, through 
which incentives would be formed: the logic of consequentialism, 
appropriateness and arguing (600). This study does not differentiate 
between rationalities or the nature of elite incentives, but mainly interested 
in the effect of civil society, vis-a-vis ‘others’, in creating such incentives 
conducive to democracy, as reflected by policy outcomes. 
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1.2. ‘Civic’ civil society 
     This study has taken civic
1
efforts of four civil society think-tanks—two 
Turkish, one foreign (Dutch) and one international/transnational (German 
affiliated)—with declared, explicitly announced democratisation 
programmes, on security sector and the judiciary, as the basis. The Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), The Turkish Industry & 
Business Association (TÜSIAD), Centre for European Security Studies 
(CESS) and Heinrich Böll Stiftung Turkey, they all have adopted 
institutional aims related to democratisation in Turkey and taken on 
voluntary roles to contribute to potential improvements in various domains 
of democratisation, by directly influencing policy outcomes through 
participation in decision-making and legislative processes, and/or indirectly 
through contributions to the formation of public opinion more conducive to 
and supportive of these ends.
2
 Their ‘democratisation’ programmes largely 
overlap. They coordinate, at least attempt to coordinate, their work, albeit—
as the findings of this research demonstrate—inadequately and 
insufficiently with each other, and seek and do receive support from the 
EU—and other sources. Turkey’s EU integration process does help to create 
a more favourable and more amenable environment for their work.  
     TESEV
3
 describes its ‘mission’ as “to bridge the gap between academic 
research and policy-making process, with a view to suggest valid policy 
recommendations for the problematic issues in Turkey”. It regards “widest 
possible dissemination of viable policy alternatives” as “an integral part of 
                                                          
1
 Almond and Verba (1963) describe the notion of ‘civicness’ as “a balanced political 
culture in which politial activity, involvement and rationality exist but are balanced by 
passivity, traditionality and commitments to parochial values” (32). Some of its 
characteristics are “valuing of active participation in local government activities, parties 
and in civic associations; self-confidence in one’s competence to participate in politics, 
civic cooperation and trust; membership in a voluntary association” (364).  
2
 Admittedly, TÜSIAD is not a ‘think-tank’ per se. But, as far as democratisation is 
concerned, it is a civil society organisation with functions analogous to those of a think-
tank. 
3
 See; http://www.tesev.org.tr/en/about-us. 20 September 2012. 
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TESEV’s mission”. Programme areas are grouped under three headings: 
democratisation, foreign policy, good governance. Democratisation 
programme covers four main areas: Perceptions and Mentality Structures 
and Institutions to include gender regime, religiousness vs. secularism, 
authoritarianism, nationalism & ethnic identity; judiciary; security sector 
reform [to include, particularly, military bureaucracy] in collaboration with 
the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
4
; Kurdish 
question to include internal displacement/forced migration, economic and 
social development, policy proposals for a political solution. In addition to 
publishing reports, TESEV “organizes conferences, panels, workshops and 
film screenings to share the findings of its research and to open to 
discussion, the policy proposals”, that is to say, it seeks a ‘political’ role and 
influence on policy outcomes. 
     TÜSIAD5, particularly in recent years, has focused its efforts on election 
and political parties reforms, and on the formulation of a new constitution 
“favouring individuals” over the state, “securing equality before law”, 
ensuring “separation of powers” based on “a pluralistic parliamentary 
system”,  that would remedy Turkey’s “democracy deficit”. TÜSIAD 
communicates its views to “the Turkish Parliament, government, foreign 
governments, international organisations and the global public with the aim 
of establishing a unity of ideas and action”, in other words TÜSIAD—like 
TESEV—also seeks a ‘role’ in the decision-making process and an 
‘influence’ on policy outcomes. Besides, as its vision implies, it also quests 
for formal and informal ‘networking’ and ‘unity of effort’. 
     CESS
6
, active in Turkey since June 2004, is based in Groningen, the 
Netherlands. It seeks “to support civil society in young democracies” and is 
sponsored mostly by the Dutch government agencies. They “advocate 
democracy and the rule of law”. Its aim is “to promote transparent, 
accountable and effective governance of the security sector” by working 
                                                          
4
 See; http://www.dcaf.ch/. 20 September 2012.  
5
 See; http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad/tusiads-vision/. 20 September 2012.  
6
 See; http://www.cess.org/cess-the-centre/mission. 20 September 2012.  
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closely with national governments and international governmental 
organisations, an international network of associate experts and instructors. 
They conduct policy research on issues of governance in the security sector 
and seek the help of local partners and provide them with support. Similar to 
the other two, CESS pursues a—rather indirect—role and influence, 
however in a more muted fashion and restricted to the so-called security 
sector reform. 
     Democracy promotion is “one of the main areas of the international 
activities of the Heinrich Böll Foundation”.7 Its work “aims primarily at the 
legitimacy of policy-making and decision-making processes as well as the 
application of democratic principles in other areas”. They work in 
cooperation with “partners from different levels of interest, the civil society 
and state actors”. Heinrich Böll, in the field of democracy promotion, takes 
“the specific context of each county into account”. Heinrich Böll Stiftung 
Turkey
8
 aims to involve in “the efforts to protect freedoms and cultures in 
Turkey”. Their primary aim is “to support the notion of participatory 
democracy and further it”. They cooperate with civil society institutions and 
academics in Turkey. Heinrich Böll’s work focuses on four main areas: EU 
process and reforms; religion and democracy; militarism and Kurdish 
question; subjects such as discrimination, nationalism, confronting the past 
etc. which have been traditionally considered taboo. Therefore, this is a sui 
generis organisation, distinct from others, but of fundamental value for the 
purpose and subject of this research. 
     This study, while primarily tracing the democracy-enhancing functions 
of these four civil society think-tanks in the context of democratisation in 
Turkey, will not ignore the others and the overall environment in Turkey in 
which civil society operates. The main dimensions of this environment are 
                                                          
7
 Heinrich Böll Stiftung has offices in Brussels, Warsaw, Prague, Tbilisi, Moscow, Kiev, 
Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zagreb, Washington D.C. as well as Istanbul. See; 
http://www.boell.de/worldwide/europenorthamerica/europe-north-america-5795.html. 20 
September 2012.  
8
 See; http://www.tr.boell.org/. 20 September 2012.  
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composed of political culture, party system and political leadership—
connected with the political decision-making system and leadership styles—
legislative process, EU accession process and, quite unusually, perhaps 
uniquely, parliamentary ‘civil society’, i.e. quite active ‘civil’ associations 
of the parliamentary staff in the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(TGNA)
9
. The results and findings of this study are supposed to help those 
active in the ‘civil society’ to formulate better strategies for supporting 
democratisation in Turkey. 
 
1.3. Approach, design 
     The main assumption of this study is: civil society democratisation 
programmes aim, in the short term, to influence the behaviour of major 
actors taking part in the policy-making and legislative processes and in the 
mid-to-long term, to transform their attitude by inducing democratic 
‘values’. Two ‘issue-areas’ have been selected for investigation: security 
sector reform—improving political oversight of the security sector, and 
judicial reform—strengthening judicial independence. Four civil society 
organisations with democratisation programmes have been taken as cases to 
study.  
     I aim to uncover the mechanisms—causal processes and intervening/ 
mediating variables, which work between civil society and the political 
decision-making, in the context of the former’s democracy promoting role. 
Basically, I will be investigating the relationship between the efforts of civil 
society (independent variable) to promote democratisation and the policy 
outcomes (dependent variable), in other words, whether the policy outcomes 
in areas of security sector reform and judicial reform are influenced by such 
programmes. In this respect, I postulate; political culture, political 
leadership, leadership types and styles and other individual influences, party 
system, EU accession process and global trends, legislative process and 
‘parliamentary’ civil society would intervene to mediate between the effect 
of civil society and the policy outcomes. Some of these intervening 
                                                          
9
 Particularly Yasama Dernegi (YASADER).  
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variables, once put into particular context, may also be moderating or 
mediating the effects of these variables.   
     Indicators and indicator attributes selected for this study—connected to 
the two areas of ‘reform’ in Turkey—are two-fold: 1. Reorganisation of the 
National Security Council and the General Secretariat for the National 
Security Council and integration of the General Staff with the Ministry of 
National Defence in the form of improved Parliamentary oversight and 
improved civilian/executive oversight, i.e. more democratic civil-military 
relations (for improving the political oversight of the security sector), 2. 
Reorganisation of the Constitutional Court and restructuring and 
reorganisation of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors in the form of 
improved Parliamentary oversight and separation of powers between the 
executive and the judiciary (for strengthening judicial independence). The 
study essentially compares the ‘actual’ policy outcomes with the ‘suggested’ 
outcomes originally recommended or proposed by the civil society. 
     This is a cross-sectional, qualitative research, for each subject area 
focusing on a particular time frame, based on the data collected from a 
relatively short period of time—not on data collected over time—
concentrating mainly on the behaviour/actions, preferences of a population 
of actors who are either directly involved in policy-making and legislative 
processes and/or affected directly or indirectly by the civil society or civic 
activity and/or exposed to such civic activity in any other way. I am not 
primarily interested in the impact of time. However, this aspect comes out as 
a side-result of the study, adding a longitudinal dimension.  
     This is an intensive case study for which ‘process induction’ approach of 
‘Process Tracing’ method is applied. I use process tracing in order to verify 
causal mechanisms through which causal or intervening variables produce 
causal effects, linking putative causes to observed effects. I expect the 
‘intensive research’ to give better accounts of time-order and causal 
mechanisms in identifying new variables—which I may have omitted—and 
maximize validity of the research.  
 12 
     I focus on inductive observation of apparent causal mechanisms based on 
thick descriptions, carefully drawing possible different ‘paths’ through 
which the factors cause their effects. Yet, this research continues as an 
‘iterative’ process, involving process verification by which whether the 
observed processes among variables match those predicted by the relevant 
theory is found out. Doing so, as cautioned by Checkel (2005), (1) I am 
wary of losing sight of the big picture, (2) be aware of the significant data 
requirements, (3) recognize certain epistemological traps inherent in the 
application of this method.  
     Process tracing offers particular advantages for studying behaviour by 
obtaining documents, interviewing subjects, performing content analysis on 
documents and statements, and for establishing precise sequences of who 
does what, when and based on which information. It is suitable for the study 
of intentional behaviour of individuals because this often involves the use of 
qualitative variables that are difficult to quantify. Process tracing is 
particularly useful for addressing the problem of equifinality by 
documenting alternative causal paths to the same outcomes and alternative 
outcomes for the same causal factor.  
     I adopt a ‘holistic’ approach—as suggested by Rudestam and Newton 
(1992) “to understand the phenomena” of political decision-making and 
legislative processes on subjects directly related to democratisation and 
‘civic’ activity of civil society in their entirety in order to “develop a 
complete understanding” (32) of the outcome of interaction between the 
government and other actors on the one hand and the civil society on the 
other, in these processes.  
 
1.4. Order of the dissertation 
     The preface can be considered an integral part of this introduction 
because there one can find the real motive behind this research topic—
search for an explanation for why a country, that is Turkey, has been stuck 
in the twilight of democratisation for such a long (?) time. One reason, I 
posit, is the lack of ‘civic’ input into the political system. Civil society is not 
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the only source to provide this input but—bearing in mind the unique socio-
economic and political history of Turkey, to include late Ottoman era—it is, 
potentially, the only one to offer something which is not centrally decided 
(by the state) in this sense. Because, Turkey never experienced a flourishing 
public sphere and was always ruled by a strong state, the political scene was 
usually dominated by an authoritarian political culture and appeasing mass 
culture. As the political parties are traditionally just reflections of this 
overall political reality, civil society organisations and particularly those 
with ‘civic’ programmes are the only ones that can possibly tip the balance 
in the direction of ‘forward’ democratisation, i.e. transforming the political 
behaviour—and attitudes—of major policy-making actors in a way that 
would be more conducive to democratic consolidation. Turkey’s European 
Union accession process has a vital role in making civil society in Turkey 
more effective. Introduction shortly explains this complex web of 
interactions, attempts to clarify the directions of causal arrows, describes, 
justifies and discusses the design and approach of the study.  
     Chapter 2, reviews and discusses theoretical perspectives and concepts 
relevant to this study, particularly concentrating on those related to 
democracy and democratisation as a process and cultural change, actors 
involved, political decision-making and legislation, civil society and civic 
functions, civil society’s involvement in respective processes. Also 
theoretical perspectives as employed and applied to this research and the 
conceptual framework are outlined, research design and measurement 
techniques used are explained and justified. 
     Chapter 3, describes the political environment in Turkey to include 
political culture, political parties, legislative process, the Parliament, role 
and influence of the European Union on ‘reforms’ and how civil society 
operates in Turkey. Then, the actual ‘civic’ work of four selected civil 
society think-tanks (TESEV, TÜSIAD, Heinrich Böll Stiftung Turkey and 
CESS) as their work relates to democratisation, particularly to the security 
sector and judicial reforms, is reviewed. 
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     Chapter 4, traces the decision-making and legislative processes—in 
narrative form—in two reform areas respectively. The focus is on what 
‘civil society’ wanted to happen—in terms of laws (policy outcome), how 
they strove to these ends—the way they sought a role at least a voice in 
these processes, and what the actual policy outcome was vis-a-vis the 
original aim. The influence and role of the EU has been given a particular 
weight in this quest. 
     Chapter 5, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, elaborates the findings and 
discusses them in some length.  
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Chapter 2 
Conceptual Perspectives and Methodology 
 
“In fact, most political systems may be somewhere in the twilight area between the 
rule of the few and the rule of the many.”10 
 
     In this chapter, first I review conceptual perspectives that are directly or 
indirectly relevant to this research; mainly democracy and democratisation 
as a process and cultural change, actors involved, political decision-making 
and legislation, civil society and civic functions, civil society’s involvement 
in respective processes. Then I summarize them as employed and applied to 
this research and outline the conceptual framework. I also dwell upon 
limitations—some of which serious—of this research design, major sources 
and types of bias, how they were handled and their effects were minimized, 
mainly through application of the ‘principles’ of participatory action 
research. Then, the measurement techniques used are explained and 
justified, followed by a step-by-step walk-through of the research process.  
 
2.1. Democracy and democratisation  
     Democratisation, that is, transition from an authoritarian regime and its 
consolidation is a long way which is walked by various societies at different 
speeds, styles and paces with extremely varying successes. Furthermore, it 
is not an uninterrupted, linear, one-way process. History has been witness to 
several setbacks, reverse moves, collapses and destructions of many 
democracies all over the world and this is a process still ongoing. 
Huntington (1991), conveniently describes and explains this phenomenon as 
“waves of democratisation”; some forward, some reverse and certainly not 
developing in a parallel fashion and pace in each and every country. In other 
words, at a certain period of time, while democracy may be developing in 
one country or region, it may be reversing, i.e., being replaced by 
                                                          
10
 Vanhanen (1997: 4).  
 16 
authoritarian regimes in other countries and regions. Also within the same 
country—as has actually occurred in many countries—there have been 
many waves of different character and direction.  
     Turkey, originally a ‘second wave’ country by Huntington’s definition, is 
a typical case in point; it has experienced four clear transitions, in 1950s, 
then in 1960s and 1970s, again in 1980s and finally (?) in 2000s. It also, 
necessarily, suffered at least three reverse waves, all accompanied by 
periods of political instability at varying degrees. Whether the current wave 
of democratisation in Turkey will be followed by another fourth wave of 
reverse nature is a valid question for which an attempt will be made to 
answer in the concluding chapter. But, based on the evidence offered by the 
modern political history of the country, it seems safe to argue, at this stage, 
that there is now an established pattern in Turkish politics which may be 
maintained and, all other things equal, a reverse wave may well follow.  
     Larry Diamond (1999), one of the leading scholars in democratisation 
studies, in the introduction of his insightful book Developing Democracy: 
Toward Consolidation, quotes Robert Dahl—another innovative scholar of 
consolidation, for a description of democracy. It is, Dahl (1971) says:  
          a system of government that meets three essential conditions:   
     meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized  
     groups for all positions of government power at regular intervals and  
     excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political  
     participation in the selection of leaders and policies; a level of civil and  
     political liberties—freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom to  
     form and join organisations, sufficient to ensure political competition  
     and participation. (qtd. in Diamond et al 1999: x)  
 
     As comprehensive as this description sounds, it highlights participation, 
competition and pluralism as key features of democratic institutions and 
practices. However, democracy may take different shapes and models 
depending on the ‘style’ these essential principles are operationalized; in 
forms of pseudo democracy, electoral democracy, delegative democracy, 
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representative democracy, liberal—radical—democracy. This list does not 
reflect isolated stages in the process of democratisation, but what O’Donnell 
describes as “the gap between democratic form and substance” (1994: 55-
67) as well as the overlap between them. Consequently, civil society’s role 
in a political system is closely related to this gap.  
     Electoral democracies
11
, at one end, meet the form requirement of 
democracy but lacks in the substance because they fail in guaranteeing at 
least some of the fundamental freedoms and political rights—for 
participation, competition and pluralism. In contrast, liberal democracy, as 
it is, represents most developed models of democracy: there are no reserved 
domains, there is full accountability of the elected officials toward the 
electorate—vertical accountability, there is horizontal accountability in the 
form of separation of powers. Liberal democracy represents a 
‘consolidated’ democracy. Between the two, are other ‘models’ of 
democracy offering and/or allowing, with varying degrees, some space for 
civil society.  
     Delegative democracy is not a model or type by itself, but a democracy 
that has failed or failing in consolidation. It is not the opposite of 
‘representative’ democracy, because representation is the essence of 
democratic governance, but it is a politico-psychological environment where 
representation does not exist in substance. The term delegative democracy 
has the ‘trademark’ of Guillermo O’Donnell (1994). Basically there is an 
absence of horizontal accountability between branches of the government, 
effectively eliminating the principle of separation of powers. That’s why, 
“democracies are more likely to function effectively and become 
consolidated the more they are representative rather than delegative in 
nature” says Diamond (1999: 36). Since the gap between democratic form 
                                                          
11
 For examples of electoral democracies based on scoring in two dimensions—civil 
liberties and political rights, see Freedom House’s 2012 Freedom in the World Report: total 
number of electoral democracies are 117 out of 195, i.e., 60%, including liberal 
democracies. That means, according to Freedom House methodology, 40% of all countries 
in the World, in terms of democratisation process, have not even reached the stage of being 
an electoral democracy yet.  
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and substance is an institutional gap, consolidation essentially involves 
measures to bridge this gap. To the degree this gap is reconciled, civil 
society finds a more amenable environment for its work.  
     In terms of political decision-making and the legislative process, 
‘delegative’ regimes may look like havens because the whole decision-
making power—at least, ultimate veto power—is reserved for a single 
office, in most cases, effectively a single person. Decision-making is easy, 
takes less time; decisions, once made, can be implemented quickly and 
effectively. However, ‘policy’, as a whole, is likely to be erratic and mired 
in several, repeated and gross mistakes, because the process is closed to 
environmental inputs, shaped in ‘black-boxes’, behind closed doors and 
there is no felt need to base it on a clear-cut programme. (O’Donnell 1994: 
55-67; Diamond 1999: 35-39)  
     Such political systems, once they set in, it is very difficult to move 
democracy forward because they create their own ‘institutions’. That’s why 
many third wave democracies
12
 have remained delegative in nature for long 
periods of time and some seem to be doomed to remain so for ever longer 
periods. Delegative democracies and models resembling them, while giving 
a false impression of a permissive environment for civil society, actually 
represent the most challenging political settings. 
 
2.2. Democratisation as a process and cultural change 
     Political culture in a given country is an integral part of the general—
both elite and mass—culture in the society. The dynamics involved in 
transforming political culture in a way more favourable for democracy are 
intertwined with the process of democratisation, in a parallel fashion. The 
two processes interact to create a common product—if successful—a 
                                                          
12
 For a discussion on delegative cases of Peru and Brazil, see Diamond (1999): “In Latin 
America as a whole, […] fundamental ills—personalism, concentration of power and weak, 
unresponsive political institutions—have prominently contributed to the turbulance and 
poor quality of democracy and to the consequent political cynicism and apathy among 
Latin American publics” (39). 
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consolidated, liberal democracy in which civil society is accepted as a 
legitimate participant contributing to competition and pluralism.  
     Sources and/or facilitating conditions of democratic progress—towards 
liberal democracy—vary widely as do sources of failure and instability. 
There is neither a clear hierarchy between them, nor they apply equally to 
all cases, across time and space. But since democratisation eventually 
involves a change in value systems, reflected on norms, beliefs and 
behaviour, political culture probably ranks first above others. Because, a 
change in culture eventually feeds back into other—social, institutional, 
economic, psychological and political—changes.  
     According to Almond and Verba cultural orientation has three 
dimensions: cognitive that is knowledge of and beliefs about the political 
system, affective that is feelings about the political system, evaluational that 
is commitments to political values and judgements. (1963: 15; 1989: 27-28) 
Similarly, Pye argues that “the notion of political culture assumes that the 
attitudes, sentiments and cognitions that inform and govern political 
behaviour in any society are not just random congeries but represent 
coherent patterns which fit together and mutually reinforcing” (1965: 7). 
But, those patterns are not evenly and uniformly spread in society. 
However, elites
13
 “have distinctive values and norms […] and they often 
lead the way in large scale value changes” (Diamond 1999: 163-64).  
     If democratization is about making democracy “the only game in town” 
with its rules, principles and institutions, willingly accepted—or, at least, 
respected—and reflected in practice by the overwhelming majority—elites 
and the mass alike—and enforced14 by a system of law, it does involve a 
cultural change. This suggestion is not about explaining the democratic 
change or its origin, but pointing to its end result, consequences. Diamond 
                                                          
13
 Burton et al put the number of elites in large countries like the US to about “upwards of 
ten thousand people”, in smaller countries like Mexico or Italy, “somewhere between one 
thousand and five thousand” (1992: 8).  
14
 The subject of enforcement is a rather problematic aspect of democratisation debate 
involving the concept of the ‘Paradox of Democracy’, discussed below. 
 20 
goes one step further and tags this change a key (intervening) variable; 
“Political culture change would figure to be a key variable in determining 
how and when a political system moves closer or further away from the 
perfect ideal of democracy” (1994: 4).  
     It’s a long, iterative process which, perhaps, will never end. This is why 
Dahl (1971) introduced “polyarchy” into the democracy jargon: “[…] 
relatively [but incompletely] democratized regimes, or, to put it another 
way, polyarchies are regimes that have been substantially popularized and 
liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public 
contestation” (8). As long as democracy is viewed from developmental 
perspective, even in consolidated liberal democracies, there is always 
room—much room—for further improvement, deepening and ‘perfection’. 
This suggestion which seems extremely simple—and admittedly self-
evident—is the key to understanding patalogies in many third wave 
electoral democracies, because, as Diamond (1999) explains:  
          There has never been in the modern world of nation-states a perfect  
     democracy […]. Important currents in democracy’s third wave are the  
     increased valorisation of such limited political democracy as an end itself  
     and the growing tendency for intellectuals […] to recognize the need for  
     realism in what can be expected of democracy. (18)   
 
     Diamond (1994), describes political culture as “a people’s predominant 
beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments and evaluations about the 
political system of its country and the role of the self in that system” (7). For 
Almond and Verba (1963), what they call “civic culture” is the basic and 
perhaps idealized set of values essential for democratisation; “a third 
culture, neither traditional nor modern, but partaking of both; a pluralistic 
culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and 
diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it” (7-8). This is 
more or less in line with Diamond’s list of “distinctive set of political values 
and orientations: moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge and 
participation” (1994: 1).  
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     From a different angle, democratic culture is determined by ‘disposition 
toward authority’, it is the inverse of what Inkeles calls “authoritarian 
personality syndrome”. Inkeles (1961) describes this syndrome as including 
“faith in powerful leaders, hatred of outsiders or deviates, a sense of 
powerlessness and ineffectiveness, extreme cynicism, suspicion and distrust 
of others, dogmatism”. On the other hand, ‘participant citizen’ would have 
an active interest in public affairs, keep himself informed and remain 
engaged in civil society based on a self-confidence that political action can 
actually produce a change in policy. (195-98) It is like living in parallel 
universes; mentally, emotionally and behaviourally, let alone attitudinally. 
The inevitable cultural clash here coming from an irreconcilable 
incompatibility is obvious. The outcome of such an encounter would decide 
the basic nature of the operational environment for civil society. 
     There are significant differences between countries in terms of the degree 
to which democratic culture—and values associated with it—are inherently 
included in the common set of values, norms, beliefs, attitudes and 
behaviour—national culture. Yet, it is misleading to consider the ‘national’ 
culture as a monolithic set. There are many subcultures within national 
cultures and while they—in terms of certain values and orientations—may 
largely overlap, some others may be conflicting. In that sense, one may 
roughly talk about an elite culture and mass culture. Even this is less than 
adequate because there are ‘sets’ of cultural values associated with certain 
groups of elite or organisations.  
     The initiation of a democratic transformation process, in most cases, is 
result of a conscious elite decision. This decision, initially, may be based on 
instrumental reasons, rather than shifts in values, i.e., cultural change. At 
some stage, elites come to recognizing the legitimacy of respective political, 
economic and other interests of each other and decide to tolerate and resolve 
their differences through bargaining rather than open—often violent—
conflict. There is an instrumental rationality—as opposed to epistemic 
rationality—involved here. Behavioural change paves the way toward 
attitudinal, normative change. Almond and Verba (1963) also point to this 
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sequential pattern of behavioural and then attitudinal change, shifts in 
values: “[…] the option for a democratic regime” is “a matter of pragmatic, 
calculated strategy by conservative forces. Even at the elite level, deep 
normative commitments to democracy appear to have followed […] rational 
choices” (39). Therefore ‘elite’ is the key variable in initiating a democratic 
transition, along with other—political, structural, conjunctural—factors 
having effects on elite interactions. Diamond (1994), rephrasing the same 
argument, says that this behavioural shift stems from “strategic 
considerations—altered perceptions of risk”, not from “what values the 
leaders hold dear in the abstract” (3). In other words, if ‘strategic’ 
considerations do not favour participation, then political behaviour 
accommodating civil society, in some form, would not be forthcoming.  
     Democratic transition is a challenge; but once it has been completed, the 
challenges awaiting the new regime are even more challenging and “neither 
breakdown nor consolidation is overdetermined” (Linz & Stepan 1996: 
187). For instance ‘trust’, the most fundamental component of social capital, 
refers to a confidence in the democratic system in general—legitimacy, and 
in the way political institutions perform in particular—efficacy. Satisfaction 
with the perceived political performance of the regime, i.e., legitimacy, in 
some societies, could exist along with low levels of political participation 
and other forms of engagement. In Spain, for example, what Montero et al 
(1997) call “affective estrangement” syndrome—low political interest, 
engagement, information and efficacy—is “a stable, if not permanent, 
feature of Spain’s political culture” (22). The roots of this political-
sociological phenomenon can be found in modern Spanish political 
history.
15
   
     If trust does not exist at least in one form, either in the form of trust in 
the regime itself or in the form of trust in the way it performs, with all 
likelihood, there is little chance of consolidation and the most likely 
outcome would be a reverse movement, i.e. failed consolidation. What 
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 For Spanish democratisation, see also: Montero & Torcal (1993), Gunther (1992) and 
Gunther et al (2004). 
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follows a failed consolidation is important for the purposes of this study. 
Because, quite different from what happened during the first and second 
waves of democratisation, nowadays, democratic regimes, if failed, are not 
replaced by outright military regimes or civil politicians with totalitarian 
practices, “democracy, instead of expiring altogether, has been hollowed 
out, leaving a shell of multiparty electoralism […]” (Diamond 1999: 62-63).     
Diamond (1999) clearly explains this ominous phenomenon for the future of 
transitioning democracies: “[…] a third wave of democratic expansion to be 
followed not by a reverse wave but with a period of stagnation or stability 
[…] in which gains for democracy are […] off-set by losses. […] such a 
period of stasis are seen to have entered” (60-61). In such a twilight zone, 
there is very little, if any room for civil society to operate. When a reverse 
socialisation starts, resulting in some form of electoralism, if not outright 
authoritarianism, democracy is faced with a ‘crisis’.  
     Crisis mainly involves lack of enough improvement in three areas of 
deepening, institutionalisation and performance—all related to the 
perception of legitimacy of the democratic regime. Kettl (1998) groups them 
as “three deficits”; budget deficit, performance deficit and trust deficit. 
There are inextricable connections between welfare, good governance and 
participation.
16
 Contrasts and disparities are not only of economic or 
political nature. Ideological and cultural disparities overshadow and 
accentuate them. This situation results in the inevitable ‘paradox’ of 
democracy. For instance; civil society has to operate in an environment 
where its ‘supply’ is not demanded, even rejected. 
     ‘Secularisation’ is another subject that can be considered as part of the 
‘paradox of democracy’ debate. The Church, even in consolidated 
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 For a related debate on ‘Reflexive Democracy’ see Kevin Olson (2006). His basic 
argument is that the term ‘welfare’ should not be understood any longer as providing 
citizens with resources they need, i.e., in economic terms, so that they can become 
politically equal, but providing them with equal opportunities to ‘participate’. “On the one 
hand, welfare is necessary to ensure equal and sufficient participation in forming the laws. 
On the other hand, equal and sufficient participation (in deliberation) is necessary to 
legitimate the system of laws that includes welfare”, he argues (189).   
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democracies such as the Netherlands, is still relevant.
17
 However this does 
not necessarily mean that this relevancy is in conflict with the secularisation 
of society and the polity. People do have overlapping identities and a 
religious identity should not be in conflict with civic or democratic identity. 
Besides, many individuals may simply consider the Church an institution 
“which should be engaged in the values and morality of society just like for 
instances, Amnesty International or Greenpeace”, not because of its 
“religious characteristics” (Hart  2005: 192-93). But, how to accommodate 
this ‘role’ in a democracy has always been problematic and particularly in 
developing societies today, this accommodation continues to present serious 
challenges.  
     The key question here is about drawing somewhat firm lines for the way 
religion is engaged in society and the state, particularly in the way political 
legitimacy is claimed. While in traditional societies religion has customarily 
decided the legitimacy in every aspect of life the process of modernization 
has radically changed this and resulted in what Kaufmann (1979) calls 
“enchurchment” of religion (qtd. in Hart 2005: 194). Therefore, the basis for 
political legitimacy has shifted from religious—or what Weber calls 
“traditional” and/or “charismatic”—to legal-rational considerations. The 
religion as a social force or the Church as an institution did not disappear 
but was comfortably accommodated in secular democratic political systems.    
     Why is this important? Although there are important differences between 
societies, “in the absence of the right to oppose, the right to participate is 
stripped of a very large part of the significance it has in a country where 
public contestation exists” (Dahl 1971: 5). Especially the notion of ‘rights’, 
from the perspective of democracy, is somewhat problematic in Islam as 
well as in Confucianism.
18
 According to Thompson (2010) the main 
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 Nearly 50 per cent of Dutch non-church members see the Church as a reliable source of 
information with regard to social and political affairs—a much higher figure than for the 
Dutch political parties, for example. (Hart 2005: 192) 
18
 Stephen B. Young and Nguyen Ngoc Huy (1990) offer a somewhat different 
interpretation of human rights and the role of law in the Confucian tradition. They argue 
that there was “a duality of virtue and power in the Confucian tradition”, but they admit 
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problem lies in a lack of development of the concept of rights at the level of 
‘ethical life’. He describes this dynamic relation between paradigms of 
ethical life and forms of social organisation by a four dimensional diagram 
(Fig. 1) based on what he calls “uneven modernisation”.  
 
Figure 1. 
Dynamic relation between paradigms of ethical life and forms of social 
organisation. (Thompson 2010: 119).  
 
 
 
     He argues that the outcome is determined by whether modernisation is 
accompanied by adequate forms of rights-based ethical life. If small 
portions of elites begin to move toward modern forms of association 
(Gesellschaft) while broader swaths of the population still maintain 
traditional, communal forms of social cohesion (Gemeinschaft), social 
                                                                                                                                                   
that “power became increasingly concentrated in modern times” (qtd. in Huntington 1991: 
340). 
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conflict for an extended period of time is inevitable. Social conflict is most 
probably followed by the emergence of authoritarianism—to repress social 
cleavages. If modernisation is accompanied by a rights-based ethic—
shifting away from nomocentric paradigm—political pluralism develops. If 
nomocentric forms of ethical life persist along with the communal forms of 
social, political life, traditionalism settles in. The essence of this debate is 
not new, nor exclusively related to ‘Islamic’ societies or Islamism19. It took 
place in the West during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and 
continues in the form of liberals-communitarians debate today. (Thompson 
2010: 100-121) Such values dominating societies may well lead to political 
regimes essentially elitist, hierarchical, corporatist and authoritarian, not 
necessarily democratic. Surely, where the right to participate is problematic, 
civil society is faced with a real challenge and dilemma.   
     A discussion of the subject of ‘paradox of democracy’ is timely here. 
Nash argues that the paradox of democracy is that “it can only be 
maintained by repression of the undemocratic”. However, she warns; 
“repression should clearly be a last resort, when discussion is no longer 
possible; there should be no a priori judgements of traditions as necessarily 
undemocratic” (2000: 249-50). There is also a mirror image of this rather 
disturbing fact, a parallel paradox; just as democracy is a double-edged 
sword which may cut both its friends and foes, the paradox is a Janus-faced 
one. It is possible to destroy democracy—or a democratic polity—by using 
what it basically and fundamentally offers, majority rule. The majority, 
represented by democratically ‘elected’ political leaders, if they are not 
loyal to the system, “are more likely to choose and condone oblique and 
partial assaults on democracy such as repressing particularly troublesome 
opposition and minorities” (Diamond 1999: 63). The risk for civil society is 
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 The term ‘Islamism’ is much contested and its contentious and controversial 
interpretations often lead to conceptual imbroglio. Here it is used to describe a political 
culture recognising a legitimate—often supreme—place for religious rules and ruling by 
Islamic scholars—ulama—in a political system. For two similar discussions of the subject 
see; Demant (2006: xxii); Cagaptay (2010). 
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that, in such a cultural climate, it can easily be introduced and portrayed as 
‘opposing’ and in ‘minority’.  
     Of course ‘religion’ is not the only source of ‘culture’ in general, and 
political culture involves a number of other orientations and the outcome of 
interaction between the religion—and the values it represents—and other 
dimensions of local culture is not pre-determined. In Latin America, where 
Catholicism is the dominant creed, a common culture of authoritarian, 
‘elitist’ elite norms and values, combined with wide-spread estrangement of 
the masses from politics, lack of demand for participation, low levels of 
social capital and deep-seated perceptions of ineffectiveness vis-a-vis the 
state, always became major obstacles to democratic development. Perhaps 
the power of religion—any religion—comes not from its direct teachings 
per se but from indirect influences in transforming the general culture and 
the resulting hybrid culture becoming either hostile or amenable to 
democracy.  
     One other important aspect of ‘cultures’ is the fact that they determine 
‘identities’ and express them. At individual level, identity is coupled with 
‘personality’. Therefore just as there are overlapping cultures, there are 
overlapping identities one—or more than one—of which may come forward 
depending on the context, the subject involved and the identities interact. 
Cultural change also means identity change and is met with reflexive 
resistance. As indicated by Pye (1985): 
          Culture is a remarkably durable and persistent factor in human affairs.  
     It is the dynamic vessel that holds and revitalizes the collective memories  
     of a people by giving emotional life to traditions. […] People cling to  
     their cultural ways not because of some vague feelings for their historical  
     legacy and traditions, but because their culture is part and parcel of their  
     personalities […]. Cultural change therefore involves true trauma. (20) 
 
     Civic culture—a set of democratic values—with its mixed character 
appears to be the panacea for all the evils and illnesses of democratic 
transformations: crisis of democracy, paradox of democracy, resistance, 
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accommodating ‘religion’, culturally diverse groups and ‘civil society’ 
within an overall political framework without imposing one solution, and 
eventually preventing a reverse movement. This outcome which can be 
called a ‘democratic miracle’ may come about thanks to two features of 
civic culture:  
          Social trust and cooperativeness and overarching commitments to the  
     system, the nation and the community, moderate the conflicts and bridge  
     the cleavages of politics. Trust also facilitates the vertical ties between  
     elites and their constituencies that keep politics functioning within the  
     institutional boundaries and constraints of democracy. These beliefs and  
     norms keep political conflict from becoming so polarized and intense  
     that it might destabilize the system. (Almond & Verba 1963: 490) 
 
     Civil society does have a crucial role in making democratic 
transformation possible. Civic culture can only be the product of a 
‘vigorous’ civil society. Causal arrows running from social capital to 
commitment to democratic political system, then to harmonious politics on 
the one hand; vertical ties enabling citizens to actively and effectively 
participate on the other, all start with and also are started by the 
involvement of civil society. If ‘civicness’ comes gradually with democratic 
experience, or precedes democracy, or an interaction develops in parallel, is 
subject to question, but the crucial role of civil society is not.   
 
2.3. Actors in policy-making 
     Weber calls elites “switchmen of history”. They are also switchmen for a 
successful democratisation as it concerns consensus at both mass and elite 
levels. Morlino (1998) rightly points to “a basic distinction between 
consensus at a mass level and support of political elites” and to two different 
faces of citizen reactions against political reality; pragmatic reactions 
against the way democratic institutions work or fail to work, and more 
ideological ones related to values. (5-6) Both are functions of elites; making 
democratic institutions work and leading the value change. 
 29 
     Burton et al (1992) explain the role of elites in terms of the stability and 
long term survival of political regimes: “Democratic stability requires a 
careful balance between conflict and consensus. […] What principally 
distinguishes unconsolidated from consolidated democracy is, in short, the 
absence of elite consensual unity” (3). According to them, in unconsolidated 
democracies while the trappings of procedural democracy and even 
substantial mass participation may well exist, there is no real elite 
consensus and elites are disunified, they distrust and have little traffic with 
one another. Similarly, for Higley and Gunther (1992), “a disposition 
toward compromise, flexibility, tolerance, conciliation, moderation and 
restraint among elites is sine quo non of consolidated democracy” (x).  
     Elites may be disunified, consensually unified or ideologically unified 
which are related to the extent of their structural integration and/or value 
consensus respectively. Consensual unity represents a relatively inclusive 
structural integration and value consensus while in ideologically unified 
elite this value consensus is monolithic. But transformations from disunity 
to unity themselves may take one of the two basic forms: settlement and 
convergence.
20
 Settlements may or may not facilitate the eventual 
emergence of a consolidated democracy, but elite convergence would most 
probably pave the way towards that end. More gradual convergences rather 
than sudden and deliberate settlements would more likely lead to 
consolidated democracies.
21
 Pacts represent some form of settlement 
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 According to Burton et al, the Fifth Republic of France—following the dire crisis of 
1958—is the paradigmatic case of an elite convergence under General de Gaulle, the key 
facilitator, which eventually led to ‘cohabitation’. (1992: 25-29) 
21
 In Brazil, lack of transformation resulted in an unconsolidated democracy; in Mexico, 
early settlement in 1920s led to stable but limited democracy, that is inclusionary 
authoritarian regime; in Spain, later settlement in the 1970s gave the country a consolidated 
democracy, thanks to lessons learned from earlier failures and the emergence of able 
leaders, like Adolfo Suarez and King Juan Carlos. (Burton et al 1992: 326) Bruneau (1992), 
focusing on the personal characteristics of key elites in Brazil, argues that highly 
fragmented party system and highly unstable and personalistic nature of political parties 
undercut prospects for an elite settlement. The only consensus and unity that existed among 
the Brazilian elites was their opposition to the entry of the masses into political arena—an 
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between certain groups of elites. However, if they deliberately exclude other 
elites—who are not part of the pact—or important social groups, and 
discriminate against them, the inevitable result would be ‘pseudo-
democracy’ at best.  
     Bottomore (1970), based on the earlier works of Gaetano Mosca (1939) 
and Vilfredo Pareto (1977)
22
, widely discusses the subject of elites and their 
circulation between social ranks. Elite undergoes changes in its membership 
over a period of time; (1) by the recruitment of new individual members 
from the lower strata of society, (2) by the incorporation of new social 
groups, and, occasionally (3) by the complete replacement of the established 
elite by a “counter-elite”. A sub-elite, comprising of middle class civil 
servants, managers, scientists, engineers, scholars, intellectuals connects the 
elite with the rest of the society. (11-12)  
     One other important aspect of elite-mass interaction is the need for a 
reduced distance between elites and masses so that the elite can possibly be 
expressive of the aspirations of the people and their interests. In this respect 
too, there is a difference between earlier democratized countries of the West 
and today’s newly democratising ones, the latter requiring elites relying 
upon mass support while this was not necessarily the case for the former.      
     The bottom line, as argued by Higley and Gunther,  among others, is that 
“in […] states with very long records of political instability and 
authoritarian rule, distinctive elite transformations, carried out by the elites 
themselves, constitute the main and possibly the only route to democratic 
consolidation” (italics added) (1992: xi). Therefore, democratisation 
requires from elites a conscious, persistent and unflinching effort in terms of 
achieving unity in one form or another—ideally, in the form of convergence.  
                                                                                                                                                   
antidemocratic consensus. (259-80) Knight (1992) finds the elite settlement in Mexico 
‘successful’, but the regime based on this “neither democratic nor fully inclusionary” (142).  
22
 Although this work of Pareto was published in 1977, he wrote extensively before, on the 
role of elites in political and social transformations. See; Pareto (1935a), Pareto (1935b), 
Pareto (1935c), Pareto (1942), Pareto (1965).  
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     One other closely related subject is the role elites play as ‘individuals’. 
Content of beliefs and images held by those individuals taking part in the 
decision-making process and cognitive approaches adopted and ordinarily 
practiced by them have an effect on determining the actual contents of the 
policy outcomes. These involve complex concepts
23
 such as operational 
code, image of the other—mirror images, cognitive mapping, attribution, 
structure of beliefs, cognitive consistency, schemas, social cognition, use of 
analogies and metaphors
24
. Cognitive behaviour varies by classes of 
persons, decision-making institutional setting and from decision to decision. 
Cognitive syndromes such as grooved, uncommitted or theoretical 
thinking
25
 do not refer to personality types. Importance of the situation—of 
great complexity and/or uncertainty; content, structure and relative degree 
of stability of beliefs; complex links between beliefs and behaviour would 
have an influence on how beliefs, images and cognitive behaviour interact, 
therefore on how they influence policy outcomes.  
     Shared images concept (Ferguson & Mansbach 1988) refers to a set of 
common ideology, values or shared assumptions among decisionmakers “as 
to the nature of the world and desirability of certain policies”. (167-68) 
Therefore, how cultural and social differences shape decision-making and 
how structures and processes of policy-making are affected would differ 
between cultures/sub-cultures. 
     The psychology of individuals also affect policy and the dynamics of 
small groups can help or hinder the decision-making process. Stern and 
Sundelius (1997) propose classifying group interaction patterns running 
from conformity (that is, groupthink) to conflict (that is, bureaucratic 
politics) and the hybrid between these two extremes. (qtd. in Garrison 2005: 
179) Under certain conditions the scope of the decision unit widens or 
narrows. When decisions are made in hierarchical groups, membership in 
the decision group is very restricted and the nature of interaction is one of 
                                                          
23
 For a detailed discussion of these concepts see; Rosati (1995: 59-64). 
24
 For analogies and methaphors in decision-making see; Shimko (1995). 
25
 For a discussion of ‘cognitive syndroms’ see; Steinbruner (1974: 125-35). 
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conformity. Then, group-think is not only one of the possible dynamics 
among members of a group, but the most likely medium of exchange. 
     Stone (2002), underlining the importance of socialisation and political 
learning, argues that “the essence of policy-making in political communities 
(is) the struggle over ideas”. Her model is based on—not rational decision-
making—but reasoning by metaphor and analogy. (2002: 8-12) Feulner 
(2009) has a similar line of argument: “[…] in the public war of ideas, 
entrepreneurial prowess is necessary to win, but it is not sufficient, […] 
those who attribute our success to skilful and aggressive marketing, and to 
nothing more, overlook the most critical factor of them all: the power of our 
ideas” (84). 
     Elite also includes individual leaders called political leadership. The 
political leadership, i.e. the skills, values and behaviour of political 
leaders—as reflected on their leadership styles and effectiveness of their 
leadership—is vitally important for the success of democratisation.  
     A leadership style is composed of behavioural patterns and strategies 
adopted by a leader. Burns (1978) identifies three styles of leadership: 
laissez-faire leadership, transactional leadership and transformational 
leadership (qtd. in Heywood 1997: 334). Laissez-faire leaders have a ‘hands 
off’ approach, while transactional leaders have a more ‘hands-on’ style. 
Transformational leaders, on the other hand, Heywood explains:  
          [are] not so much a coordinator or manager as an inspirer or  
     visionary. Not only are such leaders motivated by strong ideological  
     convictions, but they also have the personal resolution and political will  
     to put them into practice. Instead of seeking compromise and consensus,  
     they attempt to mobilize support from within government, their parties  
     and the general public for the realisation of their personal vision. (italics  
     added) (1997: 335) 
 
     If the prevailing conditions in a country allow, perhaps even compel, 
leaders to fill the ideological and moral vacuum—with accompanying 
uncertainty and fears—at the mass level, then transformational style may 
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well dominate the leadership practices. These conditions are vastly available 
in developing societies and it is simply less than a matter of chance for 
political leaders—with relevant personality traits—come to power in such 
societies and rule with ‘conviction’ rather than compromise and/or 
consensus-seeking. Such a trend, once set forward, would have its own 
dynamics and difficult to control—let alone reverse—and may even end up 
in a personality cult.
26
 
     ‘Laissez-faire’ style leadership fits well to the leadership as an 
organizational necessity, while the ‘transactional’ leadership does so with 
the leadership as a sociological phenomenon. However ‘transformational’ 
style requires both ‘personal gift’ and ‘political skills’. These traits are 
intimately linked with the personality of leaders in office.  What 
combination of style, model and personal character would befall in a 
particular polity, under certain set of conditions is simply a function of 
historical probability. But the outcome would be decisive for the direction 
democratisation can possibly take in this country—and for the 
accommodation of civil society as a legitimate actor.  
     As typically happens in ‘delegative’ democracies, where political parties 
and civil society are weak, voters are mobilized by clientelistic ties, and 
populist, personalistic appeals. There is very little accountability. In the 
absence of meaningful political programmes and policy commitments, nor 
consultation—because there is no felt need as such—there is much space for 
inevitable and unavoidable policy mistakes, setbacks and an endless process 
of course-correcting. Diamond (1999), brilliantly portrays a delegative 
democracy under personalistic rule—what he calls ‘delegative 
pathologies—and its consequences:  
          Highly personalistic, populist, delegative presidents […] rather than  
                                                          
26
 Heywood (1997) describes a ‘cult of personality’ as “a propaganda device through which 
a political leader is portrayed as heroic or God-like figure. By treating the leader as the 
source of all political wisdom and an unfailing judge of the national interest, the cult 
implies that any form of criticism or opposition amounts to treachery or lunacy. The point 
at which routine propaganda (found in all systems) becomes a fully fledged ‘cult’ may be 
unclear in practice.” (333)  
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     seeing to strengthen the judiciary, political parties, congress and other  
     representative institutions […] set out deliberately to weaken, fragment  
     and marginalize them further as a means of further aggrandizing their  
     own personal power. […] political deinstitutionalisation has been a  
     conscious strategy of personalist leaders, enabling them to establish  
     unmediated relationships with atomized mass followings while  
     overcoming institutional checks […]. (35) 
 
     One and probably the most likely result of concentration of powers in 
one office, combined with ‘transformational’ style, ‘personal gifts’ and 
‘political skills’ would be an ‘executive type’ of policy-making. But this 
‘executive’ function would go beyond the traditional roles of policy 
implementation, and include also the direction and control of the policy 
formulation process, effectively taking over the functions and 
responsibilities of the legislative assembly, through the use of various 
instruments.  
     Advisors and the ways they take part in or contribute to policy-making is 
essentially a reflection and extension of a leader’s style. A leader’s style and 
needs shape the organization of an advisory system and also affect advisory 
dynamics. Garrison (2003) describes types of advisory structures as 
collegial, competitive and formalistic. (180) Advisory structures may be 
large, informal and are even formed on an ad hoc basis or composed of a 
small nucleus of close and permanent advisors. What is of utmost 
importance is whether they can curb the negative effects of small group 
dynamics, improve the quality of information processing and mitigate some 
inherently defective advisory processes. Those who gather, analyze, 
interpret and provide the information, actually shape and narrow policy 
options available to policy-makers. On the other hand, sometimes it is the 
other way round. Political leaders may “manipulate advisers to rubber-
stamp his own ill-conceived proposals” Janis (1972) argues:  
          […] a different source of defective decision-making […] often  
     involves a much more subtle form of faulty leadership. […] subtle  
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     constraints, which the leader may reinforce inadvertently, prevent a  
     member from fully exercising his critical powers and from openly  
     expressing doubts when most others in the group appear to have reached  
     a consensus. (3) 
 
     However powerful an executive political leadership can be, still there are 
other actors participating in the decision-making and legislative processes 
and exercising some influence on the policy outcomes; political parties, 
bureaucracy, interest groups, and civil society.  
     Political parties play critical roles in democracies, by organizing electoral 
challenges to authority, mobilizing participation, articulating demands and 
aggregating political interests, they serve as key links between political 
elites and the society. The growing influence and competitiveness of the 
mass media, the decline of ideologies, the narrowing of policy choices as a 
result of globalisation have weakened the traditional functions of parties and 
led to a growing detachment of voters from political parties. This has been 
partly offset by the growing strength of civil society. But at the same time, 
peoples have been exposed to manipulation and exploitation of populist 
political leaders. According to Diamond et al (1999) “The greater risk has 
been that they [parties] would be circumvented by plebiscitarian leaders or 
abandoned by alienated voters, in either case becoming irrelevant at great 
cost to democracy” (29). That’s why Morlino (1998) argues that 
“deinstitutionalisation of political parties is one of the most serious 
obstacles to democratisation” (348). Effective democratic institutions are 
essential for sustainable democratic politics.  
     However, very rigid party structures, excessively centralized and 
disciplined party organisations and a compliant party culture may become as 
detrimental as polarisation of the political system. Because what may, at 
first, appear beneficial for democracy, can over time obstruct or undermine 
democratic consolidation and governability. “This underscores the wisdom 
of viewing adaptability as an important dimension of genuine institutional 
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maturity and strength” argues Huntington (1968: 12-26). This is related to 
dominant political cultures in political parties—defined in terms of elites. 
     Here involves a phenomenon what Diamond (1999) describes as “a 
tension between durability and adaptability”:  
          […] political parties and party systems must strike a balance between  
     competing values: […] stability and rootedness, on the one hand and  
     adaptability on the other. […] between over- and under- 
     institutionalisation. […] a weak, fragmented, inchoate, highly volatile  
     party system that barely penetrates the society, commands few stable  
     bases of popular and electoral support […] is prone to populism and  
     polarisation […]. (96-97) 
 
     Party systems and election systems in any country are interconnected and 
electoral systems too involve similar ‘tensions’; between efficiency and 
governability, on the one hand, and representation on the other, between 
majoritarianism and proportionality, between vertical accountability and 
horizontal accountability, between representativeness and accountability, 
between inclusiveness and accessibility, weaker or stronger ties between the 
voters and representatives. These are all related to electoral systems, i.e. 
how members of the legislative body are elected. Systems based on 
proportional representation are highly representative and inclusive of 
diverse interests, but they may be less than efficient. However, majoritarian 
or plurality systems such as single-member district electoral systems, while 
causing distortion between votes and seats, are more efficient in terms of 
governability. But they are exclusionary systems and concentrate power.
27
  
     Nevertheless, like in many other cases, the outcome is not 
overdetermined, depending on the wider political context, both sets of rules 
may result in what Sartori (1966) calls “polarised pluralism”, infested with 
political polarisation and fragmentation. Diamond (1999) holds that; “[…] 
majoritarian systems are ill advised for countries with deep ethnic, regional, 
religious or other emotional and polarising divisions. Where cleavage 
                                                          
27
 10% country-wide electoral thereshold in Turkey has the same effect with similar 
outcomes, e.g. concentration of power in the executive.  
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groups are sharply defined and group identities deeply felt, the overriding 
imperative is to avoid broad and indefinite exclusion from power of any 
significant group” (104). 
     Finally, political parties and election systems—along with leadership 
styles and the dominant political culture—are what make up legislatures. 
And, in legislatures both the weaknesses and strengths of these systems are 
reflected. As a result, they may or may not become meaningful forums 
where either the political parties as institutions or MPs as individuals 
mandated by their constituencies—in practice both—can engage, challenge 
and supervise the executive branch—to include the bureaucracy. An 
effective parliament, in order to perform these basic functions, would 
require, as a minimum, advisors to parliamentarians with necessary skills, a 
system of staffers with diversified expertise, an information service and 
‘institutionalised’ committees that can function with, at least some, 
autonomy from respective political parties. “In […] unconsolidated 
democracies, […] national legislatures lack the organisation, financial 
resources, equipment, experienced members and staff to serve as a mature 
and autonomous point of deliberation in the policy process” argues 
Diamond (1999: 98), then, some parliaments which may look powerful—
constitutionally—are doomed to remain weak institutionally, hence 
practically non-existent. 
     Policies—and the laws to implement policies—are formulated by 
politicians, executive and legislative alike; bureaucrats—civil servants—
offer advice. However, bureaucrats have the expertise, control over the 
information, and they represent continuity in state apparatus. Politicians 
come and go, but bureaucracy is there for extended periods. This 
advantageous position of bureaucracy over elected politicians, creates a 
critical problem of accountability. In principle, politicians, i.e. the executive 
and the legislature—parliament, are accountable to the public through 
elections, transparency, parliamentary mechanisms etc, but keeping 
bureaucracy accountable to elected politicians presents a challenge. 
Bureaucracy is considered as part of the ‘executive’ and ministers are 
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responsible for the actions of their subordinate officials. The problem is how 
to practise the oversight the ministers are supposed to have over the 
bureaucracy. Because, unless this oversight is secured, the executive would 
never be confident that the bureaucracy would be acting in accordance with 
the letter and spirit of the political decisions made by the government.
28
  
     One way to ascertain political control is to replace not only the 
minister—and the small cadre around them—in each department, but to go 
for a larger replacement in the bureaucracy through so-called political 
appointments. This option would have the obvious risk of politicizing and 
devaluing the bureaucracy.
29
 But even then, the desired outcome is not 
certain to be achieved. A well-entrenched bureaucracy—regardless of their 
own motives—would still have some latitude to ‘resist’ politically-
motivated choices made by the executive, no matter how legitimate such 
choices are. Another way to overcome this ‘difficulty’ is to outsource the 
bureaucracy through employment of advisors or consultants. Despite the 
risks of bureaucratic in-fighting, particularly in presidential systems, this 
may be an option of lesser-evil.  
     However, as argued by Bottomore (1970), “bureaucracy’s policy-making 
powers, however much they may have increased, are ultimately subject to 
the control of a political authority and the conflict between political parties 
in the democratic countries is one of the means by which this control is 
made effective”. He also quotes “ethical code of the bureaucracy” and the 
“doctrine of political neutrality” as principles providing a restraining 
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 In the United States, for example,  with each administration about 500 posts at the head 
of federal departments, agencies, administrations, commissions etc. are replaced by new 
appointees subject to approval by the Congress. Bearing in mind the huge mass of 2.7-3 
million strong bureaucracy, one can imagine how difficult it can be to assure a firm control.  
29
 Heywood (1997) explains that having “both political commitment and meritocracy” is 
difficult, because appointments made on the basis of “political affiliation and personal 
loyalty rather than ability and training” would not attract high-calibre staff to work in 
temporary positions that offer no form of job security”. Also “ideological enthusiasm” 
could blind civil servants to the “drawbacks and disadvantages” of policy proposals. (353-
56) 
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influence upon any political ambitions of bureaucracy by providing a kind 
of systemic and cultural check on it. (86-87) 
     The importance of an efficient bureaucracy, free from politicization, is 
obvious for the civil society to participate in the legislative process from 
drafting stage. Also obvious are the impediments posed by a politicized and 
degraded bureaucracy.    
 
2.4. Political decision-making, policy-making and legislation 
     The complexity of decision-making process cannot be overstated. 
Ferguson and Mansbach (1988) depict a typically complex decision-making 
environment in which individual, group, institutional actors interact under 
the influence of factors such as personality, psychology, conflicting goals, 
hierarchical structures or dominant leaders. Individuals, seeking risk 
avoidance, may look for simple alternatives that are similar to those they 
have adopted in the past, under the pressure of time or in the face of 
perceived emergencies or uncertainties. There may be previous policy 
commitments or organisational interests. Ultimate decisionmakers may have 
specific interest, ego and/or charisma to impose his or her personal will. 
Individual leaders rarely have a complete freedom of action—or ‘decision’ 
for that matter. It is hard to distinguish idiosyncratic behaviour from that 
emanating from role or other influences. (153-55) 
     It is very difficult to precisely establish the relative influence of various 
actors in the overall policy-making process. “The actual process of choice 
may not be a clear, clean occurrence, but a gradual, incremental process that 
transpires over an extended period without anyone being able to say that ‘X’ 
made the decision” warn Hermann et al (1987). Ferguson and Mansbach 
(1988) describe ‘power to influence’ as an elusive blend of at least three 
elements: bargaining advantages—such things as formal authority and 
control over information, skills and will in using bargaining advantages, and 
true perception of other players’ understanding of the first two. (174-78) 
     Standard approaches to the study of decision-making—more or less 
similar to Stone’s models above—are based on three conceptual 
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frameworks. Classical approach is the rational actor model; political 
actors—humans pursuing carefully calculated self-interest—try to attain 
fixed ends by means of the policy they have chosen. In organisational 
process model, there are factors that limit rationality in decision-making 
such as the lack of information or the capacity to process it, and a tendency 
for satisficing strategies
30
. Governmental politics seeks to gradually change 
the old policy into a new one through small, incremental steps, while 
keeping every group that are taking part in the decision-making process 
reasonably ‘satisfied’. Therefore, there is a similarity in terms of the nature 
of policy outcomes between the two. In each process, either individual 
decisionmakers or large organisational groups—sometimes inter or intra-
agency coalitions within the bureaucracy—participate in give-and-take 
bargaining. A fourth approach focuses on group dynamics and uses a 
different unit of analysis: small group of decisionmakers.  
     Naturally, models are helpful tools that help us to understand and explain 
the decision-making processes. Whatever the general character of a system 
is, there is a set of authorities with the ability and power to commit 
resources with respect to a particular problem—ultimate decision unit. 
Hermann et al (1987) widely discuss the subject of what is “in reality […] 
may consist of multiple separate bodies rather than a single entity”. Ultimate 
decision unit may be a predominant leader, a single group or multiple 
autonomous groups. Hermann et al attempt to predict policy behaviour 
based on a table depicting the character of ultimate decision unit, control 
variables (contextual sensitivity, concurrence, relationship among groups) 
and alternative conditions (sensitive/insensitive, agreement/disagreement, 
zero-sum/none-zero-sum). (Fig. 2) 
     When influences of other parts of the political process are muted (a 
predominant leader who is insensitive, a single group that can reach prompt 
consensus, multiple autonomous groups that have a zero-sum relationship), 
the linkage between the ultimate decision unit and policy behaviour is more 
                                                          
30
 Satisficing strategy: strategy aiming to find a course of action that will satisfy the most 
minimal goals instead of seeking for the action with the best consequences. (Janis 1972: 6) 
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straightforward. For example, when the ultimate decision unit is an 
insensitive predominant leader, his or her personality, orientations, view of 
the world would shape the policy. Similarly, in a single group with 
consensus, the nature of decision would likely to be based on a shared set of 
beliefs or on that of a ‘natural’ leader in the group, effectively rendering the 
group a single ‘predominant leader’. When multiple autonomous groups—
with a zero-sum relationship, form the ultimate decision unit; deadlock, 
continuation of the status quo, appeals for more time, broad and vague 
policy declarations, minimal commitment—with potential reversals—are 
most likely outcomes. However, in case of a predominant leader—
insensitive to the immediate political environment, or a single group whose 
members disagree, or multiple autonomous groups who have a non-zero-
sum relationship, policy commitments on the part of the government are 
definite and firmer. (Hermann et al 1987: 311-33) 
 
Figure 2. 
A Typology of Policy-making 
(Hermann et al 1987: 312) 
DECISIONMAKERS        Perfectly rational             Imperfectly rational 
Single decisionmaker     1a.Complete 1b.Incomplete  2a.Complete 2b.Incomplete 
         info       info                  info              info  
 
Many decisionmakers,     3a.Complete 3b.Incomplete  4a.Complete 4b.Incomplete 
same goals           info       info                 info             info  
 
Many decisionmakers,     5a.Complete 5b.Incomplete  6a.Complete 6b.Incomplete 
conflicting goals           info       info                  info              info  
 
     Individuals in small policy-making groups, their official status and 
expertise and responsibilities notwithstanding, may behave more or less like 
any other citizen and ‘strive’ for unanimity rather than for finding the best 
courses of action. Janis (1972), among others, describes groupthink as 
“deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgement that 
results from in-group pressures” (9) and argues that “the more insulated a 
cohesive group of executives becomes, the greater are the chances that its 
policy decisions will be products of groupthink” (15). Perhaps the most 
 42 
important aspect here is the ‘moral’ one. Because it involves a moral 
dilemma—a conflict between humanitarian values and the utilitarian 
demands of politics—and refers to circumstances when “the most 
advantageous course of action requires the policymakers to violate their 
own standards of humanitarian behaviour”, Janis (1972: 206) explains.31 
     For the purposes of this research, the role of what Paul Sabatier (1988) 
calls “policy subsystems”—that is collections of people who in some way 
contribute to influencing policy in a particular area—is also important. 
Sabatier argues that, within such subsystems, “advocacy coalitions” emerge 
that comprise collections of individuals—researchers, academics, 
journalists—concerned with particular area of policy, sharing broadly 
similar beliefs and values, the ‘glue’ of politics. He proposes that policy 
change can largely be understood in terms of the shifting balance of forces 
within a policy subsystem, in particular through the dominance of one 
advocacy coalition over others. (qtd. in Heywood 1997: 385-86)  
     Problems of ‘public’ nature are solved by a state apparatus through 
established ways and mechanisms—policy-making and legislative 
processes. Decision-making, as a constant and iterative process involving 
cognitive, psychological, emotional, social and political interactions at each 
and every stage of both processes, should be considered as a separate 
phenomenon in the form of a series of occasions for decision-making, 
repeatedly taking place and supplementing the both. Therefore there are 
actually three processes taking place in a complementary, concurrent and 
sometimes sequential fashion.  
     Policy-making process, generally, takes place in stages: initiation, 
formulation, implementation, evaluation. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) offer a 
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 In terms of ‘informatics’ of the decision-making environment, Bendor and Hammond 
depict a typology of models of policymaking similar to that of Janis (1972) based on four 
basic assumptions: the number of actors (single decisionmaker or many decisionmakers), 
whether the multiple actors have the same or conflicting goals, the degree of rationality 
attributed to decisionmakers (perfectly rational or imperfectly rational) and the amount of 
information attributed to decisionmaker (complete information or incomplete information). 
(1992: 302-03) 
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more sophisticated model of policy process, each step having a key 
importance for the outcome: deciding to decide; deciding how to decide; 
issue definition; forecasting; setting objectives and priorities; options 
analysis; policy implementation, monitoring and control; evaluation and 
review; policy maintenance, succession or termination. (qtd. in Tansey 
2000: 226-27)  
     Policy initiation either from ‘above’ or ‘below’ sets the political agenda. 
Actually the cases of initiation by one ‘source’ are rare. Most of the time 
what is initiated is the outcome of interaction by several actors—political 
leaders, government agencies, public opinion, mass media, interest groups 
and civil society. What makes a political system more democratic is the 
degree of success in initiation by actors from below. Heywood (1997) 
argues that “democracy could be understood in this sense to imply that the 
political agenda is shaped from below rather than from above” (386). The 
law-making—legislative—process involves bargaining, competition, 
persuasion and compromise. But this interaction occurs after the agenda for 
policy-making has been established and the major directions of policy or 
policy changes have already been determined. The ‘decisions’—or 
contributions to decision-making—of those other than the major 
policymakers are not unimportant, but they are necessarily about the means 
rather than the ends of the ‘policy’. In this respect, for all practical purposes, 
it is sensible to see the functions performed and the authority used by (1) 
main policy-making actors, (2) those who contribute to it in an advisory 
capacity, such as bureaucracy, (3) other political actors, such as opposition 
parties and the parliament, and (4) all ‘others’, respectively, interconnected 
but still separate from each other. Civil society can become part of any one 
but the first group.  
     Policy formulation translates broad proposals into specific and detailed 
objectives, priorities and courses of actions and takes place in steps. What is 
essential here is to detect the authoritative decision unit which makes the 
final, decisive choice. In this sense, Heywood (1997) explains, ‘policy’ is 
better understood as the linkage between intentions, actions and results. At 
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the level of intentions, policy is reflected in the stance of government (what 
government says it will do). At the level of actions, policy is reflected in the 
behaviour of government (what government actually does). At the level of 
results, policy is reflected in the consequences of government action (the 
impact of government on the larger society). (382) 
     Policy formulation represents a process in which, traditionally, outside 
actors are involved or allowed to involve the least. Ironically this is the 
stage, objectively, involvement of others is most needed—but least desired 
by ‘insiders’, politicians, advisors, ‘key’ bureaucrats. Implementation is the 
crucial step to see if the policy serves its original aims. Evaluation and 
review of policy is an equally important step in the overall cycle because it 
may lead to changes to make the policies more effective or to decisions to 
terminate to avoid unwanted or unintended consequences of the policy. So 
in a sense, evaluation feeds back into initiation.  
     ‘Ignorance’ of the environment by groups or individual decision/policy-
makers represents a major flaw in any policy-making process. Kegley and 
Wittkopf (1996) portray the policymaking process as “what converts inputs 
into outputs, […] conceptually […] the intervening variable that links policy 
inputs to outputs”. They argue that it is complex because there are many 
participants, procedures involved and independent sources that shape [or 
supposed to shape] actors’ responses to situations demanding action. In 
addition to personal/idiosyncratic
32
 factors, they describe a series of ‘circles’ 
made up of roles defined by actors’ positions within institutions involved in 
policymaking, then more encompassing societal setting, and finally an even 
larger international environment within which individual decisionmakers 
operate, i.e. perform their policymaking roles. (16-30) In other words, there 
are individual, role, governmental, societal, external and systemic
33
 sources. 
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 In fact, in this context, personal/idiosyncratic features of an individual, taking part in any 
process, at any stage and in any capacity, is ‘external’ to him or her.  
33
 Kegley and Wittkopf distinguish between ‘systemic’ (general attributes of international 
environment) and ‘external’ (relationships between particular countries) sources of policy-
making. (1996: 30) 
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Governmental sources are what Rosenau (1980) describes as “those aspects 
of a government’s structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices 
made by decisionmakers” (qtd. in Kegley & Wittkopf 1996: 22). Societal 
sources are nongovernmental aspects of a political system.  
     Putnam’s (1988) “two-level game” concept is related to external and—
partly—systemic factors. Leaders can strategically use developments at one 
level—either national/domestic or international—to affect policy choices 
made at the other. (433-34) 
      
2.5. Civil society and ‘civic’ functions  
     “For democratic consolidation, it is important to stress not only the 
distinctiveness of civil society and political society, but also their 
complementarity” say Linz and Stepan (1996). The discourses and practices 
of the two should not be inimical to the development of each other, either 
implicitly or explicitly. In a sense, there is a practical, albeit tacit, division 
of ‘democratic’ labour between them. Civil society, provided that it has the 
capacity, generates political alternatives, monitors the government and the 
state, helps push democratic transition and consolidation. Political parties, 
on their part, aggregate and represent differences within the society. A 
“working consensus” between the two is a prerequisite for democratic 
development and it is the basis of concerted effort and mutually respected 
legitimacy. (6-15)   
     Therefore, there is a kind of umbilical cord connection, attaching two 
societies to each other, without which neither can really survive. Political 
society, by establishing and enforcing the rights of civil society renders 
legitimacy to it, and in return itself gains legitimacy.  
     Civil society can take many forms ranging from organised NGOs for 
public good and associations for member benefits, to faith-based 
organisations, pressure groups, charities, social movements, even 
individuals active in the so-called social media. Civil society empowers 
citizens to play a role in political decision-making and thus on the decisions 
that affect them. Walker and Thompson (2008) describe civil society as “a 
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veritable marketplace, but not of goods and services, [but] a marketplace of 
interests, ideas, and ideologies. Customers don’t trade with cash and shares, 
but with their support and their time […] and media coverage […]” (32).  
     Post and Rosenblum (2002) specify the three basic functions performed 
by the independent groups and associations of civil society as “to serve as a 
centre of collective political resistance against capricious and oppressive 
governments”, “to organize people for democratic participation” and 
“socialisation into the political values necessary for self-government” (17-
18). Therefore there is an inherent tension between the ‘government’ and 
civil society as they are conceptually exclusive, they explain. Likewise, 
Fukuyama (1996) refers to the same phenomenon: “civil society is the realm 
of spontaneously created social structure separate from the state that 
underlies democratic political institutions. These structures take shape even 
more slowly than political institutions. They are less manipulable by public 
policy and indeed often bear an inverse relationship to state power, growing 
stronger as the state recedes and vice versa” (321). Therefore the doubt 
voiced by Schneider (2004) has a sound basis and it is self explanatory: “It 
is not clear why state actors would want to create associations that can, in 
turn, constrain them, so government officials are probably poor candidates 
for crafting a dense civil society as counterweight to state power” (261).  
     This brings us to one of the main problems of developing democracies, 
as far as civil society and its role in the political system is concerned, that is 
the duality of civil and political societies and the inevitable tension which is 
further exacerbated by the (im)balance of political power between them:  
          [State] is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and  
     coercive system that attempts not only to manage the state apparatus, but  
     to structure relations between civil society and public power and to  
     structure many crucial relationships within civil and political society.   
     (Italics added) (Stepan 2001: 101) 
 
     Shortening the gulf between citizens and the decisionmakers means 
citizen ownership of politics and this is related to the debate on 
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‘participatory’ democracy and ‘representative’ democracy. Citizen-centred 
politics, addressing the problem of what Boyte (2004) calls “a tinned 
version of citizenship” (13) allows participation—beyond representation and 
periodic elections—and practically and actually connects people’s daily 
lives to arenas of policy. It is not owned by professional politicians only. 
This is probably the closest concept to the meaning of civil society as 
understood in this paper: citizen-politics, in any form of participation, both 
creating free spaces
34
 and being conducted in these spaces, everyday.  
     The concept of ‘free spaces’ has common origins with Habermas’ public 
sphere. It is part of what Habermas (1989; 1996) designates as ‘the life 
world’, that is the public sphere of civil society—outside the state and 
economy—and the private domestic sphere. Actors in these arenas, orient 
themselves in terms of communicative action, toward understanding each 
other rather than toward bringing about objective, impersonal results 
(instrumental action) or influencing other actors (strategic action)
35
. 
Habermas argues that the growth of societies and clubs in the Eighteenth 
Century provided spaces for the radical criticism of state practices by 
informed outsiders. But the complexity of contemporary societies has 
limited potential for democracy because the public sphere has degenerated 
due to overexpansion, blurring of the distinction between public and private 
and the growth of mass communication. 
     Civil society debate is closely related to a ‘culture’ debate which is 
largely dominated by the notion of ‘civic culture’ which has been introduced 
by Almond and Verba (1963; 1989) and contributed by Diamond (1999) 
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 For a discussion on ‘free spaces’ see; Evans and Boyte (1992: 182-203). “In the course of 
democratic movements, as a people move into action, they change. They discover in 
themselves and in their ways of life new democratic potentials. They find out new political 
facts about the world. They build networks and seek contacts with other groups of the 
powerless to forge a broader group identity. In turn, for such processes to occur, requires 
more than local, communal roots. Such spaces must also be relatively autonomous, free 
from elite control” (188).   
35
 For a discussion on ‘rational action’ and Habermas see; Johnson (1991) and Honneth and 
Joas (1991).  
 48 
among others “[…] participant role is fused with and balanced by the 
political subject role […] and the parochial role” (171). Therefore, 
democratic civic culture is “neither blindly trusting nor hostilely rejecting 
but inquisitive and sceptical” argues Diamond (1999: 206). However, trust 
is an important aspect of civic culture because it is a fundamental basis for 
cooperation. It transpires in two dimensions: interpersonal trust and political 
trust—trust in democratic institutions—which are interconnected. If elites 
and the mass do not trust one another, hence defect from compliance with 
the rules of the democratic game, politics will never be stabilized, 
institutionalisation will never take place and democracy will not be 
consolidated.
36
  
     The role of civil society in this respect is mainly related to the creation of 
social capital. However, Omar Encarnacion (2003), among others, 
challenges this view of civil society as “an infallible democratic miracle 
worker” and calls this view a “myth”. He further argues that “quite the 
contrary, a flourishing civil society can actually be a hindrance to 
democratisation, particularly if surrounded by weak and inefficient political 
institutions”. Poorly developed institutions37 would lead to the emergence of 
‘negative’ forms of social capital—e.g. mistrust and cynicism. (4-9) 
Cochrane (2005) also argues that “community cohesion, civic activism and 
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 Diamond (1999), emphasizing “strong linkage between culture and the institutional 
hollowness of democracy” describes this as “a central problem in Latin America today, 
where laws are hollow, courts are feeble, and delegative presidents run roughshod over the 
constitution. […] most people do not consider their fellow nationals to be honest, and huge 
majorities [more than 80% in Brazil] believe their fellow nationals obey the law little or not 
at all” (208).   
37
 For a discussion on Spain and Brazil as evidence of political institutions rather than civil 
society organisations, being the main source of social capital, see Encarnacion (2003). In 
Spain, “it was democratic commitment and competence displayed by public officials, the 
social and economic transformations engineered by state agencies, during the decades 
preceding the democratic transition that lifted […] a previously radical political culture 
[…]”. In Brazil, “unrestrained state control and violence, weak support for democracy from 
the masses, corruption and clientelism, a poor conception of citizenship and widespread 
social and economic inequities” prevented the consolidation of democracy. (10-13) 
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the desire for associational life that are the building blocks of civil society, 
can lead to uncivil as well as civil outcomes. We need to understand civil 
society for what it is, namely, a subjective reflection of communities’ values 
and not an intrinsic force for good” (61).  
     However, there is a social dilemma—connected to pre-existing 
democratic culture—involved here. In developed countries of the West, 
where democratic values and habits already internalized, both at the mass 
and elite level, ‘civicness’, where it is—in context—least needed, delivers 
the best results. It is in societies where antidemocratic culture predominates, 
civic culture is most—and urgently—needed, but does not exist.  
     However, in practice, the role and actual functions of civil society in 
general and civil society organisations in particular are conditioned upon 
their recognition—at least acknowledgement—as a legitimate ‘partner’ in 
the political game. This recognition is based on an assumed popular 
mandate which may take various forms: access to the media, access to those 
in positions of political power, an active support base etc. In what is 
generally referred to as ‘representative democracy’, giving the citizens the 
opportunity to vote every few years and delegate to ‘parliamentarians’ the 
absolute right to make political decisions binding for all across a spectrum 
of matters, until next elections is a concept of the time long past. It is the 
‘participatory’ concept of democracy that has given legitimacy to civil 
society and—through it—enabled citizens to participate also ‘between’ 
elections. The right—and assumed popular mandate—to participate, in turn, 
carries with it the responsibility to represent and be accountable. Of course, 
representativity is not simply—and only—a matter of having a 
‘constituency’ to talk on behalf of, but a matter of expertise. The issue of 
accountability is rather problematic, however also the most critical. In terms 
of the messages delivered by civil society organisations and by individuals 
active in civil society, they are expected to be honest, accurate, realistic, 
really serving the goals they claim. They have to get as close to the citizens 
as possible and open to public scrutiny through full transparency.  
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     The question of ‘legitimacy’ for civil society—based on representativity 
and accountability—is also linked with some other debates of democracy 
such as ‘radical’ democracy, ‘deliberative’ democracy and the ‘right to 
participate’—in a wider sense. Radical democracy38 is based on the concept 
that, in a democracy, there are no fixed certainties to depend, nor a final 
authority to settle contentious issues at hand. This ‘agonism’ or agnostic 
pluralism comes from multiple interpretations of the same ‘facts’ as they are 
perceived and it does not reject any possibility for reconciliation or 
compromise in advance. Rationalists, such as Benhabib (1996), argue that 
“without a final adjudication of the outcome of political struggle, it is 
impossible to be sure that it is good and just, rather than unjust, racist, fickle 
and capricious” (8). However, its proponents, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
among others, see the basic trust of radical democracy as avoiding the 
totalitarianism associated with claims to absolute truth and value. They see 
“the only way of safeguarding pluralism against totalitarianism” and also 
“the possibility of constructing a mere egalitarian and inclusive political 
community” in the radicalization of liberal democracy (186-88). 
     Deliberative democracy or discursive democracy is based on the 
principles of both consensus decision-making and majority rule as the 
primary sources of legitimacy. It requires citizen participation beyond mere 
elections. This participation may take the forms of face-to-face meetings, 
town hall meetings
39
, the use of social media and participation through civil 
society. There are also international efforts and networks, such as the Open 
Government Partnership
40, to encourage governments’ openness to and 
                                                          
38
 For a discussion on ‘radical democracy’ see; Little and Lloyd (2008). 
39
 One pioneering example of ‘town hall meetings’ is America Speaks. It aims to engage 
citizens and to bring them together to deliberate about decisions so that public officials 
make informed, lasting decisions. Town Hall Meetings enable facilitated discussion for 500 
to 5,000 participants each time. The conclusions from these meetings are then brought to 
the attention of decisionmakers. 19 April 2012. http://americaspeaks.org/.  
40
 The Open Government Partnership (OGP) is one of such global efforts to make 
governments more responsive to citizen engagement through collaboration between 
governments and civil society. It is overseen by a steering committee of governments and 
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support for ‘citizen participation’. There are others, International 
Association for Public Participation (IAP2)
41
, for example, with more 
ambitious aims and a greater inventory of participation modes.   
     As for the right to participate; Bignami (2003) uses ‘procedural rights’, 
‘participatory rights’, ‘process rights’ interchangeably and divides the 
process such rights came into existence, in the European Union, into three 
stages: 1. The right to fair hearing emerging in the 1970s—mainly driven 
by English and German conception of the value of a fair hearing. 2. The rise 
of transparency in the 1990s—led by countries with longstanding traditions 
of open government—the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden. 3. In the late 
1990s, the right to participation debate—whether and under what 
conditions, individuals, firms and their associations, i.e. civil society, should 
take part in legislative and administrative policymaking. “Yet, there is no 
consensus in Europe, where republican, corporatist and liberal traditions 
continue to flourish, on the legitimacy of representation outside of political 
parties and the electoral process” (3). She plausibly argues that 
transparency, while allowing for scrutiny of public decision-making, leaves 
influence to existing political and legal mechanisms. On the other hand, 
consultation involves a formal and routine sequence of objections from 
interested parties and reasons and justifications from decisionmakers.
42
 
                                                                                                                                                   
civil society organisations. The OGP was launched in 2011 by eight founding states: Brazil, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States. 
Since then, 47 additional governments have joined the Partnership, making the total 55. 
Civil society organisations and governments work together to lead, manage, and guide the 
ongoing development and direction of OGP. 19 April 2012. 
http://www.opengovpartnership.org. Turkey is a member of OGP Initiative since 20 
September 2011. For Turkey’s OGP Action Plan visit; 
http://www.opengovpartnership.org/countries/turkey. 
41
 International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) Spectrum for Public 
Participation include goals; to inform, consult, involve, collaborate, empower, through a 
variety of tecniques ranging from fact sheets—to inform, to citizen juries—to empower. 
See; IAP2 web-site. 04 November 2012. http://www.iap2.org/.    
42
 Bignami (2003) quotes the United Kingdom as the EU member state with the broadest 
consultation rights. As a general rule, government departments must allow ‘twelve weeks’ 
 52 
Therefore only representation withstands scrutiny from the perspective of 
civil society participation. (Bignami 2003: 19-20)
43
  
     The potential ‘civic’ role of civil society is not independent of the 
political context which defines the ‘nature’ of civil society. Rossteutscher 
(2005) defines a ‘civic’ community by “the number of voluntary 
associations plus the overlap between them, especially the overlap that is 
created by the network of interlocking directorates among them” (234). 
Civic communities are products of trust ‘between’ organisations. However, 
in societies which recently suffered what can be called cultural traumas
44
, 
this is very difficult if not impossible to achieve since in such fragmented 
societies, social trust will be higher within groups rather than between 
groups. Therefore, from the perspective of democratisation, the overall and 
essential nature of civil society in a given country may present a challenge. 
This is related to ‘individualist, voluntarist’ or so-called ‘communitarian’ 
                                                                                                                                                   
to comment, synthesize and summarize those comments for public consumption, and then 
to explain the policy choices ultimately made. However, these are just Cabinet Office 
guidelines, “they don’t create binding legal duities and they vest a significant amount of 
discretion concerning when and how consult administrators” (30). See; HM Government 
Code of Practice on Consultation. 04 November 2012. 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file47158.pdf. 
43
 In the draft constitution of the European Union, elections and parliaments are believed to 
guarantee the ‘principle of representative democracy’, whereas civil society politics are 
thought to guarantee the ‘principle of participatory democracy’. According to Bignami 
(2003) “this formulation associates elections and legislative bodies with passive citizenship 
and routinization of politics, and identifies interest group consultation with active citizen 
engagement and direct democracy” (31-32). See; the EU Constitution. 25 April 2005. Title 
VI: The Democratic Life of the Union. Art. I-46: ‘The principle of representative 
democracy’. Art. I-47: ‘The principle of participatory democracy’. 04 November 2012. 
http://en.euabc.com/upload/rfConstitution_en.pdf. Treaty of Lisbon, dated 13 December 
2007, which replaced the unratified draft treaty, contains similar provisions. See Title II, 
Art. 8, 8A, 8B. 05 November 2012.  
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0010:0041:EN:PDF  
44
 Sztompka (2000) describes the sources of cultural traumas as ‘changes’; (a) sudden and 
rapid, (b) radical, comprehensive and deep, (c) perceived as imposed, exogenous, (d) 
unexpected, unpredicted, shocking and repulsive. (452) 
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accounts of civil society which in turn ultimately related to the concept of 
personal autonomy. Post and Rosenblum (2002) describe this phenomenon 
as “the openness of groups and shifting involvements among them” versus 
“the capacity of groups to endow persons with stable and enduring 
identities” (5). In divided societies, group membership based on mutually 
exclusive identities and relationships of power and authority of tradition can 
be hostile to the idea of plural identities and multiple, overlapping 
memberships in civil society. Then, some social forces can be performing 
functions counter-productive for the development of a really ‘civil’ society. 
This is correlated with the dominant general culture and the political culture 
in any given country and involves moral and political questions. The fact 
that an organisation is neither of private nor ‘economic’ nature does not 
necessarily make it ‘civil’, it is what Korkut (2005) describes—in the 
context of newly flourishing Eastern European democracies—as ‘internal 
democracy’ that would enable civil society to act as a real force for 
democracy:  
          As long as civil society organisations are not internally democratic,  
     they cannot serve as schools of democracy for their members. Only  
     non-hierarchical, participatory, internally democratic civil groups can  
     instil virtues of democracy in their members. On the other hand elitist  
     behaviour and vertical bonds […] are prone to hamper […] potentials as  
     schools of democracy. In itself, a vertically organised civil society can be  
     an obstacle to democracy. (113-14) 
 
     In this context, ever since the Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations 
article appeared in 1993, whether liberal democracy is compatible with 
Islam as a religion, and particularly civil society’s role in ‘Islamic’ societies 
has been hotly debated. Although there are some contradicting views on 
that, the general tendency is the one finding Islam inhospitable to ‘civil’ 
society in the modern—i.e. Western—sense.  
     According to Kelsay (2002), “civil society organisations represent a 
stage in the development of people who can deal with those who are 
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different from themselves” (284). He argues that mediating institutions are 
important in preserving a “balance of power between those holding the reins 
of government and ordinary citizens”. However, while there are some 
common characteristics of the ‘civil’ discourse in Islamic and non-Islamic—
particularly Western—societies, “the emphasis of Muslims seems to be on 
the creation of a sphere of citizen liberty. By comparison, Europeans and 
North Americans seem focused on citizen participation in specific 
organisations” (Kelsay 2002: 285-86). This major difference between the 
two ‘civilisations’ can be traced back to the founding years of the Islamic 
society.  
     Islam introduced ‘Muslim as ‘the’ common identity above all other 
identities and loyalties. With this identity came an unchallengeable system 
of belief, government and socio-economic organisation based on Quran and 
hadith—reports of the example of the Prophet. A combined ‘prophetic’ 
authority—and the legitimacy it provides—that can only be exercised by a 
prophet, if applied to a contemporary political system, from a democratic 
perspective, does present some challenges.
45
 A president can be elected by 
popular vote—as in the Islamic Republic of Iran—run day-to-day affairs of 
the state, but he would always be under the supervision of ulama. There is 
room for discussion, consultation and participation, but it must have a 
‘moral’ component and, at the end of the day, those making policy decisions 
should consult sources of Islamic authority, i.e. ulama.
 46
  
     Kazemi (2002), likewise, argues that since much of the philosophy of 
Islam have premodern roots and basically underwent very little change, civil 
society—an essentially modern phenomenon—is difficult to accommodate. 
According to him, problematic aspects are mainly about how to ascertain 
the extent of civil society’s presence—a space separating the individual 
from the state—and its level of autonomy from the state—existence of 
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 For a discussion of government in Islam see; Ali abd al-Raziq’s book on Islam and Basis 
of Government; published in Cairo in 1925, excerpted in Kurzman (1998: 29-36).  
46
 For a discussion of the political system in the Islamic Republic of Iran see; Kelsay (2002: 
286-310). 
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autonomous institutions. The general preoccupation with order in Islam and 
overwhelming fear of chaos (fitna) makes such an unconditional acceptance 
difficult. (321) 
     Sunar (1997) talks about two models of ‘relations’ traditionally followed 
within the Islamic world: the ‘caliphal’ model where the circle between 
faith, power and society is kept intact, and the ‘imperial’ model where the 
link between faith and society only—not power—is kept. He gives Turkey 
as a modern case rejecting both models and “breaking the circle between 
faith, power and society” (15) but, by implication, he follows the same line 
of argument with Kelsay and Kazemi.  
     Thompson (2010), as already pointed out, discusses the same subject 
from the perspective of ‘rights discourse’. “Civil society cannot be seen 
inherently to be a mechanism for democratic change since other forms of 
social transformation could result, especially in the Islamic context. These 
could be more communitarian, more theocratic and less ‘modern’ forms of 
social and political life” (101) he argues. 47  
     Then, ‘religion’ would continue to act as a barrier to developing ethical 
autonomy as well as civil society.  
     Here, one aspect of the cultural debate which is of vital importance for an 
effective civil society is the culture of charity versus the culture of 
philanthropy. Philanthropy has a participatory and organisational 
dimension: it seeks to include those to be ‘served’ and makes them an 
integral part of the effort. The term charity is commonly used to refer to 
programmes that are designed to address immediate crises. It has a short-
term focus and, in principle, one-time. Philanthropy is more than just 
‘giving’ and in this sense makes a huge difference for civil society and for 
civic activity in general. McGann and Johnson (2005) argue that, especially 
in predominantly Muslim countries, despite significant income from energy 
resources “the traditional religious obligations require donations to the poor 
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 In this context, Islamic society does not necessarily mean an Islamic state—a political 
entity based on Sharia, rule by the Book-Koran—but a social phenomenon dominant in the 
society. 
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and needy, rather than institutions such as think tanks” (257). This situation 
suggests an incongruity between Islam as a cultural framework and 
philanthropic culture, however, this does not necessarily mean that such an 
incompatibility exists in Islamic societies only.
48
  
     Think-tanks are part of the civil society and serve as an important 
catalyst for producing ideas and mobilising actions. McGann and Johnson 
(2005) describe the role of think-tanks as essentially seeking to “bridge the 
gap between knowledge and power”, linking the “two roles, that of 
policymakers and academic, by conducting in-depth analysis” (11-13). They 
identify, articulate and evaluate “current or emerging issues, problems or 
proposals, transforming ideas and problems into policy issues, serving as an 
informed and independent voice in policy debates, providing a constructive 
forum for the exchange of ideas and information between key stakeholders 
in the policy formulation process” ((McGann & Weaver 2009: 2-3). Think-
tanks target three groups, to engage and influence: policymakers, the press 
and the public. However, the key to their ‘success’ is their ability to 
overcome the resistance exercised by centralised decision-making systems, 
and to have points of access.  
     For McGann and Johnson (2005), “the viability of think-tanks is a 
critical indicator of the health of the civil society in a country. If the space 
for think-tanks to operate in a country does not exist or if it is severely 
constrained then this suggests that all non-governmental organisations are 
threatened”. They are critical because if the ‘state’ remains the sole provider 
of information and analysis, regarding the problems faced by policymakers 
and the public, the society as a whole is deprived of open, dynamic and 
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 Johnson (2009) maintains that “Arab states seem to place a stronger emphasis on charity 
than philanthropy. In one sense, this is a cultural and religious issue. […] there appears to 
be limited financial support for civil society organisations that are not directed to the 
interests of either lslam or charity” (348-52). Kimball (2009) argues in similar lines for the 
former communist societies of Eastern Europe: “Since a ‘culture of giving’ has not 
developed in the region, the general population cannot be relied upon for support. […] a 
tradition of corporate philanthropy has not been established. […] Almost all of the funding 
for these organisations originates in Western Europe or the US” (268-70). 
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democratic means of addressing such problems which can only be provided 
by think-tanks, they argue. However, in order to be able to do this, i.e. 
becoming both credible and effective, think-tanks would need to “have the 
freedom to voice policy opinions that may be in conflict with those of the 
ruling power. This is the challenge and paradox for all think-tanks” they 
stress, because think-tanks “must operate within the very environment they 
seek to change”. (256) Therefore, think-tank activity is the litmus test for 
determining the basic nature of a political environment in a country and its 
both openness and permissiveness to civil society input, in other words, if 
the political freedom to criticise and express dissent does exist.
49
 
     After all, think-tanks disseminate the results of their analysis in order to 
‘educate’ the public and inform policy debate, in other words they make 
their views available for use and to benefit from. But unless there is a real 
and strong demand for their services, only supplying these services does not 
result in much change. If the well-known economic laws of supply and 
demand are applied, when demand remains unchanged and supply increases, 
this situation leads to a lower price, i.e. lower value.  
     Freres et al (2009) offer a comprehensive discussion of the ‘think-tank’ 
environment in Spain and Portugal which is salient for this research. Their 
primary activity—rather than engaging in providing policy advice, 
evaluating government programmes or interpreting policies—is doing ‘basic 
research’. They do publicise their work and make an effort to achieve 
certain goals, but not in an aggressive manner based on comprehensive, 
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 The Think Tanks, Politics and Public Policy Project, launched by Jim McGann in 2001, 
was designed to provide factual and objective information about the state of independent 
policy advice in individual countries while establishing a framework for cross-national 
comparison. Twenty countries (Turkey was not included) were analysed using 13 
indicators: political freedom, political system, number of years as a democracy, number and 
strength of political parties, freedom of the press, economic freedom, gross domestic 
product per capita, population, number and independence of public and private universities, 
philanthropic culture, public sector demand for independent policy analysis, level of global 
integration and nature of civil society. Study found ‘foreign donor assistance’ having a 
decisive impact on think-tanks. (McGann & Johnson 2005: 1-3) 
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multifaceted strategies. Their rather elite and bureaucracy-centred policy-
making processes offer very little—if any—space for think-tanks. 
Parliaments are places where the parties can only ‘discuss’ government 
proposals, with limited control functions, hence they hardly offer a channel 
through which think-tanks could exert an influence. (200-201)
50
 They link 
this overall situation to the dominant political culture: 
          […] limited role think-tanks seem to have played in the policy  
     process in both Iberian countries. […] civil societies are relatively  
     underdeveloped in comparison with other parts of Western Europe. This  
     was mostly due to the lack of a democratic space during the long  
     dictatorships, but, to a certain extent, it predates these regimes, and forms  
     part of their broader political cultures which are termed, by Montero and  
     Torcal (1993), as ‘political passivity’. (190)  
 
     Collapse of the Berlin Wall was important for several reasons. Although 
the collapse occurred suddenly and unexpectedly, it was the result—rather 
than cause—of a series of events and developments long unfolding but went 
largely unnoticed. It not only reflected changes in politics, economy, 
international relations and social reality but also signalled more and 
fundamental changes to follow. One of them was citizen-centred politics 
which was emerging around the world. Emergence of a global civil society 
was accompanied by various social, political, intellectual and sometimes 
ideological developments, movements—and ideas—in and across societies 
and polities, such as everyday politics, cosmopolitan democracy etc.  
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 For a similar discussion on Central and Eastern European countries see; Kimball (2009). 
“[…] few talented policy analysts with a firm understanding of the needs of a democratic, 
capitalist system were waiting to direct the countries down the proper road of reforms […] 
at the exact moment when policy input was most needed, policymakers were least skilled. 
In order to fill this void, Western experts were brought in, to provide advice or how best to 
reform the economies and design the necesssary pillars of a democratic system” (251-52). 
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     David Held’s theory of cosmopolitan democracy51 attempts to develop a 
sociological understanding of the potential for democratisation of political 
institutions beyond the nation-state. In this model, nation-state is not 
ignored or by-passed, it is simply considered one political player among 
others, sharing sovereignty even within its own borders. According to 
Walker and Thompson (2008) there were “increasingly evident flaws in the 
traditional institutions of democracy”. They argue that “paradoxically, just 
as formal democracy has spread into new areas of the globe for the first 
time, substantive democracy—the ability to participate in decisions 
affecting everyday life—has been eroded by this loss of autonomy of 
nation-states”. 52 They offer ‘global civil society’ as the answer to address 
the flaws of globalisation, “if it can be properly used as a tool […] [to] 
encourage, if not impose, democratisation from outside”. Why such 
“shifting informal and opportunistic alliances of governments and non-state 
actors around specific policy issues”—what they call “civilizing global 
governance”—should not work for democratisation, they question. (32) 
Actually, although some governments clearly resist the idea, this was what 
also the ‘Cardoso’ Panel concluded. It states that constructive and strategic 
engagement with civil society is a vital defence against the challenges the 
UN itself faces today.
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     This brings us to what Risse-Kappen (1994) addresses in his Ideas do not 
Float Freely article, that is how to overcome the domestic cultural, mental 
and political resistance—to change:  
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 See; Archibugi and Held (1995), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World 
Order.  
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 Walker and Thompson (2008) describe the ‘five democratic deficits’about which global 
civil society can help to expose and potentially to remedy as: the ideological deficit, the 
deficit of integrity, the deficit of representation, the deficiency of reach and the deficiency 
of sovereignty (32). The last two are particularly relevant for the subject of this study. 
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 Final Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on UN–Civil Society Relations, 07 June 
2004. The Panel was chaired by Fernando Henrique Cardoso—former President of Brazil—
and included representatives from Iran, Spain, Sweden, the United States of America, 
Hungary, Colombia, India, South Africa, Philippines, Mozambique and Mali.  
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          The transnational promoters of […] policy change must align with  
     domestic coalitions […] to make an impact. […] access to the political  
     system as well as the ability to build winning coalitions are determined  
     by the domestic structure of the target state, that is, the nature of its  
     political institutions, state-society relations and the values and norms  
     embedded in its political culture” ( Italics added). (187) 
 
     However, “ideas do not float freely”. The strategic prescriptions offered 
by transnational actors need to be compatible with the worldviews 
embedded in the political culture, and the approaches adopted should 
integrate domestic politics, transnational relations
54
 and the role of ideas
55
. 
State-controlled domestic structures, as in Turkey, encompass highly 
centralized political institutions with strong executive governments and a 
rather weak level of societal organisation. Then, civil society is too weak to 
balance the power of the state and access is most difficult. But, once 
accessed, policy impact might be profound. 
 
2.6. Exerting influence 
     A broad range of tactics, political strategies and very diverse methods are 
employed by the civil society to influence decisionmakers, government, 
parliament, either directly or indirectly. Heywood (1997) explains that the 
methods available and the political strategy to be applied, vary according to 
a number of factors: “the issue with which the group is concerned”, “how 
policy in that area is shaped”, “nature of the group”, “resources at its 
disposal” (262-63). The channels of access through which influence will be 
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 Transnational relations are regular interactions across national boundaries when at least 
one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an 
intergovernmental organisation. (Risse-Kappen 1995: 3). 
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 Appadurai proposes a theory of ‘scapes’ based on five dimensions of global cultural 
flow; ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes. He descries 
‘scapes’, extending Benedict Anderson (1983)’s ‘Imagined worlds’, as “the landscape of 
persons who constitute the shifting worlds in which we live” (1990: 296-7). Mediascape 
and ideoscape are built on the former three. 
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exerted also play a role in choosing the best method. Indirect methods target 
mass media, public opinion, political parties, and may take the form of 
‘campaigns’—petitions, protests, demonstrations56.  
     It is common knowledge that there are major differences between a 
troubled democracy and a consolidated one. One critical indication of a 
consolidated, well-functioning democracy is an autonomous, pluralistic 
mass media, really independent in its editorial orientation. Media makes a 
major difference both by selecting and prioritizing the information available 
to the public, by interpreting it, by setting the political agenda. Informed 
public, hence informed debate—for all practical purposes—is the product of 
an independent and effective mass media. It plays a vital role in election 
campaigns and in political mobilisation by civil society.  
     For think-tanks, media appearances by their ‘experts’ discussing issues 
on televisions or in print offer the best way to influence the mass public. 
This can only be done by relying on contacts within media outlets. 
However, Kimball (2009) warns that “there is […] a large difference 
between making media appearances and making ‘meaningful’ media 
appearances. Many organisations take any opportunity to appear in the 
media, often discussing issues in which they lack solid expertise, providing 
general rather than concrete analysis” (268) which can become extremely 
counter-productive and discrediting for the organisations. 
     One another important asset, perhaps more important than the media 
exposure, is the ability to influence ‘policymakers’ privately—and directly, 
bypassing some ‘niceties’ of democracy. Political ‘decisionmakers’ include 
bureaucracy, government and the parliament—not necessarily in that order. 
The key institution—ultimate decision unit—in the process of policy 
formulation and legislation varies not only from country to country but also 
from subject to subject and the main effort of the civil society should centre 
on this key ‘institution’. 
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 According to Heywood (1997), demonstrations may take the forms of civil disobedience 
and “even the tactical use of violence”. (262-64) 
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     Direct methods may take various forms. In countries such as the United 
States, where think-tanks traditionally occupy a privileged place in politics, 
individual scholars or policy experts regularly circulate between the 
government/executive posts, Congress and think-tanks, providing a constant 
and intimate, hence effective link. This link, with connections to the media, 
takes the form of a powerful network. Networking in these countries is an 
accepted and routinized fact of ‘political’ life.57 The ‘consultative’ process 
is informal, away from public scrutiny, rarely—if ever—publicised, yet it is 
institutionalised. But, most political ‘systems’, particularly those in 
developing countries, consider civil society’s claim to a role in policy 
formulation as a ‘threat’, an attempt for sharing political power. In such 
countries, like Turkey, the environment may not be too favourable for the 
civil society as a whole and participation in policy-making and legislation in 
general is a major challenge. Some modest access to individual 
policymakers and some discernible influence on the public opinion is an 
uphill battle for think-tanks with scarce resources. There is a compelling 
need for innovative, original means and methods.
58
  
     In political systems where civil society has real political power, exerting 
influence through the parliament is called lobbying. The independence of 
the ‘legislature’, in turn, depends on the role it plays within the overall 
political system, its power in influencing policy and the party system itself. 
For example, unlike the Turkish Parliament, the US Congress’ constitutional 
independence, unique party system and powerful parliamentary committees 
allow much space for lobbying.  
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 Policy networks are communities of policy actors that criss-cross the public and private 
sectors. It is a “systematic set of relationships between political actors who share a common 
interest or general orientation in a particular area”. A policy network may embrace 
government officials, key legislators, lobbyists, academics, journalists and others. 
(Heywood 1997: 385-86) 
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 Johnson (2009) suggests that “one of the most powerful and successful tools some think-
tanks in the Middle East and North Africa have used to raise awareness and build 
consensus around policy issues is the opinion poll” (357). 
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     Similarly, global civil society and transnational actors are also faced with 
particular challenges in getting access to decision-making structures. Risse-
Kappen (1994) explains that in order to influence policies, transnational 
actors first need channels into the political system and then, domestic 
partners. Otherwise ideas promoted by transnational alliances or epistemic 
communities would not really matter. The differences in domestic 
structures
59
 account for, to a large extent, the variation in policy impact. For 
instance, in state-controlled structures—as in the former Soviet Union—
transnational actors needed to gain access to the very top of the 
decisionmaking hierarchy to have an impact. It is more or less the same 
today for semi-democratic, i.e. less than consolidated, political systems. 
Access to society-dominated structures—as in the United States—is 
comparatively easy. On the other hand, building winning coalitions for 
gaining influence in domestic politics demands considerable effort, skill and 
perseverance. As to the German system, what Risse-Kappen calls 
“democratic corporatist” structure, “access to political institutions is more 
difficult than in the US case, but strong policy networks, such as the party 
system, ensure profound influence once access is achieved” (187). Of 
course, having access does not necessarily mean having an influence all the 
time, on each and every subject.  
     International institutions are then expected to facilitate access to national 
policy-making processes for of transnational actors. But this ‘facilitator’ 
role is a function of cooperative and institutionalised interstate relationships, 
such as the EU accession process of Turkey and associated acquis 
communautaire of the EU, for instance. According to Risse-Kappen (1995), 
“international institutions [are] […] intervening variables between 
transnational activities and state policies in an analogous way as domestic 
structures” (30). They legitimize not only transnational activities but also 
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 “Domestic structures encompass the organisational apparatus of political and societal 
institutions, their routines, the decision-making rules and procedures as incorporated in 
laws and customs, as well as the values and norms prescribing appropriate behavior 
embedded in the political culture” (Risse-Kappen 1994: 208-09). 
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the demands of civil society ‘coalitions’. Also, institutionalised inter-state 
relations help ‘foreign’ members of coalitions seen less as foreigners. 
     As already discussed, dominant political culture in a given country is 
inherited from the past and represents the outcome of a struggle between the 
old cultural norms and habits and the newly introduced ones. Each cluster of 
values are associated with various groups of people and they define, even 
determine, their identities in a complex way. To make the ‘phenomenon’ 
much more complicated, these ‘identities’, in other words ‘attitudes’, largely 
decide the behaviour of the individuals and they overlap to varying degrees. 
These ‘individuals’ are those who serve in the bureaucracy, political parties, 
governments, parliaments and civil society organisations. Basically, the 
outcome of the complex and complicated interaction between these agents 
and actors decides the mental, intellectual and cultural parameters of civil 
society’s intervention in policy-making and legislative processes, 
constraining the possibilities for ‘participation’ and effective ‘pluralism’. 
     Cultural transformation is never absolute and rapid. It is uneven, takes 
place at different levels and layers, at different paces, and it is nonlinear in 
nature. Some cultural elements are favourable for democratic development, 
some are not. Some undemocratic elements may suppress those of 
favourable nature. The key is whether cultural features such as moderation, 
tolerance, accommodation, cooperation, bargaining, pragmatism, 
proceduralism, social trust are gaining ground or are still resisted by the 
majority. Yet, cultures are dynamic and the dominant beliefs and attitudes in 
a society do change.  
     As Almond (1990) posits; “[…] causality works both ways, that attitudes 
influence structure and behaviour and that structure and performance in turn 
influence attitudes. […] Deeper value and normative commitments […] 
change only in response to profound historical experiences and institutional 
changes” (144-47). However, without conscious change, periodic reform 
and renewal, political systems may become corrupt and unresponsive to the 
needs and demands of the people. Then, Diamond (1999) argues:  
          Democracy not only may lose its quality, it may even effectively  
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     disappear, not merely through the breakdown of formal institutions but  
     also through the more insidious processes of decay.  This insidious decay   
     [the progressive hollowing out of electoral democracy] is one of several  
     striking features of the latter period of the third wave that have been  
     inadequately appreciated. […] In much of the post-communist and  
     developing worlds, democracy appears stuck in a twilight zone of  
     tentative commitment, illiberal practices and shallow institutionalisation.   
     (19-20).  
      
     The causal connection between ‘civic’ work of voluntary associations 
and democratic governance is not as simple as it first appears. “The 
democratic process is by no means blocked if a substantial number of 
people do not share democratic values, as long as they do not refuse to live 
according to its procedures” (Rossteutscher 2005: 224). But, what if, they—
particularly those in the decision-making positions—are not prepared to 
accept and live according to these procedures and the ‘insidious decay’ 
settles in? Because of the complex conditionality involved in this 
correlation, the causal direction of an imagined path from civil society to a 
healthy democracy does not look certain.  
 
2.7. Summary of theoretical perspectives 
     The political decision-making model adopted in this work has been 
partly inspired by the input-output analysis concept, suggested earlier by 
Frankel (1959) and Rosenau (1969) and, further developed by Brecher et al 
(1969). It is composed of: 1. an environment or setting, 2. a group of actors, 
3. structures through which they initiate decisions and respond to 
challenges, 4. processes which sustain or alter the flow of demands and 
products of the system as a whole.  
     M. G. Hermann (2001) reformulates a similar approach—decision units 
approach—composed of inputs, decision unit dynamics, and outputs. In this, 
decision-making involves responding to a policy problem and occasion for 
decision, focuses on decision units and key factors that set into motion 
alternative decision processes, leading to particular policy outcomes. 
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Decision unit responds to stimuli from the domestic or international 
environment, or both at the same time. Policymakers have goals and 
objectives, hence agendas and plans. A problem, for the policymaker, is “a 
perceived discrepancy between present conditions and what is desired. 
Problems represent either a difficulty or potential opportunity. Occasions 
are decision points when there is a felt need by those involved to make a 
decision to cope with the problem” (66-75). 
     This research adopts this approach—as adjusted to the requirements and 
dynamics of domestic politics, combined with processes of law-drafting and 
legislation, with a view to see the role and influence of civil society 
participation in respective mechanisms. It is based on a political decision-
making framework of demands on policy—or inputs, and products of 
policy—or outputs. It particularly utilizes Rosenau’s five-group factors 
having an influence on policy decision-making: idiosyncratic, role, 
governmental, systemic, societal, in other words, ‘operational’ and 
‘psychological’ environments, as termed by Frankel (1959). There is a 
multitude of complex, multidimensional, multidirectional interactions 
between them all. Civil society—and inputs from it—is just one and it is 
highly difficult to isolate any single one of them and study as such.  
     Decisions—policy outputs—also feed back into the system as inputs, 
therefore it is a circular, somewhat cyclical and continual process. 
Decisionmakers—and their advisors—receive information from elites and 
interest groups with competing—or corresponding—views/aims, in the 
external (i.e. global, international, bilateral) and domestic operational 
environment, process this information in their psychological environment
60
. 
One critical attribute of policy behaviour is the degree to which the decision 
involves an initiative or a reaction to something in the domestic or 
international arena. 
     I pursue “multicausal explanations spanning multiple levels of analysis, 
[…] viewing the process of […] decision-making as a subject of equal 
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 Psychological environment: attidudinal prism, psychological dispositions based in 
societal and personality factors; elite images, perception of reality by individual elites. 
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importance to the output”, as suggested by Hudson and Vore (1995: 222). 
Different individual influences interact within and across levels of 
analysis—international, domestic, organisational and individual levels—
across a range of interaction patterns running from conformity to conflict. It 
distinguishes between ‘systemic’ (general attributes of the policy-making 
environment) and ‘external’ sources of policy decisions. The political 
decision-making process—and the two other connected processes which run 
simultaneously—are taken as complex and as constrained by many actors 
and the environment:  
          […] individual decisionmakers are constrained by their  
     policymaking roles, roles defined by their positions within […]  
     policymaking institutions. Those governmental variables are cast within  
     its more encompassing societal setting, which in turn operates within an  
     even larger international environment, comprising other nations, non- 
     state actors and global trends and issues […]” (italics added). (Kegley &  
     Wittkopf 1996: 16) 
 
     Civil society organisations, as actors—along with political parties, 
interest groups and external actors—would communicate information about 
the environment to decision-making elite and advocate, i.e. articulate and 
aggregate, policies to those who wield authority in the political decision-
making system. As indicated earlier, this thesis takes into account mainly—
but not exclusively—civil society organisations with clearly delineated 
democratisation programmes and/or projects, which either participate and/or 
involve in political decision-making and legislative processes, in issue-areas 
directly related to democratisation in Turkey. Such organisations, while 
explicitly promoting democracy, they also promote the role of civil society 
at the same time. Their influence would depend on their relative strength 
(real, potential or perceived) and the dispositions of elites (psychological 
environment) taking part in decision-making and legislative processes, as 
well as other factors. Here comes into equation the EU process and the 
zeitgeist—the spirit of the time, against the background of historic 
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developments taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, in Asia—with 
diverging successes, and recently in the Middle East and North Africa, 
which, altogether, can perhaps rightly be called the fourth wave of 
democratisation. The distinction between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
factors is certainly rather blurred.  
     Of course not all actors, interactions and factors are equally important for 
all types of decisions responding demands, for all decisions, addressing to 
all requirements, in all issue-areas and under all circumstances. I aim to find 
out the relative importance—in other words, the power—of ‘civil society’ as 
an actor, or the relative importance of its inputs, or as a factor, vis-a-vis 
other actors/factors in decisions directly or indirectly related to 
‘democratisation’ in Turkey.  
     It is difficult to determine the nature of the authoritative decision unit for 
‘each’ occasion for a decision—even more so, if and when it is not a final 
decision—in the chain of successive and partially parallel-running steps 
through the processes of decision-making and law-making—legislation. A 
decision unit may be ‘open’ or ‘closed’ to the pressures of its environment 
with respect to the nature of an issue-area. Each set of conditions—
parameters and constants—would result in a particular type of process 
outcome (certain ‘positions’ that have counted in the ‘final’ decision at each 
stage) and substantive outcome (actual policy ‘actions’ taken). Decision 
units with principled (contextually less sensitive) predominant leaders, 
single groups with strong internal loyalties and coalitions with poorly 
established decision rules would have internal dynamics that override 
external pressures. At the final stage, in case of laws, passed by the 
Parliament, the process outcome would be determined by the relative power 
of the governing party, i.e. the Government vis-a-vis others—including civil 
society, and the  substantive outcome, would be reflected on the actual 
policy actions taken by the government. Although I will primarily be 
focusing on the process outcome, in a particular context, substantive 
outcome would also be of concern for the purposes of the research.  
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2.8. Measuring influence and the research process 
     Several individuals and organisations participate in policy-making and 
legislative processes, at different stages, leading to policy outcomes. They 
exert influence through various channels, directly or indirectly. The policy 
‘matter’, first articulated by any one ‘player’ or proposed by any one civil 
society organisation, may take a completely different shape along the long 
and most of the time an arduous process and the outcome may not even look 
like what was originally intended. It may also take some time even before 
an ‘idea’ makes a political agenda item.  
     It should not be assumed that the most visible civil society organisations 
are the most influential ones in the political decision-making and legislative 
processes. Their relevance varies at different stages of the policy cycle: 
some are more active and effective in shaping the initial agenda, some 
others in contributing to policy development at later stages. This is largely 
determined by their financial resources, the number and quality of their 
staff, their connections to policymakers—advisors and key bureaucrats as 
well as politicians—their access to media, hence their ability to reach 
multiple audiences.  
     The major premise of this research related to measurement is that; none 
of the indicators can provide definitive data on the amount of exposure civil 
society generates and how much influence they actually have in shaping 
public opinion—indirect influence on policy process—and the preferences 
and choices of policymakers—direct influence—and eventually on the 
policy outcomes. In this respect, it benefits from Abelson (2009), Abelson 
and Lindquist (2009), and McGann and Weaver (2009).  
     Unless policymakers themselves express that their decisions were based 
on recommendations from particular organisations, it is difficult to 
determine the degree of such an influence, even if it does exist. On the other 
hand, since completely isolating the views of certain civil society 
organisations from many other individuals and organisations that actively 
seek a role and an influence on public policy is very difficult, it is virtually 
impossible to assign a numerical value to the amount of influence they 
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wield. Examining the organisations that focus on particular policy issues—
security sector and judicial reforms, selected for this research—is a useful 
point of departure for studying the interaction. For assessing their 
effectiveness, this focus would include their strategic goals, areas of 
expertise, audiences they target and the time frame in which they hope to 
achieve a policy influence. Since the political system constrains or 
facilitates access to policymakers and relevant processes, the nature and 
dynamics of it are also of utmost importance. 
     It may also be more appropriate to discuss the “relevance of think-tanks 
in the policy-making process than to speculate about how much policy 
influence they wield. In other words, […] if, when, and under what 
conditions they [could] have contributed to specific public policy 
discussions and to the broader policy-making environment”. (Abelson 2009: 
170-71) Abelson (2009) also suggests that; “scholars should also pay more 
attention to what policymakers think about contributions think-tanks have 
made at different stages of the policy making process. […] either through 
interviews with or through surveys distributed to policymakers throughout 
government” (179). This research does the former with satisfactory results. 
The latter—as it has turned out—if attempted, would have been faced with 
and crippled by significant practical obstacles.  
     My unit of analysis
61
 is ‘participation of the civil society in the policy-
making process’, a social artefact, with a view to, first describing and then 
explaining its influence on the policy outcomes. I examined the political 
decision-making, policy formulation, law-drafting, law-making/legislative 
processes and the participation of civil society at each step of these 
intermingled series of interactions of policy-making actors. At each step, the 
research necessarily attempted to focus on the composition and actions of 
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 The unit of analysis is clearest in the case of nomothetic, quantitative studies, but not so 
in qualitative research. It can be a group, a formal organization or a social artifact. Social 
artifacts are the products of social beings or their behavior. Social interactions form a class 
of social artifacts. Each social artifact implies a population of all such ‘objects’—in the case 
of social interactions, a cluster of them. (Babbie 2009: 101-09)  
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the group, the dynamics involved and the role and influence of ‘civil 
society’ in relation to the ultimate decision unit in that specific context.  
     The data required for process tracing is necessarily and overwhelmingly 
qualitative in nature. The main method for data collection used to answer 
research questions and operationalise variables was ‘intensive interview’. 
The data was mainly collected from the individuals involved in the 
processes under investigation, in various capacities, at each level, and then 
was aggregated to explain, generalise and characterise. For selecting 
interviewees, a combination of various approaches to sampling proved to be 
the optimal method. Therefore non-probability sampling methods—actually 
a combination of purposive sampling and chain-referral or snowball 
sampling—were utilized, based, secondarily, on ‘reputational’, ‘expertise’ 
and ‘availability’ criteria, focusing on individuals who were active and 
willing to talk and reflect. Also they were to be representative of a range of 
points of view—political, intellectual, institutional, cultural—in terms of 
their professional qualifications, experience, political and organisational 
affiliation and seniority.  
     Data collection spread over a period from September 2011 to December 
2012 and developed in stages. The first stage covered primarily the four 
originally selected civil society organisations; TESEV, TÜSIAD, Heinrich 
Böll Stiftung-Turkey and CESS, i.e. their senior staff. Then, as a probe, a 
mixed group of individuals, who were thought to be fairly representative of 
the decision-making and legislative spectra as well as the judiciary, were 
interviewed. These included former MPs, former judges (some of whom 
served at the Supreme Court), selected advisors to MPs, senior staff who 
served in Prime Minister’s Office in the past, senior staff from central 
organisations of political parties—with primary responsibility for civil 
society, National Security Council staff and senior Parliamentary staff. This 
list, based on the interview results snowballed and also some other 
individuals were cherry-picked as necessary, gradually expanding the 
emerging mental picture of the research domain, facilitating a properly 
focused research.   
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     These initial stages were followed by a series of steps tracing the 
processes of political decision-making and legislation: relevant ministries, 
prime minister’s office/cabinet, political parties—party headquarters, 
parliamentary/committee staffers and advisors to MPs, individual 
MPs/members of the Parliamentary committees, leadership cadre of the 
political parties. Those who were from the ministries included civil-military 
bureaucracy—active and retired, particularly from the Ministry of Justice 
and the Ministry of National Defence, the General Secretariat for the 
National Security Council, as well as the Turkish Armed Forces. The 
process at the Prime Minister’s Office/Cabinet level was traced through 
mainly retired senior bureaucrats and former ministers. Staffers and MPs 
who participated in this research were mainly—but not exclusively—from 
the Committee on the Constitution, Justice Committee, National Defence 
Committee, EU Harmonization Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee 
as well as senior posts in the General Secretariat of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly. Other individuals involved in other parliamentary 
committees were also consulted for getting a better grasp of the context.   
     In addition to the above listed range of primary group of interviewees, 
others from various civil society organisations (not necessarily explicitly 
working in the area of democratisation), foreign/transnational civil society 
organisations that are active in supporting civil society in Turkey, offices of 
international organisations and resident foreign embassies/consulates 
(providing financial, technical and/or political support to civil society in 
Turkey) were consulted.   
     The selection and pursuit of interviewees, at each stratum, continued 
until the saturation point, in other words, until I started receiving the same 
or very similar inputs. An approximate total of some seventy individuals 
were interviewed in this research. These include eight senior staff in civil 
society organisations, twelve senior bureaucrats (judges, military, TGNA), 
twelve advisors to MPs and experts at Parliamentary Committees, four 
senior staff in political parties, twelve MPs, five senior staff at Prime 
Minister’s Office and five senior staff in foreign entities that are resident in 
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Turkey. Some of them were revisited either for purposes of clarification and 
confirmation or for cross-checking some interim or provisional results.  
     Also some focus group discussions—involving a range of individuals 
from staffers to MPs—were organised to discuss some certain issues or 
particular aspects of the research subject which were common to more than 
one interviewee. These were mainly eight; four with small groups of staffers 
currently working in the TGNA, two with former MPs, one with former 
Supreme Court judges and one with the military serving in NSC Staff.
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Such group discussions proved extremely useful because they gave the 
participants the opportunity to put their own views and perceptions to test, 
complement other’s views, and eventually corroborate. However, while 
focus groups generally created a sense of confidence and encouraged free 
expression of facts and views thereby substantially improving both the 
reliability and validity of the research, they also suffered from an inherent 
risk—mental and/or psychological withdrawal, some participants ceasing 
cooperation or applying self-censorship (as one can guess, particularly in 
discussions with TGNA staff). Perhaps, given the current state of extreme 
political polarisation in all walks of life in Turkey, this was an inevitable 
trap due to exposure to others. Fortunately, the effect of this situation on the 
openness and honesty of the participants was negligible, thanks to 
‘participatory’ approach, explained below at the end of this section.     
     Intensive interviews were based on semi-structured and/or open-ended 
questions
63, and “active interpretation” (Rudestam & Newton 1992: 34) 
fusing the perspective of the phenomena and that of the interpreter. I aspired 
to hear what interviewees “[had] to say in their own words” and see the 
phenomenon “as they [saw] it” (Chambliss & Schutt 2003: 30). Applying 
the ‘rolling interview’ technique, I relied on questions, follow-up probes and 
active listening, each subject leading to the next subject, to develop an 
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 In the course of research in the TGNA, some unintended, spontaneous ‘group 
discussions’ also occurred which were extremely useful to ‘observe’ and to take note. 
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 Appendix A: Questionnaire for Directors of Democratisation Programmes, Appendix B: 
Questionnaire for Those Who are active in the Policy-making and/or Legislative Processes. 
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understanding of the interviewee’s background, attitudes and actions—and 
reactions to—developments and others’ attitudes and actions. In such in-
depth interviews, specific content and order of questions would naturally 
vary from one interviewee to another. I also asked counterfactual questions 
to compare if the outcome would be the same, absent intervention by the 
civil society.  
     I then compared words with deeds, corroborating the earlier findings 
obtained from other sources/interviews, examining if, how and to what 
extent ‘democratic’ messages of the civil society has been received, adopted 
and transformed into behavioural change, and if this change in behaviour 
was reflective of a change in attitudes (i.e. if ‘democratic’ values were 
internalized) or it was the result of other factors.  
     In order to strengthen measurement validity and for improving reliability, 
i.e. for getting consistent results, I used methodological triangulation—a 
logical combination of interviews, observations and review of relevant 
documentation.  
     Observations included participation in parliamentary committee 
meetings; observation of interactions between the committee Chairs, 
member MPs and staffers during and, perhaps more importantly, also out of 
meeting times; working habits during off-duty hours; institutional culture; 
participation of civil society organisations in parliamentary committee 
meetings; relations between media, civil society and member MPs in 
committees; meetings involving legislative staffers, parliamentary advisors, 
bureaucrats and civil society; civil society conferences and meetings directly 
or indirectly related to democratisation. The observation scheme also 
benefitted from a coincidental working trip—not an inherent part of this 
research—to the Netherlands to visit both chambers of the Dutch Parliament 
and Ministry of Defence. This gave the opportunity to observe 
parliamentary debate and to attend one specially organised parliamentary 
committee session and to discuss ‘participation’ of the civil society in 
legislative process in this country. This visit also included meetings and 
discussions with a select group of civil society organisations (think-tanks) 
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which were actively participating in political decision-making and 
legislative processes in the Netherlands and with a specific interest in 
Turkish civil society and democratisation in Turkey in general.
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     The most salient documents used for triangulation included texts of draft 
bills and proposals of law, reports of parliamentary committees and sub-
committees on draft texts forwarded to the Office of the Speaker of the 
Parliament and of course their final versions—laws—passed by the Plenary.       
     I used an electronic tape recorder and notes—as ‘memory joggers’—and 
also maintained a daily log/summary of oral interviews. Then based on the 
notes taken and the views heard, I developed comprehensive notes which 
established the basis for the ‘findings’ of this dissertation. Sources of 
information, views and documents provided directly for this research will be 
withhold.  
 
2.9. Controlling limitations: Participatory Action Research 
     Although utmost attention has been paid to avoiding threats of history, 
maturation, testing and contamination to internal validity of the study, some 
certain and serious limitations did exist. They mainly came from the rather 
sensitive nature of the research subject and the two cases selected which 
have been dominating the current political debate—actually the political 
conflict—in Turkey: ‘democratic’ reforms in the security sector and the 
judiciary. Besides, the fact that they will continue to eclipse other issues in 
the political scene for the foreseeable future, constituted a challenge for 
ensuring the validity—and to a certain extent the generalizability—of the 
results reached. 
     Slightly at odds with the commonly understood meaning of ‘history’ as a 
threat to internal validity, in this research process, the subject’s ongoing 
relevance, widely-publicised political debate over it, ever-increasing 
political sensitivity—which kept building throughout the research phase and 
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hung in the air all the time—caused a psychological pressure on individuals, 
as evidenced by the outright rejection of interviews by some groups and 
institutions with certain political affiliations. This was apparent particularly 
during revisits, necessarily after a certain time-lapse.  
     Again, the potential threat of ‘maturation’—in the form of intellectual 
and emotional change—was experienced in a rather different nature. As the 
‘participant observation’ and interviews progressed and the ‘population’ 
became familiar with the identity of the researcher and his ‘subject’, and 
were ‘educated’, both the interest in the research subject and the perception 
of questions changed, resulting in either increased eagerness or, to the 
contrary, reluctance to cooperate. Sometimes, particularly during longer 
interviews, this kind of maturation occurred in a matter of hours, between 
the beginning and the end of the interview. But, it has to be stressed that 
maturation worked in ‘both’ directions and the importance of this cannot be 
overstated. 
    ‘Testing’ also proved to be a real threat as individuals were exposed to 
certain probes during rolling interviews and responding open-ended 
questions.  
     Social/intellectual-desirability, interacting with the factors causing 
‘maturation’, resulted in a type of ‘contamination’ as the individuals, 
exposed to the basic research question—role of civil society—tended to 
give responses favouring such a role or assuming the existence or 
desirability of such a role.  
     These ‘traps’ and threats of bias having a direct influence on this 
research, in a wider perspective, were coupled with some potent ecological 
limitations of longitudinal nature. Some individuals had involved in 
interviews of similar nature in the past, and were either well prepared or 
resistant to some questions; experience in time, hindsight, and potential 
publicity of their responses created a kind of self-imposed censorship, 
selective responses or complete avoidance. Because of the prevalent nature 
of the subject and since they knew that their responses would have been 
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compared with others’ and put into context, some chose to respond 
otherwise than they would normally do under different circumstances.
65
    
     The phenomenon studied here also involves a natural socialisation 
process on the part of each actor, individually, as a group or as part of an 
organisation. However the focus of this research has been on objective 
functions as reflected by behaviour, largely disregarding subjective 
functions, in terms of socio-psychological development of the individual, 
which involve various subprocesses as explained by DiRenzo (1991). Since 
this is linked to the production—and satisfaction—of basic human needs, it 
is important for correct reading of the responses because “inadequate 
gratification in unauthentic and/or unresponsive societies” may result in 
negative motivation (275). This is believed to be of particular significance, 
particularly under the prevailing conditions of Turkish politics. However, 
because this was essentially an area of political psychology, requiring a 
stand-alone and thorough treatment, it was essentially left out of the scope 
of this study.  Nevertheless, some significant findings connected to this 
occurrence have been noted in various parts of this thesis. The phenomenon 
of negative motivation in certain bureaucratic and legislative circles, to a 
certain extent, helped this research.  
     ‘Participatory’ approach is based on the assumption suggested by Knight 
et al (2002) that “states and markets are insufficient on their own to develop 
societies successfully”. A “third force or sector, called civil society, is also 
needed”. Participatory research, both as a method and an approach, 
involves the “most crucial element of civil society—citizens” (31-32). It is 
mostly used by researchers working on developing and/or transitional 
societies for better planning and directing ‘aid’ efforts more effectively and 
more efficiently. In this research, inspired by the ‘revolutionary’ way it 
approaches to the researcher-subject relationship, its ‘principles’ have been 
used in a way to improve the reliability and internal validity of the research 
and to avoid some well-known research traps, as detailed above.  
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      Knight et al (2002) explain that, in order to explore the “consciousness 
of other people”, the researcher needs an exploratory frame of reference and 
to ‘identify’ with the people in the study. Raising consciousness would 
enable the people to begin thinking about how to close the gap between their 
current and desired realities. Many of the benefits quoted by Knight et al 
overlap with both the ‘civic’ functions of civil society and the quest to 
answer the main question of this research. Perhaps the most relevant aspect 
of the process of participatory research was the fact that, on the part of the 
participants, it induced active involvement. For the purposes of this 
research, active involvement—becoming instrumental—has taken the form 
of identification with the ‘objective’ researcher and adopting both an insider 
and an outsider view at the same time, thereby becoming both the subject 
and the object of the study, eliminating most of the research bias, hence 
maximizing the value of interviews. (2002: 33-36) 
     Some of the essential characteristics of participatory research were 
particularly salient. Knight et al describes the main logic of it as cross-
cultural; using methods of synthesis, building up pictures of society, based, 
first, on the views of people who are normally invisible to researchers, 
debating the concerns they raise with a range of different people in 
society—in our case, the diverse sample from the population of those 
involved in decision-making and legislative processes—and finishing with 
those who have most influence. This is exactly what has been done in this 
research with, humbly, successful results as reflected by the large scale 
cooperation and willingness of most of the interviewees, save for a certain 
monolithic political group.
66
 
     This research attempted to combine the ‘process tracing’ method with the 
‘participatory approach’, in order to find out whether ‘civil society’, in 
performing its ‘civic’ role, had an influence on the policy outcomes related 
to democratisation. The claim that the ‘researcher’ acted as a ‘change agent’ 
would be an exaggeration and certainly too ambitious for the scope of such 
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a limited study; but for practical purposes, he adopted a ‘civic’ role and 
acted, throughout the research process, as if he was a representative of a 
civil society institution with democracy-promoting functions, rather than a 
neutral, value-free researcher. This was done following a cyclical procedure; 
involving the initial collection of data followed by a period of analysis and 
reflection on that data and then continue the collection of data this time for 
either corroboration and/or filling in the blanks.  
     The nature and the depth of ‘participation’ by the researcher developed 
along the research process. The first interviews with people who were 
normally ‘invisible’—staffers, junior bureaucrats/advisors—were followed 
by senior level civil servants and finally those who are assumed to have the 
largest influence—MPs, senior politicians, former ministers—debating the 
concerns raised by the previous—lower—layer of sample, gradually 
building up ‘real’ pictures of ‘society’. These were complemented by 
interactions and communication in Parliamentary Committee meeting 
rooms, in offices or in the cafeteria sipping a glass of tea or coffee, during 
friendly chats in restaurants, at various times of the day, sometimes after 
close of business in party buildings, Parliament or elsewhere. This approach 
created trust and while giving the researcher the chance of being a member 
of the sample ‘society’, it made an open, honest and ‘informed’ 
discussion—albeit somewhat controlled—debate possible. It also gave the 
‘population’ the impetus to look for the changes that ‘ought to take place’. 
This process turned the population into an integral part of the ‘research 
team’, ensured utmost cooperation and the most relevant contribution, 
secured assistance and educated them as well as the researcher himself. This 
was different from the role of the ‘observer’ or even the role of ‘participant 
observer’. It consciously raised ‘consciousness’ about the gap between 
current realities and desired end-states and instigated initiative taking. This 
situation made the researcher and the population ‘one’ in searching for the 
courses of action that would fit best to the purpose of enhancing and 
promoting democratisation. 
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     In terms of representativeness of the ‘sample’; personal/psychological 
characteristics of the individuals in the sample, ecological features of the 
research, external validity of the results are believed to hold.  
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Chapter 3 
‘Turkey’, Civil Society and Democratic Reform Process 
 
“A democracy can be distinguished, if its citizens are distinguishable; if each has 
an area of choice in which he really chooses”67.   
 
     Turkey is one of the major third-wave
68
 electoral regimes displaying 
most (if not all) of their typical characteristics: an unconsolidated 
democracy frequently interrupted by military interventions, with strong 
personalistic rule and weak constraints on the executive authority, very 
much reminiscent of Latin American political regimes. This has always led 
to continued tension, volatility in politics and resulted in a highly 
disintegrated, torn society created by authoritarian, selective modernisation; 
not an ideal environment for civil society to operate. 
     In this chapter, first I describe the political environment in Turkey to 
include political culture, political parties, legislative process, Parliament, 
role and influence of the European Union on ‘reforms’ and how civil society 
operates in Turkey. I spare particular attention to the subject of Rules of 
Procedure for the Turkish Grand national Assembly, and—connected to the 
former—to what I call ‘parliamentary’ civil society, that is associations of 
parliamentary staff which have been unusually active in reforming the 
legislative system to allow, above all, more effective participation by the 
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 Huntington (1991) describes waves of democratisation as groups of “transitions from 
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East can be considered a ‘democratic’ wave is yet to be seen.  
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civil society. Then, after summarising the reform process in 2000s, I review 
the ‘civic’ work of four selected civil society think-tanks in detail; 
particularly their democratisation programmes, works, publications, 
networking, relations with the media and what they put forth—in terms of 
policies related to democratisation—to policymakers in respective ‘reform’ 
areas. This chapter also dwells upon the conflictual relations, uphill battle, 
between civil society and the executive, namely the government and, until 
after 2007, the military. I end with a compilation of civil society’s common 
demands and proposals in reform areas. 
      
3.1. ‘Learning’ democracy and democratic culture 
     The basic notion of democracy presupposes a pluralistic society. 
Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990) define democracy as a system of 
government that meets “three essential conditions: competition, political 
participation and respect for civil and political liberties” (6-7). One may also 
add, as a complementing or facilitating condition ‘inclusiveness’ to these 
three areas because it is the cement that holds them together and give real 
meaning to them. According to Diamond (1999) democracy—in other 
words, the meaning of essential conditions for democracy—is something to 
be learned:  
          […] political experience with democracy and alternative regimes, and  
     how well a formally democratic regime functions to deliver the political  
     goods of democracy, have sizable independent effects on political  
     attitudes and values, often overpowering those of the country’s  
     socioeconomic status and the regime’s economic performance. […]  
     There is no better way of developing the values, skills and commitments  
     of democratic citizenship than through direct experience with  
     democracy, no matter how imperfect it may be. (162) 
 
     However, there is a challenge of conditionality involved here; in 
Eckstein’s words “early learning conditions later learning” (1988: 782). In 
terms of developing a democratic political culture, the lack of “experience 
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with democracy, no matter how imperfect it may be”, due to frequent 
interruptions, represents the major challenge both the individual and the 
Turkish society, as a whole, are confronted with. This has resulted in the 
persistence of certain cultural orientations which are not too favourable for 
democratisation of the political culture. Because “[…] the learning of 
political values and beliefs is cumulative over a life time. […] Early 
learning limits greatly the extent and ease of later learning” (Eckstein 1988, 
qtd. in Diamond 1999: 165).  
     Since the political system has been frequently disrupted by army 
interventions, either directly or indirectly, taking various forms ranging 
from upright takeover to subtle guardianship, the executive authority has not 
always been of ‘civilian’ origin. Even between interventions, army’s ‘long 
shadow’ has overcast the political stage, most of the time, in a threatening 
manner. Although each time the rules of the political game have been 
radically altered
69
, this change has not generally represented a progress 
towards ‘democracy’ and certainly not an evolving democratic culture. To 
the contrary, as discussed below, there are some clear signs that the political 
culture in Turkey, at both mass and elite levels, is transforming in a way not 
too amenable to a change towards democratic consolidation, nor the Turkish 
society is too willing for such an outcome. In other words, in economist 
jargon, there is very little ‘demand’ for democracy, hence its ‘supply’ is 
very constrained.  
     The political culture is not monolithic and contains features of both 
traditional and modern, combining elements from both. But, again, by the 
same token, according to Gresham’s Law on money, ‘bad’ traits of political 
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culture—traditional attributes, drive out ‘good’ traits—modern attributes 
(although everything ‘old’ is not necessarily bad just because they are old, 
neither does ‘new’ always refer to ‘good’).70 Therefore the dominant culture 
is unstable, conflicting and majoritarian. It is closed to communication and 
persuasion, compromise, hardly permitting orderly political change based 
on cross-party consensus. Civil society is but one source—and tool—in 
inducing ‘democratic’ change, and its effectiveness mainly depends on other 
sources’ effectiveness and, more importantly, and other actors’ willingness 
to work together toward similar—at least reconcilable—ends. Considering 
what Vanhanen (1997) calls ‘evolutionary or Darwinian theory of 
democratisation’ that is “democracy is expected to take place under 
conditions in which power resources have become so widely distributed that 
no group is any longer able to suppress its competitors or to maintain its 
hegemony” (5), there is a strong cultural resistance to such a distribution in 
Turkey. The general tendency is in the direction of concentration, rather 
than distribution of political power and resources of power.  
     Among the social groups that compete for the concentration of power in 
Turkey, military officers are—or, have been, until recently—more 
influential than other groups such as political elite and intellectuals. 
Bottomore (1970) explains this phenomenon in some developing or newly 
independent countries by referring to weak political institutions, yet to be 
developed: “where political institutions are still in the making and political 
authority is still […] unsettled and insecure, those who control the ultimate 
power of direct physical coercion have the opportunity to play an important 
part in deciding the future of the nation” (105). As discussed below, 
although major changes have taken place in this respect, since early 2000s 
in Turkey, the influence—if not the role—of ‘military officers’ is still far 
from being absent. This must not be surprising, because, like any other 
social phenomenon, this change is also to take a long time to become really 
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rooted. This general perception was confirmed by the very recent report of 
the Parliamentary Committee
71
 established for investigating the root causes 
and consequences of military interventions in Turkey.  
     The development process of Turkish political culture during the ninety 
years of modern Turkish Republic has been basically conflictual, 
incoherent, inconsistent and is crippled with a lack of democratic ‘vision’ on 
the part of the political elite—which also includes the uniformed military, 
i.e. top brass. Because the emergence of political cultural orientations more 
akin to those of a democratic culture and a cultural transformation of such 
character has been considered a threat, traditionally, a strictly zero-sum 
approach has been adopted by almost all major political actors. The 
outcome of this powerful orientation can clearly be seen in consistent results 
of various surveys within the last 30 or so years—a deeply divided society.  
     The division is multifaceted. A division between seculars and the 
religious, as the main axis of confrontation, has always existed and revealed 
itself in various forms in politics and in society as a whole, intensifying after 
1960s. A parallel axis is based on a Turkish-Kurdish division. Yet another 
axis of major importance has been that of between the followers of Sunni 
Islam and Alevi Islam. The fact that each ‘orientation’ represented not an 
exclusive identity but an amalgamation of many interlocking—sometimes 
contradicting—identities, with a certain degree of overlap, made the reading 
of Turkish society extremely difficult. When the fall of the Berlin Wall 
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ended the global-scale ideological division of East versus West or ‘free 
world’ versus ‘communist world’ as perceived—or suggested, hitherto 
suppressed identities, hence conflicts based on them, gradually came to the 
forefront, making the cultural dimension of the political environment in 
Turkey more complex than ever.  
     Accordingly, Turkish Values Survey—which was part of the World 
Values Survey of 1990, conducted by Esmer—found that “with the RP’s 
successful showing in the elections of 1994, the problem of secularism vs. 
Islamic fundamentalism has started to receive more attention than ever. 
Many (sic) worried that this deep and widespread dissention carries the 
seeds of a dangerous schism in Turkish society” (Esmer 1995: 86). Toprak 
(1995), on the other hand, pointed to Islamic theology that “consider[ed] it a 
heresy to separate religious and political affairs” and that for the common 
people “Islam [was] a religion that demand[ed] certain duties from the 
believers such as daily prayers and periodic fasting” in order to gain “the 
blessing of God”. Nevertheless, she argued that; 
          the majority of Turks [did] not equate religion with any political  
     project […] the values held by the majority of Turks d[id] not set them  
     apart from liberal and progressive causes simply because they  
     happen[ed] to be believers in Islam. They also show[ed] that values  
     which one might associate with urban educated elites [we]re commonly  
     shared by much wider strata in Turkish society. (92-94)  
 
     However, this situation was rapidly changing. What was overlooked—
and led to a critical misperception—by many scholars, perhaps was the 
preferred method of change by the Turkish society and the role individual 
Turk perceived for himself or herself in such a change. Again, in early 
1990s, when RP won almost 20 percent (19.14%)
72
 of the national votes in 
1994 local and municipal elections and captured the city-halls of a number 
of large cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, Toprak (1995) argued that 
“an overwhelming majority of Turks [shied] away from radical forms of 
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political protest, perhaps as a reaction to the violent 1970s decade which 
culminated in a military coup” (92). Also the findings of a TÜSIAD Survey 
in 1991, found that “those who support revolutionary change [was] only 
13.7 percent”, with the majority preferring change through gradual reform—
60.7 percent—while 25.6 percent “in favour of preserving the status quo” 
(Ergüder et al 1991). But clearly the ‘majority’ opted for a change, albeit for 
different reasons.  
     Ten years later, TESEV survey in 2002
73
 showed widespread demand for 
political, i.e. democratic, reforms. Ninety percent of respondents were 
unhappy about the workings of Turkish democracy. The poll showed that 60 
percent of those questioned were "not at all happy" with the functioning of 
Turkey's democracy, while 30 percent said they were "not happy." Only 9 
percent said they were “satisfied” and only 1 percent said they were "very 
happy." World Values Survey (2001)
74
 gave similar results; only 3.1% was 
very satisfied while 76.3% was not satisfied—50.6%, not at all. However, 
when it came to 2007, WVS indicated that only 37.7% (scales from 1 to 5-
inclusive) was unhappy
75
 with the way political system worked in Turkey. 
The majority, 62.3% (scales from 6 to 10) felt that Turkey was ‘democratic’. 
Esmer, this time in 2011, discovered that the so-called ‘democracy deficit’ 
was further reduced
76
. But he argues that, intriguingly this was due to a 
decrease in ‘demand’ rather than an increase in ‘supply’ (of democracy), 
although there was a slight increase in the perceived supply.  
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     Pew results, in 2012, largely confirm these findings and put them in a 
‘regional’ context. According to Pew, large majorities in ‘Muslim’ countries 
prefer democracy; in Lebanon 84%, Turkey 71%, Egypt 67%, Tunisia 63% 
and Jordan 61%. Majorities also believe they should rely on a democratic 
form of government to solve their country’s problems, rather than relying on 
a leader with a strong hand; in Turkey, 68% to 26%, in Egypt, 61% to 33%. 
When respondents are asked to choose which is more important, a good 
democracy or a strong economy, more than half in Turkey (58% over 37%) 
choose a good democracy, up (+10 points) from 2011. Egypt was equally 
divided: 48% (democracy) and 49% (economy). Political stability in a 
‘democracy’ is also considered ‘very important’ by 61% in Turkey.77 
Increased demand for a good democracy is a promising and positive sign for 
democratic consolidation, however, political stability being considered ‘very 
important’ by the majority is contradictory. These results refer to what 
Huntington calls a “mixed political culture”, neither democratic nor 
completely authoritarian, a mix of sub-cultures.     
     Huntington (1991) argues that it was “elected leaders themselves” who 
were “responsible for ending democracy […] in Turkey […]” because “they 
had little commitment to democratic values or practices. Even when leaders 
did abide by the rules of democracy—somewhat—they often seemed to do 
so grudgingly” (297). But why? According to Diamond (1994) this again is 
due to a mix of political subcultures: 
          […] the long-standing legacy of the Ottoman Empire […] a  
     centralized, despotic, paternalistic state […] remains visible in the  
     political values of many Turkish elites, particularly, the military and  
     bureaucracy. But new geological strata of cultural influence have been  
     deposited from later historical periods […] the egalitarian, populist,  
     unifying currents of Kemalist ideology […] as well as a strong consensus  
     on consolidating and preserving democracy. In each new historical  
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     period, new value orientations have partially displaced but not  
     completely erased pre-existing ones. The result is a mixed political  
     culture, or more properly, a mix of political subcultures with different  
     combinations of emphases from different periods. (230) 
 
     Frey (1975), in the early 1970s, argued that it was “still possible to 
analyse much of the thrust of Turkish politics by focusing on the political 
elite”. Although he anticipated this perspective becoming “increasingly 
inadequate in the future” (42) this has not happened yet. Therefore it is still 
pertinent and suitable to examine ‘elite’ behaviour—and its cultural roots—
in order to study Turkish politics. On that point, Özbudun (1994) observes 
that most of the studies on the Turkish elite “have concentrated on the social 
background characteristics of particular elite groups, not, as a rule, on their 
attitudes and values” (189) which is astonishing. Because, as explicated 
above, it is extremely difficult, even impossible, to separate social 
background from attitude—and behaviour.  
     Özbudun (1994) explains the lack of “the concept of power-sharing”, in 
the Turkish political culture, with “no feudalism comparable to that of 
Western Europe, no hereditary aristocracy, no autonomous church 
organisation, no strong merchant class or artisan guilds, no self-governing 
cities and with a ruling class staffed with slaves”. He points that “not only 
the ruling class but also the subject classes seemed to share this belief in the 
paternalistic nature of the state, as evidenced by the popular expression of 
father-state”. 
     Particularly after the experiment of multiparty democracy, during the 
1950-60 period, which miserably failed and ended up in the 1960 military 
coup, the 1961 Constitution attempted to create an effective system of 
‘checks and balances’ as a counter balance to ‘parochial’ motivation of the 
political elite. However, neither the dominant paternalistic political culture 
has allowed the development of an effective political system nor the gradual 
development of a genuinely pluralistic and democratic society has really 
been aimed by the elite in general. The disappearance of unity between the 
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state elite—civil/military bureaucrats and the judiciary being prominent—
and intellectuals was coupled with the ideologically motivated purges in the 
wake of military interventions in the 1970s and 1980s. This further 
complicated Turkish politics and led to an all-out ‘cultural’ war, not only 
over the identity of the Turkish state but also over the identity of the Turkish 
people. This war is still being waged in the form of successive and endless 
pitched ‘battles’ for which no end is in sight. This already complicated and 
troubled state of affairs in Turkish politics, starting in the early 1980s, has 
been further mired by two long-dormant social-ideological forces with deep 
cultural roots. These cultural forces, religion and ethnicity—with connected 
identities and sub-identities—revealed themselves in the form of religiosity 
and ethnic Kurdish ‘group’ demands and fast became strong political 
currents dominating the Turkish political scene. This development resulted 
in what Özbudun (1994) describes as the further weakening and 
fragmentation of “the unity of outlook within the bureaucratic elite: the 
reformist, secularist and tutelary weltanschauung of the old bureaucratic 
centre” (206). But also there emerged powerful demands for local autonomy 
and even independence for the Kurds of Turkey. These powerful trends, 
which started about forty years ago, substantially affected the course of 
democratisation and determined the difficulties, hurdles and dilemmas the 
Turkish political system is faced—and troubled—with today.     
     Substantiating this proposition, Kiris (2010) argues that in 1995 and 
2002 elections, the secular-religious axis was preeminent. But in 1999, 
nationalism took the upper hand, to be replaced, in 2002 by the secular-
religious axis again. In 2007 elections, secular-religious divide became more 
prominent while nationalism still maintained some relevance. Polarisation 
along secular-religious axis overshadowed polarisation over nationalist axis. 
Left-right axis on the other hand was of even lesser importance. Polarisation 
as a whole steadily increased at each election period. “Polarisation, in 
Turkey, was mainly due to ideological factors rather than economic ones 
and the income disparity had very limited effect on this increase” he 
concludes. (240-43) 
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     The legacy of ANAP ‘rule’ in 1983-1993 under Özal78 is mixed, but its 
influence on the Turkish political system as a whole has been profound. 
Özal’s personalistic style, as Özbudun moderately describes, was 
accompanied by an ever-increasing struggle for more and more political, 
ideological and economic power and influence through staffing the posts in 
various state institutions with persons whom they trusted. This trust did not 
emanate from the merits of such selections based on talent, competence or 
proper expertise in the area, but because of primordial linkages—family 
ties, tribal affiliation, being fellow townsmen etc. Belonging to the same 
religious sect almost always played the role of mortar keeping groups of 
sub-identities together and sectarian links increasingly gained primary—
though not exclusive—importance. 
     Today, in mid-2010s, the major political problems faced by Turkey and 
the parameters within which they can possibly be tackled with and the 
cultural, ideological and ideational division within the Turkish elite can well 
be traced back to Özal era. The eternal cultural conflict between the secular 
and the religious—centred around the role and place of religion in politics 
and in society as a whole—has been unambiguously tipped under his 
leadership and under the military’s watch, favouring the latter, and has 
determined the basic course of Turkish politics. The so-called ‘Islamist’ 
Welfare Party (RP) which came to dominate the Turkish political scene 
from 1994 on—only one year after Özal’s death—and its offshoot, the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has further predominated—
and today—outbalanced any other political party or political movement, 
both represent the same line of politics as Özal’s ANAP.79  
     Elite political culture, today, constituting the major challenge blocking 
the way towards some form of normalisation in Turkish politics, let alone 
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 ANAP was not in government from 1991 on. But Ozal as President of the Republic 
maintained a powerful influence until his death in April 1993. 
79
 Turgut Özal, RP leader Necmettin Erbakan and AKP leader Erdogan are all members of 
the Iskenderpasa cemaati—formed around  the mosque with the same name in Istanbul—
which is a branch of the politically powerful Nakshibendi sect.  
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democratisation or acceptance of civil society as a legitimate partner—
beyond some controlled and limited presence—is probably not an 
overstatement.  
     At the mass level the situation is no different. Starting in the 1950s, 
Turkey has witnessed and suffered from increasingly high rates of 
geographical, hence very painful social mobility as a result of internal 
migration from rural to urban areas. Since the 1960s, there has also been an 
external migration of labour to European countries. Besides, in the course of 
the 1970s and 1980s, a group of political dissidents joined gastarbiters. This 
was followed by internal displacement of groups—mostly of Kurdish ethnic 
origin—due to increased violence particularly in Eastern and Southeastern 
Turkey.
80
 This mobility had economic and political, but also cultural aspects 
and its results could not be controlled, managed, nor contained. The 
resulting political culture is paradoxical, contradictory, puzzling and 
enigmatic. These basic characteristics of the Turkish political culture can 
best be seen in the findings of the World Values Survey.  
     For every one Turk in three, 37.3%, ‘politics’ is ‘very/rather’ important, 
but only a small fraction of them, 2.3%, is an active member of a political 
party organisation. Only 11.9% has ever signed a petition; 52.7% would 
never do this. Only 5.9% has ever attended a lawful/peaceful demonstration; 
63.1% would never do this.
81
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 Many among the latter immigrated to Europe as ‘economically’ motivated political 
asylum seekers. This latest trend has been given a boost recently as the recent developments 
in the Middle East and North Africa gave many Turkish-speaking ‘Arabs’ or ‘Kurds’ the 
opportunity to seek refugee status. 
81 WVS Egypt (2008), Great Britain (2006), Poland (2005), Spain (2007), Turkey (2007).  
Question is “[…] indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: Politics”. 
‘Very/rather important’: United Kingdom, 40.3%; Spain, 29.1%; Poland, 29.2%; Egypt, 
37.3%; Turkey, 37.3%.  
‘Not very/not at all important’: UK, 59.6%; Spain, 71.0%; Poland, 70.9%; Egypt, 62.6%; 
Turkey, 62.7%. 
Q. “[…]whether you are a member, an active member or not a member of […]? Political 
party”. Active membership: UK, 3.3%; Poland, 1.1%; Egypt, 2.0%; Turkey, 2.3%.  
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     For an overwhelming majority of Turks, 93.1%, having a democratic 
political system is very important and it is a ‘very good/fairly good’ thing. 
However, still a majority, 58.9%, believes that ‘having a strong leader’ is a 
‘very/fairly good’ thing.82 Furthermore, half of them, 50.1%, believes that 
‘the army taking over when government is incompetent’ is an essential 
characteristic of democracy. An even larger majority believes that ‘the 
government’—rather than the people—should take more responsibility to 
ensure that everyone is provided for—60.1%.83 The role of ‘Islam’ further 
complicated this picture.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Q. “[…] some different forms of political action that people can take […] whether yo have 
actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any 
circumstances, do it. Signing a petition”. 
“Have done”: UK, 68.2%; Poland, 23.5%; Egypt, 6.9%; Turkey, 11.9%.  
In 2011, this came down to 10%. 
“Would never do”: UK, 8.5%; Poland, 46.7%; Egypt, 78.5%; Turkey, 52.7%.  
In 2011, this became 61%.  
Q. “[…]forms of political action that people can take […]. Attending lawful/peaceful 
demonstrations”. “Have done”: UK, 16.6%; Poland, 10.2%; Egypt, 1.5%; Turkey, 5.9%.  
“Would never do”: UK, 38.6%; Poland, 59.4%; Egypt, 91.3%; Turkey, 63.1%.  
In 2011, this became 66%. WVS, Turkey 2007. 31 December 2012. 
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeIndex.jsp. 
For 2011 findings see; 2011 Turkey Values Survey. Summary of findings, 21 July 2011. 
Yilmaz Esmer. Bahcesehir University. 28 December 2012. 
egiad.org.tr/userfiles/ftp/.../dunyadegerlerozet.doc. 
82
 This question is slightly rephrased than the Pew question on p. 88. 
83
 WVS Egypt (2008), Great Britain (2006), Poland (2005), Spain (2007), Turkey (2007).  
Q. “[…] political systems […] as a way of governing this country. […]? Having a 
democratic system”. “Very/fairly good”: UK, 90.6%; Poland, 84.2%; Egypt, 98.3%; 
Turkey, 93.1%. “Fairly/very bad”: UK, 9.4%; Poland, 15.7%; Egypt, 1.7%; Turkey, 6.9%. 
Q. “[…] political systems […] as a way of governing this country. […]? Having a strong 
leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”. 
“Very/fairly good”: UK, 28.2%; Poland, 30.5%; Egypt, 16.0%; Turkey, 58.9%.  
In 2011 this became 63%.  
“Fairly/very bad”: UK, 71.8%; Poland, 69.5%; Egypt, 84.0%; Turkey, 41.2%.  
In 2000 this was 73%.  
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     The overwhelming majority of the Turkish people is followers of Islam 
and Islam as a religion—as a social phenomenon—is part of the ‘Turkish’ 
identity, in general. This is probably true for any other society and religion 
as well. But, how strong this dimension of identity compared with other—
and overlapping identities—and its political relevance are crucial questions. 
On this, scholars are divided. Toprak (1995), for example, differentiated 
between ‘militant’ Islam and Islamic movement in general and, in mid-
1990s, did not consider that militant Islam, “a fringe movement within the 
larger context of a plethora of Islamic groups and organisations”, had any 
prospect to become a political power. Because “the strength of the 
opposition to it, even without counting the military among the forces 
committed to defending secularism“ (93) would not allow this happen.    
     However, later developments, as examined elsewhere in this paper, led to 
different outcomes. This was mainly derived from the central place 
occupied by the religion of Islam in Turkish society as a whole and the 
acknowledged and recognised role for religion in politics. Despite the 
country’s strictly secular past and its—less than perfect—democratic 
                                                                                                                                                   
Q. “[…] essential characteristics of democracy. […] how essential you think it is as a 
characteristic of democracy. […]The army takes over when government is incompetent”. 
“Not an essential characteristic of democracy-scales from 1 to 5-inclusive”: UK, 67.2%; 
Poland, 80.1%; Egypt, 30.8%; Turkey, 49.8%.  
“An essential characteristic of democracy-scales from 6 to 10”: UK, 32.9%; Poland, 19.8 
%; Egypt, 59.3 %; Turkey, 50.1%. 
Q.; “How would you place your views on this scale? […] People should take more 
responsibility to provide for themselves vs the government should take more responsibility 
to ensure that everyone is provided for”.  
“The government should take more responsibility-scales from 1 to 5-inclusive”: UK, 
42.1%; Poland, 60.6%; Egypt, 85.4%; Turkey, 60.1%.  
“People should take more responsibility-scales from 6 to 10”: UK, 57.9%; Poland, 39.5%; 
Egypt, 14.6%; Turkey, 39.9%. 
WVS, Turkey 2007. 31 December 2012. 
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeIndex.jsp. 
For 2011 findings see: 2011 Turkey Values Survey. Summary of findings, 21 July 2011. 
Yilmaz Esmer. Bahcesehir University. 28 December 2012. 
egiad.org.tr/userfiles/ftp/.../dunyadegerlerozet.doc. 
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Constitution, for the overwhelming majority of Turks, 91.3%, ‘religion’ is 
very important.
84
 This is not as absolute as the case in Egypt which is 
99.6%, nevertheless less than even Poland—one of the most strictly 
Catholic nations, 86.8%. However, while they have great confidence in 
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 World Values Survey. Egypt (2008), United Kingdom (2006), Poland (2005), Spain 
(2007), Turkey (2007).  
Q. “[…] indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: Religion”. 
‘Very/rather important’: UK, 40.7%; Poland, 86.8%; Egypt, 99.6%; Turkey, 91.3%.  
‘Not very/at all important’: UK, 59.3%; Poland, 13.2%; Egypt, 0.4%; Turkey, 8.7%. 
Q. “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are? [A religious 
person, not a religious person, a convinced atheist]”. 
“Religious”: UK, 48.7%; Spain, 45.6%; Poland, 94.6%; Egypt, 92.5%; Turkey, 82.6%.  
“Not religious”: UK, 40.9%; Spain, 47.0%; Poland, 4.0 %; Egypt, 7.5%; Turkey, 16.9%. 
(‘A convinced atheist’ answers not included).  
Q. “[…] organisations. […] could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it 
a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at 
all? The churches”. 
“A great deal, quite a lot”: UK, 45.7%; Poland, 72.7%; Turkey, 71.7%.  
“Not very much plus none at all”: UK, 54.2%; Poland, 27.3%; Turkey, 28.3%.  
Q. “[…] could you tell me whether you are a member, an active member or not a member 
of that type of organization? Church or religious organization”. 
Active membership: UK, 19.2%; Poland, 12.9%; Egypt, 0.9%; Turkey, 1.3%.  
Q. “How much do you agree or disagree […]: Politicians who do not believe in God are 
unfit for public office”. 
“Agree strongly, agree”: Spain, 11.3%; Poland, 17.8%; Turkey, 54.8%.  
“Disagree, strongly disagree”: Spain, 74.4%; Poland, 63.2%; Turkey, 24.9%. 
(‘Neither agree or disagree’ answers not included). 
Q. “How much do you agree or disagree […]: It would be better for [this country] if more 
people with strong religious beliefs held public office”. 
“Agree strongly, agree”: Spain, 12.8%; Poland, 29.8%; Turkey, 47.8%.  
“Disagree, strongly disagree”: Spain, 67.2%; Poland, 41.4 %; Turkey, 18.7%.  
(‘Neither agree or disagree’ answers not included). 
WVS, Turkey 2007. 31 December 2012. 
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeIndex.jsp. 
For 2011 findings see: 2011 Turkey Values Survey. Summary of findings, 21 July 2011. 
Yilmaz Esmer. Bahcesehir University. 28 December 2012. 
egiad.org.tr/userfiles/ftp/.../dunyadegerlerozet.doc. 
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‘mosque’, 71.7%—as much as Poland, 72.7%—only 1.3% is member of a 
religious organisation. Yet, half of them—54.8%—believe that ‘politicians 
who do not believe in God are unfit for public office’, and it is better if more 
‘people with strong religious beliefs’ hold public office. 
     As for the role that civil society is allowed to play in an ‘Islamic’ society 
such as the Turkish society, the difficulty lies—primarily—with the 
question of which groups can be considered as part of the civil society. 
Turkish ‘town’ is very much like what Ayubi (1999) describes as “an urb, 
that is a physical agglomeration rather than a civitas, a space for collective 
debate and action” (398). Most of the groups claiming the status of ‘civil 
society’ have traditionally been ‘primordial’ in nature. Among them, 
religion-based associations, sects, mosque-affiliated communities
85
 
(cemaat), and charity institutions are prominent. A ‘civil’ society based on 
what is basically a primordial culture, which in essence refuses the 
existence of individual independent from the society is hardly a civil society.  
     A Lebanese lawyer and historian, Youssef Mouawad (2003) gives the 
example in a novel by Fouad Laroui (1999), story of a Moroccan engineer 
who returns home after years in Europe and finds himself invaded by family 
and neighbours, nowhere to ‘escape’ for privacy as an individual. “How 
could the concept of individualism emerge when God and family are 
omnipresent?” he posits. (116-18) This debate is related to what Maffesoli 
(1988) calls secondary culture “to which individuals would aggregate by 
voluntary choice and usually after repudiating their primordial culture” 
(243). Mouawad (2003) offers a striking analogy: 
          One could say that the oriental mansion has a ceiling that is religion  
     and lateral walls that are cousins. This mansion may be considered either  
     like a house of splendour, a refuge, a haven, or on the contrary, as a   
     prison that prevents the individual from moving away and assuming his  
     total freedom. […] some people have chosen to remain in the old house  
     and to root themselves there. Others have decided to flee. However most  
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 The term ‘cemaat’ of a mosque is similar to the parish of a Christian church, but 
represents a deeper and more-encompassing connection.  
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     people hesitate; do not take a decision and try to reconcile freedom with  
     their ancestral chains (Italics added). (120)  
 
     Turkish society has changed, probably beyond any other Islamic society, 
but the majority has repudiated neither God nor cousins, they hesitate. This 
is where the major social dilemma lies in Turkey.  
     When people are asked how proud they are being a Turk, 96.4% respond 
that they are ‘very/quite proud’, and 93.6% see themselves as ‘citizen’ of 
the Turkish nation. However, 93.7% also see themselves as member of their 
local community.
86
 It looks as if the majority of individuals in Turkey have 
multiple and largely overlapping—not necessarily conflicting or 
irreconcilable—identities. However, if these results are analysed against the 
background of religiosity and primary identities, the conclusions can 
become quite different. Those who define themselves as ‘religious’ are 
85%, up (+10 points) from 1990s.
87
 Those who are proud of being a ‘Turk’ 
make up 75%, but when they are further asked about priority of identities, 
two-thirds give priority to their Muslim identity.  
                                                          
86
 World Values Survey. Egypt (2008), United Kingdom (2006), Poland (2005), Spain 
(2007), Turkey (2007). 
Q. “How proud are you to be [Nationality]?”. 
“Very proud, quite proud”: UK, 91.7%; Poland, 96.0%; Egypt, 98.4%; Turkey, 96.4%.  
“Not very proud, not at all proud”: UK, 8.3%; Poland, 4.1%; Egypt, 1.6 %; Turkey, 3.5%.  
Q. “People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. […] : I 
see myself as citizen of the [country] nation”. 
“Strongly agree, agree”: Spain, 96.2%; Poland, 98.4%; Egypt, 97.9%; Turkey, 93.6%.  
“Disagree, strongly disagree”: Spain, 3.9%; Poland, 1.6%; Egypt, 2.1 %; Turkey, 6.4%. 
Q. “People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. […]: I 
see myself as member of my local community”. 
“Strongly agree, agree”: Spain, 95.9%; Poland, 92.8%; Egypt, 93.2%; Turkey, 93.7%.  
“Disagree, strongly disagree”: Spain, 4.0%; Poland, 7.3%; Egypt, 6.8 %; Turkey, 6.3%. 
WVS, Turkey 2007. 31 December 2012. 
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeIndex.jsp. 
87
 28 December 2012. http://smgconnected.com/2011-turkiye-degerler-arastirmasi.  
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     In 2003
88, 40% and 41% felt themselves belonging to ‘East’ and ‘West’ 
respectively—almost equally; 36.0% believed EU was founded on Christian 
values and in a ‘Christian Club’ there was no place for Turkey—39.8%—
and EU treated Turkey with double standards—61.8%. Furthermore, 54-
55.0% believed that closer relations with EU would bring corruption of 
moral and religious values (raised to 65% in 2012) and that they would be 
disturbed if the EU anthem was played beside the Turkish national 
anthem—66.2%. Yet, 75% was prepared to vote ‘for’ Turkey’s membership 
in the EU. When it came to 2012, in terms of the “three most important 
values, personally”, religion (6% EU to 25%TU), personal fulfilment (10% 
EU to 1% TU) and respect for other cultures (8% EU to 2 %TU) stand out 
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 Euroscepticism in Turkey. 
Q. “Vote for the EU?” I would vote AGAINST Turkey’s membership in the EU: 17%. I 
would vote FOR Turkey’s membership in the EU: 75%.  
Q. Which of the […] regions of the world do you feel you most belong to? EAST (Asia, 
Middle East), 40%; WEST (Europe, Mediterranean, Balkans), 41%. 
Q. […] EU has been founded on Christian values. Do you agree with this view? YES, I 
agree, 36.0%; NO, I disagree, 26.7%. 
Q. […] EU is a “Christian Club” with no place for a Muslim country like Turkey. Do you 
agree with this view? YES, I agree, 39.8%; NO, I disagree, 45.3%. 
Q. […] EU has treated Turkey with double standards […] . Do you agree with this view? 
YES, I agree, 61.8%; NO I disagree, 19.9%. 
Q. […] closer relations with Europe will bring along a corruption of values […]. Do you 
agree with this view?  
Corruption of the moral values of the young people: NO, I disagree, 41.0%. YES, I agree, 
55.0%; raised to 64.8% in 2012. Corruption of religious values: NO, I disagree, 42.0%. 
YES, I agree, 54.0%; raised to % 64.5 in 2012.  
Q. Will you be disturbed if you hear EU anthem being played beside the Turkish national 
anthem […] ? YES, I will be disturbed, 66.2%; NO, I will not be disturbed, 30.4%. 
Euroscepticism in Turkey. Doubts, anxieties and fears of the Turkish Public concerning 
Europe and the European Union. Open Society Institute and Bogazici University. July 
2003-July 2004. 30 December 2012. 
http://hakanyilmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/HakanYilmaz-2003December-
EuroskepticismInTurkey-Presentation-English.28464900.pdf. 
 99 
as major value differences, while generally there is an overlap in other 
values.
89
  
     Recent Pew findings
90
 confirm this sharp diversion of set of values, 
perceptions, expectations and identities in predominantly Muslim countries. 
Majorities in such countries want Islam to have a major influence in politics, 
they believe Islam currently—already—plays a large role in their nation’s 
political life and they mostly view this in a positive light. The similarities—
in terms of the place and role of religion in politics—between Turkey and 
Egypt are telling. In Turkey 64% believes that Islam plays a ‘large’ role in 
politics and of these, 57% believe this is a ‘good thing’. In Egypt these are 
66% and 61% respectively.  A plurality in Turkey, 44%, say the law should 
follow the values and principles of Islam but not strictly follow the 
teachings of the Quran—17% prefer strict observance, which altogether 
makes up 63%. A broad majority in Egypt, 60%, believe their nation’s laws 
should strictly follow the teachings of the Quran. Those who prefer ‘milder’ 
influence of Islam, 32%, included, it adds up to 92%. The sentiment that 
religion is influential in politics has increased substantially in Egypt over the 
past year—2011 to 2012. The percentage saying Islam is influential in 
Egyptian political life jumped from 47% in 2011 to 66% today.  
     These findings not only pertain to how fast perceptions of reality can 
change—if they are in conformity with the basic, inherent, indigenous value 
systems of societies—and embraced, but also some fundamental dilemmas 
faced by Muslim-majority countries: accommodating religion in politics—
particularly in ‘democratic’ politics, reconciling deep divisions among 
cultural sub-groups about the—central—role and place of Islam in societies 
in general. In Turkey’s case, there is a third quandary involved: becoming 
part of a ‘Western’ polity representing, as perceived by majorities, a 
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 Eurobarometre 74, Public Opinion in the EU. Fall 2010. National Report, Turkey. 29 
December 2012. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_tr_tr_nat.pdf.  
90
 Pew Research Center. 10 July 2012. “Most Muslims want democracy, personal freedoms, 
and Islam in political life”. 30 December 2012. 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/chapter-2-views-of-democracy/. 
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completely different—and even conflicting—set of values, some of which 
are even anathema to ‘Islam’, and national, moral and religious identities 
linked to or associated with these values.  
     This brings us to the question of ‘sum-effect’ of Turkey’s EU accession 
process on democratisation.  
     Canefe and Bora (2003) argue that “the sceptical and resistant attitude 
toward anything that is Western and European has deep roots in the Turkish 
intellectual tradition” (127-48). This ‘disposition’, as evidenced by the 
results of successive polls, is actually not restricted to the elite, but 
widespread throughout the society, albeit for different—and partly 
overlapping—reasons.  
     A review of Eurobarometer
91
 results from 2004 on, supports this 
argument. Support for the EU membership has declined from 72% in 2004 
to 42% in 2010. Within only six months in 2010, it dropped 5 points. 
Increase in the negative perception was even more pronounce, 9 points. 
These sharp changes themselves were reflective of an unusually artificial 
situation in EU-Turkey relations. This can also be seen in the expectations 
and perceptions related to the EU membership which also widely vary and 
diverge from those of the EU norms and averages. Outstanding expectations 
of the Turkish people are reflected by their perception of the EU
92
: 
economic prosperity, national prestige—in the form of greater say in the 
world, democracy, free movement in the EU and social protection. While 
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 Eurobarometer, Question: “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s 
membership of the EU would be […]?”. “A good thing”: 42%, ‘-5’ from Spring 2010. “A 
bad thing”: 32%, ‘plus 9’ from Spring 2010.  
Standard EB 74. Autumn 2010. 29 December 2012. 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_tr_tr_nat.pdf.  
92
 Eurobarometer, Question: “What does EU mean to you personally?”.  
Economic prosperity: 35% (TU), 13% (EU), Stronger say in the world: 26% (TU), 23% 
(EU), Democracy: 21% (TU), 23% (EU), Freedom to travel, work, study in the EU: 19% 
(TU), 45% (EU), Social protection: 17% (TU), 10% (EU). Standard EB 74. Autumn 2010. 
EU, Turkey. 31 December 2012. 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_fact_tr_en.pdf. 
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‘democracy’ and ‘greater say’ overlap with those of the EU, ‘freedom of 
movement’—rather than economic prosperity—scales much higher for the 
‘Europeans’.93   
     This state of relations and perceptions is not restricted to EU-Turkey 
relations only, but extends to ‘Western institutions’—particularly to 
NATO—and other Western polities—particularly the US and the UN—
among others, as well. It is true that there is a widespread loss of confidence 
in international organisations in general and in the EU in particular in many 
countries—including the individual EU members. But, for the purposes of 
this thesis, it is important to understand the real nature, extent and 
consistency of these anti-Western feelings in Turkey. According to WVS, in 
Turkey in 2001
94, “confidence in the EU” was ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ 
for the 40.2%, in NATO for 38.7%, in the UN for 46.3%. In 2007
95
, 
confidence dropped to 31.0% for the EU and 31.3% for the UN. (No WVS 
results are available for NATO in 2007). More recent Transatlantic Trends
96
 
findings manifest similar results and confirm the general trend in opinions. 
     Comparable to the favourable cases of Romania and France or the 
unfavourable case of Poland, the ‘Turkish’ attitude vis-a-vis the West, in the 
short term, is determined by the current events and common interests as 
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 Findings of another survey in 2003 indicate that economic benefits has maintained its 
importance (39%). Freedom of movement within the EU (13%), Turkey’s prestige in the 
world (12%) and particularly strengthening democracy  (12%) have gained increased 
importance in seven-year time. 
Euroscepticism in Turkey. Comparative Findings. 2003-2012. Open Society Institute and 
Bogazici University. March-April 2012. 30 December 2012. 
http://hakanyilmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/OSI-2012-Euroskep-2003-2012-
Karsilastirmalar-Sunus-v04.344184250.pdf. 
94
 WVS, Turkey 2001. 31 December 2012. 
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeIndex.jsp. 
95
 WVS, Turkey 2007. 31 December 2012. 
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeIndex.jsp.  
96
 Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings 2012. 30 December 2012. 
http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdf.   
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perceived. However, the general—in other words dominant—nature of the 
Turkish political attitude is one of distrust and lack of confidence.  
     This attitude—and its reflection on behaviour—is also clearly visible in 
social relations. Turks are one of the most suspicious peoples of the world 
trusting ‘others’ the least.97 Therefore this attitude suffers from short term 
fluctuations, it is unstable and open to manipulation by various actors, 
domestic and foreign alike, sometimes by short-term coalitions of the both. 
Naturally, this situation also allows Turkish governments greater flexibility 
in terms of selecting certain courses of political action and policy options 
regarding foreign policy, and its use as a leverage for domestic politics and 
vice versa. 
     As pointed out before, Canefe and Bora argues that the West “is 
regularly cited as the site where evil comes from and around which Turks 
should always have wits about them [sic]” (2003: 143). Since 
‘democracy’—and democratic values—also come from the West, they are 
first met with an inevitable—perhaps also indispensable—psychological 
resistance. The ‘hidden agenda’ of the Europeans or the ‘West’ in general is 
an image that haunts the Turkish mass and have a direct and indirect bearing 
upon the political elite’s approach to and perceptions of ‘democracy’ as 
exercised in the West. It is a common phenomenon of Turkish politics that 
this rather obsessive preoccupation with the ‘hidden agenda’ is more or less 
shared by all shades of the political-ideological spectrum. Avci (2003), for 
example, argues that “Euro-scepticism or in the Turkish case, ‘nationalism 
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 World Values Survey. Egypt (2008), Great Britain (2006), Poland (2005), Spain (2007), 
Turkey (2007).  
Question is “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”. 
“Can’t be too careful”: UK, 69.5%; Poland, 81.0%; Egypt, 81.5%; Turkey, 95.1%. 27 
December 2012. http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeSample.jsp.  
From early 1990s on, trust level remained stable between 8%-10%. In 2011, there was a 
slight increase in trust—15%. 2011 Turkey Values Survey. Summary of findings, 21 July 
2011. Yilmaz Esmer. Bahcesehir University. 28 December 2012. 
egiad.org.tr/userfiles/ftp/.../dunyadegerlerozet.doc.  
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in disguise’ has become a powerful tool for Turkish parties in their quest for 
votes and has reshaped aspects of party competition” (164). This ‘hidden 
agenda’ as a common phenomenon of Turkish political rhetoric and a 
propaganda theme—for good or bad—is evident in successive survey 
results.
98
 In 2003, plurality of Turks (40.9%) believed that what the EU 
imposed on Turkey was no different than the “capitulations of the Ottoman 
era”. This rose to 58.9% in 2012. Similarly, those who believed that the 
conditions imposed by the EU on Turkey were no different from the terms 
of the “Sevres Treaty of the Ottoman era” rose from 36.0% in 2003 to 
56.3% in 2012.  
     The European Parliament’s critical resolution on the Commission’s 2004 
Regular Report on Turkey
99
 was particularly important—as it was 
perceived—in confirming the widely-shared perception of the West as 
maintaining historical aims of ‘dismembering’ Turkey and supporting 
‘minorities’ to this end. While taking note of the specific conditions 
included in the Commission Report, the EP recorded a long list of 
expectations and issues.
100
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 “[…] EU has imposed on Turkey […] CAPITULATIONS OF THE OTTOMAN ERA. 
Do you agree with this view?. NO I disagree, 27%. YES, I agree, 40.9%”.  
“[…] the conditions that the EU has imposed on Turkey are no different from the terms of 
the SEVRES TREATY of the Ottoman era. Do you agree with this view? NO, I disagree, 
26.7%. YES, I agree, 36.0%”.  
Euroscepticism in Turkey. Doubts, anxieties and fears of the Turkish Public concerning 
Europe and the European Union. Open Society Institute and Bogazici University. July 
2003-July 2004. 30 December 2012. 
http://hakanyilmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/HakanYilmaz-2003December-
EuroskepticismInTurkey-Presentation-English.28464900.pdf. 
99
 European Parliament Resolution on the 2004 Regular Report and on the recommendation 
of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession. 15 December 2004. 
100
 Kurdish political parties representing the ‘Kurdish’ people, Greek Orthodox Halki 
seminary, the non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, minority languages, opening of 
the border between Turkey and Armenia, compliance with the Parliament’s 1987 
resolution
100, “remarkable work carried out” by a Turkish historian (spelling out his name) 
on the Armenian genocide allegations, call on Turkey to acknowledge the genocide, call on 
the Commission and the Council to demand “the Turkish authorities to acknowledge the 
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     Civil society, a Western ‘institution’—as largely perceived in non-
Western societies—takes its fair share from this negative connotation and 
the negative attitude and behaviour associated with it. However, in recent 
years, the rhetoric that there are foreign secret “scenario writers” for 
damaging Turkey and Turkish interests and such plans are “carried out by 
native agents of the West” is gaining more weight and being further 
expanded to reflect a presumption of clash of civilisations.
101
 It is 
noteworthy that this rhetoric defines ‘West’ with respect to Islamic world, 
hence takes ‘Muslim’ as the common and dominant identity over national 
identities. 
     Therefore, it is puzzling why and how the Turkish governments, 
especially those under AKP leadership, gave such a priority and vigorous 
support to advancing the process of EU accession. That’s why Carkoglu 
(2003) finds the real basis of ‘support’ behind earlier legislative moves—
related to the EU accession process—that took place in the early 2000s 
                                                                                                                                                   
historic reality of the genocide perpetrated”, particular places as suitable for registration in 
the World Heritage List of UNESCO, disarming the village guards and disband them, 
reconciliation with ‘Kurdish’ forces (i.e. PKK), water requirements of the lower 
Mesopotamian marshes in Iraq and Iran, among others. 
101
 Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, during a visit to Pakistan—and later to Iran—in 2010, 
in a spontaneous, impromptu speech, reflected this deeply rooted ‘cultural’ perception in 
addressing the ‘flood victims’; “Pakistan getting weaker would make somebody, out of 
Pakistan, happy. I guess you understand who these ‘somebody’ are. They are the same both 
for us and you. That’s why we have to get stronger. We have to accumulate power. We’ll 
support each other shoulder to shoulder, hand in hand. We’ll build a stronger Pakistan. The 
same is also valid for the world of Islam. You are aware of those forces that aim to divide 
and destroy the Islamic world". 13 October 2010. Haberturk daily. 8 November 2010. 
http://www.haberturk.com/dunya/haber/560831-erdogan-israil-yalniz-kalmaya-mahkum.  
“Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey; why is this belt experiencing such a terror process, 
continually? Of course there are foreign secret scenario writers and regretfully they select 
their native agents from within nations”. 14 October 2010. Hurriyet daily. 8 November 
2010. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=16037113&tarih=2010-10-14. 
Later, to Tehran Times, he said: “If you will not understand the evil designs of your 
enemies, then what will be the future of 20 million flood victims of Pakistan?” 16 October 
2010. 8 November 2010. http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=228611. 
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questionable. “The obsessive focus on the formalities of the Copenhagen 
criteria seem to have pushed the lower level of negotiations at the domestic 
players’ level behind” (252). That is, they were simply intended for the sole 
purpose of adopting the EU acquis, but were not really embraced, let alone 
internalised and reflected on their actual implementation. There is—on the 
part of the Turkish government—an instrumental rationality in operation 
here which makes Putnam’s ‘two-level game’ debate closely relevant.    
     In the relations with the West in general and Turkey’s EU accession 
process in particular, this interaction in the form of two-level game has 
played a decisive role in the political decision-making, notably in decisions 
related to the democratic reform process studied in this paper. This role has 
mainly been overcoming the resistance to change—for the purposes of 
maintaining autonomy, identity or way of life—on the part of both the elites 
and—at least partly—the mass. Not only national elites are “unwilling to 
relinquish their sovereignty over key areas of policy that would directly 
undermine their privileged positions or interests” (Onis 2003: 11), but also 
groups who feel their primary identities—sometimes beyond, and apart 
from national identity—are threatened, come together with the former. Such 
‘groups’, for varying reasons, take EU’s insistence on certain aspects of the 
accession process simply as a sinister threat to their very identity, in other 
words, their value system. As a result there is a tendency, in the general 
public, towards selective democratisation. In this context, civil society, 
especially civic groups/entities, have been principle actors as facilitators, 
and democracy-promoters—a formidable challenge against overwhelming 
odds.  
     Challenge comes from the fact that ‘selective’ democratisation, in 
principle, is readily adopted by the political elite, as a whole, as well. 
Making extensive use of the two-level game, in Turkey-EU relations, for 
promoting long-term domestic goals with a short term perspective towards 
EU, hence based on selective and instrumental application and adoption of 
the acquis, makes things extremely complicated. This is certainly not the 
most favourable environment for civil society’s participation in the political 
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decision-making process as far as—and particularly—the democratisation 
process and related reforms are concerned.  
     One subtle but crucial component of this complex picture is the nature of 
public opinion and the way it is manipulated as part of the two-level game. 
The domestic politico-psychological background to this game is intelligibly 
explained by Avci (2003): 
          The parties close to the centre […] have exhibited features of soft  
     Euro-scepticism, when convenient. The pro-Islamist parties have very  
     rationally supported the EU whenever it supported their cause but  
     opposed it when it came to crucial matters. Overall, during the period  
     since the Helsinki summit, the Turkish party elites have been  
     inconsistent in exhibiting their unambiguous commitment to EU reform.  
     Neither the left nor the right [nor the Islamists for that matter] are true  
     believers in the EU. (164)  
 
     It is timely and worthwhile to focus on the Turkish general public’s 
‘attitude’ vis a vis Europe and the EU accession process, here. In 2012102,  
roughly half of the population, 48.6%, had a positive view of ‘Europeans’—
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 Q. Do you have positive or negative views of Europeans? Positive: 64.5% (2003), 
48.6% (2012). Negative: 26.5% (2003), 42.5% (2012). No idea: 9%, in both (2003) and 
(2012). 
Q. Have you ever visited a EU country? YES: 11.2% (2003), 11.0% (2012). NO: 88.3% 
(2003), 87.8% (2012).  
Q. Have you ever established friendship with Europeans? YES: 31.0% (2003), 27.0% 
(2012). NO: 68.7% (2003), 71.6% (2012).  
Q. Turkey is a part of Europe. Geographically: 70% (2003), 46% (2012);  historically 61% 
(2003), 33% (2012); economically 28% (2003), 37% (2012); culturally: 28% (2003), 21% 
(2012); religiously 7% (2003), 10% (2012).  
Q. Would being a EU member benefit Turkey or not? NO, it wouldn’t: 13.3% (2003), 
36.4% (2012). YES, it would: 78.8% (2003), 53.7% (2012). 
Euroscepticism in Turkey. Prof. Hakan Yilmaz. Comparative Findings. 2003-2012. Open 
Society Institute and Bogazici University. March-April 2012. 30 December 2012. 
http://hakanyilmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/OSI-2012-Euroskep-2003-2012-
Karsilastirmalar-Sunus-v04.344184250.pdf. 
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down from 64.5% in 2003. Only 11.0%—same as 2003, 11.2%—ever 
visited a EU country, but 27.0% established friendship with Europeans —
down from 31.0% in 2003, yet they were opiniated enough to conclude that 
‘being a EU member would benefit Turkey’, 53.7%—down from 78.8% in 
2003. However, they were confused even as to the borders and history of 
respective entities. In 2003, 70% believed that, geographically, Turkey was 
part of Europe. In 2012 this declined to 46%. Historically, in 2003 a clear 
majority, 61%, believed that Turkey was part of Europe, but almost half had 
changed their minds by 2012 when only 33% held the same view.  
     It can safely be argued that, two-level game involving the EU process 
was played by the Turkish political elite for purely instrumental purposes 
and for domestic political gains not for the intrinsic democratic benefits 
expected from Turkey’s EU membership or progress towards this end. 
Against the background of such an attitude, civil society has very little if 
any place extended to it or a role ‘granted’—as a legitimate participant, let 
alone partner—by the main actors who are dominating the political 
decision-making process. The participation in drafting of the legislation in 
ministries or the contribution to debates in Parliamentary commissions by 
civil society—and academia—are both considered a nuisance, even a major 
source of controversy and dispute, interfering in otherwise smooth (!) inter-
party relations and ‘harmonious’ exchange of views between MPs103. This 
distorted perception of civil society may even result in refusing the delivery 
of civil society publications in the Parliament, even though they are clearly 
addressed to the MPs by name.
104
 The fact that even the minds of the 
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 This unusual complaint was voiced by Bekir Bozdag, MP and Vice-Chair for AKP 
Parliamentary Caucus. He even criticised the bureaucracy as having more influence than 
the Parliament and Parliamentary commissions in legislative process: “[…] [their 
involvement] causes controversy between the political parties. It is the dispute between 
academics, rather than between us [political parties] which is observed in the Parliament 
from time to time. This may have a psychological effect on the public opinion, but its 
reflections on the Parliament is negative” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 198-99). 
104
 This complaint was consistently raised during interviews. One civil society 
representative, Günal Kursun, voiced the rejection of civil society publications by the 
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opposition MPs are ‘confused’ with regard to the role of civil society—and 
bureaucracy—in legislative and political decision-making processes is a 
testimony to the common nature of this critical aspect of the Turkish 
political elite culture.
105
 There is a fundamental resistance to the idea of 
participation in any form or from any circle. It is considered unfair and even 
illegitimate “sharing of the political authority” which is traditionally 
perceived ‘absolute’, not restrained or limited—in practice unaccountable 
beyond regular elections.
106
  
 
3.2. Political parties and political leadership 
     Huntington (1991) adopting a deterministic approach, argues that 
“Political leaders cannot, through will and skill, create democracy where 
preconditions are absent”. Similarly, on the role of socio-political structure 
over socio-economic variables for democratisation, Roniger and Günes-
Ayata (1994), indicate that, especially in societies laden with social 
                                                                                                                                                   
Parliament, as a major obstacle to participation: “How can the civil society which is even 
unable to deliver its publicatons to 550 MPs, allegedly based on security concerns, possibly 
participate in the legislative process effectively?” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 189).  
105
 M. Akif Hamzaçebi, MP and Vice-Chair for opposition CHP Parliamentary Caucus, 
expressed the other extreme, ruling out cooperation between bureaucracy, legislative and 
civil society altogether: “[…] in developed democracies […] once an agreement is reached 
within the civil society […] bills are passed by the Parliament without serious debate. […] 
Laws may look like the achievements of the ruling party, but they ought to be achievements 
of the civil society” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 204).  
Another MP, Emin Haluk Ayhan of opposition MHP, gives another example: “(In the sub-
commission) Sometimes there are cases which are open to more than one interpretation. 
Bureaucrats feel obliged, if reluctantly, to ask questions to the minister concerned […] 
some may stick to their arguments and the views of the institution they represent. […] then 
some ministers may ask other ministers to never again assign those bureaucrats to 
commission sessions” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 210). 
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 During a joint study involving bureaucracy, civil society and parliamentary staffers, 
attended by the author as a participant observer, an example was provided by one senior 
bureaucrat. In response to a suggestion by the civil society to improve participation in the 
legislative process from the drafting stage, she said that “this would tantamount to sharing 
the political prerogative [of the government] and required advance political decision”.  
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inequalities, public policies—whether distributive, regulative or 
extractive—are “potentially discretionary and thus open to clientelistic use 
and abuse” and they are in conflict with the requirements of democratic 
consolidation: “access to power, participation, responsiveness by political 
elites to social demands” (qtd. in Turan 1997: 297). Turan, on the other 
hand, maintains that, since in Turkey, “the society became the object of state 
intervention and centrally run policies of development and transformation 
[…] the relations between the state elites and society were almost in the 
nature of a command structure” (1997: 297). The virtual absence of the 
political elite—in the modern sense—in the Ottoman Empire and the merger 
and even fusion of political elite with state elite, both literally and 
functionally, in the Turkish Republic resulted in the evolution of a unique 
common political culture.  
     The top-down Turkish modernisation by the central Ottoman 
administration throughout the XIXth century and later during the first half 
of the XXth century by the Republic of Turkey through a single(state)-party 
created its own political culture and this culture was inherited—and 
willingly endorsed—by other parties of the multi-party era. The preference 
for a single-party system at the beginning of the modern Turkish Republic 
was, perhaps, out of necessity rather than a choice. This is probably why 
Duverger (1959) argues that “the Turkish single-party system was never 
based upon the doctrine of a single-party. It gave no official recognition to 
the monopoly, made no attempts to justify it by the existence of a classless 
society or the desire to do away with parliamentary strife and liberal 
democracy” (277). But, nevertheless it resulted in a political culture which 
was resistant to democratisation. Even after the transition to a multi-party 
political system
107
 in 1945, the 1924 Constitution of the single-party era was 
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 There were two short-lived trials of multi-party politics, in 1924 and 1930; both proved 
unsuccessful and unsustainable. First was the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver 
Cumhuriyet Firkasi). Following a religiously-motivated Sheikh Sait Rebellion in 
Southeastern Turkey, in 1925, was banned and dissolved in less than a year. Second, in 
1930 was the Free (Liberal) Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi) which was able 
to survive only three months. Its founder, realizing that the party was perceived by some 
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maintained until 1961 and if it were not for the 1960 military take over there 
was no real ‘search’ for a new—and more democratic—constitution on the 
part of the political elite. Once firmly rooted, ‘single-party’ mentality, with 
all its features, has dominated all political parties, their leadership, intra-
party relations, the Parliament, parliamentary committees, the legal 
framework—to include the Constitution of the Republic, and the Turkish 
political system a whole.    
     As exemplified, elaborated and evidenced in various sections, the 
dominant political culture in the Turkish party system suffers from strong 
authoritative tendencies and in this respect there is very little, if any, 
difference between the parties. This is not surprising because not only the 
Turkish formal education system neglects, even ignores the vital importance 
of a comprehensive and coherent learning process for infusion of 
democratic values, but also the ‘leaders’ lead by example in ways that are 
anything but encouraging and facilitating ‘liberal revolution’. Besides, the 
legal framework—the Constitution and particularly the Law on Political 
Parties
108
 and the Law on Parliamentary Elections
109—is far from providing 
for the institutions that would secure the freedoms essential for democratic 
practice. The consequences of this less than favourable framework are best 
seen in authoritarian leadership styles in political parties.   
     Legally, an MP does not represent the electoral district from where 
he/she is elected or his/her constituency solely, but the whole ‘nation’.110 
However, the reality is more complicated and sophisticated than that. In 
                                                                                                                                                   
conservative elements as a political tool against early reforms, particularly secularism, 
dissolved the party.  
108
 Law No. 2820, Law on Political Parties, adopted on 22 April 1983. Official Gazette, 24 
April 1983, No. 18027. 02 January 2013. 
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2820.pdf.  
109
 Law No. 2839, Law on Parliamentary Elections, adopted on 10 June 1983. Official 
Gazette, 13 June 1983, No. 18076. 02 January 2013. 
http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/618.html.  
110
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (as amended as of 7 May 2010), Art. 80.  
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large urban constituencies
111
, the link between a deputy and his/her 
constituencies is very vague to say the least. Hardly an MP would have 
direct contact and exchange of views—or demands, deliveries, favours—
with the constituency. For one, in most cases it is the party leadership who 
ultimately decides on the ranking of the candidate on a given ticket, not the 
constituency involved. Even if she/he ever really intends and actually 
attempts to reach out to the people he/she is representing, it is practically 
difficult if not impossible to do so. On the other hand, in most rural—
smaller—districts the ties between the constituents and their representatives 
can be quite personal. Then, for an MP, either promoting or protecting the 
interests of her/his constituents and/or representing the electoral district 
he/she was elected from can become the major task. According to 
Kalaycioglu (1995) “it is amazing to note that more than half of the deputies 
who were surveyed in 1984 and 1988 reported that they spent the majority 
of their time as deputies on case work—finding jobs, providing other 
services or benefits for constituents” (49). Kalaycioglu (1995) also asserts 
that “clientelistic linkages between the represented and the representatives 
emerge as the most important cord connecting the two in Turkey” (46).  
     But, in time, a differentiation in powers—hence functions—and a kind of 
division of labour gradually occurred between the individual MPs 
themselves and the Party, particularly the party leadership. As the executive 
came to controlling huge political and economic powers in the form of state 
enterprises, state banks, foreign currency, export and import quotas, tariffs, 
subsidies, investment in certain economic sectors etc, governing party or 
coalition of parties became real patrons and individual MPs were sidelined.    
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 In 2011, Istanbul had three electoral districts for 85 MPs, while Ankara and Izmir had 
two electoral districts for 31 and 26 MPs respectively. Each candidate had to secure the 
support of a constituency of approximately 150.000 strong to be elected in competition with 
a plurality of other candidates. However Bartin, Ardahan, Igdir, Yalova, Karabük, Kilis had 
single districts each for two MPs for much less votes required to be elected—e.g. Bartin 
93.000, Kilis 61.000.  High Council for Elections decision, No. 119, dated 26 February 
2011, No. 3 January 2013. http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/Kararlar/2011Pdf/2011-119.pdf.  
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     Selected and authorised ‘agents’ of patrons in central administrations of 
political parties became instrumental in distributing or allocating rents or 
other benefits. MPs became impotent, helpless figures who, absent 
substantial support from the party leadership, can only offer a lunch to 
visiting constituents, make telephone calls to hospital managers for those 
who are, almost always, in need of help in payments, or writing short notes 
to under-secretaries for job applications.
112
 This situation, by turning most 
of the MPs into dependent images without real political functions, and the 
Turkish political system into a struggle for either coming to power or 
staying in power after the next election, has paralysed the whole political 
decision-making and legislative systems. These processes as a whole are 
mostly closed to participation by ‘outsiders’—particularly the civil society.  
     In early 2000s, immediately after the financial crisis and the stock market 
crash in 2001, Carkoglu (2003) was quite optimistic and, in cynical terms, 
predicted some accountability in the Turkish political party system, now, he 
argued, free from patronage politics: “In contrast to being in ‘power without 
responsibility’ for decades of patronage-based policy-making, for the first 
time in multi-party politics in Turkey the present political parties seem 
unable to escape from ‘responsibility without power’” (246). The new 
economic policy initiative, imposed by the World Bank, in the wake of the 
collapse of the Turkish banking system, and the IMF’s involvement in the 
form of large loans controlled by stand-by agreements, must have led 
Carkoglu to such an ‘optimism’. But Turkish politics has increasingly 
proven resourceful enough to invent new—and more effective—forms of 
patronage. A new clientelism, in the form of organised commercial and 
financial interests, has also been added to the picture.  
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 SIGMA 2010 Report quotes about a million visitors per year to TGNA and most of them 
come to talk to their representative MPs to voice ‘individual’ requests. “Responding to 
requests, often communicated directly to Deputies during meetings at their offices in 
Ankara, takes up a large part of Deputies’ time, to the detriment of other parliamentary 
activities. It also takes up much of the time of their immediate support staff—i.e. the 
advisor and secretary that every Deputy has at his or her disposal” (SIGMA 2010: 22). 
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     It must be noted that since 2002 Turkey has been governed by one-party 
majority governments from the same party, and the governing party—
AKP—has multiplied its electoral support. Today it enjoys an electoral 
support unprecedented in Turkish political history. However, this expansion 
of the political support base has been accompanied by an increased 
authoritarian style in government and less attention to the principles of good 
governance. As a result, not only the Turkish economy has been as fragile as 
it was in early 2000s, but also its dependence on foreign investment has 
increased and it suffers from a huge balance of payments deficit. This makes 
the political system increasingly exclusionary and marginalizes the MPs—
of all parties—and more importantly, the Parliament as a whole. This 
outcome is a function of political leadership.   
     Leadership in general and political leadership specifically, is a vast 
subject of study. For the purposes of this thesis, this section has been 
restricted to the general features of the leadership in Turkish political parties 
as they relate to participation and inclusiveness in the political decision-
making and legislative processes.  
     The key to understanding the role and functions of a typical Turkish 
political party leader is its absolute authority. This authority can only be 
compared with that of a sultan. He—very occasionally, she—is typically 
assisted by three to five deputy chairs. The party leadership, as mentioned 
above, strictly controls nomination and renomination of candidates in 
Parliamentary elections. This gives party leaders a strong leverage over the 
MPs and—thank to some critical features of the Law on Political Parties—
also a major advantage over potential challengers of the leadership position. 
That’s why Turkish party chairmen are elected ‘for life’. Almost all party 
chairmen have left politics under extraordinary circumstances such as a 
military coup, death, a scandal (rarely), ‘upward’ mobility to Presidential 
office or sickness, not as a conscious personal choice of retirement—or 
political, electoral failure. They jealously defend their ‘castles’ and 
ruthlessly suppress any opposition—or any move they deem ‘opposition’. 
This attitude has had significant consequences.   
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     First of all, turnover rates of MPs in parties—and in the Parliament—are 
very high. Since the 1950s, they have been consistently above 50 percent, 
and in the 2002 and 2007 elections, they reached 89.1% and 59.3% percent 
respectively (SIGMA 2010: 22)
113
.  
     Since the great majority of MPs face considerable uncertainty over their 
re-election and their only chance for renomination—and re-election—is to 
flatter the chairman or at least avoid his fury and displeasure, they turn 
extremely ‘docile’.  
     Once they are in the Parliament, even if they are prepared to stand up to 
the ‘challenges’ posed by the party culture and take on a principled 
behaviour, their freedom of action is still restricted by party bylaws and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Parliament. Their nomination to Parliamentary 
commissions is done by the party leadership and even the legislative 
proposals they draft are subject to control—and red tape—by the 
Parliamentary Party Group in advance of their submission to the Office of 
the Speaker. Although there seems to be some degree of internal 
consultation within the parties, it is extremely limited and geared more 
towards decision-taking rather than policy-making, because policy 
‘decisions’ are made by the party leadership exclusively. 
     Turkish political parties are dominated by self-asserting transformational 
leaders motivated by strong ideological convictions, with personal 
resolution and political will. Decision-making systems in the parties are 
governed by idiosyncratic and ideological considerations. This has led to 
deinstitutionalisation of party politics. Policy-making processes are limited 
to dynamics taking place in a closed, small circle of party ‘leadership’ and 
the general pattern of interaction is ‘conformity’.  
     Therefore, while incentives to become an active, self-confident—and 
competent—MP are too weak, the tendency to comply with the demands 
and expectations of the party leadership is strong. SIGMA Report describes 
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 SIGMA 2010 Report gives slightly different rates on page 25. “After the 1999 election, 
54.2% of Deputies had never held parliamentary office before; in 2002 and 2007, the 
percentages were 80.5% and 49.3% respectively.”  
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and explains the payoff of the leadership ‘culture’ in Turkish political parties 
legibly: 
          […] the opportunities for ‘back-bench’ Deputies, i.e. those who are  
     not members of the party leadership, to help shape the policy profile of  
     the party […] are very limited. […] turnover in Parliament is high,  
     committee assignments uncertain, committee memberships might change  
     after two years. […] Thus, access to policy expertise is both difficult and  
     the ‘payoffs’ of specialisation—in terms of Deputies’ policy influence or  
     personal advancement—are, at best, uncertain”. (SIGMA 2010: 23) 
 
     This type of political leadership in parties is one thing, but when one 
party dominates the political scene for more than a decade as the governing 
party, the repercussions would not be restricted to this single party only, but 
influence the whole political system deeply. This is what has exactly 
happened during the ‘reform’ process. The governing AKP, based on its 
parliamentary majority, controls the Parliament and, generally, has the 
ability to impose its party policy goals.  
     Individual deputies do have considerable constitutional authority to act 
independently from their parties, if they choose so. Whether they are—
ever—willing to use it, is another matter.  
     Kalaycioglu (1995) conducted two surveys, in 1984 and in 1988 
respectively, of the attitudes, beliefs and backgrounds of the deputies of the 
Turkish Parliament. He identified four representational styles in the 
parliament: ‘traditional strongman’, representing the traditional agricultural 
interests of underdeveloped rural Turkey; ‘the gentleman of the periphery’, 
elected because of their ties to famous families or religious orders and—
generally—act only to promote parochial interests; ‘lobbyists’ of the 
interests of big business and other organised interests; ‘diplomats’ who tend 
to work to promote a certain image of Turkey, acting almost as agents of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter two groups—from business, top-level 
bureaucracy, journalism or academia—were essentially different from the 
former two in terms of the interests they represent, their backgrounds and 
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life-styles, representing liberal, international and/or market interests. The 
former two groups, on the other hand, represented local, parochial, and/or 
traditional interests. In the 1980s they constituted about three fourths of all 
the MPs. (Kalaycioglu 1995: 42-59) 
     SIGMA Report, decades later in 2010—based on 2007 numbers, arrived 
at similar findings. According to Peer Review Report, four groups 
dominated the Parliament and despite long and frequent political upheavals, 
their shares remained fairly stable over time. “Deputies with a background 
in economics and business: 25.9%; education: 19.5%; law: 15.9%; 
engineering: 15.9%”. The report found “the social profile of the Deputies 
from the two largest parties—the AKP and the CHP—remarkably similar in 
terms of their professional backgrounds” (SIGMA 2010: 24). Also similar 
were the functions performed by a typical MP; so-called ‘case work’, 
required by primordial ties, continued to have precedence over ‘legislative’ 
activities. However, as elaborated elsewhere in this paper, pork-barrel 
services, albeit in different forms—sectoral rather than geographical—
controlled by a small cadre representing the party leadership gained more 
importance. This not only further sidelined the individual MP but also 
contributed to the marginalisation of the Parliament as a whole as the 
legislative branch of the government.   
     One other important change that took place with fundamental effect on 
the effective functioning of the Parliament was the disappearance of 
fragmentation in the Turkish party system. As late as mid-1990s, Özbudun 
(1997) described the Turkish party system as “more fragmented than ever”:  
          The largest party in the December 1995 elections (Welfare Party)  
     received only 21.4 percent of the vote. […] Both major tendencies are  
     now divided into two parties each […] a high degree of volatility in the  
     Turkish party system suggests an almost continuous process of  
     realignment. […] Another worrisome change in the party system is the  
     increasing weakening of the moderate centre-right and centre-left  
     tendencies. A fourth malaise in the party system is the organisational  
     weakening of parties and of party identification ties. (87-89) 
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     Özbudun explained this fragmentation with what Huntington (1991) 
described as el desencanto, disillusionment, “to be part of the more general 
problem of typical of many new democracies”. Party fragmentation actually 
reflected fragmentation of the democracy coalition. According to 
Huntington (1991) “The leaders of the new democracies often came to be 
viewed as arrogant, incompetent or corrupt or some combination of all 
three” (256). This happened in Turkey belatedly—or perhaps in a prolonged 
fashion.    
     Özbudun (1997) also argued that “despite the sense of disillusionment 
among many voters, this did not turn into an ideological challenge to the 
democratic system itself. Increased valorisation of democracy as an end in 
itself [was] operative in Turkey as in many other democracies” (89). But “a 
related response to democracy […], authoritarian nostalgia” (Huntington 
1991: 257) arrived after the experiment with democracy from 1983 until 
2002. The surprisingly landslide electoral victory of the AKP in 2002, ever-
increasing voting rates in 2007 and 2011 elections, resulted in a preference 
for a “strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and 
elections” by the majority of the Turkish electorate.114 Literally, the Turkish 
people see the Parliament—cynically, perhaps democracy itself—as an 
impediment, a liability and do not have much confidence in the 
Parliament—much less in political parties.115   
                                                          
114
 World Values Survey, Turkey (2007).  
Q. “[…] political systems […] as a way of governing this country. […]? Having a strong 
leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”. “Very good, fairly 
good”: Turkey, 58.9%. In 2011 this became 63%. “Fairly bad, very bad”: Turkey, 41.2%. 
In 2000 this was 73%.  31 December 2012. 
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeIndex.jsp. 
For 2011 findings see; 2011 Turkey Values Survey. Summary of findings, 21 July 2011. 
Yilmaz Esmer. Bahcesehir University. 28 December 2012. 
egiad.org.tr/userfiles/ftp/.../dunyadegerlerozet.doc. 
115
 Ibid. Q. “[…] how much confidence you have […] in Parliament?: “A great deal, a lot”: 
61.5%. 
Q. “[…] how much confidence you have […] in political parties?: “A great deal, a lot”: 
34.41%.  
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     As discussed earlier, one other general characteristic of the Turkish 
political party system has been—at times, intense—polarization. Ergüder 
(1995), in mid-1990s predicted that “there [were] some signs that an effort 
to bridge the gap between the secularists and religiously-motivated political 
elites [was] underway. A broad consensus between political parties and 
social forces seem[ed] to have emerged […]. The problem of the 1990s 
[was] to operationalize this consensus” (67-72). This did not occur. The 
Turkish political system is more polarized than ever today and the gap is 
widest. Wide-spread mutual distrust, polarisation and dominant political 
culture combine to make collaboration between political parties a real 
challenge. There is a general tendency to see those who are not ‘us’ as being 
‘against us’. European Parliament in March 2011 Resolution—immediately 
after the intense and almost fanatical polarisation following the 2010 
Constitutional referendum—made an unusual statement on this point:  
          […] concerned about the ongoing confrontation between the political  
     parties and the lack of readiness on the part of Government and  
     opposition to work towards consensus on key reforms; urges all political  
     actors, the Government and the opposition to work together to enhance  
     political plurality in state institutions and to promote the modernisation  
     and democratisation of the state and society […]. (EP 2010: 3)  
 
     As for the parliamentary oversight and scrutiny—major parliamentary 
functions in consolidated democracies—the situation is less than promising. 
Peer Review Report makes a stunning observation:  
          […] interview evidence suggests that oversight and scrutiny are not a  
     central part of the opposition strategy. Thus, opposition Deputies (just  
     like members of the governing party) allocate a great deal of their time to  
     constituency service. Perhaps more surprisingly, the opposition does  
     spend considerable resources on tabling draft laws, even though these  
     have no chance of being adopted by the Plenary. (SIGMA 2010: 20) 
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     This bold and straightforward statement indicates that while the political 
opposition does not have the ability to pass laws or amend them in 
Parliamentary committees or in the Plenary, neither does it have the will to 
really scrutinize the government’s past performance and future intentions.  
     As for the cooperation with and openness to civil society, Encarnacion 
(2003) argues that "political parties (especially those fully anchored in 
society) are especially relevant to the production of social capital” because 
of their “capacity to integrate and mobilise the general public” and to 
“provide citizens and social groups with access to the policy arena thereby 
giving voice and leverage to civil society vis-à-vis the state” (41-42). For 
the purposes of this research, this argument sounds important for two 
reasons: political parties are ‘primary’ producers of ‘social capital’ which 
civil society has to rely on. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly in 
Turkish context, without ‘links’ to political parties, civil society in general 
and civil society organisations in particular has little to do in terms of 
participating in and having a voice in policy-making and legislative 
processes.  
     One caveat is important here: there are some civil society institutions 
with close and permanent links to political parties. However such civil 
society organisations are so closely associated with respective parties that 
they have become de facto extensions of these parties rather than 
autonomous members of civil society. This perception is shared, supported, 
supplemented and aggressively—proudly—maintained both by the civil 
society organisations with such links and those parties who incubate them. 
This is not only an impasse for an effective civil society but also a threat to 
the creation of an autonomous civil society and this trend in contemporary 
Turkish politics is giving clear signs of an increase rather than decrease. 
     The Parliament is the first level in the decision-making and legislative 
process and—for all practical purposes—is the only ‘actor’, open to civil 
society ‘participation’—however qualified though. In recent years, two 
important initiatives to fundamentally reform the Parliament in the widest 
sense have been taken in connection with each other: SIGMA Peer Review 
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Report of 2011, and the Parliamentary Committee for drafting a new Rules 
of Procedure for the Parliament. Both have been carried out in cooperation 
with civil society and particularly international civil society and enjoyed 
large-scale support, but both have sadly failed and an important opportunity 
for reforming the TGNA and significantly improving civil society 
participation has been wasted.  
     SIGMA Report of 2011, took an x-ray of not only the TGNA but also—
perhaps more—of the Turkish political system with its all shortcomings, 
flaws and illnesses. Its critical importance notwithstanding, the TGNA 23rd 
Term Report, while giving details such as ‘toilets repaired’, ‘curtains 
replaced’, ‘plant-information tags attached to flower pots’, did not even 
mention of the SIGMA Report. But it did mention the EU Twinning Project 
of 2008
116, as the project which was “included among those that received 
the highest grade, conducted in a timely manner, without major problems, in 
the EU Commission publications”117—whatever this ‘inclusion’ meant to 
the drafters.  
     SIGMA Report was a significant non-partisan attempt to reform the 
TGNA, included substantial work and made comprehensive, coherent and 
unmistakable recommendations based on self-evaluation by the serving 
MPs. It was striking, particularly after the EU Twinning Project exercise 
about three years ago, that none of its recommendations had been carried 
through. None of the governing party Deputies—Pakdil, Erdem and 
Sönmez—who took part in the preparation of the SIGMA Report, was able 
to be nominated—hence run—for another term in 2011 elections. This 
                                                          
116
 EU Twinning Project ‘Strengthening the Capacity of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly’ (2006-2008): the overall objective was to improve the quality of Turkish 
legislation concerning harmonisation with the acquis. In particular, the Project aimed to 
strengthen the capacity of the Office for EU Affairs to EU Harmonisation Committee and 
the permanent committees by raising the awareness of the staff in the area of acquis. The 
Project included five evaluation meetings, 17 training seminars and six study visits to the 
Member States and European Parliament. See; Final Report. 12 February 2013. 
http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_surecine_katilim/3/final_report_10_04_2009.pdf.  
117
 See; (TGNA 23rd Term Report: 72) 
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situation signals more deeper problems obstructing real reform in the 
Parliament.  
     This finding is confirmed by the other unsuccessful attempt for reform; 
draft new Rules of Procedure for the Parliament. Despite the considerable 
effort dedicated to yet another non-partisan search for long-overdue reform 
and associated work, and after the agreement reached over a common text—
supported by the EU and civil society as a whole—it has failed to become 
law.
118
 Even the Speaker—from the governing party—who initiated this 
work, in a very unusual political manoeuvre, at mid-term, was replaced by 
another MP from the same party.
119
  
     And finally, comprehensive and unprecedented efforts of the 
Parliamentary ‘civil society’, particularly for improving civil society’s 
participation by sanctioning it in the Rules of Procedure for the TGNA and 
by drafting a law proposal specifically on the subject, have not given any 
fruit thanks to virtually complete lack of a political will—hence no 
support—to this end. 120 Obstacles to effective participation at the 
Parliament continue and there are no formal protocols that govern how civil 
society can ‘participate’. 
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 One senior staff member in the Parliament commented that “the names of the MPs 
assigned to the Committee for a New Rules of Procedure had indicated at the outset that the 
Parties did not really want a new Rules of Procedure”. Interview, March 2012. The Speaker 
of the Parliament, Cemil Cicek formed yet another Committee for the Rules of Procedure in 
December 2012. 
119
 Köksal Toptan (2007-2009)—who formed the non-partisan committee for a draft new 
Rules of Procedure in February—was replaced by M. Ali Sahin in August 2009.  
120
 “[…] there is no system for accrediting interest and civil society organisations, so that 
the status of organisations invited to take part in committee meetings […] is somewhat 
uncertain. […] the unpredictability of committee agendas, […] creates problems not just for 
Deputies […] but equally for […] civil society organisations. With legislation often put on 
committee agendas at short notice, it is, in practice, difficult for civil society organisations 
to respond effectively to invitations to present their views. […] meetings at which time is 
set aside to allow a range of affected interests to state their views and opinions in a formal 
manner are rare” (SIGMA: 13). 
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     As for the overall performance of the Parliament, as pointed out again 
and again in successive EC and EP reports, the findings of this research also 
suggest that the legislature is not independent from the executive and no 
‘separation of powers’ is really applicable to executive-legislative 
relationship in Turkey. As one senior staffer put it; “Fingers are raised and 
brought down as directed (by the executive)”.121   
 
3.3. Legislative process  
     Legislative process is the natural continuation of the political decision-
making and policy formulation process and provides the legal 
measures/tools to implement strategic plans in respective policy areas. 
Legislative process involves two parallel—slightly desynchronized—sub-
processes: ‘drafting’ law texts and then ‘making’ them into law. In Turkey, 
legislative process—and other parliamentary functions such as oversight 
and scrutiny—are mainly governed and regulated by the Constitution of the 
Republic of Turkey (1982)
122—referred throughout as the Constitution; 
Bylaw on the Procedures and Principles for Preparation of Codes and 
Statutes (2006)
123—referred as the Bylaw-2006; the Rules of Procedure of 
                                                          
121
 Interview;  March 2012. 
122
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. Law Number 2709, dated 7 November 
1982. First adopted by the Founding Assembly (tr. Kurucu Meclis) on 18 October 1982 for 
referandum, published in Official Gazette No 17844, on 20 October 1982. Following 
referandum, republished on 9 November 1982, Official Gazette No 17863. (As amended as 
of 7 May 2010, by Law No 5982, Official Gazette No 27580, on 13 May 2010). 28 
February 2012. http://www.byegm.gov.tr/content.aspx?s=tcotrot. 
123
 Bylaw on the Procedures and Principles for Preparation of Codes and Statutes (tr. 
Mevzuat Hazirlama Usul ve Esaslari Hakkında Yönetmelik). Cabinet Decision date: 19 
December 2005, No: 2005/9986, based on the Law Number 3056, dated 10 October 1984, 
Official Gazette: 17 February 2006, No: 26083. 04 March 2012.  
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/3.5.20059986.pdfhttp://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Me
vzuatMetin/3.5.20059986.pdf.  
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the Turkish Grand National Assembly (1973)
124—referred as the Rules of 
Procedure; precedent and convention.  
     Both drafting, i.e. writing laws, and legislation, i.e. making laws, involve 
various actors and organisations at different stages of respective processes. 
It must be noted that legislative process is circular in nature rather than 
linear.
125
 The Constitution and amendments to it, some decisions of the 
judiciary, government programmes, national development programmes and 
plans, current requirements prompted by implementation of laws and 
bylaws, international relations—e.g. Turkey’s European Union accession 
process, social and technological developments may require new legislation.  
     Laws, by the Constitution
126
, can only be initiated either by the 
government or members of parliament—either individually or in groups. 
The Bylaw-2006 regulates and directs procedures for preparation of the 
government-initiated bills—draft laws, and covers the process from 
ministries to (including) Prime Minister’s Office. Proposals of law, initiated 
by MPs, are directly given to the Office of the Speaker of the Parliament
127
.  
     The Rules of Procedure, as its name implies, is about agreed-upon 
procedures through which legislation takes place once a bill or a proposal of 
law arrives at Speaker’s Office and given a ‘number’. Decision-making, 
policy (re)formulation and developing a law in the Parliament—and 
elsewhere for that matter—involve completely different dynamics and are 
                                                          
124
 The Rules of Procedure for the Turkish Grand National Assembly (tr. Türkiye Büyük 
Millet Meclisi Ic Tüzügü). Decision Number 584, dated 05 March 1973. Official Gazette: 
13 April 1973, No. 14506. 05 March 2012. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ictuzuk/ictuzuk.htm.  
125
 Three other essential parliamentary functions of ‘executive oversight’, ‘scrutiny’ and 
‘representation’—in addition to the adoption of the budget—are also closely related to 
legislation, and the associated processes are circular in nature; however this aspect is not 
particularly examined in this thesis. 
126
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (as amended as of 7 May 2010), Art 88. 
127
 Bills (tr. Kanun taslagi) are initiated by the Government and they are subject to long, 
detailed and complicated procedures. Draft laws (tr. Kanun teklifi) are those prepared by 
Deputies—even by an individual, single Deputy—and directly given to the Parliament—to 
the Speaker’s Office. Appx. 80-90% of the law proposals which become law are brought to 
the Parliament in the form of bills, i.e. they are initiated by the Government.  
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mostly based on unwritten rules and procedures. Nevertheless, the two 
processes of political decision-making/policy formulation—which remains 
mainly within the purview of the government—and the legislation, in 
general sense a common effort involving other actors, are parallel, 
sometimes iterative processes. Needless to say, the very purpose of the 
Rules of Procedure is about the ‘procedural’ aspects of the legislative 
process; it excludes both political decision–making and policy formulation. 
But the legislative process does necessarily have a policy 
development/(re)formulation dimension, ‘governed’ by the Rules of 
Procedure. 
     Most of the drafting, or ‘writing’ the text of the law—in the case of 
bills—takes place in ministries and then given the final form in the Office of 
the Prime Minister. They represent two black-boxes, where civil society, or 
any other organisation for that matter, can possibly penetrate, let alone have 
any influence in the process in general. Perhaps one can name yet another 
black-box which is the parties, because political party groups also exercise 
tight control over the activities of their members. Once a policy decision is 
made, texts for legislation, in bill or proposal of law form are initiated from 
one of these three ‘sources’. 
     Political parties may—and do—impose restrictions on such initiatives 
and control—sometimes even censure—drafts prepared by their member 
Deputies, based on their Party and/or Parliamentary Group Internal 
Regulations. Therefore, although political parties are not entitled to 
‘initiating’ laws, in practice they do so by using the channels open to the 
members of the Parliament. In practice, cover letters of proposals of law 
forwarded to the Speaker’s Office by MPs bear the stamps of parliamentary 
groups. This situation may be explained by party discipline and can be 
rationalised by measures in relevant Group Regulations enabling Deputies 
to challenge obstructive interventions through party organs.
 128
 However, 
clearly these are less than perfect examples of in-party democracy.  
                                                          
128
 For examples, see; AKP Parliamentary Group Internal Regulation (tr. Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi TBMM Grubu Ic Yönetmeligi), Art. 28-32. 30 May 2012. 
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     ‘Drafting’ a law is essentially technical in nature and remains mostly 
outside the scope of this research. However, it is almost as problematic as 
the ‘making’ of it. The problems involve language—use of proper Turkish 
and standard terminology, quality of draft in terms of avoiding duplications, 
and more importantly, avoiding conflicts or contradictions with other, 
already existing laws, even with other articles of the very same law itself. 
There is a lack of coordination between organisations and institutions which 
have a stake in the same area of legislation and there is very little, if any 
input, from civil society. Since key cadre, in ministries, are replaced by 
every incoming government, novice bureaucrats struggle for survival rather 
than quality work in drafting.
129
 Texts of laws are extremely long and 
complicated. Many aspects, actually not related to the essence of the basic 
law, but to its day-to-day implementation, even certain nitty-gritty details 
which would not require any regulation at all, are included in the legislated 
law itself, effectively turning laws into by-laws or regulations.   
     Problems involved in the ‘legislative’ process are deeper, more 
fundamental and certainly ‘political’ in nature: that is why, each attempt to 
solve them by way of a new rules of procedure, as explained below, has 
repeatedly failed. Legislative process is made work ‘very fast’ and there is 
always a never-ending need for many—and urgent—amendments to 
                                                                                                                                                   
http://www.akparti.org.tr/tbmm/icyonetmelik.pdf; CHP Party Statute (tr. Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi Parti Tüzügü) Art. 64, 68. 30 May 2012. http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/CHP-Tuzuk.pdf; MHP Party Statute (tr. Milliyetci Hareket Partisi 
Parti Tüzügü) Art. 79, 80. 30 May 2012.  
http://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/_mhp2007/kitaplar/mhp_parti_tuzugu_2009_opt.pdf.  
129
 Speaker of the Parliament Cemil Cicek, when he was Dpty. Prime Minister, indicated 
some of the problems associated with drafting at ministries as the “prominent example of 
poor quality” in the national education system: “[…] the areas where we can clearly see the 
reflection of problems of quality in the [national] education system are those related to 
legislative activities. […] If there is a felt need to amend a law, again, in a month time, even 
before it goes into effect, this is not due to requirements of the society (public), but the 
inability of our collegues who take part in law-drafting process, to take into consideration 
all aspects of the subject. […] a problem of quality […].” 17 January 2010. (Neziroglu & 
Bakirci 2011: 19) 
 126 
existing laws.
130
 Unavailability of the Parliamentary agenda in a timely 
manner and last minute changes to it, make the whole parliamentary process 
depleted with hurdles. The desperate need to balance the government’s urge 
to pass the laws as soon—and as less problematic—as possible and the 
opposition’s initiatives to delay the process and control the executive, for 
most of the time, presents insurmountable obstacles to proper functioning of 
the parliament.
131
  
     At first sight, it may seem as if the executive and the political opposition 
in the Parliament share legislative agenda-setting functions. However, the 
overwhelming majority of laws eventually adopted by the TGNA are based 
on government-initiated bills. Proposals of law submitted by the opposition 
Deputies, in practice, have almost no chance of becoming law. The whole 
process is firmly dominated by the executive, i.e. the governing party.
132
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 Majority of the laws passed by the Turkish parliament are amendments to existing laws. 
Mehmet Ali Sahin, Speaker of the Parliament from 2009 to 2011, in January 2011 
Symposium, giving some statistics, complained about the overload of the Parliament: 
“During the 23rd Term, we [the Parliament] received 1601 [sic] drafts and proposals, 415 
[sic] of them had a chance to become law. In England [sic], 30-35 laws are legislated each 
year. In Germany they pass laws less than half of what we do. […] 5434 Pension Fund 
(Emekli Sandigi) Law was amended 160 times, […] Value-Added Tax (Katma Deger 
Vergisi) Law of 1984, amended 27 times in 44 years. […] 3713 Anti-Terror (Terorle 
Mücadele) Law, 24 times, […] 4734 State Bidding (Kamu Ihale) Law 20 times […] (and) 
Law Number 6001, dated 25 Haziran 2010, on State Highway Administration, we amended 
(only) 27 days after it was passed by the [very same] Parliament.” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 
2011: 23-24). As of end of the Term, the numbers were 1690—received, and 862—passed, 
respectively. See; TGNA 23rd Term Report, p. 79. 05 January 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/bilgiedinme/23_Dnm_Faaliyet_Raporu.pdf.  
131
 When a consensus between the government and the opposition can be achieved, it has 
been possible to pass three laws of 2700 articles in one single week, in January 2011. 
However as in the case of the Law on Mine-Clearing on the Syrian Border, a 6–article law 
took eight parliamentary sessions, from May, 12th through June, 3rd—22 days. (Neziroglu 
& Bakirci 2011: 13). How appropriate, passing laws of thousands of articles in a single 
week, is another subject for debate. 
132
 SIGMA Peer Review Report of 2010 has made a comprehensive evaluation of the 
administrative capacity of TGNA. ‘SIGMA’ stands for Support for Improvement in 
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     Draft bills are prepared by the ministry of primary responsibility, but 
coordinated with other ministries with related responsibilities in the same 
area. In most ministries, Strategy Development Departments
133
 are offices 
of primary responsibility (OPR) for developing laws and regulations and the 
point of contact (POC) for overall coordination of the related work. That 
doesn’t necessarily mean that each and every draft is actually prepared by 
this office.
134
  
     Each office, within the scope of government programmes, national 
development programmes/plans and action plans of respective ministries, 
                                                                                                                                                   
Governance and Management, a common initiative of the European Union—EU, and the 
Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development—OECD. SIGMA Report addressed; 
the committee system; management of parliamentary business; executive-legislative 
relations; the legislative process and the quality of legislation; Parliament and EU 
accession; Parliament, the budgetary process and public accounts; parliamentary oversight 
and scrutiny; Parliamentary groups and Deputies; administration and personnel of the 
TGNA. The Peer Review Team, who prepared the report, paid four working visits to 
Turkey; in June and October 2009 and in February and June 2010. It was supported by an 
Advisory Group, Steering Group and a Working group from the TGNA, involving 
Deputies, General Secretariat and expert staff. The key capacity concerns highlighted by 
SIGMA Report are mentioned and put into current context in relevant parts of this thesis. 
For the full report see; http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/yayinlar/sigma_report_final_eng.pdf. 05 
January 2013. 
133
 Strategy Development Departments—and their functions—have been established by 
Law No 5018 (tr. Kamu Mali Yönetimi ve Kontrol Kanunu) as amended by Law No 5436. 
They are not only OPR and POC for developing ‘ministerial drafts’, they also coordinate 
their ministry’s input to other ministries and to other state institutions’ work, prepare their 
ministry’s or government’s views on draft laws proposed by the MPs and participate in 
Parliamentary commissions—representing their ministry—and answer questions, ‘defend’ 
their institutional views, policies. However, their official responsibilities do not include 
anything related to the legislative process. 
134
 Some ministries, the Ministry of Justice for example, form ‘drafting commissions’ 
involving a wide array of participants; “academics with expertise in this area, 
representatives of higher judicial bodies and first-degree courts are especially included in 
commissions. Besides, depending on the relevancy of the subject, representatives from civil 
society organisations also take part in the commission.” Statement by Akin Cakin, Dpty. 
Head of Laws Directorate, Ministry of Justice. (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 84).       
 128 
can—and do—initiate a drafting process if there is a felt need. Minister’s 
consent and/or directive, based on an initial analysis, is sought first. Once 
the first draft is ready, views and inputs from other agencies within the same 
ministry are collected by the Strategy Development departments and 
forwarded to the initiator office for incorporation. If there is complete 
consensus, the second draft or so-called ministerial draft is ready for 
coordination with outside agencies. Then, the same process is followed, this 
time for the third draft. Bylaw-2006 calls for a 30-day deadline for provision 
of views, inputs or for raising objections to the ministerial draft. This is too 
close for a meaningful study of the draft especially if it is about regulating a 
contentious and/or complicated area with political, social, economic and 
other ramifications requiring multi-disciplinary approach and cooperation 
with external agencies—including civil society.135  
     If there isn’t any major divergence of views between the agencies 
involved, then, the fourth and the final draft at ministry level is ready for 
forwarding to the Office of the Prime Minister. If there are irreconcilable 
differences at any stage, they are first attempted to be solved through 
meetings; failing this, Minister(s) would have the final say. In such cases, 
the draft sent to Prime Minister’s Office would explain the points of 
differences and detailed background information on them. This—
ministerial—stage, if ‘permitted’ by the political elite, is dominated by 
bureaucracy.
136
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 Bylaw-2006, Art. 7. It is of course possible to extend the deadline, but, in practice, this 
is rarely done.  
136
 One related aspect of ‘Turkish’ style legislation process is the systematic attempts made 
by bureaucracy to ‘incorporate’ provisions that would improve their social rights and 
increase salaries of civil servants. This can be done in such imaginative ways that even the 
minister himself may not be aware of it before it comes to implementation. In other times, a 
very unique relationship, reflecting the ‘critical’ psychological  interaction between 
minister the politician and the corps of civil servants, may come into play: “If bureaucracy 
wants to avoid responsibility, then, includes an article in the draft law in order to pass the 
bug to politicians and the government stands behind that, brings it (to the Parliament). […] 
Because the bureaucracy is scared, and in case something comes up, wants the minister is 
held responsible. And, the Minister, despite much criticism and objections, says; ‘Well, so 
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     The same draft, at the time of its forwarding, is supposed to be posted in 
the web-site of the ministry—if it ‘concerns the public’. This, usually, is the 
first opportunity when civil society organisations as well as the general 
public be informed and can initiate action or attempt to provide inputs. The 
views of civil society organisations ‘may’ be sought by the OPR even 
before. But, if this ever happens, most of the time it is at a very late stage. 
The Bylaw-2006 describes coordination of the draft bill with ministries and 
other state institutions as ‘obligatory’; but, ‘it is possible’ to benefit from the 
views of ‘civil society organisations’ whereas ‘drafts that may be of interest 
to the public may be shared with the public through internet or the media’. 
So, coordination with civil society is simply discretionary.
137
  
     In addition to common problems of language and the lack of 
coordination, there are two main problems, confronted at the level of 
ministries: first, describing the actual need in the area intended to regulate 
by the law in hand, based on concrete data and other factors having an 
influence on, and secondly, inability to gather a multidisciplinary team that 
would be providing the needed expertise in a plethora of areas—legal, 
political, sociology etc.  
     Actually there are no specific—neither legal, nor administrative—
obstacles to; first, deciding who and which organisations can positively 
contribute to developing a good text—that is, a verbal formulation which 
best reflects the expressed aims and intentions of the policy decision—for 
the bill, and secondly, maintaining a smooth, meaningful and productive 
                                                                                                                                                   
be it, if the bureaucracy has prepared it that way let’s legislate it this way!’.” (Neziroglu & 
Bakirci  2011: 205). 
137
 Bylaw-2006, Art. 6 - (1) Before drafts are forwarded to the Office of the Prime Minister, 
views of the ministries involved and those of other state institutions and organisations are 
taken (into consideration). […] taking their views are compulsary. (2) The views of local 
administrations, universities, trade unions, professional organisations and civil society 
institutions, on the drafts, are also benefitted from. (3) Those drafts which are of interest to 
the general public, before being forwarded to the Office of the Prime Minister, may be 
shared with the public by the ministry of primary responsibility, via internet, media and 
information channels.  
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working relationship with ‘them’. These include civil society—think-tanks, 
other organisations, professional bodies, unions etc. However, in practice, 
this doesn’t happen—mainly for political and cultural reasons. Bureaucratic 
politics is one way, to explain this awkward situation, at least partly, but is 
not enough.   
     ‘Parochialism’ is common in bureaucracy and all ‘parties’ to a draft 
legislation adopt personal, institutional, political, even ideological 
standpoints. There is very little intra and/or inter-ministerial coordination.
138
 
When it happens it is mostly for window dressing, generally too late and/or 
in a haphazard way. Views of others—as well as the requirements of the 
Bylaw-2006, are simply ignored. It is ironic that, often, even the advice of 
in-house advisors is not sought. The views/inputs are not made available in 
a timely manner for the OPR; when available, most of the time they are not 
worthy of consideration with no real added-value. This is not always 
because the providers are not competent enough. Since they know that their 
views/inputs are not taken seriously nor valued, they are not prepared for 
‘wasting’ time in drafting inputs. This common behaviour has been 
institutionalised and creates a vicious circle extremely difficult to break. As 
a result, draft texts are prepared by a small circle of functionaries. This 
attitude is reinforced by a wide-spread prejudice regarding the ‘role’ of civil 
society as ‘trouble-makers’. 
     There is an almost religiously observed tendency for ever-faster 
legislative process; a constant urge to rush things and to produce as much 
legislation as possible in an ever-shorter period of time. This constant race 
against time, as a cultural ‘defect’, dominates the institutional culture in 
ministries—as elsewhere in the system—and does not allow quality work, 
resulting in a preference for quantity over quality. 
                                                          
138
 An opposition Deputy gives a telling example: “[…] draft comes to the Parliament, 
bearing the signature of the ministry [sic] under it, representatives of the organisation [sic] 
come to the Commission, none of them is aware of the draft. It is bearing signatures of the 
whole Cabinet. The Commission forwards it to a sub-commission, drafting is restarted from 
scratch.” E. Haluk Ayhan, MP, MHP. (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 210). 
 131 
     Given the rapid rate of turnover of the key personnel, hardly a case file is 
started, worked through and finalised by the same staff. Such discontinuity 
has proven counter-productive in terms of dedication, motivation and 
ownership of the projects. Although the need for a “professional, 
independent, accountable, transparent and merit-based civil service” and “a 
lack of consultation by civil service of relevant stakeholders in the 
preparation of policies and legislation” repeatedly included in EU progress 
reports
139
, these are yet to be materialized. Because of incomplete and 
sometimes contradictory work of poor quality, legislation is often amended 
in a piece-meal fashion, hastily and sometimes even before it goes into 
effect. 
     To make things worse, the lack of legislative systematique, disorderly, 
even messy, casuistic nature of the Turkish law and legal system with no 
‘norm laws’ makes dealing with any draft, regulating an area or amending 
an already existing law a difficult and, for most of the time, a risky business 
which needs to be handled swiftly and with as less interference and 
‘intrusion’ as possible. 
     Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIA)
140
 which are required by the 
relevant circular are seldom prepared. This is mainly due to the attitude of 
                                                          
139
 “[…] efforts are needed, in particular on the modernisation of civil service. Reducing red 
tape and promoting administrative simplification, as well as further developing a 
professional, independent, accountable, transparent and merit-based civil service remain 
priorities” (EC 2009: 9). “[…] no progress has been made on reforming the civil service 
system […] to develop regulatory impact assessments (RIA) […]. Also, there is a lack of 
consultation by civil service of relevant stakeholders in the preparation of policies and 
legislation. Enforcement of common standards and uniform implementation of the rules 
across the civil service remain to be achieved” (EC 2010: 10). “[…] the comprehensive 
civil service reform required to modernise human resources management has yet to 
materialise” (EC 2011: 11). 
140
 Regulatory Impact Assessment (Düzenleyici Etki Analizi): In the case of bills with 
“major revenue or expenditure implications”, RIAs are required by the Government 
Circulation on Regulatory Impact Assessment, dated 3 April 2007. It sheds light on the 
economic and social impacts of proposed legislation and its administrative feasibility and 
implementability. RIA is time-consuming, but nevertheless not binding. They help 
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bureaucracy which can be called ‘risk-avoidance syndrome’. Risk avoidance 
in ministries—and in state bureaucracy in general—takes the forms of 
avoiding detailed rationale for draft legislation on the one hand, but also 
including even routine bureaucratic actions in laws on the other—mainly for 
the purpose of shifting full responsibility to politicians. This syndrome 
sometimes in the form of ‘protecting’ information—refraining from sharing 
it—even from the minister himself, not only complicates the drafting 
process, but also makes participation by civil society ‘potentially’ 
cumbersome.  
     Risk avoidance, in order to avoid political controversy, may also prevent 
preparation of fully-developed drafts. Because politically-correct or the 
most-preferred option is not always ‘technically’ the best option. 
Anticipating the expectations at the next stage—Office of the Prime 
Minister—bureaucracy at the ministry stops at a politically-safe step. The 
coordinated final draft which is forwarded to the former is actually a rough 
draft far from being a perfect text. This tantamounts to applying self-
censorship and leaving the real ‘ministerial’ work to the Office of the Prime 
Minister. One senior bureaucrat, Mustafa Dogan, Deputy Director, Acts and 
Resolutions, Prime Minister’s Office, attests; “[…] institutions (ministries) 
want to muddle through quickly. To that end, they even do not bother 
getting views of other institutions involved, but forward them (draft bills) to 
the Office of the Prime Minister directly” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 91). 
     One end result of this state of affairs at the level of ministries is reflected 
in the way rationales—both for the body of ‘law’ in general and for separate 
articles—are formulated and forwarded along with the texts. Rationales are 
important not only for later debates in Parliamentary committees and in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
decision-makers in assessing potential impacts of the legislation, if and when implemented. 
The capacities in the ministries to carry out such assessments are in the process of being 
developed. Even when they are carried out, they are not made available to the TGNA—and 
to civil society, so that both can scrutinize legislation and question the rationales expressed 
in support of the bills. Circular for ‘Regulatory Impact Analysis’, 3 April 2007, published 
by the Office of the Prime Minister. 05 January 2013. 
http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/26492_1.html.  
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Plenary, but also for implementation as they explain the original purpose 
and intention of the legislation. They are supposed to explain why the 
proposal was brought into discussion, what benefits or other results are 
aimed in introducing, amending or eliminating a particular regulation. This 
rarely happens and most of the time the rationales are either simply the 
repetition of the law texts themselves or legal/political rhetoric hardly 
related to a specific area of regulation.
141
 Not only is this not demanded—
nor criticised, by most politicians, bureaucrats intentionally avoid providing 
explicit rationales.
142
  
     Against all odds, if civil society does find the opportunity to participate 
in the process for preparation of policies and legislation, then the problem of 
quality of participation is confronted. No matter who or which civil society 
organisation participates, so-called ‘human resources’ that would evaluate 
and work upon the ideas, recommendations or proposals offered by the civil 
society for solutions or improvements, at technical level, are generally not 
available. When the state apparatus—bureaucracy and the Government—
turn more open to participation by the civil society, this is in the form of 
expanding rather than deepening the participation. It is superficial, more 
concerned with the ‘appearance’ rather than the substance. 
                                                          
141
 For example, one of the proposed articles—Art. 31—in the Third Judicial Package, read: 
“[…] the statement of ‘twenty years’ has been amended as ‘eleven years’”. And the 
rationale offered by the government just simply repeated—in a poorly formulated 
language—the amendment itself: “[…] the condition [sic] of having served in public 
service for twenty years, for those who would be selected to membership in the Council of 
State, is to be reduced to eleven years”. See; the Government Bill dated 30 January 2012 
“Yargi Hizmetlerinin Etkinlestirilmesi Amaciyla Bazi Kanunlarda Degisiklik Yapilması ve 
Basin Yoluyla Islenen Suclara Iliskin Dava ve Cezalarin Ertelenmesi Hakkinda Kanun 
Tasarisi”. 05 January 2013. http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/1/1-0565.pdf. 
142
 M. Akif Hamzaçebi, MP, Vice-Chair for CHP Parliamentary Caucus: “[…] in the 
ministry of […][we] were preparing a draft law and one colleague said: ‘Let’s not write the 
rationale that detailed; each detailed rationale would come back to us as questions in the 
Parliament.” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 205). 
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     Deputies can prepare ‘draft laws’ themselves, direct their advisors to 
formulate a law text
143
 or can get assistance from staffers in the Bureau of 
Research and Analysis
144
 of the Acts and Resolutions in the General 
Secretariat—once they indicate the subject, substance and aim(s) and 
purpose(s) of the regulation they want.
145
  
     However, as individual MPs are required to clear their law proposals 
with the Party Group first and get them stamped, their work—including, 
particularly, relations with civil society—is subject to scrutiny. They are not 
‘encouraged’ to enter into any type of open ‘partnership’ with civil society 
and/or benefit, for instance, from their publications.
146
 Therefore, although 
political parties and their Parliamentary groups have ample opportunities to 
benefit from civil society—and academic—input for their own legislative 
work and to cooperate with both think-tanks and advocacy groups in the 
Parliament—in Committees and the Plenary—this only happens in a 
sporadic fashion, if it ever happens.  
     One other vitally important defect in political parties is that there is no 
formal structure in party groups to mirror the Parliamentary Committee 
structure. So, even if civil society is willing to approach political parties for 
                                                          
143
 See ‘The Rules of Service Contract for Employing Advisors for Members of Parliament’ 
(tr. Milletvekili Danismani Calistirilmasi Hakkinda Hizmet Sözlesmesi Esaslari), Art. 1, 5. 
05 January 2013.  http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/genser/e2.html.   
144
 Arastirma ve Inceleme Bürosu. tr. 
145
 TGNA Bylaw for Legislative Staffers (tr. TBMM Yasama Uzmanligi Yönetmeligi). 
Dated 13 December 2006, amended on 19 August 2010. Art. 30, (2), b) - “Preparing law 
proposals as outlined by members of parliament and assisting them by reviewing already 
prepared draft law proposals for correctness in terms of legislative tecniques”. 05 January 
2013. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/genser/m36.html.  
146
 Throughout the entire research process, not a single example of any reference to any 
civil society work or publication, in any proposal of law or government bill, has come 
across. Only once, one MP acknowledged one single publication and he even had the copy 
with him to ‘display’. And this was during an interview which was conducted after three 
long telephone conversations with advisors and the MP himself in advance—necessarily 
explaining the subject and the purpose of the research in length—thereby compromising the 
context and creating an unavoidable bias.  
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cooperation on a specific legislation, they are faced with the difficulty of 
finding a proper, regular contact or an institutionalised expertise.
147
  
     Similar to ministries, there is very little evidence that political parties—
governing and opposition alike—are yet prepared to accept civil society as a 
legitimate partner—let alone an actor—in policy-making and legislation, 
particularly in policy areas related to ‘politics’. It is considered power-
sharing in the party ‘leadership’ and a challenge to their freedom of 
action.
148
 This attitude is a reflection of the dominant zero-sum culture in 
Turkish politics. An alternative culture of cooperation and conciliation does 
not take hold.  
     The Office of the Prime Minister represents the nerve centre of the 
Turkish political decision-making system. Since the draft bills prepared by 
the ministries are put into their final form here and forwarded to the Office 
of the Speaker for debate in the Parliamentary Committees before the 
Plenary, its authority is ultimate. The same goes for the proposals of law 
prepared by individual MPs—to include those of opposition parties. 
Because Prime Minister’s Office—relying on the governing party’s majority 
in the Parliament—not only directs work in Parliamentary Committees, but 
also provides and defends the view of the Government—along with the 
‘bureaucracy’ representing the Ministry—in committees.  
     Also, as discussed above, because of the existence of the general trend 
for ‘risk avoidance’ at ministries, Prime Minister’s Office operates like a 
ministry and technical details of government bills are developed and 
                                                          
147
 “The capacity of party groups to prepare effectively for committee work is limited; none 
of the party groups has a formal structure to complement or mirror the standing committee 
structure” (SIGMA: 22).  
148
 This observation is confirmed by Carkoglu (2003), among others: “A small ruling elite 
(within the Turkish party system) that keeps any opposition, together with any civil society 
influence, out of their parties, dominates the Turkish parties. Hence, it is not surprising that 
civil society preferences for EU membership has failed to penetrate the parties and thus 
pressure the party organisations and their leaders to reformulate their positions in support of 
the EU membership” (189). 
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incorporated into the draft text here. Yet, this box is also closed to civil 
society participation.    
     Sometimes the Government itself, intentionally opts for using the Prime 
Minister’s Office performing ministerial functions to avoid ‘premature’ 
public scrutiny and civil society’s involvement, and for muzzling—at least 
limiting—political opposition to a government bill. For example, the 
government bill for the so-called ‘Greater Municipality Law’149, a major 
regulation of 81 pages, involving thousands of cities, towns and smaller 
villages with millions of inhabitants, was handled by the Office, not the 
Ministry of Interior. It was drafted in the Prime Minister’s Office behind 
closed doors, came to the Parliament on 8 October 2012, introduced as a 
‘norm law’ and rushed through the Committee for Internal Affairs.150 It 
became law on 12 November 2012, in about a month, in a passionate 
Plenary session which occasionally turned violent, even witnessed punching 
and fighting between the MPs.
151
  
     In the Office of the Prime Minister, Laws and Decrees Department is the 
OPR for processing the drafts.
152
 Here drafts are reviewed for their 
conformity with the Constitution, other laws, general legal principles, 
government programmes, development programmes and more importantly, 
if they are in line with other—relevant—laws153. However, the main focus 
                                                          
149
 See; The Committee for Internal Affairs Report, 31 October 2012, pp. 6-11. 16 February 
2013.  http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss338.pdf.  
150
 The Chairman initiated the debate in the Committee immediately after the forty-eighth 
hour which was required by the Rules of Procedure despite the fact that the Committee 
members had seen this draft text of a major bill for the first time and hardly had time even 
to read it.  
151
 ‘Büyüksehir Yasasi yumruklarla gecti’, 12 November 2012. Hürriyet. 16 February 2013. 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/21904224.asp.  
152
 See; Law No. 3056, ‘The Organisation of the Office of the Prime Minister’, Art. 2, 8. 
153
 There are no norm laws per se in the Turkish legal system. However, some laws are 
called ‘basic laws’ and some other laws regulating the same area are supposed to conform 
to the former. However, there is no legal hierarchy or precedence between a law called 
‘basic’ and another which is not called so. This turns into a kind of hen or egg problem and 
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of attention, at this level, is on the political aspects of the draft, rather than 
the ‘technical’ ones—which are supposed to have been tackled with at the 
level of ministries long before arriving at Prime Minister’s ‘desk’.   
     Then, a text is to be prepared for the Cabinet meeting. But, before that, 
views/inputs of other ministries are obtained, if not done before—and most 
of the time they happen to be absent. Sensitive items are dealt with through 
meetings, because bureaucrats are less than eager to raise personal or 
institutional views in ‘written’ form. But they are more prepared to voice 
their own or their ministry’s views in meetings, especially when no minutes 
are prepared and no notes taken. If there is not enough time for such 
meetings and/or written communication, given the constant air of ‘urgency’, 
less-than-perfect drafts can be forwarded to the Cabinet. Sometimes even 
the cabinet minister, whose ministry initiated the draft in the first place, can 
object to certain aspects of the text. Once endorsed, the bill is undersigned 
by the Cabinet as a whole and forwarded to the Office of the Speaker for 
legislative enactment.  
     If it is a ‘draft law’ prepared by a Deputy or a group of Deputies, then 
one of the ministries is designated as the ‘coordinating’ agency by the 
Office of the Prime Minister and a similar procedure is followed for 
preparing the government’s view on the subject ‘proposal’.  
     Once forwarded to the Speaker, bills are posted in the web-site of the 
Office of the Prime Minister.
154
 If ‘civil society’ was not involved before, 
this may be the first time they can be aware of the existence of a legislative 
initiative.  
3.3.1. Parliamentary committees  
     The Constitution
155
 and the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly
156
 describe the duties and powers regarding the 
                                                                                                                                                   
creates an endless—and probably hopeless—search for conformity because actually there 
are ‘no’ norms to turn or look to.  
154
 See; website of the Office of the Prime Minister. 05 January 2013. 
http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/pDraftOfBill.aspx.  
155
 See; the Constitution, Art. 87, 88. 
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legislative process. The responsibility of the Speaker’s office is ‘purely’ 
technical in nature. Even bills or draft laws which may be considered clearly 
in contravention of the Constitution—or do not meet formal-legal 
requirements—cannot possibly be returned to the originator or action can 
be refused by the Office of the Speaker, but just forwarded to the relevant 
Parliamentary committee(s) with a letter and supporting forms reflecting the 
technical and legal evaluations done by the staffers in the Acts and 
Resolutions Department
157
. The designation of the primary committee and 
the secondary committee(s) and forwarding action is done by the Speaker 
himself/herself, personally.
158
 Because committees cannot deal with the 
‘work’ which has not been forwarded to them—i.e. the work that they have 
not been tasked with—this is a very critical and politically sensitive action. 
As a result, once forwarded, primary committee has the ‘ownership’ of the 
draft—either a government bill or a proposal of law—with all associated 
tasks, responsibilities and prerogatives—with complete authority.  
     Committees work as the ‘kitchen’ of the parliamentary business. There 
are, at present, 17 standing committees in the TGNA, the membership of 
which ranges from sixteen to forty deputies.
159
 They are primarily engaged 
in the scrutiny of draft legislation—bills, and to a lesser extent, proposals of 
                                                                                                                                                   
156
 See; Rules of Procedure of the TGNA, Part 4, ‘Making Laws’. Art. 73 - ‘Bills prepared 
by the government, signed by all ministers, with rationale, are forwarded to the Office of 
the Speaker of the Parliament’. Art. 74 – ‘Draft laws, prepared by the members of 
parliament, with rationale, are also presented to the Office of the Speaker. Proposals shall 
bear the signature of one or more MPs’.  
157
 TGNA By-Law for Legislative Staffers, Art. 30 – ‘By examining bills and draft laws as 
well as decrees for their conformity with the Constitution, the Rules of Procedure, general 
legal principles, legislative tecniques and language of the Constitution; to prepare 
observations and suggestions in written form’.  
158
 The committee whose report will be taken as the basis for debate in the Plenary session 
of the Parliament is the primary committee. The committee which provides views, on 
relevant articles or aspects of the ‘work’, to the main committee is called secondary 
committee. See; Rules of Procedure, Art. 23. 
159
 See; TGNA website. 05 January 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/komisyon.liste.  
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law. There is a considerable imbalance in the workload of committees and 
they vary widely.
160
 
     In committees, consideration may begin at least 48 hours after the draft 
legislation has been received. Committees are invited to meetings by their 
chairs. The invitation—and the agenda—is distributed to members of the 
committee, to the Prime Minister’s Office, to relevant ministries, 
parliamentary groups of political parties, to other committees with related 
‘work’, and to the first Deputy who has signed the draft law; it is also 
posted on the Bulletin Board
161
 (Ilan Tahtasi), at least two days before the 
planned date of the meeting, unless there is an urgent need. The Primary 
Committee is required to conclude its deliberations within 45 days, while 
the Secondary Committees, by the Rules of Procedure, are given only 10 
days. These deadlines are rarely met; as a matter of fact, other 
considerations generally overtake, and while the work on a particular bill 
can be finalised at speed of light, another may take ages. As a result, in 
practice, such restrictions and control measures—over the capricious or 
arbitrary use of time by Committee chairs—are ignored and debates in 
committees may take place on the same day the subject appears in the 
agenda.  
     In the case of Secondary Committees, sometimes they may not even find 
time or a suitable time slot to draft their own agendas to discuss the subject 
in hand because a decision has already been reached and a report has been 
prepared by the Primary Committee. This is especially the case when draft 
                                                          
160
 During the 23rd Term; the Committee on the Constitution received 65 drafts (out of 
which 30 reports were produced); the National Defence Committee received 47 drafts (out 
of which 36 reports were produced); the Justice Committee received 163 drafts (out of 
which 52 reports were prepared); the Internal Affairs Committee received 123 drafts (out of 
which 24 reports were prepared); the Foreign Affairs Committee received 509 drafts (out of 
which 403 reports were produced); and the Committee on National Education, Culture, 
Youth and Sports received 110 drafts (out of which 39 reports were produced). The Foreign 
Affairs Committee’s performance is impressive and does deserve closer examination. See; 
TGNA 23rd Term Report, pp. 14-20. 
161
 For ‘Bulletin Board’, see; the Rules of Procedure, Art. 26.  
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bills or proposals of law are initiated by the Government or by the 
governing party Deputies. The inevitable result of this situation is that there 
is hardly enough time for member Deputies, to read the texts, let alone for 
getting prepared for debate, doing research, reading and debating reports 
from Secondary Committees—perhaps, establishing sub-committees for a 
more detailed investigation and evaluation of the subject—listening to 
experts from ministries, raising questions, and involving civil society
162
, if 
they can even be aware of the drafts suddenly introduced into committee 
agendas.  
     Meetings of committees are open to Deputies, members of the Cabinet 
and to ‘representatives’ of the government. They are also open to the media 
in principle. But, generally televisions are allowed filming at the opening of 
meetings, then, only reporters are allowed inside the meeting rooms, during 
the debates. This is, no doubt, as explained below, an extremely valuable 
opportunity for civil society, if properly used. Committees—i.e. chairs, in 
practice—can restrict or ban altogether any attendance or lift any restriction 
or hold ‘closed’ meetings.163 The Committees are supposed to intensively 
debate the drafts and proposals which they receive, amend them if and as 
necessary, and once fully developed, forward them to the Plenary for final 
debate and legislative voting. However, despite these logical aims and 
purposes, in practice, some drafts—actually many of them—may not always 
be fully developed, and incomplete texts may find their way into the Plenary 
session of the Parliament.
164
  
                                                          
162
 Rules of Procedure actually authorizes committee chairmen to invite experts and offer 
them the floor when they deem necessary. See; Art. 29, 30.  
163
 Closed meetings are open to committee members and to the Cabinet ministers only. See; 
Rules of Procedure, Art. 32.  
164
 The way parliamentary commissions work, in practice, has been heavily criticised in the 
Peer Review Report. “Parliamentary oversight and control of the Government is weak. 
[…] The key problem lies […] in the committee system, which is characterised by very 
limited oversight and scrutiny role of committees, uneven committee workloads, weak 
intercommittee relationships and inadequate expert and administrative support for 
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     The way parliamentary committees are governed has a vital effect on the 
participation of civil society in policy-making and legislation. Committees, 
customarily, are run by a ‘board’ of four individuals: chairperson, vice-
chair, speaker and reporter/secretary. However, Rules of Procedure 
mentions of chairperson only and tasks him/her with “preparing the agenda 
of the committee, calling meetings, deciding those who will be invited to the 
meetings, and running meetings of the Committee”.165 Since the majority of 
the committee members are from the governing party, ‘chairperson’ is 
always elected—by simple majority secret voting—from the same party.166 
Other members, effectively, has no say whatsoever in running the 
committee or deciding the agenda of the committee.
167
 The chairman, 
arguably, maintains close consultation with the whips of the governing 
party, not only for drawing up the agenda but also running the meetings in 
line with the Government’s political ‘game plan’.  
     Committee chairmen—necessarily from the majority party—working in 
‘harmony’ with the Government, are just a fact of life in parliamentary 
systems. However this fact, as in elsewhere, comes with its flaws also in 
Turkey. First of all, neither the government-initiated bills, nor draft laws 
proposed by the Deputies, i.e. party groups, are not signalled early on and, 
in the current Rules of Procedure, there are no rules, that would force action 
otherwise, Therefore, planning ahead for the Committee agenda is difficult. 
Once this can be done at all, keeping it intact, for a reasonable period of 
                                                                                                                                                   
committees. Information extracted from the government is often not followed up.” (SIGMA 
2010: iii-iv). 
165
 See; Rules of Procedure, Art. 26, 27. 
166
 The two exceptions to this general ‘rule’ are the Committee for Monitoring Human 
Rights and the EU Affairs (formerly Harmonisation) Committee where there are two vice-
chairs, one of which is held by the main opposition party members.  
167
 This aspect has also been criticised by the Peer Review Report: “There is a sharp divide 
between the governing and opposition parties that permeates nearly all of parliament’s 
activities. For example, all committee chairmanships go to the governing party and the 
same principle applies if subcommittees are formed. The governing party […] controls 
plenary and committees’ agenda and priority is given to government business. Political or 
policy initiatives that cut across this divide are very rare” (SIGMA 2010: 6). 
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time, is even more difficult because there are always last minute 
interventions and, again, there is no rule in the Rules of Procedure that 
would prevent that. To make the Committee work more unpredictable, 
amendments need not be tabled prior to meetings. As a result, with 
precarious agendas—sometimes coming out of the blue, and with a number 
of amendments that can be introduced at any minute in the course of 
discussions—sometimes immediately before a voting on a specific article, it 
is difficult, if not impossible, for the Deputies—majority party and 
opposition alike—to get prepared for Committee work on a specific 
legislation. 
     In theory, Committees enjoy extensive powers for amending the 
proposed legislation—either bills or draft laws; but, in practice, these 
‘powers’ are rarely exercised for amending government-initiated bills. Even 
making purely technical changes or grammatical corrections, let alone 
changes with political results—unless such amendments are ‘directed’ by 
the government itself—is a challenge.168 However, “legislative proposals by 
Deputies from the opposition parties are routinely voted down in 
committees and not much time is spent debating them. Such proposals are 
typically rejected in their entirety rather than amended” (SIGMA 2010: 11) 
criticised Peer Review Report.  
     Committees are actually ‘political’ platforms where political debates, 
rather than technical, logical, result-oriented deliberations, dominate. While 
governing party Deputies consider defending government-initiated bills a 
mission for which they have to fight to the last drop of their blood, 
opposition Deputies are more than prepared to challenge them at any cost, 
‘whatever it takes’. They are certainly not ideal fora where civil society can 
provide technical information and expertise, inform member Deputies and 
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 M. Akif Hamzaçebi, MP, Vice-Chair for CHP Parliamentary Caucus: “I gave an 
example and said; ‘Mr. Minister, honourable members of the Committee, look, if you put 
this semi-colon here, […]-or any other author, can only be covered by insurance if he/she 
writes on his/her own name.’ […] Semi-colon was removed, of course, but when I left for 
another meeting, Mr. Minister (I was later told) voiced a criticism: ‘Hey you, you became 
occupied with full-stops and commas’.” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 207) 
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answer their questions who are willing to improve the legislative texts. 
There is, in principle, no such demand on the part of the Deputies, neither of 
the governing nor opposition parties. Furthermore, this ‘challenge’ and 
‘defence’ spirit or psyche can take such extreme degrees that, occasionally 
Committee meetings witness physical attempts to pass bills or draft laws 
based on, virtually, numerical superiority of ‘foot soldiers’, i.e. deputies 
exerting brute force.
169
  
     One may wonder if it is not possible to overcome such hurdles and move 
the Committee work beyond a purely political—and meaningless—ritual, 
receiving technical/expert support from the General Secretariat and support 
from party groups, involving the media, interest groups, general public and 
the civil society—domestic and international? The answer, under the current 
circumstances, is ‘not impossible’, but very close to it..  
     First of all, as discussed before, turnover rates in the TGNA are 
extremely high. The latest Parliamentary elections, on 12 June 2011, also 
led to a major renewal of parliament with 349 first-time Deputies (64% of 
the total). However, despite clear and vital need, there is no realistic and 
practical system to prepare novice Deputies for the Parliamentary 
‘business’, to familiarise them with parliamentary organisation and 
procedures, nor any other framework for a structured provision of 
information. The possibility of an orientation course for start-up and for an 
initial exchange of experiences, to be followed, later, by refreshment 
sessions in the form of a ‘political academy’ within either political parties or 
the Parliament itself or a combination of both, sounds like a relevant, even 
                                                          
169
 On 11 March 2012, the debate on the contentious so-called “4+4+4 law” in the 
Committee on Education, Youth, Culture and Sports turned violent. It introduced major 
changes into the national education system which were opposed by the opposition parties. 
The first six articles of the draft took six days to ‘debate’. But once the Committee meeting 
room was occupied by more than a hundred governing party deputies, the ‘debate’ on the 
remaining 19 articles took only half an hour and the bill was ‘duly’ endorsed by the 
Committee. “‘4+4+4’ büyük kavgayla komisyondan gecti”. 11 March 2012. Milliyet. 05 
January 2013. http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/-4-4-4-buyuk-kavgayla-komisyondan-
gecti/siyaset/siyasetdetay/11.03.2012/1514018/default.htm.  
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logical suggestion. But this does not happen. The fact that neither the 
Parliament/Office of the Speaker, nor the parties or party groups are very 
much inclined to train and better prepare their Deputies for parliamentary 
functions and tasks, as explained below, is related to the essential features of 
the Turkish political system as a whole and the associated dominant political 
culture in Turkey. As a result, as exampled elsewhere in this study, there is 
very little specialisation among Deputies—hence ineffective participation in 
both committee and the plenary work.   
     Individual advisors—supporting Deputies, may be coming from different 
sources: moved from another department of the Parliament, i.e. already 
worked there in another capacity, hence relatively better experienced for the 
job; on secondment from other branches of the state administration—which 
is a plus, or are employed on a contractual basis. Most of them are directly 
recruited by the Parliament, but others are on long-term secondment and 
once they move into Parliament, they receive a parliamentary supplement of 
approximately 35%. However, as has been already discussed, they are 
mostly oriented towards constituency business, a hard fact of life in Turkish 
political parties.
170
 With few exceptions, there are no constituency offices 
for individual Deputies, and constituents often travel all the way to 
Ankara—the capital. This not only creates a major logistical burden for the 
                                                          
170
 Until recently, each Deputy was entitled to an advisor and a secretary. The secretaries 
were all civil servants employed by the Parliament. From December 2011 on—effective on 
15 January 2012, all personnel directly supporting Deputies were started to be called 
‘advisors’ and were paid based on a similar status. So there are no ‘secretaries’ per se any 
longer. But all ‘advisors’ keep coming from a variety of sources, and are of varied status. (It 
is possible to employ an ‘additional’ personnel as well—e.g. driver—but not as an advisor.) 
See; Law No. 6253, Law on the Administrative Organisation of the TGNA, adopted on 1 
December 2011. Official Gazette, 18 December 2011, No. 28146. 05 January 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/genser/6253.pdf. 
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General Secretariat
171
, but also a strain on the limited time of the Deputy—
and his/her advisors, and, reportedly, on their purse, for many of them. 
     Expert support provided to Committees by the General Secretariat is 
aimed at Committees as a whole, rather than being reserved for individual 
Deputies. Yet, both interviews and observations clearly indicate to the fact 
that each and every request from the Deputies is taken very seriously by 
staffers and they try their best to meet demands. However, it should be 
noted that as far as legislative business is concerned this is basically 
restricted to clerical support, e. g. typing texts, incorporating amendments, 
making corrections, and has nothing to the with the substance of the 
legislation, which is under strict control of the ‘chairman’. After all, 
chairmen are primary POCs for the parliamentary staff—legislative experts 
and supporting staff—serving the committee. Besides, not all Deputies have 
the opportunity to become a committee member and enjoy support from 
‘staffers’—in addition to his/her own advisors. Anyhow, expert and 
administrative support for committees is very limited, with only one or two 
legislative experts serving for each committee, in a very limited physical 
space, sometimes—in the case of the Justice Committee, for example—each 
expert, practically sharing respective ‘corners’ of already too small 
committee meeting room, as their ‘offices’, permanently. 
     As for the parliamentary groups of political parties; the number of expert 
and supporting staff working for these groups and the physical and technical 
infrastructure available to them are also very limited. There is a chronic 
disconnect between the party groups and individual Deputies. This is true, 
surprisingly, also for those Deputies serving in the Parliamentary 
committees. As a result, it is no wonder why SIGMA Report (2010) found 
committees’ ability, in the TGNA, “quite restricted”:  
          Bottlenecks in the timely provision of expert and administrative  
     support, coupled with a high volume of bills, tight deadlines and limited  
                                                          
171
 The number of visitors to TGNA in the 23rd Term, was 2.184.277, more than 500.000 
annually—on average, 3.500 visitors to Deputies daily. See; TGNA 23rd Term Report, pp. 
101-103.                                                             
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     incentives for Deputies to allocate individual time to legislative scrutiny,  
     mean that committees’ ability to probe and, where necessary, challenge  
     the rationale and substance of government bills is quite restricted. (8) 
 
     Secondary committees provide inputs and views on parts of the ’work’ in 
the agenda of the primary committee, relevant to their own area of 
specialisation; for example, a draft bill could be dealt with by the Justice 
Committee—as the primary committee—and also in committees of the Plan 
and Budget and the Committee on the Constitution—as secondary 
committees. Secondary committees are supposed to provide views on 
certain aspects or on certain articles of a draft or proposal, as indicated by 
the Speaker when the bill or draft law is first sent to the committee.
172
 
However, this specification is seldom done and secondary committees use 
discretion in selecting which aspects or what articles are in their area of 
interest and make their own decisions accordingly.  
     In practice, the general perception of ‘secondary’ committees—
practically all committees when they are designated secondary by the 
Speaker—is that their views are not regarded seriously and their work, if 
they produce any work, is wasted. As a result they may choose not to debate 
the ‘work’ which they are tasked for as secondary committee. There are 
committees—actually most of them—which have not included any 
‘secondary’ work in their agendas. When government bills or draft laws are 
supposed to be considered in both committees (sometimes in more than one 
secondary committee), the latter simply ignores the tasking or provides an 
evasive, sketchy or perfunctory response for a ‘view’, the best. Under such 
circumstances, while even opposition MPs are impotent to make any 
difference or open a debate, let alone enforcing amendments
173
, there is very 
                                                          
172
 See; Rules of Procedure, Art. 23. 
173
 During the debates on the Greater Municipality Law in the Committee of Internal 
Affairs members of the opposition parties introduced more than a hundred motions for 
amendments, all of which were rejected by majority votes. In order to help the procedure be 
completed in a ‘timely’ fashion, even the Committee for Planning and Budget, secondary 
committee as tasked by the Speaker—and whose report was required by the Rules of 
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little civil society can do to participate or to contribute to decision-making, 
law writing/drafting or legislation at later stages. The best that many of them 
do, most of the time, is to provide a short, general overview.
174
  
     On the other hand, Primary Committees, well aware of the very fact—
since this is a phenomenon common to all—do not take the reports of 
Secondary Committees worth-considering, if they ever arrive, and even if 
they include valid contribution. Sometimes such reports, are not even 
distributed to the members of the Primary Committee. This situation creates 
yet another vicious circle—similar to that of in ministries. The absence of 
any obligation, on the part of the Primary Committees, for taking the reports 
of Secondary Committees into consideration has had a negative effect on 
this result.
175
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Procedure—hastily provided a letter that “due to work-load they were unable to provide a 
view of the Committee”. See; The Committee for Internal Affairs Report, 31 October 2012, 
pp. 155-184. 16 February 2013.  http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss338.pdf 
174
 For example; government bill on Collective Labour Relations Act (Toplu Is Iliskileri 
Kanunu), came to the Parliament on 31 January 2012, forwarded to Committees on 7 
February, received by the primary—Committee on Health, Family, Labor and Social 
Affairs, and secondary committees—and the EU Harmonisation and the Justice 
Committees on the 8th. The primary committee, included it in its agenda and debated the 
bill on 9 February and formed a sub-committee. The EU Harmonisation Committee debated 
the draft on 16 February and submitted its report on 22 February. However, the attempt by 
the opposition MPs to open a debate “at least on those articles related to the EU 
harmonisation process” was blocked by the majority who argued that theirs was a 
“secondary committee anyway”. The sub-committee met on 14, 15, 29 February and 1 
March and submitted its report on 5 March which was debated in the primary comittee on 
7, 8, 13 March. The EU Harmonisation Committee report had nothing related to the EU 
accession process. The Justice Committee did not produce a report. The primary Committee 
submitted its report, based on sub-committee report, on 13 March 2012. See; Committee 
Report. 12 February 2013. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss197.pdf.  
175
 During the 23rd Term of the TGNA, in the course of four years, major committees—the 
Committee on the Constitution, the National Defence Committee, the Justice Committee, 
the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Committee on National Education, Culture, Youth 
and Sports have not prepared even a single report for the government bills or proposals of 
law which were referred to them by the Speaker, as secondary committees. The Internal 
 148 
     At the end, if simple majority of members attending the session—
provided that it is quorate—supports and vote for the ‘draft/proposal’, the 
final text—and the Committee’s report explaining its rationale—is 
forwarded to the General Assembly. If it is not supported then a rejection 
report would be prepared and forwarded.  
     One prominent example that exposes the dominant institutional culture 
in committees—particularly in Secondary Committees—is the EU 
Harmonisation Committee. The establishment of a committee specifically 
responsible for relations with the European Union in the Parliament was 
proposed by a group of AKP Deputies
176
 in 2003. The rationale in the draft 
law, argued that “Turkey was the only country among the EU’s 15 member 
and 13 candidate countries, without such a committee” and that “the 
establishment of such a committee for EU-related business only, similar to 
those in other candidate countries, would indicate the importance attached to 
the EU accession process by the Turkish Parliament”. The Committee 
would be tasked to “provide views on the compatibility of legislation with 
EU acquis; monitor all activities related to accession, including accession 
negotiations; prepare annual evaluation reports for the Parliament and the 
government; debate reports related to EU accession, prepared by the Turkish 
government and EU institutions; monitor developments in the EU and 
inform the Parliament accordingly; carry out all types of activities to create 
a favourable public opinion for the EU accession process”.  
     It was clear that there was a perfect understanding of the needs and 
requirements for the functions of this committee. However, it would 
‘permanently’ be a Secondary Committee and would debate only those bills 
and draft laws referred to it by the Speaker as a secondary committee.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Affairs Committee—as a secondary committee, prepared reports for only 3 legislative 
drafts—out of 227. See TGNA 23rd Term Report, pp. 14-20. 
176
 Report of the Committee on the Constitution on the Proposal of Law prepared by Salih 
Kapusuz and 28 AKP Deputies for the establishment of the Committee on Relations with 
the European Union in the Parliament. No 2/102, dated 3 April 2003. 05 January 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem22/yil01/ss111m.htm.  
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     This committee was established by Law No 4847
177
, for the purposes of; 
“monitoring the developments in the accession process; following EU 
policies and inform the Parliament; assessing the compliance of draft 
legislation with the acquis”. Art. 5 stipulated that “the annual reports 
prepared by the committee at the end of each legislative year, after being 
submitted to the Speaker’s Office, if suggested by the Board of Spokesmen, 
could be included in the Plenary agenda, read and a debate could be 
opened”, and these reports would be made available by the Speaker’s Office 
to the government and relevant ministries.
178
 However, until the end of the 
23rd Term—July 2007 to April 2011—this never happened and not a single 
‘report’ was read, let alone a debate was opened in the Plenary.179  
     Even the government did not bother to inform the Committee regularly 
on developments relating to the accession negotiations and the accession 
strategy. SIGMA Report, in 2010, found Committee’s “role in following EU 
policies on behalf of the TGNA as a whole […] largely perfunctory”; EU 
policy, “very much executive-dominated” and raised some major concerns 
about this situation:  
          Parliamentary structures and processes for handling EU-related  
     business are insufficient to assess the compliance of draft legislation with  
     the acquis; to monitor the developments in the accession process; to  
     follow EU policies; to conduct relations with the EU institutions and  
                                                          
177
 Law No. 4847, Law on the EU Harmonisation Committee, adopted on 15 April 2003. 
Official Gazette, 19 April 2003, No. 25084. 05 January 2013. 
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.4847.pdf.  
178
 Ibid, Art. 5.  
179
 The annual reports prepared by the EU Harmonisation Committee are no more than a 
short summary of events and the list of visits, certainly a far cry from the original intention 
of the establishment of this committee. As a secondary committee, during the 23rd Term, it 
received 77 drafts—government bills and law proposals alike—and prepared reports for 
only 31 of them. 23 drafts were returned to Primary Committees, because they had already 
prepared their own reports, hence no need for an EU Harmonisation Committee input. 23 
drafts were still ‘waiting’ at the end of the term. The Committte, except for the visits and 
attending conferences—mostly abroad—held 14 meetings only, less than four per year.  
See TGNA 23rd Term Report, pp. 37-41. 
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     with the national Parliaments of member and candidate states; and, in  
     particular, to effectively control the Government’s EU-integration policy.  
     (iv, 18)  
 
     Probably because of this criticism, the Law No 4847 was amended
180
 in 
December 2011 and the committee took the name of the EU Affairs 
Committee. The two amended articles raised the status of the Committee to 
a ‘standing committee’, in terms of its functions and the procedures the 
Committee would follow. The new Art 5 requires the Committee “to listen 
to the member of the cabinet (that is the EU Minister) in preparing its 
reports”. “The Bureau of the Assembly may include its reports in the 
Plenary agenda to be read and debated”, that is, its role still remained 
‘largely perfunctory’. Throughout the first year of the 24th Term, from June 
2011 to July 2012, the EU Affairs Committee had only eight meetings and 
prepared a total of eight reports as a Secondary Committee—out of 45 
legislative texts referred to it by the Speaker. The ‘long-expected’ report “to 
inform the Parliament on the developments in the EU accession process” is 
yet to be prepared and debated.
181
 
    Legislative staffers (so-called ‘experts’) in committees are key for 
carrying out the committee business. However they are insufficient in 
numbers, training and most of the time physical working space. ‘Perceived’ 
discrimination due to personnel with different status performing same 
functions is not a positive force. High circulation of staffers between 
committees hardly allows specialisation. Yet, ironically staffers are most 
open to civil society and eager to facilitate participation, however they have 
no formal authority, nor resources or time.  
                                                          
180
 Draft Law prepared by AKP MP Salih Kapusuz and 3 more Deputies (one from each 
opposition party, CHP, MHP, BDP) for amending Laws No 3067, 4847, 3686. 05 January 
2013. http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d23/2/2-0900.pdf. 
181
 See; TGNA 24rd Term Report, 1. and 2. Years, p. 38. 6 January 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/raporlar/FaaliyetRaporu.pdf.  
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    As for the functions of staffers, MPs’ minds are quite confused.182 
Although they are called ‘experts’ (tur. uzmanlar), they are staffers, i.e. 
those responsible for doing the staff work for the committee—in practice for 
the Committee Chairman. They are not supposed to provide expert opinion 
in committees which should be done by representatives of respective 
ministries, those of the Office of the Prime Minister or the Government, 
experts from the civil society or academia—certainly not by ‘staffers’.    
     However, staffers are closer to the sole decision-makers in committees—
Chairmen—even closer than the governing party MPs in Committees. They 
share the same physical space, endure basic hardships of the committee 
work, for long working hours, sometimes until morning. They may even 
become personal friends, even like family members. Therefore, civil society 
would need to reach the ‘staffers’ as the best conduit.  
     Staffers are overwhelmed by the sheer bulk of the work, working 
continuously for long hours and have little chance for a leave or vacation. 
Endless expectations and demands by MPs—not only from committee 
members, but potentially from ‘any’ MP—make life extremely difficult and 
stressful for the staffers. Nevertheless they are invaluable assets for the civil 
society once and if they can be included in their networks.  
     Committee Chairmen fully control the Committee work—agenda, 
schedule, working hours, actions to be taken, civil society or academia to be 
invited etc. However even they are bound with the decisions already taken 
by the governing party leadership. There is virtually no example of a 
Committee Chairman adopting an attitude which is not fully yielding to the 
direction of the governing party leadership. This is widely accepted by MPs 
of all parties as a ‘fact’ of Parliamentary life and most of them even do not 
bother challenging it. Even the opposition MPs are simply disinterested in 
                                                          
182
 Bekir Bozdag, MP, Vice-Chair for AKP Parliamentary Caucus: “Why isn’t it more 
effective in committees? There isn’t enough expertise in committees.. […] But, what do we 
have there? Only those who know the requirements of the Rules of Procedure and 
providing advice in this sense. […] It is important to have experts on rules and procedures, 
but also those knowledgeable on the substance of the business are also needed, not only one 
in each committee, many..” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 199). 
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and indifferent
183
 towards the committee work due to what can cautiously be 
diagnosed as ‘learned helplessness’184. There is no desire nor possibility to 
establish an independent will, in committees, in spite of the Government.
185
  
     The forms and conditions under which civil society, affected interests, 
i.e. stake holders, and individual experts can present their views to 
Parliamentary committees, how these views can be capitalized on, reflected 
in committee reports and communicated to the Plenary otherwise, are not 
regulated in the Rules of Procedure. Besides, even if civil society can find 
the opportunity to express their views on legislative proposals, the current 
45-day limitation for primary committees and 10-day limitation for 
secondary committees
186
 do not usually allow them the time to consider 
these views in earnest. 
     One way of having an influence, at least some sway, by the civil society 
is to make their reports, survey results and other publications available to 
committee members, particularly to the chairmen. But they end up either at 
the top of an advisor’s extremely busy desk and risk getting lost there or 
stay in a committee staffer’s cabinet—if he/she has one—forever. For 
example, it is ironic that the staff, in general, are even unaware of the 
                                                          
183
 One senior staffer explaines: “When the recent […] Report was released, we prepared a 
summary for the Committee members. Nobody asked for additional information or asked 
for anything about the report (comparison with previous reports, issues first raised or 
repeated, criticism or praise etc). There was no request for additional research. […] 
Recently, commission discussed the draft text from the Ministry of […] on ‘[…]’. The 
members came to the Committee room even without opening the cover of the dossiers we 
had prepared for them—this includes also the opposition MPs.” Interview; March 2012. 
184
 ‘Learned helplessess’: “[…] in psychology, a mental state in which an organism forced 
to bear aversive stimuli, or stimuli that are painful or otherwise unpleasant, becomes unable 
or unwilling to avoid subsequent encounters with those stimuli, even if they are 
“escapable”, presumably because it has learned that it cannot control the situation.” 
Encyclopaedia Britannica.  
185
 For a typical debate in a Plenary session on the way committees work, see; TGNA 
Minutes, 7 November 2012, Fourth Session. 16 February 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil3/ham/b01701h.htm.  
186
 See; Rules of Procedure Art 37.  
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existence of TÜSIAD Ankara Bulletin and TÜSIAD Ankara Bulletin 
Legislation Process, periodicals published—and distributed—regularly each 
month. One staffer casually recalled: “Once, we had TESEV reports 
brought, with some difficulty”.   
     One secure way of delivering publications is personal visits to 
Parliamentary committees, party groups and to individual MPs. And some 
civil society organisations do try this. However, there is limited time, it is 
one-way—i.e. in the form of offering input, not engaging into a dialogue—
and both sides are fully aware of the inability of the Parliamentary 
committees to challenge Government policy—even if their value is properly 
appreciated and they are given priority for a reading and/or is summarised 
for MPs or committee members. One senior staffer, when questioned about 
civil society products, exclaimed: “There are no documents arriving from 
civil society organisations. Members in the Committee even do not read 
what WE prepare for them. There is no interest (in any publication)”.187 
 
3.3.2. General Assembly 
     Plenary, or the General Assembly, is TGNA’s highest and final decision 
organ where oversight and scrutiny of the executive as well as legislation 
take place. Government bills and proposals of law can become law, if only 
they are adopted by the Plenary. Plenary is the first stage in the legislative 
process, when draft legislation is debated in front of all Deputies, and more 
importantly, before political leaders. Plenary sessions are also broadcasted 
nation-wide.
188
 It is doomed to become a forum on which a long and 
                                                          
187
 Interview;  March 2012. 
188
 In July 2011, the Speaker of the Parliament ‘decided’ to restrict the broadcast of 
Parliamentary debates to five hours a day—from 14.00- to 19.00—and only three days a 
week—Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday—because “longer broadcast hours created an 
undue burden” for the Turkish Radio and Television, TRT, and was not in line with the 
Protocol dated 1995. Later, this was even reduced to four hours a day because “broadcast of 
the TRT sports programmes were negatively affected”. Vatan daily, 21 February 2013. 
‘Meclis Tv icin kampanya!’. 22 March 2013. http://haber.gazetevatan.com/meclis-tv-icin-
kampanya/516569/9/Haber.  
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sometimes fierce political—occasionally turning physical—struggle takes 
place between those who are supporting the draft legislation and those who 
are against it.  
     Plenary works three days a week: Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, 
from 15.00 to 19.00. However, in practice, it gathers earlier and works into 
late night, sometimes early morning. Plenary agenda and the working 
calendar, per the Rules of Procedure, are drawn up by the Board of 
Spokesmen, eventually subject to Plenary vote.
189
 Bills, draft laws and other 
‘business’ that come from the Committees are debated and voted on, 
normally Wednesdays and Thursdays. Plenary agenda is prepared for one or 
two weeks, on Tuesdays, but updated daily. It is printed each day the 
Plenary is in session, distributed to Deputies and posted in the web-site of 
TGNA.  
     Reports from the committees, once printed in the TGNA Print House, are 
first given a ‘Serial Number’, and then distributed to party groups, 
committees, Deputies, relevant departments within the General Secretariat, 
and finally published in the ‘List of Incoming Papers’190. Only after 48 
hours from their receipt, they are included in the relevant parts of the 
Plenary Agenda, as final items. However, since the Agenda can be amended 
at any time, by the Board, and failing that, by the governing/majority party, 
government-initiated bills or proposals of law by the governing party 
Deputies, i.e. the party group, always have the chance to jump up higher in 
the agenda. If this 48-hour time lapse is ignored and a draft bill or a 
proposal of law is suddenly included in the Agenda, all actors involved in 
                                                          
189
 The Board of Spokesmen is composed of the Speaker and one representative of each of 
the party groups. It makes its decisions by consensus. The Plenary follows the proposal as 
agreed by the Board. If the Board fails to agree, the vote of the Plenary—that is of the 
majority or the governing party—on the agenda is decisive and final. See; Rules of 
Procedure, Art. 19, 49. 
190
 List of Incoming Papers: This list includes all bills, draft laws, official communication 
(tezkereler), committee reports, and reference information related to questions, 
parliamentary inquiries, general debates, motions of censure and parliamentary 
investigations.  
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the legislative business—Deputies, legislative experts, parliamentary 
advisors—would be in trouble for making necessary preparations for the 
impending debate.  
     Like the situation in committees, the Plenary stage of legislation is also 
open to amendments. It is possible to table amendments to draft legislation 
during the course of plenary discussions, even immediately before the 
voting on any one article takes place. Perhaps one the major problems of the 
legislative process in Turkey—poorly developed draft texts of law—makes 
such amendments inevitable. Because, they are not prepared with the widest 
possible participation, consultation and inputs not only from state 
institutions, but also from individual experts and the civil society. However, 
as evidenced by the high number of legislation amending existing laws, and 
repeated complaints from all involved, unilateral and arbitrary amendments, 
proposed at Plenary stage—imposed by the governing majority, alone 
cannot solve the problems originating from the exclusive and ‘politically’ 
confrontational, conflictual process of law-making. Peer Review Report, 
pointed to the link “between legislative procedures and the quality of 
legislation”: 
          The high volume of legislative business; […] the tight deadlines  
     imposed; an expectation on the part of the government to be able to  
     proceed speedily with its bills; imbalances in committees’ legislative  
     workload; the practice of late additions to the plenary agenda; and ample  
     opportunities for introducing amendments to bills during the final  
     plenary stages of the legislative process, combine to make the in-depth  
     consideration of bills and draft laws difficult. (SIGMA 2010: 12;  
     Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 59) 
 
     The problem of ‘quality—in legislative process—can best be seen in the 
odd practice of ‘norm laws (temel kanun)’—as understood in Turkey and 
explains several illnesses of Turkish political system—and political culture.  
     The ever-pressing need to pass as many laws as possible, in as short a 
time as possible, has prompted the ‘invention’ of mechanisms intended to 
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speed up the legislative process. An amendment to the Rules of Procedure in 
1996, introduced a ‘special method of deliberation’ for Basic Laws—or, 
more correctly, for draft legislation considered ‘norm’ law191—even if they 
are not per se. Actually, looking at the way this ‘mechanism’ is practised 
and at its results, one can better call it the method for NOT to deliberate.  
     When the Plenary decides to consider a government bill or draft law as a 
‘norm law’, its articles are grouped into sections not exceeding 30 items and 
the Plenary takes each group as a whole for consideration, not individual 
articles one by one as usual. Time reserved for each ‘group’ is shorter and 
there is much less debate. Motions for amendments are restricted to two per 
article and they are not debated before being voted on. Sometimes even 
laws which cannot possibly be considered ‘norm’ law can be subjected to a 
similar procedure just because they have several articles—or even if they 
have less than 30 articles altogether. It is worrisome for the quality of 
legislation in the TGNA that the ratio of such ‘basic’ laws has been in 
constant increase since 1991 when this ‘method’ was first introduced into 
the Turkish legal system, reaching to 55% of all laws—and 60% of the 
articles—passed by the Parliament during the 23rd Term. (Iba 2011: 197-
99)  
     The ultimate shape this ‘degeneration’ of the legislative process can take 
is the practice of bag-law which literally means one  big ‘law bag’, either 
amending several laws of completely different nature or introducing new 
articles to several laws, which are, again, of different nature, unrelated and 
the areas they regulate may not overlap even remotely. It has become 
customary that into such ‘bags’ anything, any ‘regulation’ or ‘de-regulation’ 
can be dropped at any time. Sometimes this happens early in the morning, 
while few Deputies, having stood against the legislative marathon of a long 
                                                          
191
 Basic Laws are, in some sense, ‘norm’ laws. The Rules of Procedure describes them as 
‘those laws containing general principles having fundamental and systematic effects on a 
branch of law entirely, stipulating essential norms that should be maintaied in enacting 
other laws in this branch’. However, those laws named ‘norm’ or ‘basic’ are of the same 
status as any other law in the Turkish legal system. See; Rules of Procedure, Art. 91. 
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day and night, almost asleep and can hardly question the necessity or real 
rationale behind a motion suddenly tabled.
192
  
     Parliamentary staff rightly describe the Committees as “kitchen of the 
Parliament”. Since the dishes are already prepared (?) in the ‘kitchen’, the 
Plenary is where they are served. One may add some ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’, 
giving some additional flavour, but cannot serve a completely new dish. In 
practice, the exclusive right of introducing amendments is reserved for the 
majority party.  
     The Plenary, like the committee work, is strictly controlled by the 
Government. The parliamentary agenda is decided and distributed, virtually 
at the last minute. Legislative time is allocated as the Government sees fit. 
The practice of late additions to the Plenary agenda is also common. There 
is not a rolling legislative plan that clearly indicates what the Government is 
intending to legislate and what its priorities are so that not only the political 
opposition, but also civil society can know and take initiative to 
‘participate’. The timing of the submission of bills, setting the agenda, 
deciding priority bills, allowing debate on particular bills or individual 
articles, supporting or not supporting motions for amendments are all at the 
discretion of the executive.
193
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 A typical example of such a motion occurred on 26/27 June 2009. During the debate for 
amending the Law No 5271, Art. 250, on the “authority of civilian Criminal Courts over 
military personnel for certain crimes”, governing party tabled a motion amending one 
single word, replacing ‘hali dahil (including the case of)’ with ‘halinde (in case of)’, 
leading to fundamental consequences of major political and judicial significance. This last 
minute critical change was introduced, minutes before it was tabled, to opposition MPs 
present in the Plenary as an ‘editorial correction’, early in the morning, at 01.05 and 
received unanimous backing. See; Law No 5918, Art. 7. 6 January 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5918.html.  
193
 Typical examples of how this exclusive, self-claimed right can be abused by the 
governing majority were provided by two motions related to the Greater Municipality Law, 
Art 2, first in the Committee of Internal Affairs and then in the Plenary respectively. The 
borders of two large municipalities in Istanbul—Sisli and Sariyer—were amended by a 
motion made—and supported—by the governing party MPs in the Committee. Later, 
during the Plenary debate, early morning on 9 November 2012, at 3 AM, this time a motion 
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     The opportunity for introducing last-minute amendments
194
 from the 
floor during the Plenary stage of the legislative process does not allow 
proper consideration of bills and draft laws. This practice largely ignores 
any civil society involvement. As envisaged in Art 88 of the Rules of 
Procedure, it is always possible to recommit the bills from the Plenary to 
Parliamentary committees, particularly when major amendments are 
suggested, to allow a thorough (re)consideration of amendments—hence an 
opportunity for civil society to participate. But, this is seldom done and it is 
very difficult to ensure—once such amendments are introduced in the 
Plenary—that bills are internally consistent. 
     There is almost no time dedicated or reserved for Parliamentary 
oversight or scrutiny. There are high number of written questions and 
requests for Parliamentary inquiries, however most of them remain 
unanswered, when an answer is actually given, it is most likely to be 
perfunctory.  
     There is not a system of rapporteurs, akin to those operated in some 
Parliaments in Europe. Regulatory Impact Assessments, even if they are 
prepared—cursorily—are not made available to the TGNA. Committee 
reports, as discussed above, are made available. However they mainly 
reflect the respective political positions of the political parties and even if 
some important technical, procedural details are included in statements of 
dissenting opinion lodged by opposition MPs, they are simply ignored. The 
Plenary debate is built upon the so-called ‘Committee text’ only.  
                                                                                                                                                   
introduced by the Minister of Interior himself—catching the opposition off-guard—
changed the borders of three major municipalities, Cankaya, Yenimahalle, Etimesgut in 
Ankara, affecting hundreds of thousands of inhabitants while they were asleep. See; The 
Committee for Internal Affairs Report, 31 October 2012, pp. 155-184. 16 February 2013.  
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss338.pdf; and TGNA Minutes, 7 
November 2012, Twelfth Session. 16 February 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil3/ham/b01701h.htm.    
194
 There are many opportunities to introduce amendments, even after the Plenary debate 
has already started. It is even possible to introduce an amendment on a particular article 
immediately before the debate on this article starts. See, Rules of Procedure, Art 87.  
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     Rights of the political parties to exercise effective oversight without 
having to secure the prior agreement of the Speaker or the Bureau, in other 
words the Government, in practice, do not exist—turning ‘oversight’ into a 
kind of potestative right.
195
. Once a text is legislated, the implementation of 
it by the executive is discretionary. There is very little opportunity and 
mechanisms
196
 by which the Parliament can scrutinize the measures taken 
by the Government, in a systematic and effective way. 
 
3.3.3. Office of the President  
     As the Speaker or the Vice-Speaker presiding the session pronounces—
after the final voting on the entire text of the draft bill or law proposal, 
‘kabul edilmistir (passed)’, it becomes a ‘law’. The signature of approval by 
the President is the latest phase of law-making. However since this action is 
not a ‘condition’ for becoming a law, it is not considered as part of the 
legislative process. Nevertheless, it is an important part of the overall 
process and offers a—last—opportunity for civil society to intervene and try 
an influence. Because, the Constitution has entitled the President, if he/she 
does not agree with certain aspects of the law—already passed by the 
Parliament—he, within 15 days, can return it to the Parliament for 
reconsideration of certain articles or the whole law.
197
 President would 
explain the rationale behind such a decision and normally share it with the 
public as well.  
     This does not necessarily mean that the civil society should wait until the 
legislative text has been adopted by the Parliament and forwarded to the 
Office of the President. Review and examination of ‘laws’ in President’s 
Office starts long before—as soon as they are included in the Plenary 
                                                          
195
 For a discussion on ‘potestative’ rights versus ‘obligatory’ rights see; (Sartor 2006: 20-
23).  
196
 “The TGNA should consider setting up special bodies within Parliament to track 
developments” (SIGMA: 37). “Committees should become central sites for executive 
oversight and control. […] Committees should regularly discuss the Accountability Reports 
produced by ministries” (SIGMA: 36).  
197
 See, the Constitution, Art. 89.  
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agenda—and there is no logical or practical obstacle to civil society making 
the President know the views on a particular bill or draft law. To the 
contrary, General Secretariat of the Office of the President, obtains the texts 
of government bills or draft laws proposed by Deputies in advance, and 
starts examining them. This examination sometimes includes inputs from 
and/or views of individual experts, academics and civil society, in addition 
to in-house experts as well as those from state institutions. The President is 
briefed on the results of this study and only then he/she makes a decision for 
either promulgating it or returning to the Parliament for reconsideration. 
Even if the ‘law’ is voted on, without any change, and sent back to the 
President for promulgation, it is still possible for the President to challenge 
it at the Constitutional Court—if he deems that the legislation is 
unconstitutional. Therefore, there is ample opportunity for civil society to 
get involved and make their views/concerns be known, even after the 
Plenary stage, i.e. after legislative texts turn ‘law’. 
 
3.3.4. Civil society in legislative process 
     Civil society, necessarily communicates and, again if and where possible, 
cooperates with various actors involved in the legislative process and, if 
possible, in the political decision-making process, directly or indirectly. 
Civil society initiatives sometimes even precede the decision-making, 
setting the agenda. And, from then on, the push and momentum for 
particular legislative outcomes are maintained or at least this is what is 
ideally wanted by civil society. The vital need for this vigour and the 
‘crusading’ spirit on the part of civil society have very good reasons.  
     For most Deputies, ‘service’ to constituents takes up a large part of their 
limited time and energy. As a consequence, not only the executive oversight 
and scrutiny, but also legislative functions are squeezed out and there is very 
little incentive to engage with the civil society. This is also true for the 
advisors serving Deputies. Their priorities, naturally, are linked to those of 
their ‘bosses’. 
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     The overwhelming pressure to pass bills and proposals of law as soon as 
possible, in both committees and the Plenary, puts civil society as a whole, 
in the position of an ‘unwanted visitor’, a nuisance which has to be tolerated 
and—albeit reluctantly—given a chance to show up and ‘talk’, but leave as 
soon as possible and, ideally, not come back again (!). 
     In practice, the letter of the Art. 30 of the Rules of Procedure is 
interpreted—by committee chairs—with an ‘inclusive’ understanding to 
cover ‘experts’ also from the civil society who may not be civil servants as 
spelled out in the text. However, there is no clear reference, in the Rules of 
Procedure, to either civil society in general or to civil society organisations 
in particular. Even the word ‘civil society’ does not exist in the existing 
Rules of Procedure. The invitation of civil society representatives—either 
personally or as representatives of certain organisations—in Committee 
meetings, their selection, having a chance to speak and voice their views, 
are all subject to decisions of the chair of the Committee.
198
  
     The floor is first offered to the government representative (for draft bills) 
or to the first name (for proposals of law) who has signed the cover letter, 
then to Committee members, followed by other Deputies who are not 
members of that Committee but present in the room. ‘Government’ may 
respond to questions, if raised. Only then, outside ‘experts’—academics, 
other individuals—and civil society representatives may have a chance to 
voice their views. As a matter of fact, because of time limitations, civil 
society can hardly have a chance to speak; if there are many representatives, 
only a few of them may have the opportunity to talk. Most of the time, none 
of them—even if they have been officially invited—can ever have a chance 
to chatter even a couple of words.    
                                                          
198
 It is naturally not possible to invite each and every civil society organisation working in 
the relevant area. Above all, neither the time available, nor the physical space in committee 
rooms—which are rather small and less than convenient in terms of their general design—
would allow that. Those which have already applied for permission to participate in certain 
sessions and active in the area of ‘work’ in hand—in the form of publications, conferences 
or other activities—would normally be given priority. 
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     In the Plenary, political tension is generally high and it is the forum 
where Deputies would make an impression in front of their party ‘leaders’. 
So, as in the Committees, it is very difficult to set aside political arguments 
from technical details and facts related to the matter at hand, hence very 
little, if any, demand for civil society involvement, also there. Nevertheless, 
there are ways and opportunities, if properly used by the civil society, that 
would influence the Plenary agenda. The Rules of Procedure of the 
Parliament, Art 59, allows three parliamentarians, each make a speech, not 
exceeding five minutes, on urgent subjects of extraordinary nature. The 
same goes for the government, but for ten minutes. This is an opportunity 
for civil society to influence the agenda or articulate an issue through 
MPs—or the Government, in theory. Also there are other ways laid down in 
the Constitution—Art 98, and regulated by the Rules of Procedure—such as 
questions, parliamentary inquiries, general debates, motions of censure and 
parliamentary investigations. Of these means of parliamentary supervision; 
questions, inquires and debates may also provide opportunities for civil 
society to get involved.
199
  
     To sum up, without a first plenary reading of draft laws and bills, prior to 
their detailed consideration in committees, neither the political opposition, 
nor the general public, or civil society has any information, nor chance, to 
initiate any effort to participate effectively in the legislation process. The 
outcome of the overall legislative process is simply unpredictable. 
Committees and the Plenary are dominated by ‘political’ discussions. Since 
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 The Constitution, Art 98 - The Turkish Grand National Assembly shall exercise its 
supervisory power by means of questions, parliamentary inquiries, general debates, motions 
of censure and parliamentary investigations. A question is a request for information 
addressed to the Prime Minister or ministers to be answered orally or in writing on behalf 
of the Council of Ministers. A parliamentary inquiry is an examination conducted to obtain 
information on a specific subject. A general debate is the consideration of a specific subject 
relating to the society and the activities of the state at the Plenary sessions of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly. The form of presentation, content, and scope of the motions 
concerning questions, parliamentary inquiries and general debates, and the procedures for 
answering, debating and investigating them, shall be regulated by the Rules of Procedure. 
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there is no clear-cut line between political arguments and inputs from 
external sources—in Committees and the Plenary—civil society, even if 
given a chance to ‘participate’, hesitates to do so because of the risk of 
becoming embroiled in government-opposition confrontation.  
     As pointed to, in Peer Review Report, “ineffective participation of NGOs 
and interest groups further weakens the parliamentary law-making process.” 
(SIGMA 2010: iii), but it seems this is currently not an ‘issue’ which is 
considered seriously, nor given priority by the government, the Parliament, 
or the political parties. Even if civil society strives for an influence with 
very limited capacity, chronic absence of advance planning and 
unpredictable agendas—both at the Committees and the Plenary—makes it 
very difficult to materialize. Besides, there is no formal or semi-formal 
protocol, similar to those in the EU or elsewhere, that would govern and 
facilitate consultation between the government and civil society as a 
whole.
200
  
 
3.4. TGNA Rules of Procedure ‘saga’ 
     First Rules of Procedure for the Turkish (Ottoman) Parliament was 
prepared in 1877, immediately after the Constitution of 1876 went into 
effect. This first constitution of the Turkish political history was designed 
based on a political regime that can be called constitutional monarchy 
today. Ottoman dynasty, based on hereditary and religious—Khaliphate—
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 For example, see; European Commission ‘General Principles and Minimum Standards 
for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission’ COM (2002) 704. 6 January 
2013. http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/civil_society/consultation_standards/index_en.htm.  
Compact Voice-UK. 6 January 2013. http://www.compactvoice.org.uk/.  
Compact, Consultation and Policy Appraisal: Compact Code of Good Practice. 6 January 
2013. http://www.hackney.gov.uk/Assets/Documents/c-consultation_policy-5.pdf. 
Also; IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum developed by International Association for 
Public Participation; inform, consult, involve, collaborate, empower. 6 January 2013. 
http://www.fermilabcommunity.org/pdfs/spectrum.pdf . “This spectrum is important 
particularly for changing the existing (mis)perception, in Turkey, of the consultation itself 
as ‘participation” (Agduk 2010: 121).  
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line of succession, maintained the prerogative to rule the country.
201
 The 
Turkish Grand National Assembly of 1920, initially adopted Nizamname-i 
Dahili of the lower house of the Ottoman Parliament and worked with the 
same rules until 1927 at which time TGNA passed a new rules of procedure 
(tr. Dahili Nizamname) of its own. The 1973 Rules of Procedure (from then 
on called Ictüzük), replaced the 1927 one and, although it has been amended 
several times—and became a ‘patchwork’ of rules—is still in force.202  
     On average, every 50 years, a new rules of procedure was introduced and 
immediately after it went into effect, serious—and endless—complaints 
about it were raised by both the governing and opposition parties. That’s 
why, ever since the first Ottoman Parliament of 1876, ‘amending’ or 
‘replacing’ the rules of procedure always had a place in the political agenda 
and much effort was devoted towards this end.  
     A new Rules of Procedure was a clear necessity for various reasons. 
Comprehensive amendments to the Rules of Procedure, since 1973, upset its 
systematic; while some articles and regulations became virtually impossible 
to practice, some other practices with no real basis, became routinely 
practised. It is hardly possible to argue that parliamentary business is run in 
the proper manner—planned and according to a programme. Governing 
parties are unhappy with the ‘slow’ and cumbersome way legislative 
process is run. On the other hand, opposition parties complain about the lack 
of real opportunities for Parliamentary oversight of the executive. 
Participation of individual Deputies in the legislative process and scrutiny of 
the executive decisions and actions is severely limited. Plenary-heavy work 
of the Parliament—and extra-parliamentary mechanisms—makes 
committees and committee work absolutely ‘redundant’.  
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 1876 Constitution was called Kanun-i Esasi (‘Essential Law’). The Ottoman Parliament 
had two chambers. Both Meclis-i Mebusan (House of Representatives) and Meclisi-i Ayan 
(House of Lords) had their own Nizamname-i Dahili (‘Internal Procedures’).   
202
 1973 Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Parliament (tr. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 
Ictüzügü) was amended “155 times in the course of 36 years” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 
227). Bearing in mind that it was first written for a two-chamber parliament, one can 
imagine the extent of these amendments. 
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     Several committees—commissions as they are called in TGNA—were 
formed in order to either amend it or to draft a new set of rules from scratch. 
Most recently, in 2008, yet another—a non-partisan—committee was 
formed to draft a custom-design, brand-new Rules of Procedure, after 35 
years.
203
  
     The so-called Reconciliation Committee on the Rules of Procedure first 
adopted the ‘aims and principles’ that would govern their work.204 These 
would improve democratic conduct, i.e. increase pluralism, participation, 
transparency; address the deep-seated challenges of longer-term agenda-
setting, government-opposition divide and extreme polarisation which has 
proven destructive for an effective legislative process; enhance the 
functioning of committees as platforms where the bills/draft laws—free 
from political confrontation—would be perfected for the Plenary. It 
introduced a Board of Committee Chairmen with considerable powers, 
curtailing government control of the agenda and legislative process. It—
would—radically change the way the TGNA’s business is managed and 
improve and strengthen the ‘role’ of opposition parties. 
     Of particular importance for the subject of this thesis, it paid special 
attention to improving chances and opportunities that would be made 
available for the civil society to participate more effectively in the 
legislative process. It introduced rules, for civil society—and professional 
associations, trade unions etc.—to offer written views and make oral 
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 Reconciliation Committee on the Rules of Procedure was established on 16 October 
2008 and completed its work on 16 February 2009. The members were Salih Kapusuz 
(AKP), Ali Topuz (CHP), Nevzat Korkmaz (MHP) and Selahattin Demirtas (DTP). The 
new draft Rules of Procedure was presented to the Speaker’s Office on 06 April 2011, by 
two MPs—Ankara Deputy Salih Kapusuz and Istanbul Deputy Ali Topuz—as a proposal, 
and was referred to the Committee on the Constitution on 11 April 2011. After the elections 
of June 2011, in the 24th term, Ankara Deputy Salih Kapusuz, once again—this time 
alone—presented it to the Office of the Speaker in July 2011. The draft did not bear the 
stamp of the AKP Parliamentary Group. For the text of the draft TGNA Rules of Procedure 
of 2009/2011, see; http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/2/2-0003.pdf. 6 January 2013. 
204
 For a detailed list of aims and principles, see Neziroglu & Bakirci (2011), pp. 229-30. 
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contributions during committee meetings. As a revolutionary change, it 
suggested stand-alone ‘hearings’, organised and planned for civil society-
deputies interaction only. As a result, decision meetings of committees 
would be separated from ‘hearings’ and released from the pressure of the 
time-table, both civil society representatives and deputies would be freely 
focusing on discussing the facts related to particular items in the committee 
agendas.  
     Parliamentary Academy
205, as an idealistic, even ‘utopic’ idea, for not 
only improving civil society participation, but also sustaining the 
improvements made in this respect by providing the institutional 
infrastructure, was also included in the draft Rules of Procedure.  
     The ‘strong support’—with only minor suggestions—given to this draft 
Rules of Procedure by the Peer Review Team is a clear testament to the 
non-partisan Reconciliation Team’s openness to external assistance and 
inputs as well as its objective, apolitical, result-oriented approach:   
          The central aim of improving the legislative process in the TGNA, as  
     is given expression in the draft Rules of Procedure, is strongly supported  
     by the Peer Review Team. In line with European developments, the  
     thrust of the changes proposed seeks to rebalance the responsibilities  
     between committees and the Plenary and to ensure that both committees  
     and the Plenary dispose of the information necessary to allow for  
     informed debate. (SIGMA 2010: 34) 
 
     The new ‘draft’ Rules of Procedure introduced fundamental changes to 
the way committees were formed, administered and run, improving their 
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 Parliamentary Academy: “For the purposes of doing research and studies related to the 
Parliament and the processes of legislation and oversight; improving the cooperation 
between the Parliament and public institutions, conducting common studies with 
universities, cooperating with international counterparts, enabling civil society to 
participate, organizing training and education programmes, doing publications; a 
Parliamentary Academy is established. Procedures and Principles related to the 
Parliamentary Academy are decided by the Bureau of the Assembly.” Draft Rules of 
Procedure of 2009/2011, Art. 119. 
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effectiveness considerably. Since draft bills and law proposals would have 
been fully developed through intensive and rational debate and external 
assistance in the form of effective participation from the civil society, 
academia, individual experts and other interest/professional organisations 
would be sought, Plenary phase of the legislative process would necessarily 
be closed to last-minute interventions, nugatory debates and loss of time. 
Agendas, both in the Committees and the Plenary, as well as the 
Government’s legislative ‘plan’, would be based on consensus and, once 
agreed, difficult to change—for an extended period of time. Since all the 
actors involved—including civil society—would have known the 
Parliamentary agenda in advance, they would have the chance to get 
prepared to make a meaningful contribution and to really participate. The 
chances for making motions were restricted and last minute moves as well 
as the practice of special legislative mechanisms for basic laws and the 
weird ‘invention’ called bag-law, would have been eliminated altogether.206  
     The drafting committee completed its work in four months, in February 
2009 by drafting an ‘agreed-upon’ text, in consultation with outside experts 
and with inputs from the civil society. The Speaker’s Office organised a 
symposium
207
, in January 2011, to discuss and perfect it with the widest 
possible participation from both the bureaucracy—the drafters of laws—and 
the politicians—policymakers.  
     The fact that although this committee was able to fully agree on the new 
draft Rules of Procedure, and no party raised any objections to any articles 
of it, it took more than ‘two years’ to move it to the Committee on the 
Constitution is telling; however, it is not surprising. 
     It is easy to understand why the General Secretariat of the TGNA—as 
the facilitator—worked so hard for such a long time—clearly taking some 
‘career’ risks—for making a nonpartisan agreement on a ‘democratic’ Rules 
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 For a detailed account of the new draft Rules of Procedure of 2009/2011, see; Neziroglu 
& Bakirci  (2011), pp. 144-77. 
207
 Symposium on the Legislative Process, TGNA, 17 January 2011. 6 January 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/yayinlar/Kanun_Yapim_Sureci_Sempozyumu/sempozyum.pdf.  
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of Procedure possible. It is also reasonably easy to explain why the 
governing party was so reluctant for a comprehensive change—and 
eventually opted for a set of rather surgical amendments.
208
 But it is equally 
difficult to explain the behaviour of the opposition parties. After their 
representatives, in the Reconciliation Committee on the Rules of Procedure, 
presumably in coordination with their respective party administrations, 
agreed with and gave their full support to it, opposition parties behaved as if 
there has been no such an agreement and that they were happy with the 
current—1973—Rules of Procedure.  
     Mehmet Ali Şahin, Speaker of the Parliament said, during the 2011 
Symposium: “We sent (draft Rules of Procedure) to political parties for their 
examination and views. But when I said, later; ‘Let’s take up this rules of 
procedure, debate it in the Parliament and adopt it as a law’, some Vice-
Chairs of Parliamentary Groups said; ‘Yes, the Committee, in fact, prepared 
a good draft but we have some reservations on its certain articles and certain 
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 Governing party—AKP—representatives gave conflicting indications of their 
expectations from the new Rules of Procedure. Deputy Prime Minister (Current Speaker of 
the Assembly) Cemil Cicek, during the TGNA Symposium of 2011 was clearly in favour of 
selective amendments to the Rules of Procedure: “[…] the abuse of the mechanisms in the 
Rules of Procedure, against their intended purposes, damages the credibility of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly. […] For a better legislation we need a new rules of procedure. 
There is a draft rules of procedure on which we have all agreed upon. We hope that this 
rules of procedure, or at least an important part of it, can be discussed in the Assembly 
before the next term. Really, making use of the opportunity brought about by the 3rd 
channel (TRT-3/Parliament Tv), there is a tendency to talk about anything other than what 
we are debating about. […] As a result, I would like to state that, the majority of the 
blockage we are faced with in the legislative process originate from the Rules of 
Procedure” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 20). However another senior politician in the same 
party, Bekir Bozdag, Vice-Chair for AKP Parliamentary Caucus, categorically agreed with 
the technical necessity for a new rules of procedure: “We need a change in the rules of 
procedure […] and (new) arrangements that would make the Plenary work like a plenary, 
that would turn our standing committees more powerful, and that would make the processes 
more open to contributions from all. […] This is a fault of the Parliament. […] Regretfully, 
we failed in getting rid of this common sin of us, in correcting this state of affairs” 
(Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 201). 
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approaches’. What are these reservations? Nothing, so far, has been brought 
forward in this respect” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 25). Later on, first the 
agreed-upon draft new rules of procedure disappeared from the web-site of 
the TGNA. Then, on the last day of 2011, the governing party—in the form 
of a draft law proposed by five Vice-Chairs for AKP Parliamentary 
Caucus—introduced a package of amendments only to certain articles of the 
current Rules of Procedure.
209
  
     These amendments were particularly on restricting the number of 
motions on each article which is being debated, limiting speaking times and 
eliminating the need to ‘read’—hence avoiding ‘waste’ of time—at the 
Plenary. It was referred to the Committee on Constitution—only, as the 
primary committee—on 4 January 2012, by the Speaker’s Office. The 
Committee on the Constitution first debated the proposed draft (No 2/242) 
on 19 January 2012 and decided to establish a sub-commission composed of 
five deputies—three from AKP, one from CHP and one from MHP. MHP 
Deputy, in the subcommittee, proposed the Primary Committee deliberate 
on the agreed-upon draft rules of procedure previously prepared—during 
the 23rd Term—rather than the limited package prepared by the governing 
party only. Failing an agreement to that, he left the meeting, and filed a text 
reserving his—and his party’s—position.210 He, basically, said that 
“different from the way other bills and draft laws were prepared, 
amendments to the Rules of Procedure must have been based on 
conciliation, compromise, getting contributions from other parties”.  
     The CHP member of the Committee, too, proposed that deliberations 
take the 2009/2011 draft new Rules of Procedure, previously prepared, as 
the basis—not the AKP package, but he stayed in the meeting. At the end, 
he remained ‘against’ the entirety of the amendments. As a result, sub-
                                                          
209
 Amendment package to the Rules of Procedure—Draft Rules of Procedure proposed by 
Giresun Deputy Nurettin Canikli and his friends—dated 30 December 2011. It was bearing 
the stamp of the AKP Parliamentary Group. See; http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/2/2-
0003.pdf. 6 January 2013. 
210
 See; Committee on the Constitution Report No 156 (2012), dated 30 January 2012, p. 12 
and pp. 28-31. 6 January 2013. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss156.pdf.  
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committee report, with minor amendments to the original draft, reflected the 
views of three members from the governing party only. Both opposition 
Deputies, pointing to the 2009/2011 non-partisan draft Rules of Procedure, 
drew attention to the need for a cross-party consensus on a major legislation 
like the Rules of Procedure of the TGNA, said that the AKP package 
cherry-picked some items from the original study and they accused the 
governing party of trying to “muzzle the opposition”. Also, later in the 
Committee, on 26 January 2012; opposition accused the government of 
attempting to “turning the Speaker of the House into a chronometer” and 
“moving the Parliament away from being a parliament, making it a law-
producing factory” and that “ignoring the draft new Rules of Procedure by 
the Committee was irreconcilable with (the notion of) democracy”.211 They 
also argued that the unilateral attempt, by the governing party, to amend the 
Rules of Procedure was unconstitutional. Five members from the opposition 
CHP wrote, in their note of reservation
212
: 
          The logic and rationale of a regulation of this nature (as required by  
     the Constitution) is clear. […] It must be done through conciliation and  
     dialogue, […] without imposition of (one single political party) group(s).  
     Leaving the Draft Text which was prepared by the common work of four  
     parties and forwarded to the Committee on the Constitution on 11 April  
     2011 […] creating a fait-accompli is unacceptable. […] Problem is not  
     originated from laws that are not passed in a timely manner or  
     deliberations take a long time. Problem is caused by inability to produce  
     drafts that would meet the needs, and government’s patronising style of  
     politics. […] patalogic and narsictic understanding, is causing heavy  
     damage on legal and political stability. […] The aim is to turn the TGNA  
     into an institution ‘that makes production, based on orders’.  
 
     When the Report by the Committee on the Constitution, of 30 January 
2012, came to the Plenary, and immediately jumped to the top of the 
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212
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agenda, this initiative caused much reaction from the opposition parties and 
resulted in serious turmoil and confrontation in the Plenary session for about 
two weeks. The opposition parties even physically occupied the floor in the 
Plenary, effectively obstructing proceedings. On 9 February, through 
discussions between the leaders of respective parties, following the debate 
on the first 9 articles of the draft Rules of Procedure
213
, it was shelved for 
‘the time being’, “until an agreement can be reached with the opposition 
parties”.214  
     The work of three years, all energy and time and good-intentioned 
efforts, were wasted. At the end, the TGNA, instead of adopting an already 
agreed-upon comprehensive set of rules, chose to conflict over selective 
amendments and eventually ended up with the old Rules of Procedure which 
were passed in 1973—under military scrutiny.  
     Peer Review Report offers an explanation for this strange turn of events, 
which, as far as the initiative for a new Rules of Procedure is concerned, 
overlaps with the findings of this research:  
          […] change is not an easy undertaking. The main challenges result,  
     first, from the dual nature of parliaments as both eminently political and  
     administrative institutions; second, from the pervasive influence of the  
     majority–minority distinction on all aspects of the organisation of  
     Parliament; and, third, from the interdependence between parliamentary  
     reform and developments in the broader political system. […] political  
     and administrative parliamentary reforms are interdependent, but that  
     formal powers and responsibilities for reform are dispersed in the  
     organisation, which makes co-ordinated approaches difficult to sustain.  
     The distinction between majority and minority parties as a basic  
     structuring principle for the operation of Parliament bears the risk that  
     parliamentary reform itself becomes quickly embroiled in a government– 
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     opposition dynamic […]. (SIGMA 2011: 43) 
 
     This was exactly what happened in the TGNA. EU, both in 2009 and 
2010 Progress Reports
215
, included the failure in adopting a new Rules of 
Procedure for TGNA, indicating the importance attached to it because of the 
connection between the Rules of Procedure and the effective functioning of 
the Parliament.  
      As a matter of fact, a deep government-opposition divide and wide-
spread polarisation of the political system as a whole do not allow cross-
party co-operation, even on subjects of ‘vital’ importance and of ‘national’ 
nature—including foreign policy.  
 
3.5. EU role and influence on ‘reforms’ 
     The story of ‘Europeanization’ in Turkey is a long, complicated and 
painful one. The Association Agreement—Ankara Agreement—between 
Turkey and, then, the European Economic Community (ECC) was signed in 
1963—half a century ago. It took more than 30 years for Turkey and the 
European Union to form a customs union in 1995. And eventually, the 
European Council—after the ‘humiliating’ rejection at the 1997 
Luxembourg Summit—granted Turkey the status of candidate country in 
December 1999 in Helsinki. The Accession Partnership
216
 for Turkey was 
adopted by the Council of Europe on 08 March 2001—and updated in 2003, 
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2006 and finally in 2008
217—and the Turkish Parliament adopted the 
National Programme for EU, on 19 March 2001, in ten days. Following the 
developments related to Cyprus and its accession—as the Republic of 
Cyprus—to the EU in 2004, Negotiating Framework for Turkey218 was 
finally agreed upon in October 2005. The text was referring to “an open-
ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand”, 
“the Union’s capacity to absorb Turkey”, “long transitional periods, 
derogations, permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are 
permanently available”. Nevertheless, Turkey started negotiations in good 
faith. 
     It is possible to identify rough episodes, in the calendar of Turkey-EU 
relations, based on which one can better see the complex connection and 
interaction between domestic politics, regional politics, foreign policy, 
political aims, changing—sometimes conflicting—priorities, tools 
mobilized and the rhetoric changed on both ‘sides’. Helsinki in 1999, 
marked a beginning. Until 2005, when the Accession Partnership for Turkey 
finally became a reality, there was an upward trend in relations. After the 
strings attached to 2005 decisions by all European institutions and the 
objections raised by some Member States, plus the impasse encountered in 
overcoming the problem of Additional Protocol due to Cyprus connection, 
relations rapidly soured. From 2005 on, for a short period of about a year, 
there was some hope of progress which ended in disappointment on both 
sides. This was followed by a ‘cooling’ period of two years, during which 
neither the EU nor Turkey seemed too eager to move forward. Then, from 
2007—general elections in Turkey—through 2010, Turkey was the ‘pulling’ 
partner of the partnership. In a sense, there have been two false honey-
moons in the course of 10 years—from 2000 to 2005 and from 2007 to 
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2010. Each period overlaps with reforms in the ‘security sector’ and the 
‘judiciary’ respectively. Under the rubrics of ‘meeting the Copenhagen 
political criteria’ and ‘fulfilment of Accession Partnership priorities’, the 
Turkish government took unprecedented steps, arguably, towards these 
ends. The European Union, in turn, took steps that paved the way for further 
reforms, facilitated the political initiatives, supported the reform process by 
providing incentives in the form of—sometimes quite vague—promises, 
financial assistance and political statements reflecting reform priorities, 
encouraging progress, in regular reports.  
     The European Commission regularly reports to the European Council 
and the European Parliament on the progress made by Turkey—in 
preparations for EU membership—since 1997. These are called ‘progress 
reports’. The European Parliament also, since 2006, based on EC progress 
reports, adopts resolutions making its views known by Turkey and the 
Member States. In these reports, the situation in terms of the political 
criteria, among other things, is analysed and this analysis also covers issues 
related to ‘security sector’ and ‘judicial’ reforms.  
     These reports are mainly elite-oriented, effective tools for encouraging 
reforms and for challenging ‘self-declared’ success by respective 
governments. They are drafted in line with EU policies and strategies, 
taking into account domestic—and increasingly regional, international—
developments, in coordination with respective national authorities of the EU 
member states.
219
 They are politically motivated, well prioritised and serve 
to clearly defined political ends. Two examples of ‘strategic’ approach in 
EU reports are the subjects of integration of the Ministry of Defence with 
the Turkish General Staff and the establishment of ‘Judicial police’.  
     The subject of integrated MoD and General Staff was—either directly or 
indirectly—repeatedly mentioned in successive reports, but following the 
reform in the NSC disappeared altogether from 2005 on, to reappear again 
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in EC 2011 Turkey Progress Report. However, this was followed by a 
warning to the Government about “the need to ensure the continued secular 
integrity of the armed forces and their operational capability” in the draft EP 
Resolution on the Turkey 2011 Progress Report, in March 2012.  
     The need for a Judicial police was included in the EC 2004 Regular 
Report, was accepted by the Government and included in the legislative 
package introduced in 2005 for amending the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Art 167) in 2005, but was not implemented. The subject disappeared from 
reports from 2007 on, but reappeared in 2011 in an emphatic style. (EC 
2011: 18) 
     Financial assistance provided under various programmes/projects, since 
2002, is another instrument available to EU authorities. Multiannual 
Indicative Planning Documents (MIPDs) set out the priorities for assistance 
under Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) based on the needs 
identified in the Accession Partnership and progress reports. In this context, 
under both the national programme and the Civil Society Facility, EU 
financial support is provided to civil society, in particular to enhance civil 
society organisations’ capacities, their administrative and communication 
skills, and encourage a civil society dialogue between Turkey and the EU. 
Technical assistance is also provided to the Turkish government promoting 
good practices on support of active citizenship.  
     To encourage civil society dialogue between Turkey and the EU, support 
is also given for participation by Turkey in EU programmes and agencies. 
Projects in areas such as media and civil society organisations are co-
financed. However, difficulties in implementation continue. The Court of 
Auditors Report in 2009
220
, identified a series of weaknesses in the 
management of the IPA and the European Parliament
221
 requested the 
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Commission to launch an evaluation of the entire programme and 
implement the recommendations of the Report. 
     Starting early 2009, there was a marked intensification in relations. In 
December 2008, the Government adopted the National Programme for the 
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). In January 2009, a full-time EU Chief 
Negotiator, with the status of State Minister, was appointed. Political 
dialogue—Association Committee—meetings were held in March 2009 at 
Ministerial level, and then in February and July at Political Directors level. 
A number of high-level visits from Turkey to European institutions also 
took place during the same period. The Association Council met in May. 
The Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document 2009-2011—focusing on 
institutions directly concerned with the political reforms in the judiciary and 
the law enforcement services—was adopted by the Commission in July 
2009. Eight sectoral sub-committees were held in a year—between 
November 2008 and October 2009. The Reform Monitoring Group 
(RMG)—made up of Minister for Foreign Affairs, the State Minister for EU 
Affairs and Chief Negotiator, and ministers of Justice and Interior—met 
under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, in February, for the first time 
since the group was first established in 2003, and expressed Government’s 
commitment to the EU accession process.
222
 The RMG continued to meet 
regularly in different parts of the country underlining the determination of 
the government to involve the ‘people’ more closely in the accession 
process. Turkey also accepted to resume formal negotiations on an EC-
Turkey readmission agreement in 2009. 
     This upward trend in relations—and in the reform process—continued in 
parallel in the year 2010. In January, a new European Union Strategy for 
                                                                                                                                                   
the pre-accession assistance and report about its implementation to the European 
Parliament” (EP 2009: Art 52). 
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Turkey’s Accession Process223 was prepared with the aim of speeding up the 
accession negotiations and increasing public awareness and support for 
accession. The new strategy was based on four pillars; continue negotiations 
on opened chapters, continue work on ‘other’ chapters, democratisation, 
(public) communication. Under the second pillar it aimed; “Civil society 
organisations, universities and other non-governmental groups […] 
effectively incorporated into the process”. The ambitious, but telling 
statement—under the third pillar of democratisation—was simply mirror-
imaging the EU reports: “Political reforms in the fields of human rights, 
democracy and rule of law constitute the backbone of the accession process. 
[…] The progress achieved in the political reforms field will pave the way 
for other reforms”.  
     It was even stated in the Strategy paper that, the Secretariat General for 
EU Affairs, based on the decisions taken at the RMG, proposed the Council 
of Ministers, in January 2010, to legislate special procedure for the TGNA 
so that one week in each month could be reserved for debates on draft laws 
related to the accession process; this never happened. Against this 
background, on 15 March, the Turkish Council of Ministers adopted the 
2010-2011 action plan
224
 outlining the legislation to be enacted and studies 
to be carried out on each chapter of the negotiations. The Association 
Committee met in March 2010, the Association Council in May 2010 and, 
again, eight sector sub-committees were held.  
     As a result, when the draft constitutional amendment package forwarded 
to the TGNA by the Government, in Spring of 2010—which started a long 
chain-process ending in a complete transformation of the Turkish judiciary, 
prominent among others, the relations with the EU and the activity on the 
part of the Government was at its highest. The European Parliament in its 
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resolution in February 2010
225
, commended the initiatives of the Turkish 
Government to encourage active participation and debate.  
     Meanwhile, EU authorities kept an eye on the legal, political and 
psychological environment from civil society perspective. In 2009 Progress 
Report, undue delays in “registration of associations and foundations, in 
particular local representations of international NGOs (International Crisis 
Group and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute)” were stated. Still as of end of 
2009,  the EU found the legal framework on associations “broadly in line 
with European standards”. However, “considerable progress (needed) to be 
made as regards its implementation, as associations still (faced) 
disproportionate scrutiny of their activities, which in some cases has led to 
judicial proceedings” (EC 2009: 20) 
     The inclusion of civil society organisations in policy-making and 
legislative processes was another area that was monitored by the EU and 
covered in EU reports. This is related to the so-called ‘democracy-promoter’ 
role of the EU. Ostensibly, EU support to civil society and civil society 
projects and programmes in Turkey are synchronized with EU policy aims 
in line with EU-Turkey relations and Turkey’s accession process. This is 
true in terms of allocation of funds, however, in terms of implementation 
there is a wide-spread disconnect between the agencies deciding policy and 
allocating funds, and those implementing the projects—official and 
private/contract alike. 
     The outreach, in terms of the EU aims and purposes for supporting civil 
society projects in Turkey is extremely limited. There is no sign of a 
deliberate, wide-scale, aggressive public information campaign. ‘Public’ 
activities are conducted within a very small circle of civil society ‘leaders’, 
activists and a very limited number of journalists.
226
 Networking is often 
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mentioned but rarely practiced. Visibility versus low-profile approach is a 
difficult—sometimes an impracticable—choice to be made by those civil 
society organisations operating in Turkey. The sarcasm hardly hidden in the 
words of a senior official of a prominent Turkish civil society organisation 
active in the field of judiciary were echoing a common and firmly-rooted 
attitude: “I haven’t seen or read reports of the EU Commission or the 
European Parliament. They are prepared based on the information made 
available to them”. She did not hesitate to voice strong criticism of EU 
‘stance’ although she had never read even a single report. This is a most 
critical shortcoming.  
     Institutions of the EU or civil society organisations funded by EU 
resources—particularly for projects related to democratisation—mainly 
cooperate with the Government and partnerships for such projects are 
reserved for government-affiliated organisations or institutions that are more 
supportive of Government policies—largely neglecting communication with 
the political opposition. Although this policy has had practical benefits in 
the short run, it seems to have been counterproductive in terms of ensuring 
long-term mass support and non-partisan cooperation.  
     In this context, Lundgren (1997) argues that “the most established form 
of political assistance is aid to civil society. By supporting individual 
citizens and groups of citizens, an external actor may contribute indirectly to 
political reforms and to the building of a democratic culture” (94). 
According to her, the aid to support political institutions or civil society can 
be provided through different channels or mechanisms: directly to the 
government of the recipient country, to local NGOs or by funding NGOs in 
the home country, which in turn transmit the aid or run projects in the 
recipient country.  
     Her discussion—and comparison—of the aims and the methods used by 
the EU for aid to Turkey and Poland respectively is very helpful for better 
understanding the bilateral dynamics involved—between the EU and 
Turkey—in the whole ‘reform’ process. She asserts that, while the aid to 
Turkey was mainly intended for only helping civil society, the aid for 
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Poland was intended both for political institution building and to help build 
an active civil society. Besides, the EU aid to Poland was through 
cooperative arrangements—a fourth way. Only cooperation projects, 
between EU NGOs and Polish NGOs, were supported. However, aid to 
Turkey was in the form of direct support to Turkish NGOs. Also, EU 
support to civil society in Turkey almost exclusively focused on human 
rights organisations which made up, in Poland, only a small fraction of the 
total aid. Where did the differences in the approach and aims originate 
from? One possible explanation is that the main idea was to integrate Polish 
civil society with that of Western Europe. For Turkey, a similar ambition 
simply did not exist. (Lundgen 1997: 99-100) 
     Based on this set of observations, one may presume that the EU has a 
stronger interest in Poland becoming a democracy than in Turkey doing so. 
The consequences of this conception—and its actual application to aid to 
civil society in Turkey—have been far-reaching. It has been directed to 
limited, selective aims, mostly uncoordinated and isolated from the larger 
political context, and particularly devoid of a comprehensive vision of 
democratisation. The EU aid to civil society in Turkey has not enjoyed the 
much needed political support and synergy that could come from better 
coordination and ‘serious’ work. There was almost no real ‘political’ 
ownership of the projects supported. They have been implemented in a 
piecemeal fashion and the results, naturally, have not been too impressive. 
     Lack of a proper understanding of the ‘EU’ and EU accession process 
gives rise to a general suspicion in Turkey, which is traditionally associated 
with the West.
227
 There is very little, if any, that is being done to ensure 
correct perception of the EU and this publicity problem directly and 
indirectly hampers civil society’s effective functioning. The clear 
suspension of negotiations with the EU in 2006 and the perceived 
indifference on the part of the Turkish government just supported this 
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perception and had a negative effect on civil society and its democratisation 
efforts. President of the European Movement Turkey, Haluk Günugur, in 
mid-2010, expressed this frustration:  
          The attitude and the rhetoric of the Turkish Government and that of  
     the Office of the Speaker of the TGNA, on the role and importance of  
     civil society about the EU and their attitude vis-a-vis ‘civil dialogue’ are  
     now just making me laugh. […] The European Union and its civil society  
     organisation International European Movement are pretending as if they  
     will accept Turkey and the Turkish Government in power pretends as if  
     becoming an EU member. This secret consensus satisfies both sides  
     nowadays.
228
 
 
     Global civil society also focuses on supporting ‘democratic governance’, 
e.g. mechanisms, processes and institutions, and tries to foster ‘democratic 
principles’ by providing “policy-advice and technical support, assistance for 
strengthening capacity of individuals and institutions”.229 The prevailing 
principle of dealing with governments in “strengthening civilian oversight” 
and “participation in legislative and decision-making processes through 
established consultation platforms and mechanisms”230 seems to work 
against the very purpose of such projects. Their views at the level of 
ministries are taken but not always implemented. Besides, there are 
ambiguities as to which office has the authority to make critical decisions. 
In the absence of ‘ownership’, national counterparts often represent the 
main obstacle to efficient implementation. 
     Most of the EU projects are related to the ongoing democratisation 
process in Turkey and are politically sensitive in nature. The lack of 
political consensus inside the country, on the substance, scope and pace of 
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intended reforms does not allow coherent attitude vis-a-vis these reforms. 
Political change management and implementation of civil society projects 
has to go hand-in-hand within an overall, comprehensive ‘government 
programme’ which really does not exist. This situation makes partnership 
and networking very difficult and results in low ownership.  
 
3.6. Parliamentary ‘civil’ society 
     Civil society, as discussed in Chapter 2, is the term used for describing a 
sphere composed of individuals and organisations that voluntarily come 
together, position themselves outside the state, market and family 
relations—in other terms, excluding the political sphere, economic sphere, 
private sphere, but including public sphere—for the primary purpose of 
contributing to the provision of common good for the society as a whole. 
There are some 100.000 organisations in Turkey (STGM Report 2012: iii, 2) 
that can be listed as civil society organisations in the form of associations, 
foundations, labour unions, public sector trade unions, professional 
associations and chambers.
231
 When almost 60.000 cooperatives of various 
nature are added, then the total number exceeds 160.000. Three of them are 
professional associations representing parliamentary staff in TGNA. This is 
important for the purposes of this thesis because some of their efforts, as 
professional organisations, is exclusively dedicated to improving 
participation by the ‘civil’ society in legislative process and making this 
participation more effective.  
     These three organisations are the Turkish Association of Legislation 
(Yasama Dernegi/YASADER), the Association of Parliamentary Advisors 
(Parlamenter Danismanlari Dernegi/PDD), and the Association of 
Legislative Experts (Yasama Uzmanlari Dernegi/YUDER) which is not as 
active as the other two beyond “supporting its members’ professional and 
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cultural development” although its Bylaw232 allows for “collaboration with 
NGOs” on matters related to legislative process. Particularly one of them—
YASADER—is certainly punching way above its weight, at least they tried 
very hard, until recently.  
       One publication is a typical case in point for understanding the 
importance of what I call ‘Parliamentary civil society’ and the critical—
perhaps even revolutionary—role they volunteered to play: Advocacy and 
Influencing Policies by Istanbul Bilgi University
233
. It perfectly exemplifies 
the concepts such as linkage strategies (technocratic approach, coalition 
building, grass-roots mobilisation) and the ‘actors’ who adopt and 
implement them—international governmental organisations, 
nongovernmental organisations, epistemic communities forming 
transgovernmental coalitions. The whole production process of this 
publication and the production team involved also partly explain how the 
two-level-game in Turkey—with respect to relations with the EU and the 
international community—was operated in the period leading to the reform 
‘moment’ of 2010 and how it was reversed afterwards. Furthermore, it also 
helps better understand the limits of linkage concept of Mayer (1992). At 
the end of the day, it is the ‘substantive quality of available ideas’ that 
shapes principles, conceptions and eventually the behaviour. 
     Advocacy and Influencing Policies was produced in the course of 2007-
2009 and was published in January 2010. It represents a coalition for the 
purposes of “making NGOs more active in finding solutions to problems in 
their environment, supporting NGOs in leading national and international 
administrations to formulate necessary policies and contribute to making 
NGOs an important actor in democratisation process in Turkey” (Yentürk et 
al 2010: 3). This publication represented a common effort between a private 
university—Istanbul Bilgi University (NGO Education and Research 
Centre), Turkish Parliament (indirectly, over Parliamentary civil society, 
                                                          
232
 See; YUDER Bylaw, Art 2. 10 January 2013. http://www.yuder.org/bilgi.asp?aid=27.  
233
 See; http://www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/savunuculuk.pdf and 
http://stk.bilgi.edu.tr/cd/10/index.html. 8 January 2013. 
 184 
YASADER), an international NGO (National Democratic Institute, NDI of 
the US)
 234
 and the whole effort was funded by yet another international 
NGO (Open Society Foundations, of the US)
235
.  
     The contributors included not only those scholars associated with the 
university and the NDI but also two ‘officials’ from the Parliament—the 
Director General of Laws and Decrees of the TGNA and the Deputy 
Director of the same Directorate—an extremely rare, perhaps unique 
happening in the Turkish bureaucratic culture and practice. Although they 
participated in this work as members of a ‘parliamentary’ civil society 
organisation, YASADER—not under their official hats—doubtlessly, this 
could not possibly happen without an explicit prior permission, even support 
from the Speaker of the Parliament, if not also from the Government, albeit 
tacitly.
236
 They wrote about ‘The opportunities for the civil society to 
participate in the legislative process in the Parliament’ (Neziroglu 2010) and 
‘Participation of the civil society in Parliamentary oversight’ (Kocaman 
2010).  
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     In one of these articles the question of ‘Why civil society should 
participate in the legislative process in the Parliament’ is answered in a 
comprehensive way:  
          The MP-NGO connection is not an alternative to MP-citizen link. […]  
     It can be argued that, without civil society, citizens, individually, are  
     very rarely interested in the legislative process and attempt to influence it  
     directly. […] First of all, participation by the civil society brings  
     representative democracy nearer to direct democracy. […] Civil society  
     participation and a robust Parliament-citizen relation improve the  
     prestige of the Parliament in the eyes of the citizens. […] One other  
     benefit of an effective civil society participation is the improved quality  
     of legislation. […] Yet another advantage is the fact that, then, the   
     citizens would own these laws and become better disposed toward  
     respecting them. (Neziroglu 2010: 49-50)  
 
     Apparently, two senior officials of the Parliamentary staff consider the 
participation of the civil society in the legislative—and oversight—process 
not only as a necessity to improve the legislative efficiency but also as a 
factor that would reinforce the perception of political legitimacy (on the part 
of citizens). This is important in itself. But once this attitude is put to the test 
of behaviour, it gains real meaning.  
     YASADER publications is not limited to contribution to and 
participation in this single Project— Advocacy and Influencing Policies. 
Another book, Handbook for Civil Society Participation in the Legislative 
Process (2011), was first published in 2009 by YASADER. It was 
financially supported by the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation 
(BST)
237
 and MATRA
238
 (Second edition), facilitated by the NDI. It is the 
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 The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation (BST) is a grant-making programme 
of the German Marshall Fund. BST operates in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, 
Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia. It promotes, among other aims, strong, 
effective civic sectors. It operates by affirming the value of citizen participation in the 
democratic process and by strengthening a critical set of institutions that lie at the nexus of 
state and society. Initial investment for BST has been provided by the German Marshall 
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first example of its kind—produced by the ‘Parliament’ in order to 
encourage and invite active and effective participation by the civil society in 
the legislative process. Because the publication was found too sophisticated 
by some ‘users’, also a more concise summary in the form of a booklet was 
also prepared for easy use, with involvement from Ucan Süpürge (Flying 
Broom), a women’s organisation working for the improvement of 
democracy and civil society.    
     YASADER—again assuredly, supported by the Secretariat—i.e. the 
Speaker—also involved in many other projects, which—if succeeded—
would have transformed the civil society participation radically, not only in 
the legislative process, but also in law-writing/drafting process, as well as 
agenda setting in the general public. They organised conferences, 
workshops and advertised the idea of a Legislative Academy. YASADER 
members sometimes under their ‘civil society’ hat, sometimes under official 
civil servant hats—to be frank, sometimes wearing both hats at the same 
time—were quite instrumental in making the cross-party agreement on a 
complete, non-partisan draft Rules of Procedure possible in 2011. They 
adopted a purely technocratic, scientific approach and—in cooperation with 
international civil society—probably went, for good reasons, beyond their 
                                                                                                                                                   
Fund of the United States, the United States Agency for International Development, the 
Government of Romania, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, and the Ministry of 
Defence Republic of Latvia. The Robert Bosch Stiftung is also contributing to the activities 
of the BST as well as the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation which contributed to the 
early activities of the Trust. 03 March 2012. http://www.gmfus.org/grants-
fellowships/grantmaking-programs/black-sea-trust.  
238
 MATRA is a bilateral assistance programme of the Netherlands with the aim of 
supporting social transformation in countries neighbouring Europe by contributing to 
development of an open, pluralist and democratic society, respecting rule of law. It is aimed 
at cooperation with civil society and with central, regional and local authorities. The 
MATRA programme is active in Turkey since 2000. Twinning with Dutch organisations or 
with partners from other MATRA countries or new EU member states is possible, but this 
is not a condition for applications to MATRA. 02 March 2012. 
http://istanbul.nlconsulate.org/the-consulate-general/departments/matra-and-human-
rights/more-information/matra.html.  
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remits and crossed the limits of traditional bureaucratic culture, as either 
civil servants or as members of the Parliamentary civil society.     
     YASADER got involved in several common projects in partnership with 
Turkish and international/foreign NGOs and with support from various 
sources, primarily for improving the participation of civil society in the 
legislative process. Some of the major projects are Legislation School for 
Civil Society Organisations
239
, Civil Society Participation in the Legislative 
Process
240
, Legislation School for Local NGOs
241
, Parliamentary Oversight 
Symposium
242
.    
     These activities must be seen against a background of various EU-related 
similar projects in which the TGNA was a partner or host, or just took 
unilateral initiative such as the memorandum on Relations Between NGOs 
and the Parliament in Some European Countries
243
, Panel on Participation of 
the Civil Society in the Legislative Process
244
, TGNA Common Working 
Groups Initiative
245
, the EU Twinning Project on Strengthening the 
Capacity of the TGNA
246
, Inclusive Civic Engagement in Legislation 
                                                          
239
 YASADER-Turkish Association of Legislation, 20-21 June, 2009, Ankara, Turkey.  
240
 In partnership with TGNA, MATRA-The Netherlands, 2009-2011, Ankara.  
241
 YASADER-The Embassy of the Netherlands. 2011-2012. 10 January 2013. 
http://www.yasader.org/sayfa/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=35&Ite
mid=53&lang=en.  
242
 Organized by the TGNA, YASADER and YUDER. 8 May 2012.  
243
 TGNA Research Center, November 2007. 10 January 2013. 
http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_surecine_katilim/6/aeastmrkzbilginotu.pdf.  
244
 TGNA and YASADER, November 2007. 10 January 2013. 
http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_surecine_katilim/5/PANEL2007BILGI.pdf.  
245
 See; http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_surecine_katilim/4/tbmmocg.pdf. 10 January 
2013. 
246
 EU-supported project. Partner countries: Turkey-Italy-Hungary, 17 December 2007- 31 
October 2008. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/TR%2006%2003%2005%20Strengt
hening%20the%20capacity%20of%20the%20TGNA.pdf. 10 January 2013. 
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Making in Turkey
247
. In terms of other major activities, the TGNA 
Symposium on Legislative Process in Ankara and the MATRA-supported 
conference on Strengthening Legislative Process
248
 in Istanbul, both in 
2011, are prominent. Particularly the former’s proceedings, which have 
been published in book form (TBMM 2011) is very useful for the civil 
society to better understand not only the mechanisms and opportunities but 
also the potential hurdles in participation in the legislative and law-drafting 
processes.    
     PDD has adopted a relatively lower profile in terms of civil society 
projects. However, it has taken on the primary responsibility for the 
implementation of the project for ‘Inclusive Civic Engagement in 
Legislative Process in Turkey’. In this, first ‘advisors’ were trained by 
British and Turkish experts in preparation for the implementation phase. 
The Project covered four provinces (Bursa, Corum, Mardin, Mersin) and 
involved citizens, civil society institutions, bureaucracy and local 
administrators. Two legislative initiatives—both unrelated to daily politics 
and contentious issues—were taken as subjects of pilot field-work: ‘Law for 
the Protection of Personal Data’249 and ‘Law for the Trade of Fresh Fruit 
and Vegetables’. Former failed and became null in the 23rd Legislative 
                                                          
247
 UNDP-supported project. The Office of the Prime Minister of Turkey, YASADER and 
PDD. 2008-2009. 10 January 2013. 
http://www.undp.org.tr/Gozlem2.aspx?WebSayfaNo=1272.  
Government decision, No 2008/14502, dated 22 December 2008, on the “Paper signed 
between the Goverment of the Republic of Turkey and the United Nations Development 
Programme—UNDP—on 19 June 2008 for the Project on Inclusive Civic Engagement in 
Legislation Making in Turkey”, Official Gazette No 27112, dated 16 January 2009. 
248
 Pre-Accession Transformation Programme. Strengthening Legislative Process, Istanbul 
Conference. 21-22 February 2011. ‘Effective Participation of Civil Society Organisations in 
Legislative Process and Consultation: A Search for a Model’. 10 January 2013. 
http://www.meclishaber.gov.tr/develop/owa/haber_portal.aciklama?p1=107187.  
249
  “Law for the Protection of the Personal Data”. The draft bill was prepared by the 
Ministry of Justice and forwarded by the Office of the Prime Minister to the Parliament on 
22 April 2008. This subject did become ‘contentious’ later years, but was not in 2008. 
http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d23/1/1-0576.pdf. 03 February 2012. 
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Assembly, but the latter was passed by the Parliament in March 2010
250
. 
The slogans used during the field-work signalled the main thrust and 
purposes of the project: “Yasalar Sizi Etkilemeden Siz Yasalari Etkileyin 
(Before Laws Have an Effect on You, You Have an Effect on Laws)”, 
“Yasasin Halk (Let the People Legislate)”, “Anlatmaya Değil, Dinlemeye 
Geldik (We Came to Listen, not to Talk)”. And in response, the mostly 
asked question, by the people, was “If America (the United States) was 
behind this project”, NOT how to participate, reflecting enormous cultural 
obstacles faced by such pioneering projects, which are discussed in 
following chapters.  
     Parliamentary ‘civil’ society, after all, is made up of staffers—so-called 
experts, advisors and senior administrators—and is part of the General 
Secretariat. As such, it is composed of individuals tasked with supporting 
the Speaker, the Bureau, the Board of Spokesmen, the Plenary, 
Parliamentary Committees, party groups and Deputies. They are civil 
servants who have voluntarily chosen to involve in civil society based on—
mostly, but not exclusively—a sense of civic duty. There is a complex 
interaction between their ‘civic’ motives, their official positions and 
responsibilities, the political clout and the overall political environment they 
are working in. They are faced with and sometimes suffer from various 
personnel problems beyond their control and these have negative effects, not 
only on their professional performance but also on their effectiveness as 
members of the Parliamentary civil society—their self-proclaimed, self-
styled role.  
     Peer Review Report (SIGMA 2010) listed major personnel problems of 
TGNA. According to this report; government-opposition divide spills over 
into the daily work, staff management is influenced by political actors 
through direct and indirect means. Two rather important findings of the 
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 Law No. 5957, on Regulating the Trade of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables and Other 
Commodities Having Supply and Demand Regularity (tr. Sebze ve Meyveler ile Yeterli 
Arz ve Talep Derinligi Bulunan Diğer Mallarin Ticaretinin Düzenlenmesi Hakkinda 
Kanun), adopted on 11 March 2010. Official Gazette No. 27533, dated 26 March 2010. 
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report are about the results of these problems: compartmentalisation and de-
motivation. (25-29) One staffer—expert—grudgingly voiced what was 
clearly the general sentiment of experts who were recruited through 
competitive procedures: “There is very little expertise available in ministries 
because assignments are generally made based on fellow-townsmenship, 
kinship, regionalism or sectarian preferences rather than merit, qualification 
and competence.” He was referring to the same practice within the TGNA in 
an indirect way.
251
 
     From the perspective of general political culture, there is ‘no’ demand for 
civic activity. Even initiatives such as “Democracy Education and School 
Assemblies” firmly and personally supported by the Speaker of the 
Parliament—Cemil Cicek—did not have a chance to come even closer to 
their declared aims.
252
 The implementation of the programmes such as 
Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education of the Ministry of 
Education
253
 is supposed to change this attitude in the mid-to-long term. 
However, for the time being, there is very little, if any, regular cooperation 
between the Parliament, civil society, bureaucracy
254
 and academia in 
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 Interview, March 2012. 
252
 See; ‘Bylaw for Democracy Education and School Assemblies’, No 2004/2564. 11 
January 2013. http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/2564_0.html, and 
http://tandis.odihr.pl/documents/hrecompendium/en/CD%20SEC%202%20ENV/Democray
%20Education%20School%20Assemblies%20Project%20Turkey%20ENG.pdf.  
253
 TR 2009/0136.01 Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education is one of the 33 
projects supported by the European Commission under the Instrument for Preaccession 
Assistance (IPA)—Transition Assistance and Institution Building Component—Part 2, of 
the National Programme for Turkey. Project’s purpose is to increrase institutional capacity 
of the Ministry of National Education to design, develop and implement democratic 
citizenship and human rights education (EDC/HRE) that corresponds with European core 
values from pre-school to secondary education; with a view to fostering a democratic 
school culture and society. 04 March 2012.  
http://www.cfcu.gov.tr/SPOs/FAs/FA_2009_Part_II.pdf.  
254
 To the workshop on ‘Civil Society Participation in Legislative Process’, on 15-16 March 
2012, bureaucrats participated for the first time after two years, and the last time since this 
was the final meeting of the long-standing project. They simply stated that the draft law and 
amendments under discussion that would strengthen civil society participation “required 
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implementing ostensibly comprehensive and ambitious plans/programmes 
towards such ends. The absence of ‘academic’ input in implementation and 
advancement of similar projects is noticeable.
255
  
     Also missing, vitally, is the political input—avoiding ownership. There 
has been no involvement of the political elite—e.g. MPs, political party 
representatives, the Government—except for limited participation by their 
advisors. The three main pillars of the entire scheme—training and 
education, legislative law, improving civil society participation—would be 
standing on the fourth pillar, strengthening the legislative process itself. The 
latter, necessarily required active participation and contribution from the 
political elite. One typical example is the Civil Society Common Working 
Groups initiative.
256
 Led by civil society organisations such as Human 
Rights Common Platform (IHOP) and Civil Society Development Centre 
(STGM) as well as YASADER and PDD, with the ambitious aim of 
bringing Deputies of different political parties—with similar concerns on 
particular subjects—together and to make them cooperate with civil society, 
eventually leading to improving civil society’s contribution to legislative 
                                                                                                                                                   
political decision” and “since there were too many civil society organisations, their views 
could only be taken over the internet”. 
255
 For example, in the final meeting of the ‘Civil Society Participation in Legislative 
Process’ on 15-16 March 2012, NGOs, staffers and bureaucrats, after two years of 
deliberations spent considerable time on the “role of civil society”. With a meaningful 
academic input such issues would have been clarified at the outset, years ago. 
256
 The initiative first approached to 60 MPs and formed 13 groups—at least ten MPs in 
each, shared by the media in a press conference on 23 January 2008, in the Parliament. On 
07 February, 13 MPs representing 13 groups and more than 250 civil society 
representatives came together for a meeting called ‘Prejudices are not Allowed in’. The 
initiative had its first meeting in Ankara on 9-10 October 2008. Coordinators were Sanar 
Yurdatapan—singer/composer, human rights activist—and a former Deputy Ahmet Faruk 
Ünsal (AKP). In a parallel effort, Local Forums Common Working Group were also 
initiated and first 19 Local Forums were formed—each with 20-25 participants, NGOs and 
Deputies. A call was made by representatives of the 19 forums and the chairmen of 
standing committees in the Parliament to form them in all provinces at the 09 October 
meeting. 2 May 2012.  
http://www.yasader.org/web/yasama_surecine_katilim/4/tbmmocg.pdf.   
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process. The initiative was started in 2008, but from 2009 on gradually drew 
down and disappeared mainly due to a lack of interest on the part of the 
MPs.
257
 Attempting to strengthen the legislative process, without deputies, 
tantamount to trying to treat a patient in absentia.    
     The projects are run by a hand-full of civil society ‘enthusiasts’ in the 
TGNA, not enjoying the practical or moral support of neither the political 
leadership
258
 nor their fellow colleagues in general. Nevertheless, perhaps 
inevitably, there are management problems which hamper effective 
implementation too.  
     On the other hand, although considerable efforts and resources are 
committed to improving participation of the civil society in the legislative 
process, there is almost no visibility of these efforts in the TGNA, nor 
parties or individual MPs—or their advisors—are really informed about 
them. One senior MP—former minister—indicated that he has “never heard 
of even the existence of professional associations within the Parliament”, 
neither has the extensive work on the draft new Rules of Procedure ever 
come to his attention.
259
 And yet, to put it straight, even in the civil society 
itself, there is virtually no interest in TGNA-led efforts and initiatives to 
improve participation of the civil society.
260
 This behaviour is difficult to 
explain.  
                                                          
257
 Sanar Yurdatapan, in early 2009, complained about shortcomings in terms of 
participation by the Deputies—the key to the success of this initiative. “Civil society is not 
taken seriously”. 14 August 2009, Bir Gün. 11 January 2013. 
http://www.birgun.net/actuel_index.php?news_code=1250242967&year=2009&month=08
&day=14.   
258
 One mid-level TGNA official opening the final two-day workshop on the ‘Civil Society 
Participation in Legislative Process’ on 15 March 2012, delivered a five-minute speech and 
left immediately.  
259
 Interview, May 2012. 
260
 For example, in the final meeting of the ‘Civil Society Participation in Legislative 
Process’ on 15-16 March 2012, very few NGOs which showed up—Pozitif Yasam Dernegi, 
AKUT, Mazlum-Der, Human Rights Platform (Helsinki Citizens), Afet Gonüllüleri Vakfi, 
NDI (National Democratic Institute), ODER (Otistic Children Association), Narlidere 
Zihinsel Ozürlüleri Koruma Projesi, Türkiye Kücük Millet Meclisleri Projesi, Seffaflik 
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     The same observation is applicable also to the international civil society. 
They adopt a piecemeal approach to projects they support. Head of an 
international NGO stationed in Ankara and actively supporting the reform 
process since 2008, did not even heard of the names of major civil society 
organisations in Turkey. Nor had he heard of the draft new Rules of 
Procedure that would facilitate ‘his’ work a lot.261 There is virtually no 
cooperation between and within them. In one case, diplomatic 
representatives of the same country, i.e. diplomatic staff of the same 
Embassy were not aware of the two simultaneous civil society activity—
taking place in Istanbul and in Ankara—supported by the very same staff. 
Furthermore, neither NGO was aware of each other’s activity, let alone 
coordinate, synchronize and mutually support. 
     To sum up, civic efforts of the Parliamentary civil society, no matter how 
praiseworthy and exemplary they are, so far have failed to play the role they 
volunteered for. The mammoth but unsuccessful effort to improve civil 
society participation has clearly exposed the major problem blocking a 
comprehensive reform in the TGNA: lack of political will. ‘Civic’ action by 
‘bureaucrats’ without political support and backing did not provide for the 
organisational, institutional and structural reforms required for institutional 
capacity building and this situation does not bode well for the civil society.  
 
3.7. How civil society operates in Turkey 
     The way civil society operates and takes part in the consultation process, 
or whether it actually participates, is related to the role and status granted to 
civil society, not only by the legal framework but also by the mental 
framework dominant in the Turkish political culture. The degree of 
acceptance, by various political and bureaucratic actors, of the civil 
                                                                                                                                                   
Dernegi (Transperancy International), Ucan Süpürge (Flying Broom), Sivil Toplum 
Gelistirme Merkezi Dernegi/Kapasite Geliştirme Dernegi—and those from the bureaucracy 
who attended the meeting, after two years of deliberations, spent almost a whole day on the 
meaning of ‘participation’. 
261
 Interview, April 2012.  
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society—as an ‘actor’ or a ‘partner’—in the decision-making, drafting and 
legislative processes, decides the way it operates and ‘participates’. The key 
here is to understand what ‘participation’ means to those involved.  
     For the majority, it is simply making the draft legislation available for 
the public and the media so that they—public—can make their views known 
should they wish so. In this case, even if the executive—and the 
bureaucracy in general—displays willingness to talk to civil society and 
adopts a more inclusive attitude, the result is expanding, rather than 
deepening and improving the quality of interaction. This is seen in the 
common habit of bureaucracy in Turkey, in general, to make draft bills 
available only after they finalise them, i.e. when they are forwarded to the 
Office of the Prime Minister. (The ‘time’ factor, which has already been 
discussed above, has an important impact on this attitude) That’s why, 
ministries, Prime Minister’s Office and political parties are three black-
boxes closed to any ‘participation’ particularly on politically sensitive 
subjects. 
     There is also a general distrust—even hardly concealed contempt—
attached to the notion of ‘civil society’ which is reflected in the dichotomy 
between the socially-favoured attitude in the form of rhetoric and the actual 
behaviour. One typical example was given by the Deputy Prime Minister 
Cemil Cicek who said, during a symposium on civil society’s participation 
in legislative process, in January 2011:  
          In today’s world, civil societies play an important role in the process  
     of legislation. I don’t know what the number of our civil society  
     (organisations) is, but the civility of some of them is self-proclaimed.  
     They are invisible, but only their nameboards are visible. When one  
     sends draft bills or a proposal of law, no answer is forthcoming. […] and  
     later they complain and say ‘nobody asked for our inputs, if we were  
     asked we would have said this and this’. What has to be done is to make  
     active contributions at early stages of the drafting process. (Neziroglu &  
     Bakirci 2011: 19).   
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     But, six months later, when he became the Speaker of the Parliament, in 
the preface to the publication on the very symposium, he said: “[…] first of 
all, while drafting a law, views of other organisations and those of the civil 
society should be particularly sought” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 5). 
Despite the more positive attitude he adopted, clearly his understanding of 
the civil society’s role did not include ‘participation’ as an equal partner, but 
restricted to ‘receiving’ views which may or may not be accepted.262 
     The hesitation to involve civil society in ‘processes’ is common not only 
in the political elite but also—increasingly—in the bureaucracy as a state of 
ambivalence spreads through the state institutions along with the ‘perceived’ 
challenge, even ‘threat’ posed by the civil society. The participation beyond 
consultation is considered by many ‘sharing the political power’ without 
responsibility. This is related to the wider ‘participation’ debate currently 
ongoing in contemporary democracies. Civil society, in this sense, is the 
way to complement—rather than replace—representative democracy by 
providing alternative and new ways for citizens to ‘participate’.  
     As a result, eventually it comes to if ‘participation’ by the civil society is 
considered legitimate and accepted in a meaningful way or not. The answers 
to these basic questions have proven unaffirmative and have discouraged 
even the most good-intentioned attempts in Turkey. One example is the 
modest but pioneering ‘Countdown: European Movement 2002’ initiative. 
The initiative, led by Cengiz Aktar, was launched early 2002, for the 
purpose of supporting the process leading to the EU Copenhagen Summit in 
December 2002, at which time Turkey expected to secure candidate 
status.
263
 It was short-lived, but critical in terms of its effect on government 
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 Cemil Cicek, as the Speaker of the Parliament, would make a sincere, systematic and 
sustained effort to involve civil society during the drafting process of a new constitution, 
later in 2012, and would personally lead the initiative. 
263
 See; (Aktar 2005). December 2002 Copenhagen Summit confirmed Turkey’s candidate 
status but deferred the opening of negotiations to 2004, provided that “the European 
Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the 
Commission, decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria”. See; EU 
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policies in a fateful year. But there are civil society think-tanks and other 
organisations which sustained a long-standing, systematic effort—against 
all odds—in order to support the democratisation, and attempted to 
participate in the decision-making, law-making and legislative processes in 
Turkey through direct and indirect ways based on mid-to-long term goals 
and programmes.  
     Turan (1997) argues that a society “employing means more appropriate 
to a political democracy […] presumes the presence of a democratic culture 
or a mindset which precedes the emergence of problems regarding the 
identity of the political community” (292). In Turkey, this critically needed 
mind set has not evolved before the emergence of current problems, and as a 
result, the means employed in coping with them are not particularly 
appropriate to a political democracy. Identities continue to remain at the 
basis of the most contentious problems of Turkish politics, society and 
polity.  
     The Turkish democracy has come a rather long way and now can be 
considered quite an experienced political system. However, systemic 
problems continue to dominate the system. Elites are still unable to work 
together and compromise, the public is largely indifferent to the problematic 
of ‘participation’ and there is widespread disillusionment with democracy, 
hence search for a strong leader—versus a democratic leader. As a result, in 
Huntington’s words, the political system in Turkey has become the typical 
example of ‘cyclical pattern’, sadly alternating "back and forth between 
democratic and authoritarian systems”, the change of regime performing 
“the same function as the change of parties in a stable democratic system” 
(1991: 279). Under mercurial conditions, the often-repeated, self-
proclaimed mission of securing or protecting democracy can be the main 
obstacle to promoting democracy simply because fundamental democratic 
values are not generally and genuinely internalised.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Presidency Conclusions of 29 January 2003. 14 July 2012. 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/council-eu-27.pdf.  
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     The term civil society, a ‘Western’ institution, has a negative connotation 
and there is a negative attitude and behaviour associated with it. In recent 
years, the rhetoric of “Foreign agents damaging Turkey and Turkish 
interests” has gained more weight than ever. As a result there is a tendency 
towards selective democratisation. It is readily adopted by the political elite, 
as a whole. Turkey-EU relations are used for promoting long-term domestic 
political goals with a short term perspective towards EU. Therefore, there is 
a selective and instrumental adoption and application of the acquis. This is 
certainly not the most favourable environment for civil society’s 
participation in the political decision-making process as far as—and 
particularly—the democratisation process and related reforms are 
concerned. There is a fundamental resistance to the idea of participation in 
any form, from any circle. ‘Political authority’ is traditionally perceived as 
‘absolute’, not restrained or limited, in practice, unaccountable beyond 
regular elections. Therefore, ‘sharing’ it, is considered unfair and even 
illegitimate. 
     Özbudun (1997) argues that “consolidation of democracy requires a 
balanced relationship between civil society and political society. […] the 
impact of civil society upon political society would be one of informing, 
monitoring, checking and pressuring the latter, but not one of replacing it” 
(85-86). However, in Turkey, it seems that neither the political role nor the 
status of civil society—as a legitimate partner—is recognised by the 
political society nor such a role is expected or demanded by the general 
public. 
     Currently, there are basically two modes of political decision-making. 
Key political decisions—on politically sensitive subjects—are made in 
small, closed groups and related policies are formulated accordingly. The 
follow-on work, i.e. ‘drafting’ the laws in ministries or at various levels of 
the bureaucracy, including the Office of the Prime Minister, are technical in 
nature and are strictly based on the already made key decisions. The whole 
legislative process, then, turns into a not too meaningful ritual. This mode 
sometimes takes the form of bypassing the whole bureaucracy and the 
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Parliament and the bills are introduced at the last minute, immediately 
before a vote is taken in the Plenary. In this case, the whole political system 
is meant to rubber stamp the initially made political decision(s) and there is 
virtually no chance or opportunity for the civil society to involve in any 
form, let alone participate.  
     If the matter in hand is not politically too sensitive or general sentiment 
in the public is in line with Government’s political aims, then, while major 
decisions are still made at the very top and/or prior political endorsement is 
obtained before the proper drafting process is initiated, there may be a 
chance for the civil society to participate. However, depending on the 
substance of the subject and the inclination or preference of the Government 
to involve civil society, this chance would be limited in terms of the time 
available, and still restricted in terms of access to the system. If civil society 
does have the chance and gets access, then participation is mostly symbolic, 
in the form of ‘offering’ input and a favourable reception is mostly not 
forthcoming. 
     The chance for a real participation is highest for subjects with little or no 
political sensitivity or for those not carrying any risk of being politically 
manipulated. In such cases, ‘cooperation’ with civil society may turn into 
impressive showcases as was the case in Law No 6284, in 2012.
264
 
     Decision-making models and leadership styles that dominate the Turkish 
political scene also play a role in the complex interaction between the 
executive, i.e. Government and bureaucracy, and civil society. Until mid-
2000s, the political decision-making system—traditionally a combination of 
organisational process and governmental politics models—was run by a 
‘political’ leadership of laissez-faire nature. Policy was developed through a 
general interaction pattern of ‘rational’ actors. Role, governmental and 
systemic—rather than societal and idiosyncratic—factors played a role. 
From mid- 2007 on, the system was dominated by a transformational 
leader—not a coordinator or manager, but rather an inspirer or visionary—
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 Law No 6284, ‘Law for the Protection of the Family and Prevention of Violence against 
Women’, adopted on 8 March 2012. Official Gazette, 20 March 2012, No. 28239. 
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motivated by strong ideological convictions, with personal resolution and 
political will. Where the ultimate decision unit is an insensitive predominant 
leader his personality, orientations, view of the world shape the policy. 
Then, shared images dominate among decisionmakers and other ‘operatives’ 
who are reasoning by metaphor and analogy—rather than rational decision-
making—in line with the leader’s world view. When policy-making process 
is limited to dynamics taking place in a closed and small circle of decision-
makers and/or advisors, conformity becomes the general pattern of 
interaction. This style of leadership, in essence, is closed to any 
‘interference’ by civil society.  
     Canes-Wrone’s—among others—discussion of the ‘strategy of 
pandering’(2000: 104)265 is applicable to Government-civil society relations 
in Turkey. Essentially, in the competition for the support of public opinion, 
given the established patterns of interaction between the political decision-
making and the public opinion, the political landscape displays a clear 
dominance of the ‘political leadership’ over civil society. This is mostly due 
to control of and access to information and almost absolute government 
control over the media. A very docile civil society reflects the fundamental 
problem facing civil society in Turkey; a sense of weakness, dependency 
and inability to bring about a change, however modest. 
     The more legislative items are associated with parochial identities the 
stronger is the resistance to participation which is considered ‘interference’. 
                                                          
265
 The carrying out of the ‘Strategy of pandering’ would change depending on the belief 
about whether citizens are well-informed or misinformed or uninformed. Canes-Wrone et al 
discusses in length full pandering as “occurring when a government official always selects 
the policies voters want” or forward-looking pandering-policy leadership, “leaders 
engaging in the opposite behavior”, despite a “lack of popular support for doing so”. If the 
competition for the support of public opinion, between the political leadership and civil 
society, involves what Geer (1996) calls “democratic leadership”, i.e. “politicians moving 
public opinion toward his or her policy position”, it is easier for the civil society to compete 
because the rules of the democratic game apply equally and fairly to both ‘parties’. (Canes-
Wrone et al 2000: 104-105) 
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Such a psychological disposition is hardly conducive to a more co-operative 
governing-opposition relations and to participation of civil society.  
     Regionalism is complimented by ‘sectarianism’. Almost a cult-like 
attitude existing in particular groups or sub-groups—in political parties, 
bureaucracy, civil society, and increasingly in academia—categorically 
rejects involvement of any kind by ‘outsiders’ and is closed to any contact, 
communication or interaction with them. This includes civil society. Any 
initiative, in any form, taken by the civil society sparks off a wave of 
rumours, and conspiracy theories start to spread. Even the most ordinary 
civil society projects can easily turn into a contentious issue. “There is a 
kind of ‘paranoia’ about any initiative directed at improving people’s 
participation” says one senior civil society official.266 This is exacerbated by 
the deeply rooted distrust and suspicion towards ‘West’ and the civil society 
associated with the West takes its fair share. Politicians are restricted and 
restrained by the anticipated public perception of the legislative initiatives if 
they involve civil society, let alone the initiatives which are advocated by 
them.  
     Most of the Deputies, coming from small towns with little, if any, 
foreign language ability nor experience of the modern world, in addition to 
the above-mentioned impediments, experience difficulty in correctly 
perceiving the role of civil society in democracies—a natural and integral 
part of the political system in the West—its sources of funding, international 
networking etc. Therefore, they prefer to maintain a ‘safe’ distance from 
civil society. 
     The dominant culture of Turkish elite appears to be ‘looking’ self-reliant, 
confident—in most cases, overconfident—of his/her competence, no felt-
need for further education or self-improvement for either professional or 
intellectual purposes. ‘Individuality’ and self-confidence may sound desired 
features of a mature personality. However, when they are not based on a 
robust education, experience and eagerness to excell through continual 
training, education and personal development, they constitute major 
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 Interview; January 2012.  
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obstacles to cooperation and team-work with others. This situation results in 
an avoidance behaviour vis-a-vis any potential ‘confrontation’ with 
diverging or challenging views. Hence, there is no interest in civil society 
products, inputs, alternative approaches, even if they are made available 
and/or accessed. This is a tendency which is ‘proudly’ displayed and even 
uttered more by younger generations. When some interviewees were asked 
if they needed to get any assistance or contribution from civil society 
organisations in performing their functions as advisors to MPs or civil 
servants, they took such questions as an insult to their ‘competence’ and a 
challenge to their professional ‘qualifications’.  
     The more individuals are of similar socio-economic, ideological 
backgrounds and the longer they work together, share similar institutional 
identities—hence represent similar sub-cultures, they are more prone to 
‘group-think’ and resulting self-censorship. Then, once such a general 
institutional culture gradually develops and settles in, it is extremely 
difficult to change it for better or worse. Currently, the common feature of 
the institutional culture in Turkish bureaucracy is one that avoids, even 
resists civil society and refuses cooperation. This was, until recently, the 
prominent characteristic of the institutional culture in the Turkish military. 
Now that the military has completely walled itself off, the civilians in 
bureaucracy and the politics, ever aggressively defending their turf, have 
turned more ‘militaristic’ in this sense. 
     It also appears that ‘avoiding clash’ with the executive has become a 
common feature of the organisational culture in Turkish bureaucracy. The 
overall psychological environment reflected by the group-think is described 
by some interviewees as ‘cultural oppression’, practically obstructing free-
thinking and quality work. One judge from the Court of Appeals explains 
that:  
          When government bills—related to judiciary—are referred to the  
     court, the text is distributed to boards and chambers of the Court for  
     comments and inputs, but they are seldom actioned; neither the inaction  
     is questioned nor action is enforced. It’s very difficult to work on a draft  
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     bill or government bill to arrive at a common understanding and common  
     view through discussion and argument because the views are too diverse  
     to reconcile. Therefore the views expressed as inputs are mostly  
     ‘personal’, individual views or—depending on the subject—the  
     personality and/or beliefs of the President of the Court decide the  
     outcome, i.e. constitutes the institutional view”.267 
 
     On the other hand, since following certain ‘democratic’ procedures for 
drafting and making laws—legislating—is considered ‘waste’ of time, there 
is a never-ending search for ‘easy’—simple, flexible, short, not too 
complicated—procedures on the part of the governing party, in order to pass 
bills without major ‘trouble’ in the Parliament. The opposition is no 
different in terms of what to be expected from the legislative process and its 
teleological purposes, particularly in a democracy.
268
 Where legislative 
process—hence outcomes—are not taken as the end-product of a democratic 
process, quite naturally and unavoidably, there isn’t much incentive to 
involve civil society.  
     The phenomenon that can be called ‘problematic of time’ is a major 
obstacle to quality legislation and meaningful civil society participation, no 
matter how constructive this contribution may actually be. Ostensibly, there 
is an obsession with ever speeding up the legislative process. Anything that 
would slow down the legislative process—such as involvement of the civil 
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 Interview; December 2011. 
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 Bekir Bozdag, MP, Vice-Chair for AKP Parliamentary Caucus: “[…] TGNA urgently 
needs a formal regulation for legislative process and tecniques. […] (this regulation) may 
be in a law form. (Then) it would be difficult to amend it, but Bureau of the Assembly can 
also deal with this requirement in a certain way. Because then, it would be easier to amend 
when needed” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 200). M. Akif Hamzacebi, MP, Vice-Chair for 
CHP Parliamentary Caucus; “[…] in the subcommittee […] members delve into the 
subject, hear out all parties involved; problems and solutions are put forward; the end text 
may not be (exactly) what the MP would like it to be, but at least problems would have 
been discussed in some length” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 219).  
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society—is considered unwarranted and unjustified. SIGMA Report 
explains this with the existence of a particular legislative culture: 
          It is against the backdrop of a legislative culture in which formal or  
     informal restrictions on the volume of government bills are not deemed  
     feasible that the management of business becomes strongly driven by the  
     desire to increase ‘legislative throughput’, i.e. to speed up processes so as  
     not to become overwhelmed by volume. (SIGMA 2010: 10) 
 
     There is a clear consensus among bureaucrats that politically-imposed 
time restrictions and deadlines constitute a major burden on the quality of 
work.
269
 However, if the nature of this resentment and displeasure is related 
to the quality of legislation per se is questionable. It may simply be related 
to the increased workload and long working hours. The latter is more in line 
with the legislative culture often hinted and/or manifested by civil servants 
and politicians alike.
270
 If this is not related to a genuine desire to improve 
the quality of legislation—which seems to be the case—then, even if the 
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 Bureaucrats are quite straightforward in speaking out on that point and voicing their 
annoyance, in interviews as well as during on-the-record workshops: “rushing the 
legislative process does not allow proper study and examination (of the draft bills)”, Adem 
Keskin, Legal Advisor in the Ministry of Health (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 42). “[…] we 
sometimes run into difficulty, particularly when the space is too brief between the time a 
draft bill reaches the General Secretariat for the Office of the President and the time it is 
included in the Plenary agenda” Emin Sunmaz, Director, Legal Affairs in Acts and 
Resolutions and Legal Affairs, Office of the President (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 187).   
270
 Mustafa Dogan, Dpty Director, Acts and Resolutions, Office of the Prime Minister; 
“[…] it is important that the ministries should take views of the civil society organisations 
on a draft before they submit it to the Office of the Prime Minister. (However) if this was 
made obligatory, […] this could have an obstructive effect on the legislative process as 
well” (Neziroglu & Bakirci 2011: 90-91). M. Akif Hamzacebi, MP, Vice-Chair for CHP 
Parliamentary Caucus; “There are suggestions for a second chamber, which I don’t agree 
with. […] if there was a Senate of the Republic, then laws would also go there and mistakes 
would be corrected (they argue). This (simply) prolongs the legislative process” (Neziroglu 
& Bakirci 2011: 208). 
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time factor was eliminated, there would not be an increased willingness to 
‘accommodate’ civil society.  
 
3.8. ‘State’ of civil society in Turkey 
     TACSO Turkey 2011 Report
271
 provided an analysis of the civil society 
environment, an overview of the main features of civil society, main 
achievements and shortfalls, and institutional and organisational capacity 
needs of civil society in Turkey. It listed as major problems faced by the 
civil society in Turkey; inadequate financial resources (71%), inadequate 
volunteer support (38%), weak voluntary culture at local and national levels 
(35%), problems regarding legal framework (30.5%), collaboration and 
dialogue with others in the same area of interest (19.5%), weak relations 
with central government (17%), weak relations with the local government 
(16%). It concluded:   
          […] the government came to at least recognise the civil society as an  
     actor, even if it is only a discourse change and on paper and not sincerely  
     aimed at the attempts to call for civil society for consultation. […] in  
     most cases, the attempts only stay at the first levels of participation:  
     providing information or hearing through general consultations. […] The  
     consultations are made either in a very broad gathering of various civil  
     society organisations regardless of expertise areas […] or with relatively  
     smaller number of CSOs that are not necessarily experts in the field. […]  
     although they were called in to participate in such consultation meetings,  
     they did not have much effect on the results, and monitor the proceeding  
     steps. (TACSO Turkey 2011: 12) 
 
     The problems faced by the civil society in Turkey are also specified in 
the latest STGM report in 2012. The main purpose of the Impact Evaluation 
Survey Final Report (2005-2010) was to evaluate STGM’s support to civil 
                                                          
271
 Technical Assistance to Civil Society Organisations (TACSO) in the IPA Countries, 
Turkey Needs Assessment Report 2011. 10 February 2013. 
http://tacso.org/doc/TR_NA_Report.pdf.  
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society organisations, its contribution to the development of the civil society 
in general and looking for additional ways to improve such support.
272
 The 
findings largely overlap with the findings of TACSO report. 
     Legal, administrative, political and mental/cultural infrastructure for civil 
society participation in decision-making and legislative processes—both in 
the state bureaucracy and in the Parliament—is largely absent in Turkey.273 
The relations between the executive and civil society are replete with 
serious problems of communication. Notwithstanding, civil society, 
dedicates its already scarce resources primarily at seeking to influence the 
executive stages of law-making. The Parliamentary stages of the legislative 
process—Committees and the Plenary—are largely ignored.  
     Absence of development in civil society networks is a major 
shortcoming. Civil society organisations—including, even civil society 
think-tanks—are essentially voluntary initiatives of individuals. Naturally 
friendship ties, at least initially play a role in any of such organisations. 
However, the main problem in Turkey is that such a start remains almost the 
sole basis for these organisations, hampering institutionalisation. Inter-
agency interaction and cooperation remain limited to interpersonal relations 
between ‘friends’. Real, systematic, effective cooperation with other civil 
society organisations—for the purposes of democratisation—is negligible. 
‘Networking’ with international civil society organisations—and others—is 
largely one-way and mostly restricted to providing funding to various 
projects. Therefore, the struggle to ‘participate’ is a lonesome crusade.274  
                                                          
272
 STGM, since 2005, carried out three different projects, one for every two-years: from 
2005 to 2007, Strengthening Freedom of Association for further Development of Civil 
Society; from 2007 to 2009, Supporting Civil Society Development and Dialogue in Turkey; 
from 2009 to 2011, Civil Society Development for Active Participation, covering about 
2000 rights-based civil society organisations. (STGM Report: 7-8) 
273
 Also in TACSO Report: “[…] viable participation/consultation mechanisms for working 
with government/public are either absent or ineffective and obscure” (TACSO Turkey 
2011: 27). 
274
 Regarding cooperation and networking—or lack of it—within civil society, that of 
between TESEV and TÜSIAD—two most active and influential—is striking. TESEV’s 
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     On the other hand, civil society itself, in most cases, is the major obstacle 
to its own success. Fundamental ideological differences and other cultural 
reasons lead to ‘framing’—of individual names, funding sources, perceived 
aims, networking with certain CSOs—and seriously hinder civil society 
cooperation. There is a self-imposed isolation based on a deep-seated 
prejudice. Most members of most of the CSOs participate in activities of 
one—their own—organisation only. The interviewees claimed that they 
‘would’ participate if they were invited, but they never took the initiative to 
reach out—to ‘others’. For instance; one of the civil society organisations 
working on the constitutional amendment package in the course of 2010-
2011 received an invitation from a prominent CSO to participate in a study. 
They “refused to participate”, said a senior member interviewed, because 
“of the name of the individual leading the study, the foreign source funding 
it, the ‘reputation’ of this particular CSO and their cooperation with a ‘rival’ 
CSO” he explained. “Our participation would legitimise their end product” 
he added. Another senior member from the same CSO, after voicing the 
same attitude in a separate interview, when questioned about the rationality 
of this behaviour, admitted that this “shouldn’t have been the way civil 
society works, but (she) could not help”.275 
     The same goes for the publications; members read or are interested in 
their own publications only. Their perception of the ‘other’, then, is 
necessarily distorted, resulting in the denial of—potentially—valuable 
partners or allies in the civil society. One CSO member, referring to two 
civil society organisations—included in this study—said that she had “never 
                                                                                                                                                   
Chairman—Can Paker—is also a member of TÜSIAD and it was him who initiated the 
Tanör report in 1997. He was also the first chair of the Parliamentary Commission of 
TÜSIAD, in 1995-96 period. He was involved in EU Political Criteria working group, and 
the report prepared by Prof. Süheyl Batum in 2001. This situation is tactfully explained by 
one TESEV staff: “Although there isn’t a cooperation like walking ‘arm-in-arm’, there is 
indeed a relationship that can be described as ‘elbows touching’”. So, there may—or may 
not—be more cooperation than can be observed from outside—between these two cousine 
organisations.  
275
 Interviews; December 2011 and January 2012.  
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seen or read any of their publications, neither was (she) interested in what 
they were saying, because (their) views (did) not overlap (with those of 
herself)”. Realizing the undeniable contradiction in this statement she 
added: “I’m prejudiced in that respect—I know this is not the way it should 
be in democracies”. She described the views of one prominent organisation, 
on the constitutional package of 2010, as being supportive of the 
government position while they had actually fundamentally opposed to its 
basic premises.
276
   
     Again, when it comes to coordination, linkage and synergy between 
initiatives led by different countries—even if such efforts are supported 
from a common EU facility—the situation can become confusing, to say the 
least. For example, EU may ‘task’ the Netherlands and the Netherlands may 
sub-contract certain projects, outsourcing to international professional 
companies. For the company employee the project at hand is just a ‘job’, a 
disposition which is hardly compatible with the spirit of civil society. There 
is also some sensitivity, which makes much sense in the Turkish context, 
necessitating the adoption of an ‘advisory’ role and avoiding ‘lecturing’. 
Also, not all embassies and foreign civil society organisations are equally 
well prepared to stay abreast of domestic developments.
277
 On the other 
hand, being well aware of the currently extremely polarised political climate 
in Turkey, they are—understandably—reluctant to adopt a more assertive 
stance and would rather maintain a physical and emotional distance.
278
 
Involvement of Turkish ‘agencies’ as the ‘owners’ of such initiatives—
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 Interview; January 2012. 
277
 One foreign diplomat, interviewed in May 2012, said that “the Government considered 
civil society a nuissance until 5 years ago, but today they considered it an ally” and that the 
“general environment was positive”. However, the European Parliament Resolution of 
March 2012—less than two months before this statement—was reminding the Turkish 
Government “the pledge to base the (Constitution) drafting process on the broadest possible 
consultation of all segments of society as part of a process which genuinely engages 
Turkish civil society” (EP 2011: Art 8). 
278
 Despite repeated attempts, it has proven virtually impossible to reach some of these 
international organisations’ resident representatives in Turkey for interviews.  
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using funds and benefiting, or not benefiting, from the results—does not 
help much to alleviate the situation.  
     In the case of two conferences, held in the same week—virtually 
overlapping—one in Ankara and the other in Istanbul—in May 2012, 
supported from the same EU source, ‘coordinated’ by the same resident 
embassy, on the same subject—democratisation and civil society 
participation—as part of projects which are ongoing for years, not a one-
time event; respective organisers—and the participants—were mutually 
unaware of even the existence of the ‘projects’ involved, let alone the 
conferences held at the same time. Furthermore, when there is a time-lapse 
between implementations of various projects, there is simply no memory 
and the efforts are simply lost in outer space.
279
 This intractable problem is 
the major source of waste of effort and resources, and most importantly, it is 
very discouraging for the civil society—i.e. individuals working in it—from 
taking further initiatives.
280
   
     A culture of ‘charity’ dominates the cultural dimension of civil society 
environment in Turkey and favours belief-based, i.e. religious, associations. 
However the culture of timely paying membership dues—in ‘other’ civil 
society—is prominently very weak, to say the least. There is nothing these 
organisations can really do to enforce the membership rules—and dues. 
                                                          
279
 The main reason—and explanation—for the ineffective role played by Turkish 
authorities in coordinating such efforts appears to be lack of time, i.e. intense tempo, work-
load, and frequent turn-over of personnel. Plus, see above ‘Culture’. 
280
 A MATRA supported Project, from 2006 to 2009, involved Utrecht University—
coordinator—the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Istanbul Bilgi University and the 
Turkish Justice Academy, and aimed at improving respect for ‘human rights’ within the 
Turkish judiciary. However, from 2009 on, Turkish judiciary was subjected to even more 
and intense criticism in EU Progress Reports in terms of internalisation of human rights 
and improving standards within the judiciary. See; MATRA TR 13112‘Training of Turkish 
Judges and Public Prosecutors on Human Rights and Strengthening Local Capacity for the 
Internalisation of Human Rights Standards’. 27 February 2013. 
http://www.uu.nl/faculty/leg/nl/onderzoekinopdracht/internationalcooperationprojects/proje
cten/Pages/turkey.aspx?refer=/faculty/leg/nl/onderzoekinopdracht/internationalcooperation
projects/projecten/turkey.  
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Since there is no institutional funding, ‘hunting’ for funds consumes much 
of their energy, time and exhausts their enthusiasm. Constant preoccupation 
with finding the funds vital for institutional survival is a major distraction 
from a consistent pursuit of certain legislative subjects. On the other hand, 
relying on government funds and/or foreign donors have their respective 
political and psychological disadvantages vis-a-vis independent funding.  
     The governments and international institutions that have supported civil 
society programmes in Turkey are increasingly less inclined to lend support. 
Funds are provided for shorter periods, making sustainability and lasting 
impact more difficult. For example, MATRA support for various projects, 
from 2011 on, changed in nature from bulk/large scale support to big and 
long-term projects which were centrally administered, to smaller-scale, 
shorter-term, locally administered projects.
281
 “This is getting worse, as 
budgets get tighter and tighter and governments become more selective and 
even opportunistic” explains a senior civil society staff, resented. 
     ‘Absorbing’ EU funds, properly, has particularly been a constant source 
of annoyance even irritation between the Turkish government and the EU 
authorities. Since 2009, assistance under IPA is supposed to be managed by 
the Turkish authorities and the Commission just carries out the accreditation 
process. However, concerns about the local capacity for managing these 
funds have repeatedly been voiced in EU Progress Reports.
282
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 Interview; September 2011.  
282
 “Turkey needs to complete preparations for the transfer of management responsibility 
under the rural development component (V), vigorously address system weaknesses 
including regarding monitoring and further improve the quality and efficiency of the project 
and programme cycles” (EC 2009: 6).  
“Turkey needs to strengthen its capacity to absorb funds, achieve results and implement in 
a timely manner components I-IV. […] The supervision by the National Authorising 
Officer needs to address system weaknesses, including monitoring and control, and further 
improve the quality and efficiency of the project and programme cycles”  (EC 2010: 6).  
“[…] delays continued to occur and Turkey needs to strengthen its capacity to deliver 
results, absorb funds, develop a project pipeline and implement all IPA components in a 
timely manner” (EC 2011: 5). 
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     Shortage of stable funds—compounded with the shortage of capacity to 
absorb and manage those already available—presents a formidable 
challenge for long-term employment of area experts and administrative 
staff. This does not bode well for an institution—such as civil society—
offering, in principle, expert opinion.
283
  
     The problem of visibility—or lack of it—appears to be yet another 
obstacle to operational success of civil society. Visibility creates a sense of 
legitimacy, hence political power to have an impact on the political 
decision-making and legislative processes. With almost no resources of their 
own, civil society in Turkey has to rely on the media—as catalyser—over 
which it has no control. On the other hand, civil society itself not only lacks 
resources to increase their visibility but also their efforts to that end is very 
limited. ‘None’ of the civil society organisations in Turkey pursues an 
aggressive media campaign in support of their public policy aims and 
objectives. Neither do they have dedicated staff for jobs directly and 
exclusively related to the media and public relations.
284
  
     Some of the civil society organisations have more visibility and enjoy 
more media interest than others. Columnists’ interest, in general, is higher 
than that of the editorial staffs. However, public relations in general—and 
the media in this respect—is an area which is taken care of as a ‘secondary’ 
job by any one staff member, often in an amateurish style. Financial 
constraints is one but not the only reason for this outcome. “Since we are 
quite small (an organisation), we find it difficult to become very active in 
our outreach. We would love to organise events which are mainly outreach 
rather than (simply) training. But again we are limited by our funds. We are 
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 “The majority of CSOs are not satisfied with their human resources. Over half of the 
paid staff positions (60%) are positions of an administrative or financial nature, 15% are in 
areas of expertise and only 8.5% are professional managers” (TACSO Turkey 2011: 18). 
284
 TUSIAD is an exception in that sense. They do have a media office and dedicated 
funding for media relations and publicity in the form of not only publications but also 
media appearances and other occasions. However, even they are not eager to pursue a 
consistent media policy in support of their policy initiatives and prefer to remain within the 
boundaries of a ‘defensive’ posture.  
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operating in a marketplace of ideas but we are not marketing our ideas as 
effectively as we should” says a senior staff from an international civil 
society think-tank, active in Turkey.
285
  
     Although all civil society organisations—understandably—claim 
success, few of them actually measure it. Evaluations of success are rare in 
both Turkish and foreign/international civil society organisations. When 
they are conducted, they are mainly in the form of internal, in-house 
evaluations, between ‘friends’. “We don’t have a systematic way of lessons-
learned. We do have hot wash-ups, (then) write a report, and talk how to 
improve, but all is informal” says one senior staff. “We don’t have a 
lessons-learned mechanism, save very informal talk or exchange of views 
between us. No external evaluation. Things are not run very professionally 
here, I have to say. The whole business is run by five-six individuals here” 
says another.
286
 Self-assertive claims naturally do not help much and, as a 
result, weaknesses and challenges remain unaddressed.
287
 Bearing in mind 
the enormous efforts undertaken with limited resources, lack of a 
comprehensive evaluation system that would match these efforts appears to 
be a major flaw.
288
  
     To make the lack of an evaluation system worse, there is almost no 
feedback from the readers on publications. When it is available—mostly in 
the form of ‘courtesy’ letters—it is often not from the people who have the 
power to follow up or implement the ideas offered in these publications—
politicians, decision-makers, bureaucrats. Even the feedback from academia 
is not as forthcoming as one would expect. 
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 Interview; September 2011. 
286
 Interviews; September 2011.  
287
 “We believe we contributed to this change, in a small way, but we can never prove this” 
said one senior civil society official. Interview; September 2011. 
288
 For example, two important TESEV reports on the Judiciary—published in 2011—were 
sent to 7000 e-mail addressees, posted on their web-site and sent to certain offices in 
bureaucracy by post. See; TESEV Board of Trustees 2012 meeting; 2011 Report, 2012 
Programme and Budget, p. 6. 17 July 2012.  
http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Editor/2011_Faaliyet_Raporu.pdf.  
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     On the other hand, Turkish media also has problems of its own with 
negative effects on civil society. There is an intense competition. 
Addressing to the needs and expectations of a mass reader with an average 
of 6.5-year schooling while maintaining certain levels of circulation is a 
matter of survival and not easy. Civil society’s civic programmes—
particularly when they are not worth reporting in a ‘dramatic’ style—are not 
too attractive in this respect. Journalists—and editorial staffs, more—simply 
cater to the demands of their readers.
289
  
     Finally, there is a sense of ‘detest’ connected to civil society that can be 
called ‘untouchables’ syndrome.290 There is a complete air of secrecy when 
a civil society organisation attempts to reach a particular piece of 
information, however ordinary this information is—and even readily 
available otherwise. Whatever access is possible, it is limited, restricted and 
whatever information is made available, it is sporadic and inconsistent. This 
tendency which has been the routine and firmly practised behaviour in the 
Turkish army
291
 has now become common throughout the state bureaucracy 
and the Government, to include even the ‘autonomous’ institutions such as 
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 A senior official in an international civil society think-tank complained, in desperation: 
“But journalists are lazy, they want reports from us about Prime Minister’s remarks, we 
direct them to the Ministry of Interior, but they insist in getting something from us. One 
journalist asked me if the allegations were true. I said, ‘Kardesim, you very well know what 
we are doing, why don’t you just write what you already know?’”. Interview; Oct 2011.  
290
 ‘Untouchables’ (also Dalit or Scheduled Cast) are the lowest cast in Indian society—
traditionally despised and looked upon—practically, with NO chance of social-mobility.. 
Until recently, they were subjected to many social restrictions. They were segregated in 
hamlets outside the town or village boundary; forbidden entry to many temples, to most 
schools, and to wells from which higher castes drew water. Presient of India, Narayanan 
who served from 1997 to 2002 was from the Scheduled Cast. He became President, but 
remained a member of the Scheduled Cast, an untouchable.  
291
 “I have been a member of the European Parliament for the last 11 years. There have 
been instances when I attempted to talk to a general or to a member of the army who has 
had a say in important decisions, but myself and my collegues have been refused, each 
time. The army, this way, imprison itself into a monolithic structure [and culture] which 
constantly resists change” (Lagendijk 2010: 89).  
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the Justice Academy—an ‘academic’ institution.292 Accordingly, there is no 
‘demand’ for civil society input to any initiative, particularly ‘political’ 
ones. One senior staff in an international civil society think-tank gives an 
interesting example based on a unique observation in Turkey: “Letters of 
interest are required by the funding institutions. Such letters rarely come 
from government authorities, but from universities, civil society institutions, 
influential but private elite. There is an interest, there is favourable 
reception, but demand, NO..” 293  
     Several initiatives by civil society to engage officials and Government 
departments as well as the Parliament, have not gone beyond courtesy calls 
to office-holders. Civil society representatives have been politely offered tea 
or coffee, their views have been ‘attentively’ listened to, however there has 
been very little follow-on cooperation. The great difficulty to take any 
document, even a single-page memorandum—if it is more than one copy—
into the Parliament, speaks volumes.
294
  
     On the positive side, for international/foreign civil society, neither the 
Government nor executive offices have ever tried to stop their activities. 
They have received some unfriendly comments here and there—as 
exemplified in this paper—but nobody has attempted to stop or silence 
them. (This can hardly be said for the domestic civil society.) Today, the 
general environment is more permissive for their work than was the case ten 
years ago. They know Turkey much better and make less mistakes now. 
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 Not only civil society, but also media, academia and even the Parliament, in this sense, 
is in the dark. 
293
 Interview; September 2011.  
294
 Entering into the Parliament, each and every visitor, going through x-ray, is routinely 
searched at least twice, in most cases three times, last one done physically by hand. Then 
each document, files, hand-written notes, note-books, brief-cases are subject to detailed 
check and ‘reading’ to make sure that whatever is looked for—which is not explained to the 
visitor—is not allowed into the Parliament. Once inside the Parliament complex, even then, 
at the entrance to each separate building, a similar check and control is repeated—this time, 
visitor’s name, the office and the individual he/she is visiting, time of entrance etc are also 
recorded by the ‘police’.    
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Still, it is difficult to operate in Turkey because—as foreigners—things are 
hard for them to understand and they don’t always know how best to 
approach certain people and authorities.  
     In terms of participation, there is a continuous fluctuation, in line with 
the endless waves of change in Turkish domestic politics. Recently, as 
reflected in EU reports and as voiced in interviews, the environment is not 
developing in a more positive and more permissive direction. Accordingly, 
civil society in Turkey, in line with the change in the tone and substance of 
EU reports, seems to have adopted a more assertive and more outspoken 
stance.
295
 Whether this is happening as part of a coordinated change in their 
overall strategy—provided that there is such a strategy—remains to be seen.  
     Under such circumstances, talking about civil society ‘participation’ 
sounds like an overstatement. 
 
3.9. Participation: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation 
     The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
296
, 
founded in 1994, is based in Istanbul. It is an independent, non-
governmental think-tank, analyzing social, political and economic policy 
issues. TESEV aims “to serve as a bridge between academic research and 
policy-making process in Turkey” with the main purpose of “promoting the 
role of civil society in the democratic process” by “opening new channels 
for policy-oriented dialogue and research”. TESEV describes its mission as 
                                                          
295
 TESEV publications have become more critical of what can be described as ‘selective 
democratisation’ and—while much is being achieved in certain areas of democratisation—
counterproductive developments in some areas. Heinrich Boell started publishing a three-
monthly magazine, Parameters—a major change in terms of publicity—since late 2012 and 
become more critical of ‘selective’ liberalisation and reverse trends. A similar—more 
balanced—stance can be seen in CESS publications as early as 2011 in Security Matters 24 
(see; http://www.cess.org/publications/security-matters, 6 March 2013) and most recently 
in the book on the current state of affairs in the security sector reform (CESS 2013) as well. 
The fourth organisation studied here—TÜSIAD—can be said of having maintained a rather 
regular attitude in this respect.    
296
 TESEV website. 15 July 2012. http://www.tesev.org.tr/en/en/program/democratization-
program. 
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“to bridge the gap between academic research and policy decisions, with a 
view to suggesting valid policy recommendations for the problematic issues 
in Turkey”. TESEV Chairman Can Paker, during an interview297, in 2011, 
described their mission: “My (our) cause is increased transparency, 
civilianisation in Turkey. […] Indeed, we do work for having an influence 
inside—with only partial success”.  
     Its three areas of focus are democratisation, good governance and 
foreign policy, with both a short-term and a long-term perspective on 
domestic and global developments. It is a ‘civil’ organisation in the sense 
that they do not employ or work with retired ‘bureaucrats’ or ‘politicians’ 
and maintains some distance from them. Also, their focus is mainly on 
‘democratisation’, in the widest sense.  
     However, TESEV does have a network of experts of all walks of social, 
bureaucratic, and political life, including media and academia. TESEV is 
not a think-tank where many full-time experts work all the time; there are 
only a few of them. However TESEV relies on a wide network of academics 
and experts, bringing local, national and international actors together. 
This—being highly inclusive—is “where (they) create a difference and 
which sets (them) apart from other think-tanks” in that respect.  
     TESEV, while being fully aware of the limitations and obstacles 
involved, aims to change the public/mass culture—what they describe as the 
mentality in Turkey—with the purposes of contributing to Turkey’s 
democratisation process. It aims to get involved in all phases of policy-
making: issue articulation, policy formulation—and legislation, and 
implementation. However its main focus, primarily but not exclusively, 
appears to be on issue articulation. However, they are gradually adopting a 
more policy-formulation oriented posture and this change is already visible 
in more recent publications. 
     Towards these ends, TESEV organises regular seminars, conferences, 
roundtable discussions, and supports research. Research is directed to 
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 “Kilicdaroglu: TESEV’den istifa edemez!”. 27 November 2011. Haber7. 21 July 2012. 
http://www.haber7.com/haber/20111127/Kilicdaroglu-TESEVden-istifa-edemez.php.  
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selected “problematic” areas—“obstacles blocking democratisation”—so 
that “they can be discussed freely in Turkey”. It is TESEV policy that their 
publications reflect the views of respective authors. However TESEV 
strives for academic objectivity and quality in ‘their’ publications. 
Increasingly in recent years, they complement such research and publication 
with concrete policy proposals of TESEV.  
     Such activities bring together specialists and policymakers from Turkey 
and abroad. It considers “the widest possible dissemination of viable policy 
alternatives” an “integral part of TESEV’s mission” and targets “the widest 
possible audience”. TESEV releases project reports, books, pamphlets, 
policy watch briefings and seminar proceedings aimed at both the general 
readership and policy-making community. Therefore, potentially, it has both 
a direct and indirect role in the policy-making, and influence on 
policymakers.  
     As early as 2002, TESEV’s 2001 Constitutional Changes and Political 
Reform Proposals report (Özbudun 2002) evaluated the constitutional 
amendments
298
 which went into effect in 2001 and discussed further 
proposals for reforms. Throughout, TESEV worked on defining the role of 
civil society. It published—as part of the ‘Building Civil Capacity in Areas 
of Security and Human Rights and Improving Democratic Consciousness’ 
Project—Media and Security Sector Oversight: Limits and Opportunities 
(Aytar & Cavdar 2009) and NGOs and Security Sector Oversight: Limits 
and Opportunities (Aytar & Ensaroğlu 2009), for the purposes of 
strengthening civil memory and motivating civic potential.  
     NGOs and Security Sector Oversight discussed TESEV’s perspective on 
the role of civil society in supporting democratic transition. This booklet 
provided a self-evaluation of the civil society—in the context of security 
                                                          
298
 The 1982 Constitution was amended in 1987, 1993, 1995 and 1999—twice, before 2001. 
The amendment package, which was adopted in October 2001, was the most 
comprehensive amendment package of all, in 33 articles and dedication/preface—including 
Art. 118 on the National Security Council—with a broad-based consensus. Adoption of the 
National Programme—for EU—by the Parliament, in March 2001, was the main incentive 
for this initiative. 
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sector—and offered a kind of road map and an agenda, as well as an 
emergency action plan, for Turkish NGOs. Its sober observation of the 
current role and effectiveness of civil society democratisation programmes 
was not too promising for the future: “It seems rather difficult to argue 
today in Turkey, that the concept of civil and democratic oversight of the 
security sector has been completely understood and internalised by Turkish 
NGOs”. TESEV suggested going beyond ‘complaining’ only and becoming 
part of the solution, by making suggestions, policy proposals. Being 
independent from the state did not necessarily mean being in conflict with 
the state or governments. TESEV offered the ‘state’ some specific targets to 
support common efforts with civil society, such as provision of basic 
information about security and security sector to NGOs,  improving the 
understanding of civil society oversight of the security sector, adopting a 
common language and sensitivity about it, encouraging civil society 
organisations to think about how to operationalise such oversight and 
examination, establishing networks of monitoring and coordination.  
     Finally, apart from their expectations from the state for common action, 
TESEV, shared an ambitious ‘game plan’ for common action by the NGO 
community as well—for the main purposes of increasing the capacity of 
civil society, intra-civil society coordination and coordination with other 
‘civil’ actors. This included; training and education, targeting specific state 
organisations and activities, creating a common pool of information with the 
aim of turning it into a common NGO platform, establishing networks of 
monitoring and coordination, to formulate a communication strategy in 
order to make more effective use of the media, overcoming the lack of trust 
on politics and political parties and launch an effective and sustained 
lobbying effort, improving TGNA-civil society relations, making best use of 
the opportunities offered by the Freedom of Information Law, to 
aggressively pursue the establishment of an independent gendarmerie/police 
complaints commission, and as a minimum, to monitor and report on to 
what degree security sector is able to provide security and how respectful it 
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is, of human rights, rule of law and international legal documents to which 
Turkey is a party. (Aytar & Ensaroglu 2009: 21-24) 
     When early security sector reform efforts related to the National Security 
Council started in 2001, TESEV was still a newly flourishing civil society 
think-tank with limited resources. Its main focus was on social and 
economic issues, foreign policy—such as EU process, Turkish-Armenian 
relations, Cyprus—and hitherto had little interest in the security sector or 
judicial reforms. Then gradually it gave priority to areas such as minority 
rights, Kurdish question, state and religion, good governance. In 2009, when 
‘judicial reform’ came to dominate the political agenda in Turkey, TESEV, 
with an experience of 15 years behind, not only had an excellent 
understanding of the role and mission of civil society, but also had a vision 
for future cooperation with other actors, based on a true understanding of 
the needs, requirements and limitations, in perspective. However, as far as 
the, once popular ‘security sector’ reform was concerned, most of the 
envisaged reforms, by 2009, had already been realised, either by amending 
the legal framework or through practical but effective changes in civil-
military relations in the country. The gigantic task of ‘integrated General 
Staff and Ministry of Defence’, along with an overall reorganisation of the 
Turkish Armed Forces had never really come to discussion nor to political 
agenda and the whole subject had been reduced to a simple protocol 
decision—order of precedence, involving the Minister and the Army Chief.  
 
3.9.1. TESEV’s work on ‘reforms’ 
     It is TESEV’s contention that, security sector reform and its civil-
democratic monitoring and inspection requires the ‘description’ of actors 
who would do that, and also supporting and ‘empowering’ them. Naturally 
in addition to those actors who come to power through elections, i.e. 
Parliament and the Cabinet, there are judicial bodies tasked by relevant laws 
and authorized for judicial action. However, strengthening the state 
institutions for their oversight functions, alone, no matter they are ‘elected’ 
or not, would not be enough to render security institutions really 
accountable. This may make the oversight look ‘civil’, but is not really 
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enough to make it ‘civil’ and ‘democratic’, TESEV argues. For TESEV, the 
monitoring of ‘vertical’ hierarchy of oversight by those civil actors on 
horizontal platforms is of vital importance. Two of these actors are the 
media and the civil society that would establish a more indirect monitoring 
of the security sector along with those tasked by laws such as the 
Parliament, the Cabinet—Council of Ministers, and the judiciary, affecting 
a direct role. (Aytar & Cavdar 2009; Aytar & Ensaroglu 2009) 
     TESEV’s first publication towards a security sector ‘reform’ was 
Defence Expenditures and Their Economic Impacts in Turkey, 1980-2001 
(Senesen 2003), in 2003. This ground-breaking work was followed, in 2004, 
by the Turkish translation of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)- 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Handbook for Parliamentarians: 
Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms 
and Practices (Born et al 2003). In 2006, in a bulletin series initiated by 
TESEV, the issues related to security sector reform, among others, were 
shortly discussed in the context of, then, the newly introduced Anti-Terror 
Law (Aytar 2006). Later, that year, Almanac Turkey 2005: Security Sector 
and Democratic Oversight (Cizre 2006), the first-ever reference book on the 
security sector reform in Turkey was published. Democratic Oversight of 
the Security Sector: Turkey and the World (Aytar 2006), also published in 
2006, was the first in ‘Series in Security Sector Studies’ initiated by DCAF 
and TESEV. It includes, in addition to the preface by Ümit Cizre and a 
paper by Philipp Fluri—DCAF Deputy Director, the speeches delivered by 
Can Paker, Willem F. Van Eekelen (of CESS), Mehmet Dülger, Alain 
Faupin, Serif Sayin, Pal Dunay and Ümit Cizre during the May 2004 book-
launching event for the Turkish translation of DCAF-IPU Handbook for 
Parliamentarians. These speeches would provoke the Army and soon bring 
counter arguments and strong criticism from the Chief of the General Staff.  
     In 2008, TESEV convened a conference—Democratic Horizons in the 
Security Sector: Turkey and Europe Security Sector Governance—and 
published the results in book form, Security Sector Governance: Turkey and 
Europe (Cizre & Cerrah 2008). In 2009, TESEV published Almanac Turkey 
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2006-2008: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight (Bayramoglu & Insel 
2009) and the first of its security sector policy reports, The Security Sector 
in Turkey, Questions, Problems and Solutions (Akay 2009). These were 
followed, in 2010, by Security Sector Policy Report 2, Military-Economic 
Structure in Turkey, Present Situation, Problems and Solutions (Akca 
2010).  
     Security Sector Policy Report 1, was a follow-up to the two previously 
published Almanacs, summarizing their findings and recent developments. 
It focused on the military only and also included a section dedicated to the 
reform in the National Security Council, summarising 2001 and 2003 
amendments, first to the Constitution—Art. 118, and later to Law No 2945 
and the implementation process. It did make some minor suggestions 
though, related to NSC, based on the findings of the report that “structural 
change in the NSC did not dramatically alter the role it had been playing for 
the past 20 years” (Akay 2010: 25), however the report failed to substantiate 
such allegations.  
     TESEV, formed a working group of ‘experts’299 in November 2004, 
composed of “political scientists, lawyers, members of police academy, 
retired military”. The aim was to “monitor ‘civilianisation’ in Turkey and 
also developments and policies related to security sector in the international 
arena” and to prepare two reports. The publication of the first report took 
about five years and had some substantial shortfalls in terms of ‘steering’ 
the debate on the subject, as originally intended. TESEV, in 2009, formed 
yet another “working group300, composed of leading academics and 
practitioners in the area of security sector reform” for the preparation of the 
second policy report. Probably this was due to a felt need—because of the 
shortfalls of the first report—to include experts who were really familiar 
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 TESEV Annual Report 2004, February 2005, p.10. 17 July 2012. 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/Content/pdf/Tesev_2004.pdf. 
300
 TESEV 2009 Annual Report and 2010 Activity Programme and Budget, p.24. 17 July 
2012. http://www.tesev.org.tr/Content/pdf/Tesev_2009.pdf. 
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with military organisation, operational planning methodology and political-
military interface and who had practical experience.   
     At the beginning of 2010, some fundamental changes, not only in the 
‘understanding’ and ‘perception’, but also in the nature of civil-military 
relations in Turkey had already taken place. Yet, the Democratisation 
Programme Conference
301, in June 2010, described the ‘question of the 
military’ as “what (lied) behind Turkey’s deep-seated political and social 
problems” and argued that “Turkey’s troublesome adventure with 
democratisation since the 1950’s (was) often regarded as the struggle of 
civil politics to end the military tutelage over state institutions”. However, 
as TESEV decided to focus more on ‘policy formulation’ rather than 
research
302
, in the light of changing power relations and emerging new 
concerns, its focus shifted to the area of judiciary reform. Besides, first 
time, in June 2010, it organised a workshop
303
 on ‘Police’, focusing on 
human rights violations under custody, legal representation, advocacy and 
the way police investigations were conducted. TESEV’s 2011 programme, 
again first time, did not include security sector reform as an area of primary 
focus, but added media-democracy relations “because, in terms of finding 
solutions to problem areas media (could) become both an obstacle and an 
opportunity”, it read.304  
     TESEV’s decision, from 2010 on, to develop policy proposals on 
judiciary—and other—reforms marked a major change in TESEV’s strategy 
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 TESEV Democratisation Programme Conference. 24-25 June 2010, Istanbul. Panel; 
“Turkey’s Military Question: While Politics is Pushing the Boundaries (tr. Türkiye’nin 
Asker Sorunu: Siyaset Sinirlari Zorlarken)”. 11 January 2012. 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DEMP/ETKINLIK%20DOSYALARI/program-
tr.pdf 
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 TESEV Board of Trustees 2011 meeting; 2010 Report, 2011 Programme and Budget. 11 
January 2012. 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/Genel/TESEV%202010%20Faaliyet%20Raporu.p
df.  
303
 TESEV Democratisation Programme Workshop. 11 June 2010, Ankara.  
304
 TESEV 2010 Report, 2011 Programme and Budget, p. 3. 
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as a civil society think-tank. This change coincided with the launching of 
the 2010 constitutional amendments campaign by the AKP Government.  
     TESEV’s major publications on the judiciary and the judicial reform in 
Turkey, include three ‘Policy Reports’, two monographs and a separate 
publication which is actually a compilation of the first report and two 
monographs. Both monographs, Justice Can be Bypassed Sometimes: 
Judges and Prosecutors in the Democratisation Process (Sancar & Atilgan 
2009) and Just at Times, Unjust in Others: People’s Perception of the 
Judiciary in the Democratisation Process (Sancar & Aydin 2009) were 
published in 2009. These were followed by the Judiciary Reform Policy 
Report 1: A Judicial Conundrum: Opinions and Recommendations on 
Constitutional Reform in Turkey (Yazici 2010) and Judiciary Reform Policy 
Report 2: Access to Justice in Turkey: Indicators and Recommendations 
(Berk 2011). Just Expectations: Compilation of TESEV Research Studies on 
the Judiciary in Turkey (Aydin et al 2011), as its name implies, was a 
compilation of the previous studies, plus media’s perception of the judiciary 
was discussed in the context of democratisation. Towards the end of 2011, 
TESEV published yet a third policy report on the judiciary; Mills that Grind 
Defendants: Criminal Justice System in Turkey (tr. Sanik Ogüten Carklar: 
Insan Haklari Acisindan Türkiye’de Ceza Adalet Sistemi) (Dogru 2011).  
     Findings of these reports were shared with the public and the media 
through press conferences, sometimes in the form of panels open to general 
public. The Judiciary Reform Policy Report 1, for example, was discussed 
by such a panel
305
 in May 2010 in Istanbul. Besides, TESEV 
democratisation programme convened two conferences
306
 in Istanbul in 
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 Press Conference and Panel. 6 May 2010, Istanbul. A Judicial Conundrum: Opinions 
and Recommendations on Constitutional Reform in Turkey. 30 January 2012.  
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DEMP/ETKINLIK%20DOSYALARI/bulletin%20
judiciary%20policy%20report%201.pdf.  
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 TESEV Democratisation Programme Conference. 24-25 June 2010, Istanbul. “Politics, 
Institutions and Citizenship in a Changing Turkey: Is it Possible to Live Together?”. 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DEMP/ETKINLIK%20DOSYALARI/program-
eng.pdf. 30 January 2012. 
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2010 and 2011 respectively, focusing on the judiciary, judiciary reform and 
the role of the media, among others. An international conference on reform 
of the judiciary was convened in Ankara, again, in 2011.
307
  
     The first conference in Istanbul—Politics, Institutions and Citizenship in 
a Changing Turkey: Is it Possible to Live Together?—discussed the urgent 
need for a judicial reform and the challenge posed by “the entire judicial 
tradition, entrenched judiciary-state relations, and the perception and 
attitude of the media towards the judiciary”. Ankara conference, in April 
2011, discussed judicial reform in Turkey. In addition to addressing the 
challenges to constitutional reform in Turkey and to achieving justice and 
establishing truth in societies going through a transition from an 
authoritarian rule, deliberations during the conference also covered 
“political, legal and social measures needed to be taken to ensure that the 
national legal framework, the legal culture and the judiciary adapt to the 
new political order”, “obstacles to judicial reform”, how to “address these 
issues” and “the relationship between constitution-making and judicial 
reform”. Next conference in June, dealt with the subject of “access to justice 
and the right to a fair trial” from the perspective of actors—government, 
political parties, the judicial bureaucracy and civil society. It addressed the 
role and responsibilities of these actors “to generate more ideas and policies 
on the subject of judicial reform” and questioned if “current judicial reform 
initiatives (were) capable of satisfying society’s expectations”. 
     Such conferences were supplemented by various workshops involving 
various actors who were either taking part or playing a direct or indirect role 
                                                                                                                                                   
TESEV’s Democratisation Programme Conference. 24-25 June 2011, Istanbul. “Turkey in 
Transition: Society, Politics, the Judiciary and the Media”. 11 January 2012. 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DEMP/ETKINLIK%20DOSYALARI/TESEV%20
Demokratiklesme%20Programi.pdf 
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 TESEV International Conference on the Judiciary. 15-16 April 2011, Ankara. “Justice at 
Times of Democratic Transition: Constitution Making, Judicial Reform and Confronting 
the Past”. 29 January 2012. 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/default.asp?PG=DMKETKDEN&MMM00_ITEM_CODE=DEM-
YRG-ANK-TR&MMH00_CODE=010705&MMM20_CODE=&MMM21_CODE=.  
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in policy-making and legislative processes. A closed workshop in Ankara on 
14 May 2010, two days after President Gül signed the Parliamentary 
decision on a constitutional amendment package of 27 articles into 
referendum, brought together a diverse set of actors: Ministry of Justice—
Inspection Board, General Directorate of Criminal Affairs, Department of 
Strategy Development, General Directorate of Laws, General Directorate for 
EU Affairs; Justice Academy of Turkey; a judge and a raporteur from the 
Constitutional Court; Union of Turkish Bar Associations, Bar of Ankara, 
Demokrat Yargi
308
(the only civil society organisation participating in this 
workshop), one advisor from the opposition MHP. Yet another workshop on 
11 June 2010, this time, brought together TESEV and YARSAV.
309
 
     TESEV’s Judicial Policy Report 1—A Judicial Conundrum (Yazici 
2010), analyzed the Judicial Reform Strategy released by the Ministry of 
Justice in August 2009 and discussed the mandate of the Constitutional 
Court and the restructuring of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, 
among others. A brief analysis on the constitutional amendment package of 
2010—which was not publicly known when the contributors first started 
working on the report—introduced by the government in March 2010, was 
also included in the report. This is the key document in terms of reflecting 
TESEV’s ‘point of view’ related to the reform in the Constitutional Court 
and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors. 
     Etyen Mahcupyan (former Director) of TESEV democratisation 
programme, in the preface to the report, summarized how TESEV saw the 
critical role of the judicial reform for democratisation. He said: 
                                                          
308
 Demokrat Yargi is a civil society organisation of a group of judges and prosecutors 
which rivaled YARSAV over differences of opinion about the nature of required changes in 
the legal framework related to the judiciary and the way such changes should be enacted. 
They supported the government line until after the referendum of September 2010, but 
opposed the way changes were implemented afterwards. The two separate workshops on 
the same subject were probably necessitated by the rivalry between Demokrat Yargi and 
YARSAV which launched a bitter campaign against the package. See; (Ertekin 2011). 
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 YARSAV: Association of Judges and Prosecutors. 13 January 2013. 
http://www.yarsav.org.tr/index.php?lang=en.  
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          […] one of the critical steps that has to be taken to establish  
     democracy is to reform the judiciary. […] the judicial system needs to  
     have a policy of ‘reform’ and to share this policy with the society. […]  
     this reform has two aspects. One of them is to review the issues of  
     independence’, ‘impartiality’ and ’legitimacy’ in terms of the whole  
     system and the position of the judiciary, and secondly to ensure that  
     international norms are applied to these concepts. (Yazici 2010: 5) 
 
     Four subjects were considered of major importance: the relationship 
between the executive branch and the judiciary—in terms of issues of 
independence and impartiality; the position of the judiciary vis-a-vis the 
universal law—as opposed to so-called ‘official’ ideology of the Turkish 
state; the election system of higher judicial bodies—prominently—of the 
Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors; 
fundamental restructuring of these bodies. Erözden, in his contribution, 
discussed the need for “a new perception of law that holds human rights and 
other universal democratic standards as supreme values” and suggested 
“measures that will ensure the subjective impartiality of the members of the 
judiciary” (2010: 11). Özbudun, discussing ‘constitutionalism’ and 
‘democracy’, pointed to the tension between the two, because of the 
prevalence of constitutional judiciary in our time. He explained: 
          The unique character of the constitutional judiciary and the political  
     nature of the majority of cases referred to the constitutional courts  
     require the adoption of very different methods in the selection of  
     members of these courts compared to general courts. […] the common  
     practice in Western democracies is the selection of all or the majority of  
     members of the constitutional courts by political bodies. The intention is  
     not to make constitutional courts servants of the governing party […]. On  
     the contrary, the intention is to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of  
     these courts vested with extraordinary powers such as the authority to  
     annul laws. […] Thus there is no Western democracy, except for Turkey,  
     where the power to elect judges of the Constitutional Court is completely  
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     detached from Parliament. (2010: 13) 
 
     Özbudun also made recommendations regarding the judicial review of 
constitutional amendments as to their substance and the rules of procedure 
of the Parliament.
310
 There was also a hardly hidden general warning 
accompanying his views on specific issues: “All these needed reforms can 
be realised by enacting a totally new liberal constitution meeting universal 
democratic norms rather than making partial constitutional amendments” 
(Özbudun 2010: 15). 
 
3.9.2. Cooperation and networking 
     TESEV represents an excellent—and successful—example of 
networking and international cooperation with an extensive range of 
multilateral and overlapping partnerships. 
     TESEV publication of the Turkish translation of Handbook for 
Parliamentarians (Born et al 2003), involved not only DCAF and IPU but 
also Willem F. Van Eekelen, former Minister of Defence of the 
Netherlands—later chairman of the CESS Task Force of the Project on 
‘Governance and the Military’. Aytar’s 2006 article on the new Anti-Terror 
Law was based on a report prepared earlier by TESEV in collaboration with 
the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. Almanac Turkey 2005: 
Security Sector and Democratic Oversight (Cizre 2006) was also a product 
of the cooperation and collaboration with DCAF and was published as part 
of the DCAF-TESEV Book Series.  
     Members of various European think-tanks—Centre for European Policy 
Studies in Brussels (Emerson 2006; Tocci 2006); Centre for European 
Reform in London (Barysch & Grant 2006)—contributed to TESEV’s EU 
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 Ozbudun (2010) argued that “the reform must also explicitly prevent the Constitutional 
Court from reviewing constitutional amendments as to their substance”—a competence 
neither the 1961 constitution nor the 1982 Constitution gave to the Constitutional Court—
and limit judicial review “solely to certain specific procedural defects”. As for the 
constitutional review of the rules of procedure of the Parliament, he advised “to either 
abolish this review or restrict it to an a priori review” (14-15). 
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Watches. Foreign Policy Bulletins also included a wide range of 
contributors from FRIDE in Madrid (Youngs 2007) to German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs in Berlin (Kramer 2007), The German 
Marshall Fund in Brussels (Asmus 2007), Centre d’Etüdes de Relations 
Internationales (CERI) (Bafoil 2007), European Regional Academy in 
Yerevan (Mkrtchyan 2007) and the Palestinian Centre for Democracy and 
Conflict Resolution (Nasser 2007). 
     Funding sources for both research projects and publications and also for 
other activities are regularly and explicitly expressed and/or made public by 
TESEV. These include a diverse set of institutions including civil society 
organisations and think-tanks reflecting an interlocking web of national and 
international organisations such as Open Society Foundation-Turkey, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (Sida), Chrest Foundation of the United States, Geneva Centre for 
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Global Dialogue, to name some 
of them.   
     Those provided by the European Commission and other EU-related 
funds also stand out in TESEV’s financial resources. TESEV conference in 
June 2009, in Ankara
311, ‘Security Sector Oversight and Civil Actors’, open 
to public and the media, was the closing conference of a Commission-
supported Project, ‘Civilian Capacity Building and Raising Democratic 
Consciousness in Security and Human Rights’. The conference had three 
panels focusing on the democratic oversight in general, the role of the 
NGOs, and the relations between the media and the security sector 
respectively and involved journalists, politicians, bureaucrats and members 
of civil society, Turkish as well as international. During this conference, 
three products of the Project were also presented, “Almanac Turkey 2006-
                                                          
311
 Conference. “Security Sector Oversight and Civil Actors”. 11 June 2009, Ankara. 
TESEV press release. 05 January 2012. 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DEMP/Security%20Sector%20Conference%20EN
%20press%20release.pdf . 
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2008” (Bayramoglu & Insel 2009) (Bayramoglu & Insel 2010)312, “Media 
and Security Sector Oversight: Limits and Opportunities” (Aytar & Cavdar 
2009)
313, “NGOs and Security Sector Oversight: Limits and Opportunities” 
(Aytar & Ensaroglu 2009)
314
. Mid-2011, an international conference on the 
judiciary discussed “Justice in Times of Democratic Transition”315. EU 
Commission Turkey Progress Report in 2005, quoted and lauded both 
DCAF-TESEV and CESS-IPC work.
316
  
     Although funding sources of CSOs—not only for TESEV but also for 
many others—have always become a subject of controversial debate, it is a 
fact of life that the only funding available in Turkey comes from (some of) 
the members of TESEV’s High Advisory Board.  
     TESEV did try to involve other CSOs which were active and outspoken 
in the area of judicial reform, especially in 2010, during the period leading 
to the referendum of September 2010, but the overall polarisation of the 
Turkish society and its reflection on civil society, along with the 
longstanding preoccupation with seeing ‘things’ from a confrontational 
                                                          
312
 Almanac Turkey 2006-2008. Published in Turkish in 2009 and in English in 2010. The 
English version does not include the chapter on “Media, Civil Society and Education” of 
the Turkish version, also are missing some articles from 2009 edition, such as those on 
NATO and MIT.  
313
 Published in Turkish. Medya ve Güvenlik Sektörü Gözetimi: Sınırlar ve Imkanlar (Media 
and Security Sector Oversight: Limits and Opportunities) (Aytar & Cavdar 2009).  
314
 Published in Turkish. Sivil Toplum ve Güvenlik Sektörü Gözetimi: Sınırlar ve Imkanlar 
(NGOs and Security Sector Oversight: Limits and Opportunities) (Aytar & Ensaroglu 
2009).  
315
 International Conference on the Judiciary. 15-16 April 2011, Ankara. “Justice at Times 
of Democratic Transition: Constitution Making, Judicial Reform, Confronting the Past”. 
TESEV press release. 17 July 2012 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/tr/etkinlik/uluslararasi-yargi-konferansi-demokratik-gecis-done.  
316
  “Initiatives such as the Task Force on Governance and the Military, jointly sponsored 
by the Center of European Security Studies and the Istanbul Policy Center, or the project on 
Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector promoted by TESEV and the Geneva Center 
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) could make an important 
contribution. It is also important to promote better public understanding of reforms in civil-
military relations, both at home and abroad”. (EC 2005: 15).  
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perspective—and to take sides—did not allow to sustain this initiative and 
get meaningful results.  
     The media was invited to the book-launching event of TESEV’s 
Handbook for Parliamentarians (Born et al 2003), in 2004; and the 
conference where Almanac Turkey 2005: Security Sector and Democratic 
Oversight (Cizre 2006) was presented, in September 2006, was open to the 
public and the media.
317
  
     David Judson, Editor in Chief, Turkish Daily News, contributed to 
TESEV Foreign Policy Bulletins (Judson 2007). Irfan Bozan, a journalist 
and producer in NTV, until recently, was closely associated with TESEV. 
Bozan not only contributed to TESEV Foreign Policy Bulletins (Bozan 
2007) but was also author or co-author of three TESEV books on religion 
and political Islam (Bozan et al 2004), (Cakir & Bozan 2005), (Bozan 
2007). So were journalists such as Rusen Cakir (Cakir & Bozan 2005), Ali 
Bayramoglu (Bayramoglu & Insel 2009) (Bayramoglu & Insel 2010), Alper 
Gormüs, Cengiz Candar, Umur Talu, Hasan Cemal, Derya Sazak to name 
some of them.  
     Apart from such exposure, general openness to and cooperation with the 
‘media’, TESEV published books focusing on the role of the media in 
overall democratisation process. Media and Security Sector Oversight: 
Limits and Opportunities (Aytar & Cavdar 2009) discussed the role and 
limitations of the media in affecting democratic transition from security 
sector perspective. Two recent publications, on the other hand, as part of the 
‘Media and Democracy’ study initiated by TESEV in 2010318, examined 
judiciary-media relations, (mis)perceptions of the media, media’s 
                                                          
317
 For repercussions of this event in 2004—and of the publication—later in 2006, see 
below ‘Uphill Battle for civil society’.  
318
 Herkesin Yargisi Kendine: Demokratiklesme Sürecinde Basinin Yargi Algisi (Erdal 
2010); Communicating Democracy–Democratising Communication: Media in Turkey, 
Legislation, Policies, Actors (Elmas & Kurban 2011). The two publications examine the 
legal basis, regulations, actors, and the guiding policies of media in Turkey and offers a 
political-economic perspective. 
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relationship with various state institutions, governments, and the economic 
structure.  
     ‘Media in Transition’ panel, in Istanbul conference, debated ‘The Media-
Democracy Relationship and the Economy-Politics of Media’. “The press 
and tools of mass communication have a crucial role in the consolidation of 
deliberative and participatory democracy and the transformation of social 
and political mentalities”, argued the invitation letter to the conference.319  
     But, despite all these efforts, “while TESEV’s visibility is much higher 
than others in the media”, as stated by one of its senior officers, “media’s 
interest in TESEV work, is mainly restricted to (certain) columnists, rather 
than editorial staffs”.320 
 
3.9.3. TESEV’s position on reforms 
     One senior member of TESEV staff, first indicating that “influencing 
policy-making processes was not their aim to measure success against”, 
nevertheless boasted that “their research was recognized by the media and 
taken seriously by the Government and the Parliament, their publications 
were read and sought after and they managed creating a political agenda in 
the public”.321 Besides, “their work was supported by the Government, the 
Parliament and the public, civil society, academia etc., including security 
studies (of universities)”. She concluded that, they “without doubt had a 
power and influence”. Similar evaluations were also included in successive 
annual reports prepared for the members of the Board of Trustees.
322
 These 
                                                          
319
 TESEV’s Democratisation Programme Conference: 24-25 June 2011, Istanbul.   
“Turkey in Transition: Society, Politics, the Judiciary and the Media”. 11 January 2012. 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DEMP/ETKINLIK%20DOSYALARI/TESEV%20
Demokratiklesme%20Programi.pdf.  
320
 Interview, September 2011. 
321
 Ibid. 
322
 TESEV Board of Trustees 2011 meeting; 2010 Report. 11 January 2012. 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/Genel/TESEV%202010%20Faaliyet%20Raporu.p
df; also, TESEV Board of Trustees 2012 meeting; 2011 Report. 17 July 2012. 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Editor/2011_Faaliyet_Raporu.pdf.  
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reports also refer to a “communication strategy—planned in detail—in order 
to share the outcome of such studies with the public”. These are rather 
impressive and, at the same time, ambitious and pretentious statements 
which this thesis aims to evaluate.   
     As already covered above, TESEV basically advocated that the security 
sector was to be under—direct and indirect—oversight of the Parliament 
and the civil society, through legal measures, transparency and 
accountability, and the judiciary must be independent, impartial, cognizant 
and respectful of universal legal norms, and efficient. These were what was 
communicated by TESEV to general public and to political decisionmakers. 
TESEV recognized the interconnection between various dimensions of the 
democratic ‘reform’ process in seemingly separate areas, security sector and 
the judiciary being prominent. The period of mid-2009 through mid-2011 
was important in terms of the timing and concentration of effort for 
TESEV’s participation in the debate related to the overall reform process.  
     The conference in June 2010, organized by TESEV Democratisation 
Programme in Istanbul
323
 had, as its major theme “Is it possible to live 
together?”. The titles of panels in the conference reflected five main areas of 
work of the democratisation programme: religion, state and society 
relations; Kurdish question; military question; judiciary, media and tutelage; 
minority rights. The conference was based on the argument that “Turkey 
faced a multi-layered problem of ‘living together’” and “the system of 
military and judicial tutelage”, both “preserved the structure—which created 
this situation” and “solidified the sphere of politics around official 
ideology”. Adopting a holistic approach, it aimed to reveal the 
interconnection between Turkey’s main problems in the process of 
democratisation. The Second Policy Report on the Security Sector was 
released immediately after this conference, in July 2010. The First Policy 
Report—on the security sector, had already been published in November 
                                                          
323
 TESEV Conference, “Politics, Institutions and Citizenship in a Changing Turkey: Is it 
possible to live together?”. 24-25 June 2010, Istanbul. 16 July 2012. 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Editor/program-eng.pdf.  
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2009. Together, they provided clear-cut policy suggestions of TESEV on 
the security sector reform.  
     On the judicial reform, the First Policy Report had been published in 
May 2010. As a result, in the course of about six months, TESEV provided 
a comprehensive and detailed set of inputs for the constitutional amendment 
package—already published in mid-May 2010 in the Official Gazette and 
put to referendum due in September—for the articles related particularly to 
the judiciary, in a timely manner.  
     As for the security sector reform, TESEV put forward some 
recommendations detailed and substantiated in Security Sector Policy 
Report 1. These were necessarily limited in scope because as already 
discussed, at the time of the release of this report, both most of the foreseen 
changes, particularly those related to the NSC, had already been actioned 
and the priority of reforms had shifted to the judiciary:  
          The often-mentioned Article 2 of the NSC Law and Article 35 of  
     TAF’s Internal Service Law need to be changed as the first, most  
     significant and macro-level step towards pulling the TAF back into its  
     natural area of jurisdiction. In the executive branch, the relationship of  
     responsibility and authority between the MoD and the Chief of Staff  
     needs to be reformulated so that the former, not the latter, is the first  
     among equals and has broader control and oversight powers. (Akay  
     2010: 29-31) 
 
     The report’s one prominent observation, based on the 2008 National 
Programme was that; “the pledges made in civil-military relations (were) 
limited in scope”, moreover, the Programme did “not envision [sic] a 
fundamental shift in the structure of law enforcement units”, and it did not 
“promise a real change in the security model in Turkey” which was “a sign 
of the lack of political will in this area” (Akay 2010: 30-31).  
     The Judicial Sector Policy Report 1 was certainly more timely and 
included substantial recommendations related to the restructuring of both 
the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors. 
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The main recommendation on the Court was that, “The composition of the 
Constitutional Court must be amended and a significant role must be given 
to Parliament in the selection of its members. The term of duty of members 
must be limited to a certain period” (Özbudun 2010: 15).   
     TESEV report made reference to the text—and its certain articles—
drafted in 2007 by a group of experts.
324
 Its propositions aimed at 
                                                          
324
 This draft ‘civilian constitution’ was prepared, in 2007, by a group of six, chaired also 
by Prof. Ergun Özbudun in response to a request by Prime Minister Erdogan. Others were 
Prof. Zühtü Arslan, Prof. Yavuz Atar, Prof. Fazıl Hüsnü Erdem, Prof. Levent Köker and 
Assc. Prof. Dr. Serap Yazici. “Composition of the Constitutional Court Article 112 - (1) 
The Constitutional Court is composed of seventeen members. (2) The Turkish National 
Assembly elects eight members with the three-fifths majority of its full membership and at 
least three of these members have to be elected from among professors specialised in 
constitutional law, public law or political sciences. Four members are elected by the 
Plenary Assembly of the Court of Cassation, four by the Plenary Assembly of the Council 
of State, and one by the Plenary Assembly of the Court of Accounts from among their own 
presidents and members by the absolute majority of the members and by secret ballot. (3) 
To qualify for selection as members of the Constitutional Court, members of the teaching 
staff of institutions of higher education, senior administrative officers and lawyers are 
required to be over the age of forty and to have completed their higher education in law, 
political sciences, economy and administrative sciences and to have served at least fifteen 
years as a member of the teaching staff of institutions of higher education or to have 
actually worked at least fifteen years in public service or to have practiced as a lawyer for at 
least fifteen years. (4) The Constitutional Court elects a president and deputy president 
from among its members for a term of four years by secret ballot and by an absolute 
majority of the total number of members. The president and deputy president may be 
elected for maximum two terms. (5) The members of the Constitutional Court may not 
assume other official and private functions, apart from their main functions. (6) The 
principles and procedures of the election to be made by the legislature shall be regulated by 
a law. Term and termination of duty Article 113 - (1) Members of the Constitutional 
Court are elected for a single nine-year term. Members of the Constitutional 
Court shall retire when they are sixty-five years old. (2) Membership in the Constitutional 
Court terminates automatically if a member is convicted of an offence requiring his 
dismissal from judicial profession; it terminates by a decision of an absolute majority of the 
total number of members of the Constitutional Court if it is definitely established that he is 
unable to perform his duties on account of ill-health.” For the Turkish text. 18 July 2012. 
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“strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Constitutional Court by 
giving the Parliament an important role”, ensuring that the majority of the 
members of the court “be elected by judicial authorities”, eliminating the 
crucial role played by the President of the Republic alone. The key to giving 
the Parliament an important role was the quorum—determined as the three-
fifths of the total number of members—in the election of the Court 
members. This would prevent excessive influence of the majority. Limiting 
the term of membership to nine years would ensure that “changes in public 
opinion would be reflected on the composition of the Constitutional Court”. 
As for the ‘competence’ of the Court325, it maintained the principle that 
“constitutional amendments could be reviewed only with respect to their 
form and such review should be restricted to consideration of whether the 
required majorities were obtained for the proposal and adoption and whether 
the procedure requiring two rounds of debates was complied with” 
(Özbudun 2010: 16).  
     TESEV report criticised most provisions of the constitutional amendment 
package—as it related to the Court—already forwarded to the Parliament, 
on following points: granting the National Assembly the power to elect only 
three out of seventeen members was a positive but insufficient 
improvement; however, the major reservation was about the election by 
simple majority in the third round. The dominant role of the President was 
also maintained. Tenure of twelve years—with no re-election was an 
improvement, however, this limitation should also have applied to the 
current members. (Yazici 2010: 33)  
                                                                                                                                                   
http://www.siviltoplumakademisi.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
387:ergun-ozbudun&catid=52:anayasa-taslaklari&Itemid=130.  
325
 ‘Özbudun’ draft of 2007; “Art. 118 - (3) If the Constitutional Court is in the opinion that 
the implementation of the provision subject to an annulment action will cause irreparable 
damages and that the said provision clearly appears to be unconstitutional, it may, upon 
request, stay its execution by a reasoned decision taken by a two-thirds majority of the 
present members. The Constitutional Court’s final decision on the merits of the case shall 
be published in, at the latest, sixty days in the Official Gazette. Otherwise, the stay order 
shall become ineffective.” 
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     Policy Report also discussed items related to the restructuring of the 
High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, particularly increasing the number 
of the members of the HCJP to include first-degree judges and prosecutors, 
allowing the TGNA to elect some of the members and election methods. 
Based on the reports of the Venice Commission and of the Consultative 
Council of European Judges (CCEJ), it found the ‘present’ composition and 
working methods of the HCJP as conflicting with European practice and 
incompatible with the principles of the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary. It suggested “a mixed composition of judges and non-judges”; 
selection methods, composition and security of tenure to ensure 
“autonomy”; selection of non-judge members by the Parliament—which 
“has to be exercised by qualified majorities”. The presence of the Minister 
of Justice in the Council, report found unproblematic, provided that he/she 
“should not have the right to vote in disciplinary matters”. (Yazıcı 2010: 17-
20) Also for recommendations regarding the restructuring of the HCJP, it 
adopted ‘Özbudun’ draft of 2007.326 
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 ‘Özbudun’ draft of 2007, Art. 109 - (1) The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors is 
composed of seventeen regular and four substitute members. The Undersecretary of the 
Minister of Justice is an ex officio member of the Council. Parliament elects five regular 
and one substitute members from among first-degree judges and prosecutors with the 
absolute majority of the total number of its members and by secret ballot. One substitute 
and three regular members are elected by the Plenary Assembly of the Supreme Court of 
Appeals and one substitute and two regular members by the Plenary Session of the Council 
of State; one substitute and four regular members by the first-degree judges and prosecutors 
in courts of justice from among their peers, and two regular members by the first-degree 
judges and prosecutors in administrative courts from among their peers. […] Members to be 
elected by the Plenary Assemblies of the Supreme Court of Appeals and Council of State 
must have reached the age of sixty. […] (2) The Council convenes with seventeen members 
and decides with the absolute majority of its members. […] (3) Elected regular and 
substitute members of the Council cannot assume another function as long as they hold 
their posts. (4) The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors recruits, appoints and relocates 
[…] judges and prosecutors […]. It decides on proposals of the Ministry of Justice for 
abolishing the post of a court or a judge or a prosecutor, or changing the jurisdiction of a 
court. […] (5) The Minister of Justice is authorized to appoint judges and prosecutors to 
work temporarily or permanently at the central organisation of the Ministry of Justice […]. 
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     Regarding the provisions—related to HCJP—included in the 
constitutional amendment package, the report found the “increase in the 
number of the HCJP members” and “allowing the election of first-degree 
judges” commendable. The most important shortcoming was “its failure to 
give a role to the Parliament in the selection”. Also, the proposal 
strengthened an “already powerful authority” of the President of the 
Republic. Abolishing the President’s “power to select members from among 
the nominees of the Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State”, on 
the other hand was commended. (Yazici 2010: 36) 
     To summarize; TESEV aimed the security sector be under direct control 
of the Government, and indirect control of the Parliament—through 
Parliamentary oversight of the Government—and civil society, media, 
people (general public). The judiciary, must be independent, impartial—
cognizant and respectful of universal legal norms—and efficient. It 
advocated legal measures, transparency and accountability, towards these 
ends. Among them, those related to the NSC, MOD and the TGS, the 
Constitutional Court and the HCJP, were prominent.  
     Specifically, TESEV wanted: the Law on the NSC—Art. 2, ‘concept of 
national security’, and TAF’s Internal Service Law—Art. 35, ‘mission of 
the armed forces’ be amended; the relationship between the MoD and the 
Chief of Staff be reformulated; restructuring of both the Constitutional 
Court and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors; a significant role in 
the selection of the Constitutional Court judges and the members of the 
HCJP be given to the Parliament—while reducing the powerful authority of 
the President in the selection of judges; the term of duty of the Court judges 
be limited to a certain period. 
     A change in the security ‘model’, rather than selective and partial 
amendments was sought and “the lack of political will” in the area of 
                                                                                                                                                   
(6) The Minister of Justice may assign judges and prosecutors temporarily to avoid any 
interruption in the service […]. (7) Principles governing the fulfillment of the duties of the 
Council, procedures related to the election of its members and activities […] shall be 
regulated by law.  
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democratisation was consistently stressed. Adopting a holistic approach, 
TESEV recognized the intimate interconnection between Turkey’s main 
areas of democratisation.  
 
3.10. Participation: Turkish Industry & Business Association
327
 
     The Turkish Industry & Business Association (TÜSIAD) was established 
in 1971 in order to articulate and advocate a new development strategy for 
Turkey—based on ‘free market’ economy and open to international 
competition—which was eventually adopted and vigorously followed by the 
government of the time, from 1983 on. TÜSIAD is an organisation of the 
private sector with about 600 members that produce 60-65% of the Turkish 
GDP. Its membership is voluntary. It employs a professional staff of 
approximately sixty, to include Representative Offices world-wide, and 
University Partnership Forums.  
     TÜSIAD’s work is essentially carried out through committees328, chaired 
by members of the TÜSIAD Board of Directors. Committees are composed 
of academics and TÜSIAD members with special interests, expertise and 
education. Working Groups—associated with the Committees—support 
them; they work in conjunction with the Secretariat General and TÜSIAD 
University Partnership Forums, for developing TÜSIAD’s views and 
positions. Committees meet regularly and serve as a bridge to the TÜSIAD 
Board of Directors. TÜSIAD International, established as a separate unit, 
carries out activities in the field of strategic business development. TÜSIAD 
also has offices in Brussels, Berlin, Paris and Washington D.C. These 
offices contribute to the process of developing the EU acquis, assist in the 
smooth progress of the EU harmonisation process, by establishing relations 
with academics, international bodies and governments. Representative 
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 Formerly the name was The Turkish Industralists’ and Businessmen’s Association. The 
name in English was changed to ‘Turkish Industry & Business Association’ in 2009. See; 
TÜSIAD Charter, http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad/charter/. 19 July 2012. 
328
 For TÜSIAD committees, see; http://www.tusiad.org/committees. 31 March 2012. 
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offices publish monthly bulletins to keep TÜSIAD members and experts 
informed about important issues. 
     The Parliamentary Affairs Committee
329
, chaired by one of the vice 
chairmen of TÜSIAD’s Board of Directors, formulates TÜSIAD’s views on 
issues related to political reforms and judicial reform, among others. In 
addition to its own members, the Committee benefits from academic input 
in the process of forming its views and position papers. It monitors 
legislative texts in the parliamentary agenda, through ‘constructive’ 
exchange of views between the Parliament and TÜSIAD and it promotes 
participation of the private sector in the legislative process. The Political 
Reforms Department within the TÜSIAD’s Secretariat General supports the 
committee’s work.  
     TÜSIAD, clearly, aims for a substantial role in the political decision-
making and legislative processes and has got organized accordingly. This 
includes policy decisions—and legislation—related to ‘democratisation’ as 
a matter of priority, because “There is an intimate connection between 
economic development and democratic consolidation” explains one senior 
staffer: “We want to see a Turkey consolidated its democracy, developed its 
economy—becoming a respected country in the world. We aim to support 
this process with TÜSIAD’s views, proposals so that it moves forward 
faster and in a sounder way”.330   
     TÜSIAD Ankara Permanent Representative Office331 performs critical 
functions in this respect. It keeps track of the executive and legislative 
developments, helps to facilitate TÜSIAD’s participation in the decision-
making process and, regarding the legislative process, arranges TÜSIAD’s 
relations with the Parliament, through political and legislative consultation 
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 For TÜSIAD Parliamentary Affairs Committee, see; 
http://www.tusiad.org.tr/committees/parliamentary-affairs-
committee/?f%5Byear%5D=2011&f%5Bmonth%5D=7. 19 July 2012.  
330
 Interview, December 2011.  
331
 For TÜSIAD Ankara Permanent Representative Office, see; 
http://www.tusiad.org/tusiad/representative-offices/tusiad-ankara-permanent-
representative-office/. 19 July 2012. 
 239 
mechanisms and personal contacts. Ankara Office represents TÜSIAD vis-
a-vis the Government, Parliament, private and public sector entities and 
institutions, civil society organisations, international missions and 
individuals, in order to secure TÜSIAD’s contribution to the economic, 
social and political decision-making processes. It provides up-to-date 
information to TÜSIAD’s members and professionals by preparing regular 
publications on the legislative process, Ankara’s agenda, the EU accession 
process and harmonisation. Ankara Office’s two publications—Ankara 
Bulletin
332
 and Ankara Bulletin Legislative Process
333—are important tools, 
in this respect.  
     TÜSIAD, a voluntary organisation of businessmen and industrialists, has 
consistently been active in tackling economic, social and political problems 
of Turkey with a long-term perspective, divorced from popular—daily—
politics, made clear-cut policy proposals and has been a candid advocate of 
‘democracy’and democratisation. To these ends, TÜSIAD, directly and 
indirectly, makes its views known to the Parliament, the Government, 
foreign governments, international organisations and the general public. It is 
TÜSIAD’s position that they have been “contributing to the establishment 
and development of the notion of ‘civil society’ in Turkey”.  
 
3.10.1. TÜSIAD’s work on ‘reforms’ 
     Since “policy advocacy is essential for any civil society”, TÜSIAD’s 
work on democratisation started about 20 years ago, in mid-1990s with a 
report on the Election System (Gürsel 1996) and continued to this day. In 
terms of institutional views of TÜSIAD, against a background of more 
diverse views expressed and/or reflected in various publications, two 
aspects need clarification. On the one hand TÜSIAD maintains working 
groups and committees, providing inputs to Board of Directors, and 
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 Ankara Bulletin, 2013-1. 13 January 2013. 
http://www.tusiad.org/__rsc/shared/file/TADT-AnkaraBulteni-Ocak2013.pdf.  
333
 Ankara Bulletin Legislative Process, 2012-12-A. 13 January 2013. 
http://www.tusiad.org/__rsc/shared/file/TADTAnkaraYasamaBulteni-Aralik2012.pdf.  
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formulates its institutional views as expressed explicitly as ‘TÜSIAD 
views’. On the other hand, TÜSIAD outsources reports on various subjects 
including those related to democratisation, or support studies reflecting 
‘differing views’ on certain issues, but not necessarily reflecting TÜSIAD’s 
institutional views. Otherwise, “TÜSIAD essentially maintains a democratic 
attitude and behaviour, careful in displaying this stance at all times; despite 
some disagreements among TÜSIAD members on details, there is a 
consensus on a common democratic ground”.334 As a result, like many other 
civil society organisations, TÜSIAD has often been subjected to unjustified 
criticism by either the governments or opposition parties, sometimes by 
both.  
     So-called ‘Tanör Report’ (1997), in that sense, established a ‘tradition’ 
for the perception of TÜSIAD, its views and its publications by the general 
public. This perception is mixed—and sometimes distorted—when deemed 
fit to intended political, sometimes ideological ends, and, as a result, has 
largely contributed to some serious problems of communication as exampled 
below. Tanör Report, much beyond its time and certainly out of the spirit of 
the time, outlined a series of major political reforms—for better governance 
as well as for the promotion of civil and human rights. Despite some up and 
downs due to changing domestic and international circumstances, 
TÜSIAD’s focus on democratic reforms has been stable since then.  
     Some commentators, scholars, Önis for example, among others, have 
pointed to the “instrumental nature of TÜSIAD’s commitment to 
democratisation agenda”, arguing that “significant components of the 
business community embraced democratic reforms for their intrinsic 
benefit” (Önis 2003: 19). This is perhaps true and probably valid for the 
private sector not only in Turkey but in any other country in the world, by 
the very nature of this sector. Nevertheless, that does not and probably 
cannot rule out the ideological and moral (i.e. cultural) commitment of 
individuals within the business community to ‘democracy’ for its own sake. 
We can also see that there is an ambiguity in terms of TÜSIAD’s role—
                                                          
334
 Interview, December 2011. 
 241 
trying to influence policy-making from outside or trying to become an actor. 
Probably, in reality, it is the latter rather than the former.  
     The Perspectives on Democratisation (Tanör 1997) was prepared—under 
the responsibility of TÜSIAD Board member Can Paker—to identify the 
obstacles to democratic consolidation in Turkey and to make policy 
proposals based on the best examples in Western democracies. This report 
had a preface by the Board of Directors indicating that it did not necessarily 
represent TÜSIAD’s views. But this report, which raised proposals well 
beyond the democratic expectations—and political as well as mental 
limitations—of the time, caused much discussion also among TÜSIAD 
members. As a result, the ‘Halis Komili’ Board of Directors was not 
absolved and had to leave office. It included more than 100 proposals both 
in the Constitution and in various laws, ranging from judicial system, to 
government, to human rights, reflecting a wide perspective. In two years 
time, another report by Bülent Tanör (1999), reviewed the current debates 
on democratisation in Turkey. Two years later TÜSIAD published an 
updated version of the 1997 report by the same author (Tanör 2001), re-
examining the debate that took place and the changes/improvements already 
occurred and implemented in Turkey. This was followed by the EU process, 
and successive governments started launching EU harmonisation packages. 
And TÜSIAD, this time, started publishing smaller, thematic reports on 
critical subjects, like the one on political parties (Batum 2001) for example. 
These were also supplemented by seminars whose proceedings were also 
published.  
     The most controversial parts of the pioneering ‘Tanör Report’ in 1997, 
were on ‘civilianisation’ and ‘cultural rights’, with no major proposals on 
the ‘judiciary’. Civilianisation essentially included suggested changes in the 
structure of the National Security Council (NSC). It proposed that the 
“National Security Council (NSC) be eliminated as a constitutional body 
and its sphere of activity be restricted to national defence (as it was prior to 
1960), parallel to the practice in all democratic countries” (Tanör 2001: 17). 
During the 1997 General Assembly of TÜSIAD, some members not only 
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objected to parts of the report but also suggested alternative texts/proposals, 
some even brought studies made by some other academics, as well as those 
who supported the study in its entirety. The reasons for objections were 
diverse; but some of those who objected initially, perhaps reflexively—
because some proposals sounded so ‘unusual’—then, later changed their 
positions. In a few years, some of these proposals had already been 
enacted—the law on the structure of the NSC was amended and also its 
General Secretariat was reorganised.  
     On the tenth anniversary of the first ‘Tanör Report’, in 2007, this time 
another author, Zafer Üskül prepared a ten-year update report.335 This 
report, reiterated Tanör’s proposals for reforms in the judiciary—
reorganisation of the Constitutional Court and HCJP, and in the security 
sector—elimination of the NSC from the Constitution as a constitutional 
body and integration of the General Staff with MoD.  
 
3.10.2. Cooperation and networking 
     “We are not in a position of ‘We’ve done our best, we offered proposals, 
if they don’t like them, we ignore them and remain indifferent, this is their 
problem’, this is NOT the case” explains one TÜSIAD official.336 But the 
way of becoming ‘active’, changes depending on the time, context, the 
subjects and the processes involved.  
     Each time TÜSIAD publishes something, it is subject to the widest 
possible distribution—to the Parliament,  politicians, decisionmakers.337 
Many of the addressees are also invited to TÜSIAD conferences/seminars. 
Trying to reach the target audience and having an influence is a long 
process, effects of which gradually building up, throughout. Sometimes 
TÜSIAD is invited to share institutional views with those who take part in 
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 For example, a full package of TÜSIAD studies and publications related to the work of 
drafting a new constitution—since 1992—was provided to the Speaker of the Parliament 
when the Conciliation Committee on Constitution was established and started work in 
October 2011. 
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the decision-making and legislative processes. In response to an invitation, 
for example, a TÜSIAD Board member, Volkan Vural, briefed the 
subcommittee of the Conciliation Committee on Constitution—Drafting 
Committee on Civil Society—about TÜSIAD’s views, along with others, 
such as TESEV.  
     Parliamentary Affairs Committee of TÜSIAD, each year, visits Vice-
Chairmen of the political party caucuses represented in the Parliament. They 
also visit the Justice Committee and the Committee on the Constitution. 
They discuss draft bills or law proposals in the agendas of these committees. 
At politically critical junctures, TÜSIAD Board of Directors and/or the 
President—and other members individually—involves directly; they visit 
political parties, deliver speeches, issue press statements, give interviews 
and make TÜSIAD views, concerns known. However, it appears that 
TÜSIAD mainly focuses on the Government to have a direct access to the 
process and, if possible, influence on the policy outcomes. Secondary 
audiences seem to be Parliamentary committees and, to a lesser extent, 
political parties. As already pointed out, efforts on political parties other 
than the governing party are based on a sense of democratic ‘politeness’ 
rather than practical expectations for support to current legislation and/or 
political decisions.   
     European Union institutions are another venue for cooperation for the 
purposes of democratisation. Several EU officials in the course of 2010 
visited TÜSIAD—for example Stefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement 
and European Neighbourhood Policy, in March, and Head of the EU 
Delegation to Turkey, in April. TÜSIAD also visited Spain—holding EU 
Presidency—in April and also Commissioner Füle, among others, in 
Brussels in June. During such contacts constitutional amendment package 
must have been included in the agenda.  
     Regarding cooperation—and networking—with other civil society 
organisations, the situation is not too different from others. However, as 
discussed before, although lack of serious cooperation with TESEV is 
noticeable, there may be more cooperation between these two organisations 
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than it is observed from outside. Nevertheless, cooperation with any other 
civil society organisation—for the purposes of democratisation—is 
negligible.    
     According to TÜSIAD officials, they “pay great attention to how its 
work and position is perceived and reflected by the media”.338 On a daily 
basis, comprehensive reports on anything published having the word 
‘TÜSIAD’ in it, including the local press in Anatolia, is received and 
reviewed, particularly with a view to understand if publications, press 
statements etc. are correctly perceived. As is often the case in Turkish 
media, sometimes columnists may write based on so-called secondary 
sources—the way TÜSIAD reports are reflected in the media—rather than 
reading the actual reports themselves. Then, a letter signed by the President 
or the Secretary General himself, is sent to correct the miscommunication 
and a copy of the actual report is also provided. If there is a more general 
misperception, then the President goes on TVs or gives press statements, 
interviews to correct it.  
     TÜSIAD appreciates the fact that “the media is the only way (they) can 
possibly reach the people in the street”, however, they do not have an 
aggressive policy to ‘reach’ people. Perhaps this is a sign of either the low 
priority or importance—or both—TÜSIAD attaches to reaching people. If 
media is properly employed for purposes other than reaching the people, is 
yet another valid question. However, ‘TÜSIAD’ appears to be believing in 
the ready availability of the media; “TÜSIAD is always attractive for the 
media. We don’t need to spend special effort. Especially when our studies 
or other activities are on democratisation, there is much interest”.339 This 
conclusion, based on practical observation, may well be true, however, the 
subject of the role of media in support of civil society programmes, such as 
TÜSIAD’s, probably requires a much more sophisticated approach and 
systematic planning—beyond simply following the reporting in the media—
for success.  
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3.10.3. TÜSIAD’s position on reforms 
     “TÜSIAD participates in legislative work starting from the initial stage 
of drafting bills in ministries by providing inputs, views, participating in 
debates, issuing reports, visiting political decisionmakers. We are happy to 
see that many of the suggestions/proposals we made, have already been 
materialized” says, one senior TÜSIAD staffer.340 
     Regarding the security sector reform and particularly the restructuring of 
the National Security Council, TÜSIAD has both initiated and led the effort. 
In this sense, as a civil society organisation, its functions typically range 
from issue articulation to policy formulation, legislation and evaluation. 
The Perspectives on Democratisation (Tanör 1997), identified the present 
structure, role and status of NSC as an obstacle to democratic consolidation 
in Turkey. The policy proposals it formulated for reforming the institution 
were based on the best examples in the West. Tanör’s next two reports, first 
in 1999, and the updated version of the 1997 report in 2001, reviewed the 
developments and evaluated the policy outcomes in the light of TÜSIAD 
proposals which were made in the course of four years. 
     The 1997 report, proposed that the “National Security Council (NSC) be 
eliminated as a constitutional body and its sphere of activity be restricted to 
national defence” and the General Staff—actually the ‘Chief’—it stated “be 
subordinated to the Minister of Defence” (Tanör 2001: 17). An integrated 
MoD and the General Staff was never really discussed and is still missing 
from the political agenda, since the issue has always been limited to a matter 
of precedence between two ‘individuals’. Nevertheless, in a few years, with 
the comprehensive amendments in the Constitution in 2001, most of 
TÜSIAD proposals—on NSC and its General Secretariat had already been 
enacted. Yet, 2001 March Tanör Report found the intended improvements 
‘unsatisfactory’ and, with reference to EU process then, reiterated the 
original proposal. It accused the Government of not aiming for “a radical 
solution”. The amendment package adopted by the Parliament in October—
more than six months later—did not give heed to TÜSIAD views. TÜSIAD, 
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adopted a very active stance in this process during the heated debate over 
the revolutionary amendments in the constitution, which would come to 
haunt it years later—in 2010.341  
     Üskül Report of 2007, as NSC and General Secretariat already fully 
restructured after 2003 amendments, maintained the original ‘Tanör 
proposals’—elimination of NSC from the Constitution as a constitutional 
body, and subordination of the General Staff to MoD. This has not 
happened to this day and 2010 changes did not include any article related to 
the NSC and, although radical changes have been enacted, it is still a 
Constitutional institute with a broad area of interest. 
     In 2010, TÜSIAD closely followed the process of constitutional 
amendments—related to judicial reform—from the beginning and directly 
involved in the whole process. In February, newly elected TÜSIAD Board 
of Directors, headed by President Boyner, visited Prime Minister—on 
18th—and other political leaders to include the President, Speaker of the 
Parliament, some of the cabinet ministers and political parties—on 24th and 
25th—in Ankara and shared their views on the constitutional amendment 
package. This was immediately after the TÜSIAD General Assembly on 21 
January and the press conference—for sharing 2010 programme with the 
public—on 15 February. (The next meeting with Prime Minister would take 
place on 14 July 2010, shortly before the exchange of harsh words between 
the TÜSIAD President Boyner and Prime Minister Erdogan over ‘taking 
sides’ on the issue of constitutional referendum package.) In these meetings 
and visits, TÜSIAD stressed the need for “a democratisation package, to 
include a new constitution, political parties law, election law—that would 
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put the individual at the centre of the political system—and separation of 
powers” as “indispensable principles of democratisation” for TÜSIAD.342 
The government revealed the constitutional amendment package of 26 
articles on March, 22nd. 
     Before, on 19 February
343
, MHP Chairman and some senior members of 
the party leadership came together with TÜSIAD over a dinner and 
discussed current political developments. On 25 March—three days after 
the package was made known to the public—this time three cabinet 
ministers
344, would visit TÜSIAD in Istanbul to discuss the draft package. 
These and similar visits clearly indicated that TÜSIAD was accepted as a 
legitimate actor in the decision-making and legislative processes.
345
  
     Following the visit of the AKP leadership, on 25 March, TÜSIAD’s 
views on the new package, in the form of a report
346
, were made public in a 
press conference. A copy of the report had already been given to the visiting 
ministers. TÜSIAD pointed to the fact that the package, as it was, would 
“not facilitate further work on a new constitution because it did not stand on 
a consensus or compromise in the Parliament” and ”it was far from being 
democratic”.   
                                                          
342
 Interview, December 2011.  
343
 The dinner, on 19 February 2010, was in Rahmi Koc Museum in Istanbul and was 
closed to media. TÜSIAD team of Ümit Boyner, Ali Kibar, Rifat Hisarciklioglu (TOBB), 
Murat Yalcintas, Asim Kocabiyik, Feyyaz Berker, Hüsamettin Kavi, Erkut Yüceoglu 
hosted MHP Chairman Devlet Bahceli, Meral Aksener, Münir Kutluata, Cihan Pacaci and 
Dogan Cansizlar. The working dinner lasted two-and-a-half hours. 10 March 2012. 
http://www.internethaber.com/news_detail.php?id=232382.  
344
 They were Dpty. Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek—later Speaker of the Parliament, Justice 
Minister Sadullah Ergin and Vice-President of the AKP Parliamentary Caucus Bekir 
Bozdağ.  
345
 BDP leadership also visited TÜSIAD, after the referandum of 12 September, in October 
2010. “BDP TÜSİAD’i ziyaret etti.” 27 October 2010. Hürriyet. 22 July 2012. 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/16145866.asp.  
346
 See, Internet Haber, 25 March 2010. 14 January 2013.  
http://www.internethaber.com/tusiaddan-yeni-anayasa-cagrisi-239869h.htm.  
 248 
     In this report, out of 26 articles, TÜSIAD opposed to those related to the 
judiciary, i.e. the Constitutional Court and HCJP only, and explained why, 
and how they should be reformulated. This press conference and the report 
was the first sign of an open confrontation with the Government which 
would continue and—despite efforts to contain, on both sides—escalate for 
a long time to come. On 30 March, the Government—technically, governing 
party—forwarded the package of, now 28 articles, as a draft law rather than 
a government bill, to the Parliament. In April, TÜSIAD report was further 
developed and Parliamentary Affairs Committee paid another visit to the 
Parliament, to political parties represented there and explained TÜSIAD’s 
views, once again.
347
   
     TÜSIAD views on the relevant parts of the amendment package were 
clearly reflected in the report of 25 March, in the paper presented to the 
Chairmen of relevant committees in the Parliament by the Parliamentary 
Affairs Committee, during visits in April 2010, and were repeated in the 
March 2011 Press Statement
348
 before the general elections.  
     In summary, TÜSIAD—similar to TESEV—also recognised the intimate 
connection between economic development and democratic consolidation. 
They stressed the need for a democratisation ‘package’, to include a new 
constitution, political parties law and election law—as a minimum—rather 
than a piece-meal approach, based on individualism—versus collectivism—
and separation of powers; advised consensus and compromise in the 
Parliament. TÜSIAD proposed that; the NSC be eliminated as a 
constitutional body and its sphere of activity be restricted to national 
defence; the General Staff be integrated with the MoD, and the 
Constitutional Court and HCJP be reorganized. 
 
                                                          
347
 On 13 April 2010, Parliamentary Affairs Committee visited Chairmen of the Committee 
on the Constitution and the Justice Committee, and Vice-Chairmen of respective political 
party groups in the Parliament. 
348
 Press Release, 27 March 2011, TÜSIAD. 14 January 2013. http://www.tusiad.org/bilgi-
merkezi/basin-odasi/basin-bultenleri/tusiad-basin-bulteni---27-mart-2011/.  
 249 
3.11. Participation: Heinrich Böll Stiftung Turkey 
     Heinrich Böll Stiftung-Turkey has been active in Turkey since 1995—
from 2005 on, as an association registered with the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs.
349
 Heinrich Böll Stiftung—located in Berlin—is close to the 
German Green Party and operates in 27 countries in addition to Turkey. 
“Democratisation is a chief tenet of green politics” states Heinrich Böll-
Germany web-site
350, still “it is often far from clear how to translate the 
general notion of democratisation into concrete projects, campaigns, or 
educational programmes”. Civil society is considered one important and 
versatile tool in this respect. To these ends, Heinrich Böll aims primarily, 
directly working on the “legitimacy of policymakers and decision-making 
processes” and indirectly through the “application of democratic principles 
in other areas, such as climate and gender policy”. 
     Heinrich Böll’s work for ‘democracy promotion’ takes the specific 
context and needs of each country into account. Accordingly, planning for 
the scope of actions matches the former, in cooperation with various 
partners. In Turkey, their aims are to support the steps taken by Turkey for 
democratisation, to help civil society to develop, to bring ‘civil’ experience 
from abroad and to help exchange of views between Turkey and the EU. 
However, in Turkey, partners are mainly from the civil society, rather than 
the state; this sets Heinrich Böll apart from many other associations.  
     The areas selected by Heinrich Böll to focus on are; minority (non-
Muslims’) rights, human rights in general, Kurdish question, religion and 
democracy, sustainable development, ecology, and civil-military relations. 
This list excludes work on ‘judiciary’ and the judicial reform process. 
Heinrich Böll prefers to talk about the relationship between democracy—
democratisation—and religion(s), rather than inter-faith dialogue—between 
‘religions’. 
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     Primary audience for Heinrich Böll would change from one subject to 
another; elites, journalists, civil society, academics—and over them—the 
mass public. Heinrich Böll adopts a phased approach—and strategy—as 
dictated by the circumstances. They may ‘lead’ the effort or, as other civil 
society organisations in a particular area of interest gain experience, self-
confidence and initiative, then, shift their priorities.
351
 “We are not powerful 
enough to reach the people in mass to transform the overall political culture 
as a whole, to make it more democratic” admitted one senior member from 
Heinrich Böll.352  
     Heinrich Böll, is more of an ‘advocacy’ group vis-a-vis an epistemic 
community.
353
 However, scientific work/methods are essential to their work, 
as long as they remain ‘objective’. “It is often possible to tell—by simply 
looking at the name of an ‘academic’ organisation—which political party 
they associate with or close to” says the same senior member. “There is a 
gray area in Turkey between the academic work and politics. In a sense, 
science is used as a political tool”.354 Heinrich Böll brings journalists, 
academics and civil society together, because otherwise, “each group is 
stuck within themselves, like a separate social club..”. Some reports are 
produced by Heinrich Böll, but some others are outsourced in the form of 
support provided to researchers. 
     They do not offer policy proposals, but just help/support others—civil 
society—to substantiate their views and proposals. Most of the time, their 
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focus is on the first phase of policy development—articulation; sometimes 
the second phase—policy formulation, but still in the facilitator role, 
because, as a ‘foreign’ institution, there is always the risk of being 
(mis)perceived as one interfering in domestic politics. For example, in 2007, 
once AKP declared its intention for a new constitution, Heinrich Böll 
invited academics and other experts to talk and debate on specific proposals. 
Initiative had already come from within the political system itself and 
constitutional amendments had been raised as a subject in the political 
agenda, i.e. articulated; they just wanted to contribute to the debate in order 
to make it more inclusive through wider participation of diverse views. 
 
3.11.1. Heinrich Böll Stiftung’s work on ‘reforms’  
     Democratic reforms in the security sector and the judiciary are not 
priority areas for Heinrich Böll-Turkey. Nevertheless they do contribute to 
civil society activities in these areas because of the interconnection between 
various dimensions of democratisation. In this context, they are rather active 
on civil-military relations.  
     In 2007, Heinrich Böll gathered two meetings in Van and Diyarbakir to 
contribute to, then, the ongoing debate on a new constitution.
355
 The 
subjects discussed included human rights and the notions of ‘sovereignty’, 
how to reformulate human rights and fundamental freedoms, multi-
lingualism and local administrations, multi-culturalism, democratic 
legitimacy, rule of law. They organised another conference on ‘Human 
Dignity and Human Rights’ in May 2008, in cooperation with Goethe 
Institute and Turkish-German Cultural Affairs Board, in Istanbul Bilgi 
University and published the proceedings (Dufner 2008). Presentations 
included ‘Human Dignity Principle in the High Courts: Legal Status in 
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Germany’ (Limbach 2008) and ‘The Tension Between Freedom and 
Security’ (Starck 2008).356  
     Heinrich Böll published, in 2010, The Role of the Army in Turkish 
Politics (Boztekin 2010). This was the compilation of the proceedings and 
results of the two-day conference held in Istanbul in November 2009. 
During the opening speech of the conference, Head of Heinrich Böll-
Turkey, Ms. Dufner described the Turkish Army as “a giant rock blocking 
the way to democratisation” (Boztekin 2010: 5). The conference aimed to 
“hear the results of the work on civil-military relations by distinguished 
researchers and their proposals to remove this rock”. For a policy of ‘peace’, 
it was necessary, as first steps; “to get the army under more civilian control, 
describe politics as a civilian area, clean the political arena of military 
symbols and open a new road where the society can develop its own politics 
and will”. In addition, against the background of recently revealed 
allegations about some army personnel’s involvement in ‘coup-plots’ and/or 
planning for coups—which later proved controversial357—she said: “The 
news on planning for coup which we’ve heard about recently, are horrible 
and, in democracies, absolutely unacceptable”.358 
     The conference was organised in the form of a series of panels where 
‘experts’ shared their views and then responded to moderated questions. 
Under the influence of these widely publicised recent stories of planned, 
intended or ‘attempted’ military interventions, most of the views expressed 
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were of extreme nature and clearly anti-militarist rather than ‘democratic’ 
per se. Such statements
359
 clearly reflect the dominant sentiment in Turkey, 
media and the general public in general, at the end of 2009, immediately 
before the 2010 Constitutional referendum process. One panelist—Ömer 
Laciner—was most emphatic: 
          Against the military tutelage which still exists in practice, a sound  
     ideological propaganda campaign—beyond some institutional  
     arrangements—is needed. […] (The Turkish Army) is a scary force, it is  
     armed and as you have realised with recent revelations, it does not  
     hesitate to resort to even the most disgusting methods. We are faced with  
     an organisation that harbours cowardly people who can think of bombing  
     children, who can plan to kill you, us in cold blood”. (Boztekin 2010: 39,  
     72) 
 
     In May 2010, this time another conference, on the so-called ‘27 May 
Coup’ of 1960360, brought together the ‘victims’—surviving family 
members—and the living members of the so-called National Unity 
Committee—those who led the coup—and some columnists who were 
particularly familiar with the history of military interventions in Turkish 
politics, academics, columnists and even a senior bureaucrat from the 
Parliament, however, no military. The panels discussed constitution, media, 
the army culture, institutions and identities, and the lasting legacy of the ‘27 
May’ Coup in the political regime in Turkey.  
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     Just before the general elections of June 2011, Heinrich Böll this time 
published a comparison of political party programmes—AKP, CHP, MHP 
and BDP. This comprehensive study
361
 included democratisation, civil-
military relations, judiciary as well as other priority areas such as a new 
constitution, Kurdish question, foreign policy, human rights, freedoms, 
development, local administrations etc. But they did not indicate a 
preference or make any policy proposals. 
 
3.11.2. Cooperation and networking 
     Heinrich Böll’s cooperation with TESEV, for the purposes of 
‘democratisation’, ranks prominent. This is probably because of the partial 
overlap in terms of their priority areas; Kurdish question and the role of the 
‘security sector’ in the policy-making process related to this question. 
During the two-day conference in 2009 (The Role of the Army in Turkish 
Politics) the second day was reserved for presentations and discussions on 
TESEV’s first Policy Report on the Security Sector Reform. There was also 
representation from CESS in this conference. However, other than that, 
Heinrich Böll’s cooperation and collaboration seems to be more with 
smaller scale, mostly advocacy organisations, operating mainly locally, with 
limited financial resources and limited experience in civil society work. In 
that respect, their network of partner organisations is quite widespread, and 
impressive in the Turkish context—18 in the area of democratisation.362  
     Heinrich Böll does work with celebrities as a campaign strategy, not in 
the area of democratisation though. They supported a TV campaign 
involving female and male celebrities for a campaign to raise awareness 
about domestic violence against women, in 2011 and it proved very 
effective.
363
 In terms of networking, Heinrich Böll has ‘friends’ in political 
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parties—most of them—whom they rely on for help to get their messages 
through. They also have contacts—columnists—in the media, like those 
who helped in organising the 1960 Military Coup conference and who even 
took the podium to talk. 
     Heinrich Böll, recently, started working closer with the media. There is a 
perceived sensitivity and this is for very good reasons. Apart from the 
general sensitivity of being a ‘foreigner’, there is this ‘German foundations’ 
label, a favourite debate in Turkish politics which often comes to the fore as 
detailed below. So, there is a sensitivity and—it may well sound unusual—
they do not want Heinrich Böll is mentioned too often in the media. They 
are happy as long as “what they talk about or what participants talk and 
discuss in their conferences/seminars are reflected in columns”.364  
     Therefore, objectively, media’s interest can be improved, if it were not 
for the sensitive situation Heinrich Böll Turkey is in. Since they do not wish 
to be seen much in the media, the current situation is, to a degree, their own-
making. “But, in a society, where we are under threat, even life-threats are 
coming personally, I do not want my face to be seen in the media” says one 
senior member.  
 
3.11.3. Heinrich Böll Stiftung’s position on reforms 
     Like many other civil society organisations in Turkey, it is difficult to 
measure the success of Heinrich Böll, mainly because they facilitate the 
debate towards formulating policy options rather than making direct policy 
proposals. There are exceptions to this general ‘rule’, but due to the 
sensitivities involved—mentioned above—‘foreign’ civil society 
associations are more hesitant in this respect. On the other hand, while they 
do not work on specific legislative proposals, they do work on 
democratisation in general and this is not always and only about laws, but 
also about the practice—behaviour, and then cultural/attitudinal change. 
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Still it is a challenge from measurement techniques perspective. “We always 
wonder if our publications are read or just used as ‘flower pot stands’ where 
they end up” 365 said one senior staff, a concern which is shared by many in 
the world of civil society in Turkey.  
     Whatever criteria are taken for measuring real success, Heinrich Böll 
works for opening up the debate and encourages free, tolerant, objective 
discussion on the subjects at hand. From this perspective the views 
expressed in their publications, by individual academics, journalists etc—
and occasional statements by the Head of Heinrich Böll Turkey—can be 
taken as benchmarks for what they want. “Turkish army, whatever role they 
may have played in the history of Turkey and regardless of their importance, 
has to withdraw from politics and the political scene in modern Turkey” 
says Ulrike Dufner, Head of Heinrich Böll-Turkey. “They should not make 
public statements on the country and government’s policy. Whoever makes 
decisions related to defence policy and the army, should not be the army 
itself” (Boztekin 2010: 7) she adds. 
     Another view in this respect is offered by Andrew Cottey, who 
participated in November 2009 conference in Istanbul. He pointed out two 
aspects of civil-military relations: “The idea of democratic culture and its 
relation to the military culture” and “a phased approach to reform in civil-
military relations in Turkey, as the only—albeit sometimes frustratingly 
slow—way” (Cottey 2010: 82-86). In terms of the role and place of civil 
society organisations in democratic oversight of the security sector, Yilmaz 
Ensaroglu argued that “the perception of security in Turkey and the meaning 
attached to the concept of security are extremely vague and limitless. […]  
this allows the reduction of all political problems into security and public 
safety problems. […]  This clearly reveals that it is more of an security 
oversight of the civil society, rather than the democratic oversight of the 
security sector” (Ensaroglu 2010: 61-62). On the other hand, Joost 
                                                          
365
 There are ‘successful’ examples by Heinrich Böll though, such as the reports on Kurdish 
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Lagendijk, a frequent and active participant in Heinrich Böll activities, 
considered the amendments in the National Security Council Law as “a step 
in the right direction, but he—like Ensaroglu—also touched upon the 
subject of ‘securitisation’ and said that “Europeans were expecting debates 
taking place in the Turkish Grand National Assembly to find answers to 
questions such as ‘the limits of national security which should be dealt with 
by the army’” (Lagendijk 2010: 87-88). 
     It can be concluded that, Heinrich Böll Turkey advocates Army’s 
withdrawal from politics and its subordination to elected civilian authority, 
reforms focusing on cultural aspects—rather than institutions only, a phased 
approach to reform in civil-military relations, eliminating the tendency for 
securitisation of each and every problem in Turkey and active involvement 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the reform process.  
   
3.12. Participation: Centre for European Security Studies   
     The Centre for European Security Studies (CESS)
366
 is based in 
Groningen, the Netherlands. It was established in 1993, to support civil 
society in young democracies and to encourage democratic defence reform 
in Central and Eastern Europe. As the countries in these regions progressed 
their democratic transitions, CESS priority was shifted to the security sector 
reform—in the widest sense of the term—and to ‘training’. Embracing the 
motto of ‘reveal, explain and justify’, it seeks transparency and 
accountability in security sector governance where it is “the most difficult to 
achieve”, but nevertheless “that is exactly where it is most urgently needed”. 
     CESS is an independent, neutral, civil society think-tank, sponsored 
mainly—but not exclusively—by governments and government 
organisations through grants and assignments for its programmes. It works 
closely with national governments and international governmental 
organisations. CESS has a very small staff, but a wide international network 
of associate experts and instructors as well as some sixty “friends, 
colleagues, fellows”. 
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     The main source for CESS funding is MATRA
367
 with “some help from 
the British and the Americans”. Initially MATRA funds were dedicated to 
‘major’, big projects and that of CESS was one of the last ones of such 
projects. From 2012, the focus is more on ‘local’ projects controlled by the 
Embassy of the Netherlands in Ankara and the Consulate-General in 
Istanbul aiming cooperation with local partners, such as the one with the 
‘Parliament’; Strengthening the role of civil society in legislative process. 
    CESS’s primary audience is composed of stakeholders and future 
stakeholders in the security sector—policymakers and future policymakers, 
those who oversee policy, mid-career officials in ministries, bureaucracy, 
also staffers in parliaments, people working in the media and civil society 
on similar or related matters. They aim to influence policy-making and 
legislative process indirectly. CESS involves in all three stages of policy 
making: articulation, formulation and implementation at varying degrees. 
“We articulate and go a little bit into policy formulation as well, as in the 
case of an integrated ministry of defence and general staff, we are across the 
board” says one senior fellow.368  
     CESS conducts policy research on issues of good governance in security 
sector and provides training for mixed groups of practitioners from 
government—including the military—the media and civil society, seeks 
local partners and provides teaching material and training for local trainers, 
so that they can sustain the training effort. CESS publications are produced 
by outside academics, practitioners and in-house experts.  
 
3.12.1. CESS’ work on ‘reforms’  
     CESS Turkey programme, Governance and the Military: Perspectives 
for Change in Turkey, started in 2003 and was carried out in three phases: 
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2004-2006, 2006-2009 and 2010-2013. The first phase
369
 aimed at 
contributing to “an increased understanding in Turkey of the appropriate 
role of the armed forces in a democracy” in the light of the EU 
(Copenhagen) criteria for membership. It was sponsored by the MATRA 
programme.  
     CESS organised a conference in Ankara in September 2004. This 
conference had the title of ‘The Role of the Armed Forces and Turkey’s EU 
Membership Expectations’. Both Dutch and Turkish Ministers of Defence 
were planned to participate and each would deliver a speech in this 
conference. Dutch Minister Henk Kamp failed to travel, hence Minister 
Gonül also decided not to attend. But the Chief of Dutch Armed Forces, 
General Dick Berlijn
370
, did travel to Ankara and delivered a speech, on 
behalf of the Dutch Minister, in military uniform. He addressed the subjects 
such as an ‘integrated’ Ministry of Defence and General Staff, which was 
common in European countries; requirements of the EU membership, in 
terms of civilian oversight and subordination of the military; parliamentary 
oversight of the defence budget etc. Referring to the EU Turkey Progress 
Reports, he suggested that; “the EU was of the opinion that TAF should 
prepare itself for a different status (role) in politics”. Dutch Ambassador to 
Ankara, Sjoerd Gosses, was also present, sharing similar comments with the 
media, afterwards.  
     Initial reactions from retired generals—including the former chief of the 
Turkish Air Forces—participating in the same meeting, were controlled and 
mild, but they all stressed the need for considering ‘sensitivities’ involved—
unique to Turkey, and ‘timing’ of the measures to be taken. One of his 
remarks was important in terms of the way later developments took shape. 
He believed that; “if the army (could) be convinced, by the politicians, that 
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its institutional interests would continue to be respected and preserved under 
the civilian leadership, that would facilitate and speed up the democratic 
transformation” General Berlijn said.371 The draft report prepared by a 
group of experts—so-called the Task Force of 18 members—including 
Turkish nationals, military and civilian alike, under the co-chairmanship of 
former Dutch Minister Willem Frederik (Wim) van Eekelen of CESS and 
MG Armagan Kuloglu (R) of ASAM
372
 was also distributed to the media.  
     CESS completed the report—Governance and the Military: Perspectives 
for Change in Turkey—by February 2005, and the final report, printed, was 
ready for distribution in April. It clearly suggested, among others, that the 
General Staff should become subordinate to the Ministry of Defence. 
However, before this planned event, Turkish co-chairman of the Task Force 
(of ASAM) announced that he and his institute no longer wished to be 
associated with the work because the report “was not satisfactory from 
(their) point of view and it did not reflect (their) sensitivities and the truths 
adequately; included items that were not agreed to and not reflecting the 
Turkish sensitivities” and ASAM—reportedly in communication with the 
military—withdrew from the Task Force late April. Soon, another Task 
Force member, a well-known retired general, Edip Baser, would also 
withdraw.
373
  
     CESS—supported by several academics from prominent Turkish 
universities—stood behind its main arguments and insisted that this should 
be the way-ahead for Turkey, if Turkey was serious about EU membership. 
The most controversial item was the insistence for a date or a firm 
commitment in the form of a statement of intention for ‘reform’ by the 
Turkish—AKP—government. However, although the original plan was to 
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release the report in May in another conference in Ankara, after the 
withdrawal of ASAM—and resulting speculations on the motives of CESS 
work in Turkey—this was cancelled and postponed to Fall 2005 during 
which time CESS continued its work, in partnership with Istanbul Policy 
Centre (IPC) of Sabanci University.  
     The final report was published as a CESS occasional and distributed in a 
conference in November 2005, in Ankara.
374
 Later it was published in book 
form, with some editions, in 2006 (Faltas & Jansen 2006).  
     The first phase was also a test of the permissiveness of the environment 
for civil society work in Turkey. The hurdles of democratic transition in 
Turkey of the time, inexperience in and unfamiliarity of CESS with dealing 
with politically sensitive issues in Turkish context, the unfortunate incident 
of Dutch Chief of General Staff lecturing in his national uniform on Turkish 
domestic politics in Ankara in front of TV cameras, all contributed to this 
end-result. This first phase ended with a series of seminars in 2005/2006 
designed to allow dissemination of, and debate on, the Report and its 
recommendations. 
     The second phase ‘Reforms in Turkish Civil-Military Relations: 
Measuring Progress and Building Capacities’ was effectively launched by a 
conference on ‘Perceptions and Misperceptions in the EU and Turkey: 
Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession’ in June 2008. In this phase, 
CESS aimed to “help Turkey meet the requirements for EU accession in the 
field of civil-military relations” and to “promote a better understanding 
within the EU of the challenges that Turkey faces in this regard”.375 The 
concluding conference, in November 2009, was titled ‘Academia Meets 
Government and Parliament in Turkey’ reflecting the perceived need—in 
the area of security sector reform—by CESS.  
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     During the course of the second phase, CESS made a strong attempt to 
involve the political decisionmakers and the Parliament. In 2007, Willem 
van Eekelen, Chairman of the CESS Board, visited the Chairman of the 
Defence Committee, Kemal Yardimci (AKP), in the Parliament and invited 
him—and a team of committee members—to the Dutch Parliament for 
exchange of views. This visit was planned, based on mutual agreement, in 
advance and scheduled in detail, twice, and both were cancelled at the last 
minute by the Turkish guests, without any reasonable explanation given.
376
  
     In 2009, CESS published Perceptions and Misperceptions in the EU and 
Turkey: Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession (Volten 2009). This was 
a compilation of the papers presented at an informal international 
roundtable, held at Oegstgeest in the Netherlands in June 2008, organised by 
CESS together with the Turkey Institute
377
, as part of the second phase of 
CESS work in Turkey. The papers in this book generally argued that 
although the pace of reforms was ‘remarkable’, still much remained to be 
done and the EU was ‘impatient’ about this slow pace of reforms in Turkey. 
     The third phase was launched under the general description of 
‘Promoting Good Governance in the Security Sector of Turkey’378 with the 
objectives of enhancing the capacity for good governance in Turkey’s 
security sector; promoting good governance, transparency, accountability 
and the rule of law; and helping to encourage and empower civil society to 
participate in monitoring and overseeing the security sector. The programme 
included, as usual; one-day high level seminars, workshops, interactive 
seminars, other training courses, ‘games’—based on plastic or ‘generic’ 
scenarios—and working papers prepared by the participants.379  
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     The third and reportedly the final phase of CESS work on security sector 
reform in Turkey, was closed, in October 2012, with a visit to the Dutch 
Parliament and to leading think-tanks in the Netherlands by a select and 
diverse group of participants/contributors to this effort of almost ten 
years
380
, and the concluding conference in Ankara on 14 December 2012
381
.  
 
3.12.2. Cooperation and networking 
     The Centre for European Security Studies works with local partners, 
mostly universities and/or institutions which are active in areas of 
democratisation and security sector reform in particular. Initially, in 2003 
they started collaborating with the Centre for Eurasian Strategic Studies 
(ASAM), which was the leading Turkish think-tank of the time. After 
ASAM withdrew from the project in April 2005—for reasons outlined 
above, they continued, as partners, with the Istanbul Policy Centre (IPC)
382
 
of the Sabanci University.  
     The second phase of the programme was carried out mainly in co-
operation with the Istanbul Policy Centre and Bilkent University, in Ankara. 
CESS continued working with Bilkent University as a partner during the 
third phase of the programme, along with IPC of Sabanci University, and 
recently increased practical cooperation with Ari Movement
383
 in Istanbul 
and TOBB-ETÜ University384, in Ankara.  
     CESS also cooperated with many other institutions or organisations as 
well as individual experts in Turkey and elsewhere. It would be safe to talk 
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about a portfolio of experts who have been willing—because they share 
similar concerns and perspectives—to contribute to CESS work, rather than 
a concrete ‘alliance’ directed to certain, specific ends. In this sense, CESS 
approach is more like that of Heinrich Böll’s. The need for this ‘style’ of 
civil society networking is clearly explained by a senior fellow at CESS: 
          Networking has its advantages, but also risks. Networking brings with  
     it the risk of being a party (to the subject under debate). We are not an  
     advocacy group trying to achieve certain objectives through networking.  
     We just seek project partners to work with us in a similar fashion, not to  
     (form) broad coalitions in order to exert political influence. I don’t want  
     to be too political (in Turkey).
385
  
 
     CESS did attempt to involve the media, by informing and inviting them. 
However this was not an ‘aggressive’ media campaign. Their visibility 
remained limited to one or two articles
386
. There have been many columnists 
from prominent national dailies actively participating in conferences 
organised by CESS, however they have not paid much attention to CESS 
work nor saved one or two lines for CESS work in their articles. Compared 
to the intensive CESS effort to involve media, this is an exceptionally 
bizarre result. Most of the publicity associated with CESS has been 
restricted to ‘negative’ reporting in 2004-2006 period. One senior 
administrator in CESS complained about that and attempted a self-criticism: 
“Although we do not seek to operate under the media lime-light, there must 
have been more media interest. To some extent I blame ourselves for not 
being effective enough for informing the media”387 he said.  
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3.12.3. CESS’ position on reforms 
     “We are among the centres with the best understanding of good 
governance in the security sector” said one senior fellow. “My educated 
guess about CESS influence on policy-making is that; in capacity building 
our contribution has been small but useful, in studies our contribution has 
been bigger, in terms of getting the subject on the agenda, our contribution 
has been significant”388.  
     When the third phase
389
 was started in mid-2009, the main rationale for 
the ‘Turkey’ programme was that “although Turkey had a large and highly 
professional armed forces—playing a leading role in formulating defence 
and security policy, there were too few civilians working in the making and 
execution of security policy and only a few of them were prepared for such 
work”. Besides, those involved in the policy formulation did not 
“sufficiently understand the implications of democratic reform” or “the need 
for collaboration amongst government agencies, between uniformed and 
civilian officials, and between government, journalists and civil society”. 
CESS project aimed to address the main security sector problem in Turkey: 
“lack of civilian capacity for the making, execution and oversight of 
security policy.”  
     Task Force Report of 2005 and Governance and the Military: 
Perspectives for Change in Turkey (Faltas & Jansen 2006) provided CESS 
view of the work—in the security sector—that must be fulfilled to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria. CESS suggested three steps: acknowledging “the need 
for further action”, announcing that Turkey will move “towards closer 
alignment when the time is right”, and start “work on a programme, […] a 
roadmap or action plan” (Greenwood 2005: 22). The ‘work’ on a 
programme covered mainly two areas: a review of the defence organisation 
with a view to integrating the General Staff with the MoD, and improved 
oversight, i.e. accountability and transparency. More specifically, it included 
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“bringing key (T)GS functions under the aegis of an expanded MoD, 
building up a body of civil servants […] knowledgeable about defence 
[…]”. It also called for measures aimed at “improved financial 
accountability” and “institutional and individual capacity-building to ensure 
that Turkey’s elected representatives can be genuinely effective in holding 
the country’s armed forces to account” (Greenwood 2005: 42-43). The latter 
included “more access, more information and more time, to be given to 
Parliamentarians, to exercise oversight” as well as much greater political 
input […] in preparation of key policy documents”, in other words, 
addressing the problem of ‘democratic deficit’. Basically, CESS advised the 
Turkish government to begin laying the groundwork for further change, by 
reviewing its defence organisation and by bringing greater accountability 
and transparency to the conduct of security affairs. Although CESS adopted 
an active attitude based on the assumption that this council was heeded, and 
launched ambitious programmes accordingly, the end result has proven 
otherwise; the Turkish government did not share CESS priorities nor its 
cautionary notes, and there was very little CESS can do to help a reluctant 
government.  
 
3.13. ‘Uphill battle’ for civil society 
     Mithat Sancar, a scholar who is active in Turkish civil society, refers to a 
phenomenon of “a castrating and polarizing rhetoric rife” in describing the 
politico-psychological environment in Turkey: “As such, the general and 
professional public opinion becomes dominated by a castrating and 
polarizing rhetoric rife with ‘treason charges’ and ‘conspiracy theories’” 
(Aydın et al 2011: 4). Against this background and confirming this 
observation, one senior executive in a leading NGO, which was target of 
even ‘physical attacks’ in 2006, said during an interview: “Perhaps, it’s 
about ‘courage’; we are different because we create our own agenda and we 
are not scared by potential reactions”390. Agduk (2010), an international 
civil society—NDI—worker, refers to the same phenomenon in a more 
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detached way: “A framework with systematic, pluralistic, feedback 
mechanisms, providing necessary infrastructure, exists neither in the public 
administration nor in the legislative body. It is possible to argue that the 
relations between the decisionmakers and civil society (in Turkey) today are 
marred with many problems of communication” (134). Such ‘problems’ do 
create an environment which is not really encouraging—and not even 
permissive—for the civil society and, indeed, they do represent a cluster of 
problems obstructing a real and meaningful participation. The experience of 
those four civil society organisations particularly covered in this research is 
telling in this respect.      
     In 2006, TESEV published Almanac Turkey 2005: Security Sector and 
Democratic Oversight (Cizre 2006) and Democratic Oversight of the 
Security Sector: Turkey and the World (Aytar 2006). The latter was the 
product of collaboration between DCAF and TESEV. It also included texts 
of the speeches delivered during the May 2004 book-launching event for the 
Turkish translation of DCAF-IPU Handbook for Parliamentarians. Some of 
the views expressed in speeches and the official status of some of the 
contributors provoked the Army and soon brought counter arguments and 
strong criticism from the Chief of the General Staff himself, personally.  
     The Chief of the General Staff, Büyükanit, delivering a speech at the 
opening ceremony of 2006-2007 academic year in the Combined Armed 
Forces Colleges in Istanbul, harshly criticised the views expressed in 
Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector (Aytar 2005), accused the 
report of having been prepared with “foreign support” and by “dark forces” 
which had a ‘secret agenda’; pointing to some authors from the Police 
Academy who contributed to this study, he said: “This reveals that some of 
the isolated incidents which are subject to judicial action now, are being 
directed from one nerve centre”.391 He did not save ‘an EU official’—
Hansjörg Kretschmer, Head of EU Commission Turkey Delegation; the 
‘chief of general staff of a friendly and allied country’—Gen. Dick Berlijn, 
                                                          
391
 ‘Professional army is expensive’ (Profesyonel ordu pahali). 03 October 2006. Star daily. 
20 July 2012. http://www.stargazete.com/politika/kisa-kisa-haber-57645.htm.  
 268 
a ‘Turkish official’—Antalya Deputy—and Chairman of Foreign Affairs 
Committee—Mehmet Dülger (AKP)392, from criticism, without naming 
them—except for “Mr. Kretschmer”. His words directly targeting the 
government were quite straightforward: “No explanation was offered, from 
any level in the State, against baseless accusations. It is only the most 
natural right of TAF—which has been paying utmost attention to remain out 
of political polemical talk—to defend itself against attacks which are 
launched under the EU cloak. Nobody is coming forward to defend us, we 
will not hesitate to defend ourselves” he said. 
     Both authors and the raporteur reacted mildly to such accusations and 
explained that the Almanac was prepared in cooperation with DCAF of 
which Turkey has also been a founding member since 2003. Acting Prime 
Minister M. Ali Sahin (Prime Minister, then, was on an official trip abroad), 
agreed with these comments and said that; “Some unfounded accusations 
have been raised against TAF. It is only natural that the Chief of the General 
Staff, as the head of TAF, responds them. It is fair and right”.  
     This was not an isolated development which did not repeat again or an 
incident restricted to army ‘culture’ or army’s traditional—now changed—
role and attitude only..393  
     CHP Chairman—since May 2010—Kemal Kilicdaroglu is one of the 306 
members in the TESEV Board of Trustees
394
. He became a member in 2002, 
long before he became the Chairman of the party, nevertheless this issue, 
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unexpectedly came to occupy the political agenda
395
 in late 2011. Those 
who raised the subject argued that “membership in TESEV was 
irreconcilable with the nationalistic posture of the party”. This ‘allegation’ 
was accompanied by rumours that there were ‘more’ TESEV members in 
the party central bodies—as if TESEV was a secret agency spying on 
Turkish national interests and being associated with TESEV meant 
betrayal.
396
 They all gave the impression of being part of an ongoing in-
party struggle for power.
397
  
     Kilicdaroglu, in a live interview
398
, early 2012, said: “Being a member of 
TESEV is not a crime. (Besides) I’m a member of other civil society 
organisations as well. […] Sometimes we are questioned for ‘not enrolling 
in civil society’. (Some other times) when we do register in, then faced with 
the question of “Why?”. However, TESEV ‘connection’ proved to be a soft 
belly that can be used to attack a political party, particularly to the main 
opposition party. One TESEV member, early September 2011, before the 
debate over Mr. Kilicdaroglu’s connection to TESEV started, said: “But 
finding new members can become a real challenge because people may not 
desire too much, being named with or associated with TESEV due to their 
business interests etc. Main source of income is from abroad, EU 
Commission, foreign governments. Finding funds for research (by TESEV) 
in Turkey is a real challenge”.399 
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     Such ‘miscommunication’ is not unique to TESEV and CESS only. 
TÜSIAD President, of the time, Ms. Yalcindag, during a Board Meeting in 
January 2008, touched upon the subject of headscarf—which was under 
passionate debate then—among others, and found its introduction into the 
political agenda ‘untimely’ and stated that the priority should have been 
given to ‘economy’. MHP—junior opposition party—Chairman Bahceli 
criticised this statement by ‘TÜSIAD’, and similar approaches by some 
media outlets and during an address to MHP Parliamentary Group, he said:  
          This organisation, in reports prepared under the pretence of  
     democratisation, has suggested the recognition of Kurdish identity and  
     education in mother tongue in state schools. When it comes to headscarf,  
     they question the ‘timing of it’. This clearly displays how sincere they  
     are in believing in democracy, human rights and how immune they are to  
     being slaves of double-standard.
400
  
 
     He did not name TÜSIAD but his description of “an umbrella 
organisation which acts as the fatwa authority of Istanbul capital” was 
straight forward as to whom and what organisation he meant. TÜSIAD, in a 
press release responded that “the hasty and haphazard way, the subject of 
headscarf was addressed and introduced, has given certain circles—who 
want to break the movement to contemporary civilisation which is 
represented by the EU process—an opportunity to reveal their secret 
agenda”401 but MHP was not quoted in the text. MHP Chairman, in turn, 
responded to this release, this time clearly targeting TÜSIAD by name, and 
stated that
402
 “decoding the past and the present of TÜSIAD and following 
its behaviour in the future was important and necessary, as the only way of 
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understanding the reality of TÜSIAD by the public opinion” and that MHP 
had already “started to work on that” and “they would share the findings of 
this endeavour with the nation in due course”. This was an open 
confrontation and even declaration of ‘war’ which resulted in a complete 
lack of contact between the two institutions until February 2010, for longer 
than two years.  
     During the heated and polarised political debate ruling the country during 
the period leading to 12 September 2010 referendum, a polemical 
‘exchange’ of statements started also between Prime Minister Erdogan and 
TÜSIAD President Boyner. Soon this exchange gained an institutional 
character, i.e. between the Government and TÜSIAD. Basically, Prime 
Minister wanted TÜSIAD to take a clear political position (and support the 
constitutional amendment package); he—using a well-known Turkish 
saying—warned that; “ Whoever did not take a side, would be doomed to be 
eliminated”403. In response, Ms. Boyner said that “Nobody had the right to 
demand a statement of will from TÜSIAD”. Than the ‘dialogue’ took a new 
and more political—and twisted—turn, Prime Minister reminding 
TÜSIAD’s support to constitutional amendments in 2001, said: “We will 
not surrender this country to the hegemony of capital. […] I mean, in the 
past, you were able to corner governments and play with them like playing 
with cats and dogs. But you cannot play with this government”. Boyner 
responded by explaining that, “in 2001, in the context of EU process, there 
was a consensus in the Parliament over the intended amendments”, but now, 
“it was a referendum and it was the responsibility of political parties, not 
civil society, to convince the people to vote in a certain political direction”. 
“Under any circumstances it was a very unfortunate statement. […] I did not 
take it as a threat. This would be too much. But in a society where civil 
society, polyphony and pluralism should be flourishing eventually, such 
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statements can be quite disheartening” she said404. Only Can Paker—
TESEV Chairman and TÜSIAD member—made a clearly-stated ‘yes’ 
preference for the coming referendum.  
     There was no direct contact between Erdogan and TÜSIAD until after 
January 2011—after the referendum and major changes in the judiciary 
were already implemented—when Erdogan attended the TÜSIAD General 
Assembly and delivered a speech. However it did not stop there, relations 
continued to be marred with an endless series of serious clash of opinions. 
In about four months time, towards the end of May 2011, yet another crisis 
occurred, this time over the Government attempts to get certain internet 
sites—which were deemed harmful to ‘children and youngsters’—under 
control. This led to rude, even offensive verbal attacks by one deputy prime 
minister, over its woman President—and her family—to TÜSIAD. 
Expanding the debate and taking it, again, out of context, he also said
405
: 
“TÜSIAD has always been an unreliable organisation which does not live 
up to its words”.  
     One other area of ‘miscommunication’ is more to do with the ‘way’ civil 
society does business than the—more often than not—politically motivated, 
selective attacks on the ‘products’ of civil society work. This may take 
several shapes and forms depending on the funding source of the study, 
other civil society organisations involved in collaboration, or the personal 
views, even reputation of academics/experts—vis-a-vis the NGOs’ 
institutional views—reflected in studies under question.  
     Immediately after the referendum of 12 September 2010, TÜSIAD 
organized a series of roundtable discussions on certain aspects of a new 
constitution for Turkey. Five tables met between 02 November 2010 and 01 
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March 2011. Here, TÜSIAD was a complete facilitator; 22 academics, 
experts and so-called opinion-leaders came together in 11 separate meetings 
and in different compositions, debated around five separate tables and 
TÜSIAD simply published the results in the form of a report and shared 
with the media on a press conference.
406
 The publication included—in 
addition to the conclusions of separate tables—a common article by the two 
coordinators of their own, neither representing the common views of all 
participants, nor the views of TÜSIAD. The report was about the general 
principles, not on specific articles of a new constitution or about concrete 
formulations, but principles that could lead to such formulations. However 
the whole report—especially the last article by two coordinators—were 
taken as representing TÜSIAD407 views and position. This started a new 
public debate and gave yet another opportunity for political manipulation as 
the election campaign—for June 2011 general elections—was already 
underway.  
     MHP’s reaction was particularly aggressive and stronger by even MHP 
‘standards’, to say the least. In 2007, immediately before general elections, 
an exchange of 'words’ had already taken place between TÜSIAD and 
MHP.
408
 When TÜSIAD President—Ms Arzuhan Dogan Yalcindag, then—
invited party leaders, by an open-letter, to reveal their party programmes, 
MHP Chairman Bahceli responded that he “would appear only in front of 
the Nation (to explain)”. The main reason for this confrontational attitude 
was the Democratisation Report sponsored by TÜSIAD after which Bahceli 
invited TÜSIAD to “form a political party and compete for votes". Bahceli, 
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this time, called for a boycott
409
 of ‘Boyner family’ products by “patriots 
and nationalists” and asked those “businessmen who are prudent, 
employment-creating, respectable patriots, either to save TÜSIAD from this 
charade or stop representing [sic] TÜSIAD (i.e. leave the organisation)”.   
     TÜSIAD, in a bulletin410, next day, explained that the round-table 
meetings were intended to compile different views related to specific 
aspects of a constitution and the last article which was reflecting the 
‘personal’ views of two coordinators was not representative of TÜSIAD’s 
position. In a desperate attempt, in this bulletin, TÜSIAD also shared 
specific institutional views on specific ‘dimensions’ of a new 
constitution.
411
  
     One needs to bear in mind also the reign of extreme ‘polarisation’ wide-
spread in the society, to put this and similar developments into context. In 
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this frame of reference, one senior staff explains the difficulty traditionally 
faced by civil society in Turkey:  
          The process for a new constitution is participatory and it is bringing  
     different groups and views in the society together; we just aimed to go  
     along these, similar lines. Some other academics—who might not be of  
     the same line of thinking—were also invited, but they refused to attend.  
     There could have been a different composition (and different results) if  
     they had chosen to participate.
 412
  
 
     One recent example resurfaced in the political debate in Turkey, this 
time, again, when Prime Minister himself targeted and implicated ‘German 
foundations’, hence Heinrich Böll Stiftung-Turkey.  
     Apart from the general suspicion towards foreigners, the stories 
particularly about German foundations in general and allegedly their 
‘covert’ activities in Turkey first emerged after the publication of a book 
(Hablemitoğlu 2001) on activities of some German companies active in 
gold-mining in Turkey. These allegations included; transfer of funds—in the 
form of donations from the German government—through local 
municipalities in South-eastern Turkey or through ‘German’ foundations, to 
PKK and to its individual members. Heinrich Böll Stiftung-Turkey was one 
of these six ‘German’ foundations. Assassination of the author of this book 
in 2002 led to several speculations ranging from the German secret 
service—to silence him—to ‘Cemaat’ about whom, it was known, he was 
also preparing a separate book for publication (Hablemitoğlu-posthumous 
2003). The assassin was never caught and not even a single clue was found 
and this situation contributed to further speculations as to who wanted his 
death and why—and the involvement of the so-called deep state which had 
allegedly penetrated into security and intelligence services.  
     Such allegations in the form of a smear campaign were always around
413
. 
But, when they were voiced by the Prime Minister himself it made a 
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difference. On his way from a visit to the Republic of Macedonia, talking to 
journalists in the plane he said that “These (German) foundations, 
particularly through credit contracts with BDP and CHP municipalities, and 
contractors of their choice, were diverting funds to PKK”.414 There were 
speculations
415
 that he actually meant German Agency for Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) and development funds provided by the German bank of 
KfW, not foundations. However, both had been active in Turkey for more 
than 50 years, under Turkish government’s control and support. In an 
attempt to correct what he described as ‘cherry-picking by the media’, 
Prime Minister actually repeated the same allegations what he meant to 
‘correct’.416 
     Heinrich Böll Turkey, in a press release417 immediately rejected these 
allegations and said that “Prime Minister’s allegations about German 
foundations (were) both incorrect and politically dangerous” and that 
“German foundations neither supported infrastructure projects nor provided 
credits”.   
     Such allegations naturally made, not only Heinrich Böll Stiftung-Turkey 
or other German organisations in Turkey, but civil society as a whole, a bit 
nervous and uncomfortable. There was a positive development though; at 
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least some in the media had the courage to oppose and warn Prime Minister 
about his words. Ten years ago it was the other way round. Perhaps this can 
be taken as one sign of democratic development of Turkish society. In an 
unusual and unusually long interview, Head of Heinrich Böll Stiftung-
Turkey, explained how they felt and why they reacted so strongly: “We 
were extremely sorry about this. Because all German foundations—as a 
matter of fact we are an association—active in Turkey, support Turkey’s 
EU process, reforms, democratisation of Turkey and mutual understanding 
(between the two countries)”.418  
     One senior representative of an international (foreign) civil society 
organisation described the impact of such ‘misunderstandings’ on their 
work: “The society is afraid, scared. Even on TVs, people cannot talk 
openly for defending us—particularly because we are ‘foreigners’—against 
baseless accusations. The fact that some are still maintaining connections 
and even dialogue with us is a positive development in itself; comparing 
with the situation in the past”. 419   
 
3.14. Civil society’s council and advice for ‘reform’ 
     It can be said that the demands or proposals of the civil society, domestic 
and international alike, have been consistent, principled and straight 
forward. The way they have been formulated—slightly differently—
depends on the prevailing political-psychological atmosphere in Turkey and 
the larger international context in the region. However, they largely overlap 
and are in line with the expectations and demands of the European Union as 
reflected in successive Progress Reports of the Council and in the European 
Parliament’s Resolutions. In general, subjects such as legal measures, 
transparency and accountability (i.e. improved oversight), related to the 
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NSC, MoD, the TGS, the Constitutional Court and the HCJP, and the need 
for a more democratic behaviour are addressed and advocated.  
     The general expectations of reform in the area of security sector were 
that; the sector should be under direct control of the Government and 
indirect control of the Parliament, and the Army should completely 
withdraw from politics. A change in the security ‘model’, not partial 
amendments, was sought. More specifically:  
     1. The NSC be eliminated as a constitutional body, 
     2. The relationship between the MoD and the Chief of Staff be 
reformulated; the General Staff be integrated with the MoD, 
     3. The Law on the NSC—Art. 2, ‘concept of national security’ be 
changed,  
     4. TAF’s Internal Service Law—Art. 35, ‘mission of the armed forces’ 
be amended, 
     5. Greater political input by the Parliament be provided to remedy 
‘democratic deficit’. 
     The general expectations of reform in the area of judiciary were that; it 
must be independent, impartial and efficient. Explicitly: 
     1. Both the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors be restructured,  
     2. A significant role be given to the Parliament in the selection of the 
Constitutional Court judges and the members of the HCJP, the authority of 
the President in the selection of judges be reduced. (A mixed model in 
which the majority is elected by judicial bodies, half of the rest by the 
Parliament with qualified majority, and the other half by the President, 
universities and Bar Associations), 
     3. The presence of those, in HCJP, coming from the executive branch 
should be ended. 
     4. The term of duty of the Court judges be limited to a certain period.  
     Civil society, recognizing the intimate interconnection between Turkey’s 
main areas of democratisation, economic development and consolidation, 
recommended a holistic approach, stressed the need for a democratisation 
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‘package’—not a piece-meal approach and advised consensus and 
compromise in the Parliament and elsewhere in the political system.       
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Chapter 4 
Civil Society and Reform Process in Turkey 
 
“In war, more than anywhere else in the world, things happen differently from 
what we had expected, and look differently when near from what they did at a 
distance.”420 
 
     This chapter traces the decision-making and legislative processes in two 
reform areas, security sector and judiciary, respectively. The focus is on 
what ‘civil society’ advised to happen—in terms of laws (policy outcome), 
how they strove to these ends—the way they sought a role at least a voice in 
these processes, and what the actual policy outcome was, vis-a-vis the 
original council.  
 
4.1. Democratic reforms in Turkey 
     The principal pressure for democratic reforms in Turkey originated from 
civil society organisations. The first and probably single most vocal 
organisation in this context has been TÜSIAD. Many other civil society 
organisations have also been active in promoting democracy in Turkey, 
mostly targeting political elite and elite political culture, TESEV, Heinrich 
Böll Stiftung, Centre for European Security Studies—selected as cases for 
this research—prominent among others. Besides these, there have been 
other civil society organisations which were not directly working on 
democratisation but providing indirect support to such efforts—particularly 
in the European context—such as Economic Development Foundation, 
European Movement Turkey, European Foundation of Turkey etc.. Not all 
civil society organisations focused on ‘democracy promotion’ activities as a 
whole. But this thesis aims to find out the role and influence of ‘positive’ 
initiatives by the civil society to this end. It therefore necessarily focuses on 
those activities promoting democracy in Turkey in general and infusing 
democratic values into the political elite culture in particular, yet taking into 
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consideration the sum-effect of ’passive’ and/or ‘negative’ factors in that 
context. 
     The reform in the security sector in Turkey, was initiated, immediately 
after the adoption of the Accession Partnership for Turkey by the European 
Council in March 2001, over the composition, structure, roles and functions 
of the National Security Council (NSC) and the legislative framework 
related to the NSC and the Secretariat General for the NSC. Although the 
reporting chain for the Chief of the General Staff 
421
 and the General Staff’s 
legal and practical position as a stand-alone ‘Ministry of Defence’ 
responsible for formulation—and implementation—of the national security 
and defence policies have always been contentious subjects in domestic 
political debate, these issues were avoided by successive governments to 
start with.  
     First, amendments to Art 118 of the Constitution
422
 were enacted as early 
as October 2001—in six months from the Accession Partnership. They 
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 282 
introduced minor but symbolically important changes. These changes 
reflected the determination of the Government to pursue EU accession goal 
firmly and also constituted a test for the Army’s potential reaction to further 
‘reforms’. Major changes, in 2003, would follow.  
     Reform attempts in the judiciary, particularly on the Constitutional Court 
and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, came much later in 2010—
after some hesitant attempts in 2008. 
     The 1961 Constitution—establishing the Constitutional Court—parallel 
to similar models in the West, gave an important role to the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly in the election of judges to the Court—five out of fifteen 
judges were elected by the Parliament.
423
 The 1982 Constitution changed 
this system radically and gave the President of the Republic a dominant, 
almost exclusive role in the election of the judges to the Constitutional 
Court.
424
 Özbudun explains this situation as reflecting the “general tendency 
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Minister and the Chief of the General Staff. […] The organisation and duties of the General 
Secretariat of the National Security Council shall be regulated by law.  
423
 The Constitution of the Turkish Republic, 1961. Art. 145 - The Constitutional Court is 
composed of fifteen regular and five substitute members. Four regular members are elected 
by the Plenary Assembly of the Supreme Court of Appeals, three by the Plenary Assembly 
of the Council of State […]; one member is elected by the Plenary Assembly of the Court 
of Accounts […]. The National Assembly elects three and the Senate of the Republic elects 
two members. The President of the Republic also selects two members. The President of 
the Republic selects one of these members from among three candidates nominated by the 
Plenary Assembly of the Supreme Military Court […]. (Özbudun 2010: 14) 
424
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1982. Art. 146 - The Constitutional Court 
shall be composed of eleven regular and four substitute members. The President of the 
Republic shall appoint two regular and two substitute members from the High Court of 
Appeal, two regular and one substitute member from the Council of State; and one member 
each from the Military High Court of Appeal, the High Military Administrative Court and 
the Audit Court, three candidates being nominated for each vacant office by the Plenary 
Assemblies of each court from among their respective presidents and members, by an 
absolute majority of the total number of members; the President of the Republic shall also 
appoint one member from a list of three candidates nominated by the Council of Higher 
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of this Constitution to strengthen the authority of the President of the 
Republic and to design this office as a tutelary institution over elected 
civilian political institutions, acting on behalf of the state elites” (2010: 14). 
In 2010, when the Government initiated a major constitutional reform 
package, this system was still in force.   
     One other issue of major importance was the limitation of the term of 
membership in the Court. Contrary to general tendency in Europe—12 years 
in Germany, 9 years in France, Italy, Spain for example—in Turkey, a 
‘judge’ once selected to the Constitutional Court, at the minimum age of 
‘40’ could remain on duty for twenty-five years until he or she reaches the 
mandatory retirement age, i.e. sixty-five.
425
  
     Preparations for the judicial reform started in early 2008, after the 
screening report of Chapter 23—Judiciary and Fundamental Rights—was 
delivered, by the EU Commission, to the Ministry of Justice. The first draft 
of the Judicial Reform Strategy was ready to be shared with the public, on 
the Ministry web-site, mid-April. This was followed by a series of meetings, 
conferences, workshops,  involving legal community, bar associations, 
academia, bureaucracy, civil society and EU officials. Finally, in Summer of 
2009, it was adopted by the Council of Ministers. The Commission in the 
2009 Progress Report commended the drafting process because it was 
inclusive. (EC 2009: 70) However, how much of the input received by the 
Ministry of Justice, throughout the drafting and coordination process was 
actually incorporated is difficult to judge. But, the Strategy itself gives only 
                                                                                                                                                   
Education from among members of the teaching staff of Institutions of higher education 
who are not members of the Council, and three members and one substitute member from 
among senior administrative officers and lawyers […]. 12 July 2012. 
http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982Constitution-1995-4.pdf 
425
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1982. Art. 146 - […] To qualify for 
appointments as regular or substitute members of the Constitutional Court, members of the 
teaching staff of institutions of higher education, senior administrative officers and lawyers 
shall be required to be over the age of forty […]. Art. 147 - The members of the 
Constitutional Court shall retire on reaching the age of sixty five […].12 July 2012. 
http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982Constitution-1995-4.pdf 
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two examples as evidence of this assertion that “All the opinions were taken 
into consideration and necessary revision done” (Judicial Reform Strategy 
2009: 10, 17, 38). 
     The Judicial Reform Strategy
426
 paper, which was eventually posted on 
the website of the Ministry of Justice, contained ten objectives aiming at 
enhancing the independence, impartiality, effectiveness and efficiency of the 
judiciary. It did not give details on the projected changes in the 
Constitutional Court or the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors. It 
simply included “redefining tasks of the Constitutional Court and 
restructuring it accordingly” and “Restructuring the High Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors”. There were references to the 9th Development Plan427 and 
the 60th Government Programme
428
 in the strategy paper.   
     The Judicial Reform Strategy Action Plan, later, detailed the actions to 
be taken to achieve these objectives and laid down a timetable. Achieving 
these objectives would enable the establishment of a legal order meeting the 
requirements of a democratic state governed by rule of law and also would 
ensure the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria laid down in the EU 
accession process, it asserted. Under the Objective 1 (Strengthening 
                                                          
426
 “Judicial Reform Strategy objectives: strengthening the independence of the judiciary, 
promoting the impartiality of the judiciary, enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness in 
the judiciary, enhancing professionalism within the judiciary, improving management 
system of the judicial organisation, enhancing confidence in the judiciary, facilitating 
access to judiciary, ensuring effective implementation of measures to prevent disputes and 
improving alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, improving the penitentiary system, 
continuation of legislative works in line with the needs of our country and for 
harmonisation with the EU acquis”.  Ministry of Justice, Judicial Reform Strategy 2009.  
427
 See; the 9th Development Plan 2007-2013, Economic and Social Development Axis No 
5, Objective 7.5.5. “Improving Justice System”, pp. 111-12. 12 July 2012. 
http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/plan/ix/9developmentplan.pdf  
428
 The 60th Government Programme Action Plan 2008-2011. 10 January 2008. See—
under ‘Democracy and the Rule of Law’—DHD-01 (Preparation of a new Constitution 
based on public consensus), DHD-02 (Improving fundamental rights and freedoms), DHD-
03 (Strengthening Civil Society and Public Accountability), DHD-04 (Continue Justice and 
Judicial Reforms), p. xi. 13 July 2012. http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/plan/ep2008.pdf. 
 285 
independence of the judiciary) and Goals 1.1 and 1.2, Action Plan drew a 
detailed road map for the intended changes in the Constitutional Court and 
the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, respectively. “In line with tasks 
and types of composition of constitutional courts in the European 
countries”, studies with relevant institutions would be conducted and 
“necessary amendments (would) be made in the legislation concerning the 
composition of the Court”. Intended changes in the HCJP were much clearer 
and more detailed, almost like a draft bill—even with rationale:  
          The HCJP will be composed according to the principle of wide  
     representation. The HCJP will be structured with two or three chambers.  
     The Court of Cassation and the Council of State will be represented in  
     the HCJP by their members who are selected [sic] in their plenary. In  
     order to represent the judiciary as a whole, effective representation of  
     first rank [sic] judges and prosecutors in the HCJP will be ensured  
     through selection [sic] by their colleagues apart from high courts.   
     Representation of the Turkish Justice Academy [sic], academicians in the  
     field of law and lawyers in the HCJP will be provided. Effective judicial  
     remedy against decisions of the HCJP will be provided. Justice Minister,  
     in terms of providing relations with the Parliament and ensuring  
     accountability, and the Undersecretary of the Justice Minister [sic], in  
     terms of coordination of relevant works with the Ministry will take part  
     in the HCJP. Necessary legal amendments will be completed. (Action  
     Plan 2009: 4) 
 
     Action Plan predicted that “inspection of judges and prosecutors (would) 
be carried out by the Council in a way that the prosecution and defence 
powers (were) not gathered in the [sic] one hand. Disciplinary, examination 
and investigation proceedings against judges and prosecutors (would) be 
conducted by the Council” (Action Plan 2009: 5). However, the vital 
question remained; as the way-ahead was already decided upon in advance 
and in such details, how would any other views that may be diverging from 
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the executive’s intent be possibly incorporated or accommodated, during the 
consultation process, for development of the drafts for legislation?  
     As civil society was included among the potential contributors to this 
effort when the subject of ‘constitutional amendment’, once again, came to 
occupy the political agenda of Turkey in early 2010, they considered this a 
perfect opportunity to ‘participate’—in one way or another.  
 
4.2. Security Sector Reform (National Security Council) 
     The formulation of the ‘Turkish defence policy’ has traditionally been 
the direct responsibility of the Turkish General Staff (TGS). The military 
has also—indirectly, but effectively—been responsible for the development 
of ‘national security policy’. This practice has its roots in the history and 
dominant political culture of the modern Turkish Republic. In the course of 
2001-2007, and particularly following the 2010 Constitutional referendum, 
the Turkish political system as a whole—and the dominant role played by 
the Army in it—has undergone a fundamental transformation and civil-
military relations have been based on a rather different legal and 
psychological foundation.  
     Until the mid-2000s, the National Security Council (NSC), as the main 
and the ultimate constitutional authority, constituted the backbone of the 
Turkish political decision-making system. The military’s over-
representation
429
 in the Council further reinforced their ability to have a 
                                                          
429
 The Constitution (as amended as of 7 May 2010). Art. 117 - […] The Chief of the 
General Staff is the commander of the Armed Forces, and, in time of war exercises the 
duties of Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the President of the Republic. The Chief of the 
General Staff shall be appointed by the President of the Republic following the proposal of 
the Council of Ministers; his duties and powers shall be regulated by law. The Chief of the 
General Staff shall be responsible to the Prime Minister in the exercise of his duties and 
powers. The functional relations and scope of jurisdiction of the Ministry of National 
Defence with regard to the Chief of the General Staff and the Commanders of the Armed 
Forces shall be regulated by law. Art. 118 - The National Security Council shall be 
composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Prime Ministers, 
Ministers of Justice, National Defence, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the 
Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Forces and the General Commander of the 
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powerful ‘say’ in policy decisions related to security and defence and made 
the TGS the primary actor with constitutional status, functions and roles. 
Moreover, the critical positions reserved for the active or retired
430
 military 
personnel within the General Secretariat for the NSC made the military the 
dominant ‘political’ power with real control over the national security and 
defence policy of Turkey—effectively in any political decision.431  
     Technically, the policy formulation cycle was initiated by the Secretariat, 
usually based on the current National Security Policy Document (tr. Milli 
Güvenlik Siyaseti Belgesi) and the recent General Threat Assessment 
collectively produced by the TGS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
and the National Intelligence Agency (MIT). The relevant parts of the 
NATO intelligence documents
432
 were also taken into consideration. In 
addition to the ‘military’ agencies, each ministry and the MIT were 
requested to forward their views with a rationale. Both the document and 
views related to it were handled as ‘Secret’ and were strictly controlled. 
Based on the views received, the Secretariat would develop the draft new 
National Security Policy Document.  
     Most of the time, there were one or more meetings to discuss issues of 
major importance or those aspects on which there were major differences of 
opinion. Seldom any other agency—save the MFA—challenged the 
military’s view regarding national security policy options or courses of 
action. Potential conflicts between the views of TGS and the Secretariat—
                                                                                                                                                   
Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic. […] The National 
Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers the advisory decisions that are 
taken and its views on ensuring the necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, 
establishment, and implementation of the national security policy of the state. […] 
430
 This was mainly due to the job specifications of those posts rather than an arbitrary 
selection favoring retired military just because of their military background.  
431
 For a more detailed discussion on the mechanisms of the Turkish national security 
policy formulation and the current state of affairs see; (Solmazturk 2013), pp. 95-108.  
432
 MC-161 series documents: NATO General Intelligence Estimate and assessments 
related to specific threats such as ‘proliferation’ and ‘terrorism’. MC-165, Significant 
Technological Developments and Military Implications. 
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which was considered part of the in-house business—were almost always 
avoided through utilisation of ‘informal’ channels. The Office of the Prime 
Minister, and the Parliament as a whole, were simply absent in this entire 
process of ‘national’ policy formulation and, perhaps more remarkable, in 
its implementation. The final draft was normally briefed to the National 
Security Council, and once endorsed, was signed by the Prime Minister and 
became effective. It was distributed, by the Secretariat, to the military and 
civilian agencies that had primary responsibility to implement it. The 
‘executive’ implementation of this key policy document—on ‘behalf of’ the 
Prime Minister—for all practical purposes, was the responsibility of the 
General Secretariat of the NSC.  
     Although a similar process was employed for the formulation of the 
defence policy, it was more or less an in-house exercise mainly involving 
the military agencies only. Once approved by the Chief of the General Staff, 
the so-called National Military Strategy of Turkey (tr. Türkiye’nin Milli 
Askeri Stratejisi-TÜMAS), i.e. defence policy, was presented to the Prime 
Minister (during a briefing, traditionally given in the General Staff 
Headquarters), distributed and became effective. In any case it was a closed 
process with little, if any, participation and pluralism, excluding the 
Parliament—National Defence Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee, 
General Assembly—completely.   
     Since the whole process was absolutely exclusionary in nature, no 
meaningful debate could possibly take place in civil society or in the wider 
public in general, neither would they have any access to any information 
related to ‘defence and security’.  
     The European Union always maintained a watchful eye on the security 
sector reform and consistently urged for a change in the ‘culture’ of security 
and transformation of the ‘model’ of the security sector. The European 
Commission regular report on Turkey, in 1999, concluded that; “the NSC 
continue(d) to play a major role in political life” (EC 1999: 10). 
Commission’s 2000 report reiterated the same observation and reserved a 
separate paragraph for the NSC: 
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          There has been no change in the role played by the National Security  
     Council in Turkish political life. Its conclusions, statements or  
     recommendations continue to strongly influence the political process […]  
     it appears that at present the views of the National Security Council in  
     practice seriously limit the role played by the government. Moreover  
     there seems to be too little accountability to the Parliament with regard to  
     defence and security matters. (EC 2000: 14) 
 
     European Parliament in October 2001, recalling the meaning of a 
“multiparty democracy” as “full control over political decision-making by 
the democratically elected civil authorities”, suggested the (Turkish) 
Parliament “in the current transition period […] be able to monitor the 
activities of the National Security Council”. It also stressed “Commission’s 
worrying observation […] that there has been no change in the role played 
by the NSC in Turkish political life”. (EP 2000: Art. 13) 
 
4.2.1. Security sector reform process 
     When the reform in the security sector was initiated in 2001 the reporting 
chain for the Chief of the Turkish General Staff—directly to the Prime 
Minister—and the General Staff’s autonomous status were excluded from 
the reform agenda. Actually Minister of Defence Vecdi Gonül, during an 
interview in 2002, clearly stated that there was no intention on the part of 
the government to this end. He said: “In the West, civilians formed the 
army, but (in Turkey) it was the army which established civilian 
(administration)”.433 This interview is significant for revealing the real 
nature of ‘change’ in civil-military relations in Turkey. He said that he 
found “the debate [on the subordination of the TGS to the MoD] regretful” 
and that “this arrangement, which was in line with the traditions of Turkey, 
would continue”. Minister Gonül, three years later, in a 2005 interview, 
                                                          
433
 “Batida siviller orduyu, bizde ise ordu sivilleri kurdu”. Sedat Ergin. 19 December 2002. 
Hürriyet. 04 February 2013. 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=114324. 
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reiterated this position of his government on civil-military relations: 
“Turkey does not need to do work on something which is not on the 
common agenda [with the EU]”, he said.434 The general argument was that 
the subordination of the Chief to the Head of Government, i.e. Prime 
Minister, provided a sufficiently democratic mechanism and direct 
subordination to the Minister, while not conforming to the current needs of 
Turkey—it was tried and failed in the past—it would probably fail again. 
CESS was sarcastic on this point: “However, it will take more than repeated 
assertion of this conviction to make the issue go away” (Greenwood 2005: 
18). However, the ambiguous language adopted in EU reports, as to the 
initial expectations of the EU in this respect, provided the Government some 
freedom of action.  
     The ‘reform’ of the NSC occurred in stages. The very first changes, as a 
first step, came in 2001 when Art. 118 of the Constitution—on the ‘National 
Security Council’—was amended. In May that year, the Ecevit Government 
forwarded a constitutional amendment package of 38 articles to the 
Speaker’s Office as a draft law signed by all three leaders of the coalition 
parties—leading Democratic Leftist Party (DSP), Motherland Party (ANAP) 
and Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The general rationale
435
 behind 
submitting this package read “newly emerging needs, expectations of the 
public, new political openings, EU membership process and related 
economic and political criteria”. The fact that the package was prepared by 
an ad hoc Parliamentary Interparty Conciliation Committee was also clearly 
stated. The rationale—specific for relevant articles—stated “requirements of 
the coalition government” (for the inclusion of deputy prime ministers in 
NSC) and “making the council decisions sounder and considerations, from 
legal perspective, more comprehensive” (for the Justice Minister). There 
                                                          
434
 “AB, ordumuzu tolere edecek”. Sedat Ergin, Gündem. 15 February 2005, Hurriyet daily. 
22 January 2013. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=296745.   
435
 Draft law on “Amending the Constitution”, by Istanbul Deputy Bülent Ecevit and 290 
other deputies. 06 May 2001. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem21/yil01/ss737m.htm. 
Accessed on 09 December 2012. 
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was no rationale given for the change from ‘priority consideration’ to 
‘evaluation’—for NSC decisions. 
     The draft bill was submitted to the Speaker’s Office on 06 May, 
remained unactioned for about four months and forwarded to the Committee 
on the Constitution only on 19 September 2001. The Committee finalised 
the debate on it, in two days, prepared its report and forwarded it to the 
Plenary on 21 September.
436
 Curiously, there was no other report prepared 
by—or sought from—a secondary committee, prominently the National 
Defence Committee. Nor a sub-committee was established, although clearly 
these changes would have fundamental effects on the way national security 
policy was formulated. It became law
437
 in October 2001, in less than two 
weeks, and only six months after the Accession Partnership. Art. 35 of the 
‘package’ amended the Art. 118 of the Constitution—‘National Security 
Council’. 
     Civil society gave a manifest support to this initiative by the government. 
Nine civil society organisations and platforms, including the Turkish 
Industry and Business Association (TÜSIAD)—the most influential, and the 
Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB)—the 
largest, circulated a paid advertisement.
438
 Published in major national 
dailies on 24 September 2001—twenty days before the draft law came to the 
General Assembly—it openly supported a ‘Yes’ campaign. 
     The minor but symbolically important changes introduced by the 
‘package’ reflected the intention of the Government to pursue the EU 
accession goal. This bill also constituted a test for the Army’s potential 
reaction to further ‘reforms’. The number of civilian members was increased 
as the membership in the NSC was expanded to include Deputy Prime 
                                                          
436
 TGNA, Report by the Committee on the Constitution, No 2/803, 21 September 2001. 09 
December 2012. http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem21/yil01/ss737m.htm.   
437
 Law No 4709, adopted on 03 October 2001. Official Gazette, 17 October 2001, No. 
24556.  
438
 Sabah, 19 August 2010. “The advertisement in which TUSIAD and TOBB indicated 
Yes”. 09 December 2012. 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Ekonomi/2010/08/19/tusiad_ile_tobbun_evet_dedigi_ilan.  
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Ministers and the Minister of Justice. The ‘advisory’ nature of NSC 
decisions was also underscored. From now on, the Council of Ministers 
would "evaluate" the decisions of the NSC, rather than "giving priority in 
consideration". “The Cabinet heeds NSC decisions” was altered to “takes 
into consideration”, basically treating NSC decisions as “advice”.  
     Later in December 2001, the 57th—Ecevit/coalition—government 
prepared a bill
439
 for amending the Law No 2945
440
 in line with the changes 
in the Constitution—Art. 118—already passed by the Parliament. It was 
referred to the Committee on the Constitution on 04 January 2002 by the 
Speaker’s Office. However, the bill never made it to the Plenary, and when 
the legislative term suddenly ended in the midst of an economic and 
political crisis in Fall 2002 and the country went into early general elections 
in November, it became null.
441
 
     Civil society, at that time, did not find these changes satisfactory, but 
major changes would follow later, in 2003. The Turkish Economic and 
Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), for example, argued that these changes 
“did not represent a radical change in the status of the Council”. While 
referring to previous publications by TÜSIAD (Tanör 1997, 83-85; Tanör 
1999, 100-109), suggesting “ending the constitutional status of the National 
Security Council”, TESEV, nevertheless, indicated that “in reality, current 
political conjuncture was not fit for more fundamental changes in the status 
of the Council”. Because, it was argued, “Armed forces playing a more 
effective political role in Turkey, in comparison to other Western 
democracies, (had) too fundamental historical, sociological and political 
                                                          
439
 Government Bill on amending the Law on the National Security Council and the NSC 
General Secretariat; dated 28 December 2001, based on the Cabinet decision dated 27 
December 2001. 
440
 Law No. 2945, Law on the National Security Council and the General Secretariat for the 
National Security Council, adopted on 09 November 1983. Official Gazette, 11 November 
1983, No. 18218. 
441
 This was due to the Rules of Procedure of the TGNA, Art. 77: “Those government bills 
and draft laws, which are not finalised and not become law before the end of a legislative 
year, become null. […]”.  
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reasons to be changed by a simple amendment in laws or in the 
constitution”. It reiterated the need for “a more restricted and concrete 
redefinition of the notion of national security” (Özbudun 2002, 8). 
     In 2 November 2002 early elections AKP, an off-shoot of conservative 
Virtue Party (tr. Fazilet Partisi)—less than a year after it was founded—
came to power through a land-slide victory. An unusual event that 
immediately followed this, is important for correctly understanding the 
radically changing parameters of the political environment in Turkey. AKP 
leader Tayyip Erdogan—banned from active politics then, by a court 
decision—had a meeting with the Chief of General Staff, General Hilmi 
Ozkok, on 15 November 2002, the day before President Sezer asked 
Abdullah Gül (Chairman of AKP) to form the new government. This 
meeting took place in the General Staff Headquarters. The substance of this 
meeting, which took about an hour, is not known by general public yet. But 
there are credible and logical speculations that they arrived at a common 
understanding, a kind of modus vivendi.  
     The new, 58th—Gül—Government of the AKP, as soon as assuming 
office, resubmitted some government bills
442
 which had become null, to 
include two proposals on the NSC—previously prepared by the Ecevit 
coalition government. They were referred to the Committee on the 
Constitution on 19 December 2002, debated on 9 January 2003—bearing in 
mind the holiday period, clearly given priority—supported unanimously and 
adopted by the Plenary on 15 January 2003, eventually reflecting the 
Constitutional changes of 2001, on Law No 2945.
443
 
                                                          
442
 Government letter to the Speaker’s Office dated 11 December 2002, resubmitting some 
government bills which became null. 1/404: Government Bill, “Adding Two Articles and 
One Temporary Article to the Law on the National Security Council and NSC Secretariat 
General, and Amending the Art. 36 of the State Personnel Law”.   
1/941: Government Bill, on “Amending the Law on the National Security Council and NSC 
Secretariat General”. 
443
 See Law No 4789, dated 15 January 2003, Official Gazette No 24997, 18 January 2003. 
“Law on Amending the Law on National Security Council and the General Secretariat for 
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     2003 and 2004 harmonisation packages and specific legislation 
introduced important changes and more importantly, they established a new 
modus vivendi between the government in Office—AKP—and the Army 
(strictly speaking, top command). The tone and content of the CESS report 
clearly reflected the widely shared air of satisfaction of the time and this 
modus vivendi: 
          [Prime Minister] Mr. Erdogan believes in the necessity of separating   
     religion from politics. He and his colleagues have accordingly kept their   
     distance from political Islam […] . On this key subject General Özkök’s  
     sentiments mirror those of the Prime Minister. The Chief of General  
     Staff acknowledges that pious people may pursue secular politics; […]  
     he respects people’s religious beliefs and preferences “as long as they  
     [are] not carried to the public realm as a symbol of political Islam”.  
     (Greenwood 2005: 17) 
 
     In July 2003, the 59th—AKP—Government submitted to the Parliament, 
a comprehensive ‘democratisation’ package of 37 articles—the so called 
Seventh EU Harmonisation Package.
444
 It was prepared as a Government 
bill, amending various laws, including legislation related to the NSC and its 
General Secretariat, among others. Aiming to curb the operational tasks and 
the executive authority of the NSC, in line with its redefined constitutional 
role of a ‘consultative’ body, the general rationale—in a clear reference to 
the Accession Partnership Document of 2003
445— referred to the “EU 
membership process”, “legal, political and economic reforms, undergone by 
                                                                                                                                                   
the National Security Council”. 09 December 2012. http://www.izafet.com/hukuk/368633-
mgk-yasasinda-degisiklik.html#ixzz1vPCgCEr1.  
444
 The Government Bill for a ‘democratisation’ package of 37 articles amending various 
laws; dated 23 July 2003, based on the Cabinet decision dated 23 July 2003. 
445
 Partnership Document of 2003 aimed to curb the vast operational tasks and authority of 
the NSC. Official Journal of the European Union. L 145/40, 12 June 2003. Council decision 
of 19 May 2003 on […] the Accession Partnership with Turkey. 09 December 2012. 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Apd/turkey_apd_2003.pdf.  
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all candidate countries”, the “National Programme (of Turkey)” of March 
2001 and “constitutional amendments of November 2001”.  
     It was referred to the Parliamentary Justice Committee—as the primary 
committee—on 24 July 2003; was debated, first in the EU Harmonisation 
Committee on 24 July—the following day of its submission to the Speaker’s 
Office, and then in the Justice Committee on 29 July, and adopted in the 
Plenary on 30 July 2003.
446
 The whole process, for the full package, was 
completed remarkably in a single week. 
    This Seventh Package—Articles; 9, 24-28, 35—introduced further and 
important changes to the structure, composition and responsibilities of the 
NSC—particularly its General Secretariat. Since this position was no longer 
‘reserved’ for a general/admiral of the Turkish Armed Forces, civilians were 
also ‘permitted’ to be appointed to the post of Secretary General: “If he/she 
was to be a member of the Turkish Armed Forces [only then] endorsement 
by the Chief of the General Staff would be sought”. With the new 
description of its responsibilities, now stated in two simple sentences—
amending Art. 13, Duties and Responsibilities—the Secretariat was stripped 
of its traditional role of an ‘executor’ and became what was essentially a 
secretarial unit—with no real ‘job’. In practice, the functions of the 
Secretariat were downgraded and restricted to ‘mobilisation inspections’ 
and ‘crisis management’ through Disaster Relief and Emergency Response 
Department (AFAD). The authority to “supervise” the execution and 
implementation of the NSC decisions was transferred to one of the Deputy 
Prime Ministers. Also the regular NSC meetings were to be scheduled to 
take place bi-monthly, instead of each month.  
     The amendments to the Law No 2945 and the Bylaw for the General 
Secretariat
447
 for the NSC were used as instruments by the Government to 
                                                          
446
 See law No 4963, dated 30 July 2003. Official Gazette No 25192, 07 August 2003. 
“Law Concerning the Amendment of Various Laws”. 
447
 Bylaw for the General Secretariat for the National Security Council. Cabinet Decision 
dated 29 December 2003, No: 2003/6688, based on the Law No 2945, adopted on 09 
November 1983. Official Gazette: 08 January 2004, No. 25340. 09 December 2012. 
http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/yonetmelik.html.  
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enact political decisions. In December 2003, the formerly ‘Secret’ Bylaw 
for the Secretariat was abrogated and replaced by a new ‘Unclassified’one. 
As the Secretariat was fundamentally reorganised, several offices with 
critical tasks and responsibilities were closed. In August 2004, for the first 
time a civilian—an ambassador—was appointed as the Secretary General of 
the NSC. The overall manpower composition of the Secretariat also rapidly 
changed as the contracts of retired military personnel were not renewed and 
an influx of ‘civilians’—initially, mainly from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs—replacing them, occupied key positions. Even the style of ‘writing’ 
and jargon, used in correspondence and communication, transformed from 
‘military’ to ‘diplomatic’.448    
 
4.2.2. Aftermath 
     The reform of the NSC and reorganisation of the General Secretariat for 
the NSC were complete towards the end of 2006. All changes were initiated 
solely by the political authority and the EU process had a major impact on 
the overall transformation process in terms of compliance with the political 
criteria. This did not happen overnight and easily. Public support to reforms 
–as part of the EU accession process—for reducing the army’s role in 
politics, remained fairly consistent throughout the reform period. Over a 
scale of 10, it was 6.2 in 2002, 6.3 in 2005 and 6.0 in 2012. (Yilmaz 2012)  
     Although there was support from the civil society and the public in 
general, army’s attitude and top-command’s preferences and decisions also 
played a major role. In 2004, the NSC already having been tamed, the 
military having silently accepted curtailment of its power and maintaining a 
low profile; came a seemingly unintended test, this time from the opposition 
                                                          
448
 Since then, as of December 2012, four ‘civilian’ secretary-generals took office, all but 
one with a diplomatic background. It can be argued that this was based on a conscious 
political choice to replace the military with the diplomatic corps, the only other state 
institution—apart from the army—which has been involved in formulation of the national 
security policy and with some capacity to maintain the effectiveness without serious 
disruption. The current incumbent—mid-2014—is a former governor and a recent office 
holder within the Office of the Prime Minister.  
 297 
MHP. In June, a 17-page letter signed by the Chairman of the Party, 
Bahceli, was sent to all generals and admirals as well as senior bureaucrats 
and all MPs.
449
 It complained about “government’s passive attitude” 
regarding the ‘Kurdish’ question—and EU’s manipulation of the Turkey’s 
EU accession process as a ‘political tool’. These letters were returned to the 
originator, as directed by the Chief of the General Staff.
450
  
     In December 2004, a military investigation by the TGS Military Court 
was launched for a former commander of the Turkish Navy—Ilhami Erdil—
on charges of abuse of power and unlawfully accumulating wealth. This was 
an extraordinary event in itself because he was the ‘first’ highest-ranking 
officer to be prosecuted and sentenced
451
 in decades—actually since the 
Yassiada trials of 1960-61 following the military coup in 1960. It was taken 
as yet another sign of change of heart at the Army’s top brass and it was 
speculated that this was linked to the EU accession process.
452
 This high-
publicity trial—involving family members in front of TV cameras—largely 
eliminated the impression of ‘untouchables’ and contributed to the removal 
or lifting of a kind of ‘mystical’ air traditionally associated with the army.    
     Against this background, it made sense that there was a need to avoid 
reform fatigue, to slow down for digestion and train a civilian cadre to take 
over some ‘defence’ posts and associated functions to work with the 
military. Besides, both in and out of Turkey, in the immediate 
neighbourhood there were serious risks involved and the Turkish 
                                                          
449
 ‘Pasalar mektubu MHP’ye iade etti’ (‘Pashas returned the letter to MHP’). 5 August 
2004, Radikal. 22 January 2013. http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=124155.  
450
 This was offensive for the MHP leadership and led to a period of coolness and 
distancing between the Army and the MHP until 2012, for about eight years. 
451
 A commander of the Air Forces, in 1976, had been tried for corruption charges but was 
acquitted on all charges by the TGS Military Court in three weeks.  
452
 ‘EU-Conscious Turkey Prosecutes Ex-Navy Admiral’. 22 December 2004. Los Angeles 
Times. 22 January 2013. http://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/22/world/fg-turkey22. Adm. 
Erdil was eventually sentenced to 30 months in prison, stripped off his military ranks, 
discharged from the service—symbolically, since he was already retired—his two 
apartments were seized, in February 2006.  
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government could hardly afford alienating the Army. However, CESS 
warned that “it (was) not in Turkey’s interest to allow prudence to produce 
paralysis” (Greenwood 2005: 21). This was exactly what happened and 
what would follow soon.  
     Some important developments in 2007 which can be called a watershed 
in Turkish political history marked the end of an era, under the guardianship 
of the Turkish military. Presidential elections in the Parliament to succeed 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer were due in April. The political scene had 
already turned extremely tense because of the conflictual debate centred 
around ‘secularism’ and so-called Republic Rallies across the country, 
involving hundreds of thousands of secular-minded individuals—as they 
described themselves.
453
 The Constitution required a candidate to get two-
thirds majority (367) vote to be elected by the Parliament in the first two 
rounds. Simple majority (276) would suffice only in the third round. 
However, opposition CHP—and some legal experts—argued that, apart 
from the requirement of a majority vote, a quorum of two-thirds was also 
necessary even at the first two rounds and they—as well as other opposition 
parties—decided to boycott presidential elections altogether. In the first 
round on 27 April governing AKP failed to secure a ‘quorum’ and their 
candidate—Abdullah Gul—got only 357 votes, out of 361 MPs present. 
This started a political chain reaction which eventually led to a complete 
restructuring of the Turkish political scene.  
     The Army—General Staff—posted a press release on its official web-
site, late evening, 27 April. In a clear reference to AKP candidate, it stated 
that the TAF was “a party in those arguments and absolute defender of 
secularism”. This was an open threat to the governing party and an 
intervention in the presidential elections.
 454
 The government rejected this by 
                                                          
453
 These meetings/demonstrations were unprecedented in terms of their size, with 
sometimes over a million participants.  
454
 ‘e-muhtiraya 28 Nisan’da verilen cevap Türkiye’nin onünü acti.’ Zaman, 28 April 2009. 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_e-muhtiraya-28-nisanda-verilen-cevap-turkiyenin-
onunu-acti_842302.html. 
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a press conference by the Spokesman next day, but nevertheless adopted a 
conciliatory tone. Meanwhile CHP took this issue to the Constitutional 
Court. The Court ruled on 1 May that a quorum of two-thirds was necessary 
and annulled the first round
455
, which was repeated on 6 May and again 
failed the quorum. Governing AKP had no choice but to call early general 
elections. Elections of 22 July returned AKP back to power, based on an 
even larger electoral support—46.6 percent. AKP presidential candidate Gul 
was renominated and elected in the third round on 28 August 2007, thanks 
to MHP which decided not to boycott the election—and made a quorum 
possible.
456
  
     Two parallel developments as part of the overall turmoil in domestic 
politics also occurred in the same period.  On 5 May, the day immediately 
before the second round of failed voting in the Parliament, Prime Minister 
Erdogan received Chief of General Staff, General Yasar Büyükanit in his 
Dolmabahce Palace office in Istanbul and reportedly the two arrived at an 
‘understanding’.457 This was, like the one in November 2002; yet another 
‘modus vivendi’ meeting between the prime minister and the army chief..   
     Secondly, starting in mid-2007, court cases involving hundreds of 
generals, admirals, high ranking officers as well as a diverse group of 
individuals—academics, journalists, individuals who were active in civil 
society, even certain police chiefs—allegedly conspiring against the 
Government, were started and these trials soon came to occupy the political 
agenda of Turkey. This continued, at an increasing rate, through the 
Constitutional referendum process of 2010 and general elections of 2011.  
Besides, in mid-2008, AKP closely escaped a second closure case
458
 on 
                                                          
455
 Nine of the eleven members in the Court were in favor of annulling the vote. 
456
 If MHP had insisted on a compromise candidate, AKP had no choice but to seek for a 
cross-party aggreement on a non-partisan figure. 
457
 The content of this meeting is still not known as both individuals said that they would 
take this secret to grave. 
458
 The first case was even before the party came to power, in October 2002. In 2008, 
closure case failed by only one vote—6 to 7. The Court found AKP ‘guilty’ of charges, but 
did not close. 
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charges of violating secularism. These developments not only 
overshadowed the reform process—in the security sector—but also 
effectively stopped it.   
     However, some other parallel developments also took place. In May 
2006, the Security Affairs Department of the Prime Minister’s Office was 
upgraded and completely reorganised as the Directorate General of Security 
Affairs. Its terms of reference
459
 included the authority for “managing 
communication and coordination between the Office of the Prime Minister 
and other state institutions with responsibility for internal security, external 
security, counter terrorism”. The next step was the establishment of the 
Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security in the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. The new Undersecretariat—without ‘operational’ responsibility—
came into being in 2010
460
 and was tasked to “develop counter-terrorism 
policies and strategies; support security institutions and other relevant 
bodies; ensure coordination between them; provide strategic information; 
track and analyse international developments in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant bodies; carry out or 
commission analyses and oversight”. This was actually a complete change 
of hands in the security bureaucracy. As this new bureaucratic animal had 
the task of “informing the public about its activities and conduct public 
relations”, practically all functions formerly carried out by the military-
dominated General Secretariat of the National Security Council were taken 
over by a ‘civilian’-dominated new organisation and were actually 
expanded.  
     The new Undersecretariat was affiliated to the Office of the Prime 
Minister in July 2011 and started serving as secretariat for the Counter-
                                                          
459
 See Art. 12, Law No 3056, “Law Concerning the Organisation of the Office of the Prime 
Minister”dated 10 October 1984, amended by Law No 5508, dated 24 May 2006.  
15 November 2012. http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/687.html.   
460
 See Law No 5952 “Law Concerning the Organisation and  Missions of the 
Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security”, adopted on 17 February 2010. Official 
Gazette: 04 March 2010, No. 27511, and  Bylaw dated 25 March 2011. 15 November 2012. 
http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/30975.html 
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Terrorism Coordination Board. Finally, with the parallel and quite similar 
‘de-militarisation’ process that also took place within the National 
Intelligence Organisation (MIT), the security sector reform, as of mid-2012 
seemed to have reached its politically optimal extent.   
     Nevertheless, the EU was quite late in completely taking the 
transformation already occurred and its real nature, on board. This was 
probably due, at least in part, to the persistence of firmly-held perceptions 
and it also reflected an intellectual distance from the reality of Turkish 
politics. European Commission Turkey 2009 Progress Report which was 
published in October 2009, included a long list of criticism related to the 
current state of civil-military relations in Turkey.
461
 It even, surprisingly, 
stated that “No change (had) been made […] to the Law on the National 
Security Council” while radical changes had already taken place and fully 
implemented.  
     The 2010 Progress Report which was adopted in November 2010, 
immediately after the September 2010 constitutional referendum, adopted a 
rather cautious tone; but the 2011 Report
462
, as far as the NSC reform was 
                                                          
461
  “The armed forces have continued to exercise undue political influence via formal and 
informal mechanisms. Senior members of the armed forces have expressed on a large 
number of occasions their views on domestic and foreign policy issues going beyond their 
remit […] On a number of occasions, the General Staff reacted publicly to politicians and 
media reports. […] No change has been made to the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service 
Law or to the Law on the National Security Council. […] The 1997 EMASYA protocol on 
security, public order and assistance units remain in force. No progress has been made on 
strengthening legislative oversight of the military budget and expenditure. Likewise, the 
Defence Industry Support Fund (SSDF), […] is still an extra-budgetary fund excluded from 
parliamentary scrutiny. Parliament has no mandate to develop security and defence policies. 
[…] The alleged involvement of military personnel in anti-government activities, disclosed 
by the investigation on Ergenekon, raises serious concerns.” (EC 2009: 10-11) 
462
  “In October 2010, the National Security Council approved a revised National Security 
Policy. This document is not public. It was reportedly prepared mainly by the civilian 
authorities. […] The Supreme Military Council of August 2011 was a step towards greater 
civilian oversight of the Armed Forces. Civilian oversight of military expenditure was 
tightened and a revised National Security Plan [sic] adopted.” (EC 2011: 14). 
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concerned, sounded fully satisfied with the progress achieved, although 
actually no further changes, since 2006, had taken place. However, in less 
than five months—following the 2011 Report—‘European’ optimism about 
civil-military relations in Turkey, had gone away and—as far as the ‘army’ 
aspect of the security sector reform was concerned—replaced by a rather 
deep ‘concern’. In March 2011, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
European Parliament
463, while welcoming “the continued efforts to improve 
civilian oversight of the military”, emphasised “the need to ensure the 
continued secular integrity of the armed forces and their operational 
capability”.  
     This was an unprecedented official statement by any European institute 
as far as the militaries of any country were concerned. The EP Resolution 
on 29 March 2012, adopted a slightly amended version of this motion and 
stressed “the need to ensure the continued operational capability of the 
(Turkish) armed forces” (EP 2011: 11). This was remarkable because in 
about seven years, the European Parliament which recorded a long list of 
demands from the Turkish Government in 2004, including security sector 
reform among others
464, and kept warning about “supervision and oversight 
by the civilian authorities”465, came to be worrying primarily about “secular 
integrity” and “operational capability of the (Turkish) armed forces”.  
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 European Parliament. Motion for a resolution on the 2011 Progress Report on Turkey, 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 20 March 2012, B7-0189/2012, Art. 10. 10 July 2012. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&language=EN&reference
=B7-0189/2012. 
464
 European Parliament Resolution on the 2004 Regular Report and on the 
recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession. 15 
December 2004. 
465
 European Parliament, in its 2007 Resolution expressed concern “about the repeated 
interference by the Turkish Armed Forces in the political process”, underlined that “the 
formulation and implementation of the national security strategy should be surpervised by 
the civilian authorities”, called for the “establishment of full parliamentary oversight of 
military and defence policy” and “parliamentary supervision over country’s secret services, 
gendarmerie and police” (EP 2007: Art 9). 
 303 
4.2.3. ‘Other’ reforms? 
     The ‘security sector’ reform was restricted to the NSC—and its General 
Secretariat—only, and the expectations of civil society in the form of a 
general reform did not materialise. The ‘sector’, as far as the army is 
concerned, has come under the direct control of the Government and the 
Army has withdrawn from politics. However, all other elements of the 
intended reform, as of mid-2013, are still awaiting. One other symbolic 
move forward could have been the amendment of the TAF’s Internal 
Service Law—Art. 35, ‘mission of the armed forces’.466 
     An excellent opportunity to this end occurred as a result of the initiative 
by the political opposition and, in a sense, tested the intention of the 
government for comprehensive and meaningful reforms. A draft law
467
, 
prepared by a Deputy from the main opposition party—CHP, to amend the 
Art. 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, was submitted to 
the Speaker’s Office in September 2011 and was referred to the National 
Defence Committee on 01 October 2011. Another draft law
468
, this time 
prepared by a Deputy from BDP, to amend the very same article was 
submitted to the Speaker’s Office in October 2011, was referred to the 
National Defence Committee on 18 October 2011. Of significance, 
however, for the purposes of this research; there was no reference either to 
EU reports nor to civil society publications or statements, in the rationales 
included in the texts submitted to the Parliament. After more than a year, 
both drafts were still sitting in the National Defence Committee, without 
any action, and this was happening in a Parliament where both the 
Parliamentary committees and the General Assembly were firmly controlled 
by the majority represented by the governing party. Actually, TESEV’s 
Security Sector Policy Report’s one prominent observation in 2010, based 
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 This eventually happened in July 2013. 
467
 Draft Law by Deputy Muharrem Ince (CHP), 12 September 2011; 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tasari_teklif_sd.onerge_bilgileri?kanunlar_sira_no=9
3899. 30 July 2012. 
468
 Draft Law by Deputy Hasip Kaplan (BDP), 07 October 2011; 
http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/2/2-0108.pdf. 02 August 2012. 
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on the 2008 National Programme was that “the pledges made in civil-
military relations (were) limited in scope” and the Programme did “not 
envision [sic] a fundamental shift in the structure of law enforcement units”, 
nor did it promise “a real change in the security model in Turkey” (Akay 
2010, 30-31). This was “a sign of the lack of political will in this area”, it 
concluded. 
     These reforms notwithstanding, in terms of formulation of the national 
security policy and the defence policy, little has changed since the 
beginning of the 2000s. The General Secretariat of the NSC, as before, is 
nominally responsible for the overall coordination and compilation of the 
national security policy with the same agencies involved. But, now the 
TGS—as the once dominant political actor—has been, reportedly, replaced 
by a small ad hoc group working for the Office of the Prime Minister as 
need arises. The National Security Policy Document is now a purely 
‘political’ document, that is, it reflects priorities more in line with the 
political priorities of the Government and the governing party. The whole 
process is still closed to the Parliament, civil society, the public and the 
media. As for the defence policy, it still remains within the sole purview of 
the TGS and there is no discernible intention on the part of the political elite 
to take any initiative to make elected civilians responsible for ‘policy’. 
 
4.3. Judicial Reform (Constitutional Court and High Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors) 
     The debate of ‘judicial reform’ is connected to the wider—classical—
debate of constitutionalism. There are two openly conflicting, perhaps 
irreconcilable approach to the subject. One opts for the parliaments—simply 
because they are elected—as the sole owner of the legislative power. The 
other, on the other hand, opposes this rather restrictive approach and 
considers ‘power sharing’ essential for democracies so that they can 
perform to their best. In a sense, the existence of Constitutional Courts, 
clearly means sharing ‘legislative’ power with the judicial branch. 
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Particularly in parliamentary systems, this power sharing also—perhaps 
more so—involves the executive branch.  
     This is also related to executives’ natural inclination to control the 
judiciary, thereby becoming immune to judicial control—which means a 
major impediment for the proper functioning of democracies, particularly 
parliamentary democracies. Ran Hirschl (2004), in this context, argues that, 
“There is now hardly any moral controversy in the world of new 
constitutionalism that does not sooner or later become a judicial one. The 
global trend toward juristocracy is arguably one of the most significant 
developments in the late-twentieth and early twenty-first century 
government” (qtd. in Ozbudun 2010: 13). This brings us to the subject of 
‘reform’ of the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors in Turkey, by the ‘executive’ in the course of 2010 and 2011.  
     The European Commission, from 1999 on, included ‘judiciary’ in its 
regular reports, initially pointing out the need for increasing the number of 
judges and prosecutors and improving their training. The 2000 report 
indicated limited progress and stated that; “[…] no other specific measures 
[other than the increase in numbers] aimed at increasing the efficiency of the 
judicial system can be reported” (EC 2000: 13). However as Turkey 
progressed towards adopting and implementing the acquis, both the letter 
and the spirit of the Progress Reports started to change and the ‘judiciary’ 
was treated as a matter of priority. In late 2007, there was a straight forward 
criticism as to what the expectations of the EU with respect to the judiciary 
were:   
          Overall, there has been some progress as regards the efficiency of the  
     judiciary through implementation of adopted legislation and continued  
     use of IT. However, tensions in the relations between the government  
     and the judiciary have not been conducive to the smooth and effective  
     functioning of the system. More needs to be done in terms of    
     strengthening the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Finally  
     there is no overall National Reform Strategy for the functioning or a plan  
     to implement it. (EC 2007: 10) 
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     The Judicial Reform Strategy and the Action Plan of the Ministry of 
Justice would only be ready late 2009, finally paving the way for reform in 
Turkish judiciary. The approval of the Judicial Reform Strategy by the 
Government was seen as a positive step by the EU. However concerns 
remained about the independence, impartiality and efficiency of the 
judiciary, particularly on its independence: 
          […] no progress on the composition of the High Council of Judges  
     and Prosecutors or on the reporting lines of judicial inspectors. […] The  
     composition of the High Council is not representative of the judiciary as  
     a whole; only senior members of the Court of Cassation and of the  
     Council of State are members of this Council. […] The judicial  
     inspectors, who are responsible for evaluating the performance of judges  
     and prosecutors, are attached to the ministry, not to the High Council.  
     […] Under a 2007 regulation, judicial inspectors can request a court  
     order authorising interception of telephone calls by members of the  
     judiciary.  (EC 2009: 11)  
 
     By the same token, the EU also found the procedures for the selection of 
candidate judges and prosecutors as “open to subjective interpretation” (EC 
2009: 69). Such concerns were also shared by the European Parliament and 
they invited the Turkish Government “to restructure the High Council of 
Judges and Prosecutors, so as to ensure its representativeness, objectiveness, 
impartiality and transparency” (EP 2009: Art 9). 
     In early 2010, the domestic political agenda in Turkey was dominated by 
the hot debate on the constitutional reform package, the government’s so-
called ‘Kurdish opening’ and the ever-widening investigations into alleged 
‘coup plans’ involving not only the military but also civilian bureaucrats, 
academics, journalists, politicians, civil society members, even ordinary 
citizens. The political climate was openly confrontational. The relations 
between key institutions—particularly the Army, the Police, MIT, the 
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judiciary and the Government—were strained with unclear boundaries of 
ideological/political fronts and shifting alliances.  
     The judicial ‘reform’ process which was launched in the midst of such a 
political strife was considered as part of the general ‘manoeuvring’ for 
gaining positional and legal advantage, by both its opponents and 
proponents, heavily criticised by the former, equally justified by the latter. 
Soon it became simply the continuation of the already harsh political and 
ideological battle on yet another front and further complicated the overall 
democratisation process in Turkey.  
     Like the security sector reform, reform in the judiciary developed in 
stages: drafting the Constitutional amendment package, making it into 
law—legislation, campaign for the referendum, adoption of the laws on the 
Court and on the HCJP, elections for the HCJP, followed by (s?)elections 
for the Court of Cassation, the Council of State and the Constitutional 
Court.  
     When the process was effectively started in early 2010, there were, on 
the part of the European Union, still some criticism of the involvement of 
the military in politics
469
, however, main concerns were now about the 
judiciary. The EU wanted a “comprehensive and swift reform of the 
judiciary” because it was “vital for the success of the modernisation process 
in Turkey” (EP 2009: 9). Other concerns centred around lack of dialogue 
and spirit of compromise, polarisation within the Turkish society and 
political parties, and—as an inevitable result of this situation—failure in 
translating political initiatives and rhetoric, into concrete amendments to 
legislation.  
                                                          
469
 “On occasions senior members of the judiciary, of the military and of an association of 
judges and prosecutors made statements which likely to be perceived as pressure on 
individual courts and members of the judiciary, putting thus the impartiality of the judiciary 
at risk in important cases” (EC 2009: 69). “[…] is concerned about the continuing 
involvement of the military in Turkish politics and foreign policy, and reiterates that in a 
democratic society the military must be fully subject to civilian oversight; calls in particular 
on the Turkish Grand National Assembly […] to engage in the development of security and 
defence policies” (EP 2009: Art 10). 
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     The EU—as reflected in both the Commission reports and EP 
resolutions—invited the Turkish Government as well as all political parties, 
“to develop an appropriate balance between political competition and 
pragmatic cooperation, so as to facilitate reconciliation within Turkish 
society and to enable the realisation of key reforms, in particular that of the 
Constitution” (EP 2009: Art 2). 
     The Constitutional Court was first introduced into the Turkish 
constitutional system by the 1961 Constitution. The 1982 Constitution also 
maintained the Court and its jurisdiction remained the same. The 
amendments which were put to referendum in September 2010, introduced 
important changes to the structure and role of the Court: the status of 
‘standing’ judges was eliminated, the number of judges was increased from 
15 to 17, the sources judges were coming from were rearranged and 
diversified, the Parliament had a chance to select three judges directly, the 
serving term for judges was limited with 12 years, an ‘individual 
complaints’ procedure was also introduced at the Constitutional Court. 
     The referendum of 12 September 2010 was a benchmark in the course of 
democratisation in modern Turkish political history, and an important 
milestone in the ongoing democratisation process because of its wider 
implications. The 1982 Constitution had already been amended 16 times 
before. But the ‘12 September’ amendments while eliminating the military 
guardianship in domestic and foreign policy, it effectively ended the 
separation of powers in Turkish political system and carried the political and 
ideological polarisation of the Turkish society to extremes.  
     After the referendum, the government launched work on implementing 
the constitutional amendment package, giving immediate priority to 
‘reforming’ the judicial structures—in particular the Constitutional Court 
and the HCJP. In November 2010, a new ‘High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors’ law; in January 2011, a new law on the ‘Organisation of the 
Constitutional Court and Trial Procedures’; in February 2011, an 
amendment package involving major changes in the Court of Appeals and in 
the Council of State were passed by the Parliament. Within the next six 
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months, after the referendum, Turkish judiciary was completely transformed 
an reorganised in a revolutionary fashion. These laws addressed a number 
of priorities of the Accession Partnership as included in respective parts of 
the Judicial Reform Strategy and the Action Plan, however not necessarily 
in the exact form and substance one would expect from ‘democratic’ 
reforms. 
     Besides, the issues such as the ‘Judiciary police’, Political Parties Law, 
Election Law, prominent among others, never came out because of other 
higher priority items—as deemed so by the governing majority party. There 
was very little that could be done—although they did attempt—by the 
political opposition to have any influence on the fast developing process. 
Political agenda—and changes to it—was set almost ‘daily’ and it was 
virtually impossible to maintain even the attention of the general public on 
specifics of the judicial reform package for an extended period. 
 
4.3.1. Judicial reform process 
     A new constitution always had a place in the political agenda of Turkey, 
ever since the first civilian government, after 1980 military takeover, took 
office in 1983. From time to time it dominated the political and, 
occasionally, the larger debate in society. A draft constitutional reforms 
package, in response to invitation from the Government, was prepared in 
2008 by a group of academics, but there was no consensus between political 
parties and the society as a whole divided over the subject of constitutional 
reform. European Commission 2009 Progress Report stated that “Despite 
numerous announcements, the government did not put forward any proposal 
for amending the constitution, nor did it propose any methodological 
approach, based on consultation, to that end” (EC 2009: 7). 
     Soon after, in January 2010, the governing party forwarded a draft law
470
 
to the Speaker’s Office, amending the Law on Referring Constitutional 
                                                          
470
 Draft law on amending Art. 2 of the the Law No 3376 on Referring Constitutional 
Amendments to Public Referandum, dated 23 May 1987, submitted to the Speaker’s Office 
on 07 January 2010. 
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Amendments to Public Referendum. This was a clear sign of government’s 
decision to go ahead for fundamental changes in the Constitution. The 
rationale, in the draft text, argued that the period of 120 days before any 
resolution can be put to referendum—as originally required by this law—
was “well beyond the time period needed for reaching the correct and 
pluralist information and forming a firm belief about the amendments, and 
long enough to wear down the current interest on the referendum”. It was 
not possible to “reconcile the practice of focusing the public so much on the 
referendum with the principles of rational democracy [sic]”. The proposal 
would shorten the period from 120 to 45 days, in other words from four 
months to one and a half months. It was referred to the Committee on the 
Constitution on 08 January 2010—the next day. 
     On 22 March 2010, the Justice and Development Party announced a draft 
composed of twenty three articles and three provisional articles in order to 
amend various provisions of the Constitution. They included a number of 
different elements, introduction of an Ombudsman system, collective 
bargaining rights for public servants, the lifting of the legal immunity for the 
leaders of the 1980-83 military regime and for all those ‘served’ in this 
period. However, the key and the most controversial items were about the 
reform of the ‘judicial system’—the Constitutional Court and the HCJP.  
     The draft immediately started a debate as to the way it was prepared, as 
well as its content, even before it was submitted to the Parliament. Soon—in 
a week time—it was ‘finalised’ and after the addition of three new 
articles—making it a total of 29 articles—was submitted to the Parliament 
as a draft law—not a government bill—on 30 March471 and was referred, by 
the Speaker, to the Committee on the Constitution on 31 March, the next 
day. However because of an unexpected signature crisis, in a very unusual 
way, the first text was withdrawn from the Committee and then it was 
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 Draft Law on “Amending Some Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey”. 
See; Report by the Committee on the Constitution, dated 14 April 2010. 24 March 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem23/yil01/ss497.pdf. 
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resubmitted on 5 April 2010, this time as a 28-article package.
472
 The 
legislative process developed in parallel with the debate on the package and 
it was hotly contested. The opposition CHP took the case to the 
Constitutional Court for annulment of intended changes—the whole 
package—arguing that they were ‘unconstitutional’.  
     General rationale for the constitutional amendment package included; 
“comparative law, requirements of the country, general consensus on the 
need for a constitutional change—particularly in areas generally considered 
problematic, some draft texts for a new constitution already prepared by 
various civil society organisations and political parties, extensive debate 
which already took place in the society involving experts on the subject”. In 
separate articles there were also references to Venice Commission Report 
on Turkey
473
, requirements of the National Programme, various 
international texts such as the Partnership Programme, Progress Reports, 
consultative visit reports etc.  
     Critical issues such as ‘Constitutional Court judges serving until the age 
of sixty five, i.e. compulsory retirement age’, ‘selection monopoly by the 
President of the Republic’, ‘the need for diversification of sources for 
membership’, and particularly ‘selection of judges for the Court by the 
Parliament and the election method’ were all addressed and rationalised in 
relevant articles of the draft law. The Parliament would be able to select 
judges to the Court, allowing conciliation and compromise based on 
qualified majority that would be sought primarily—failing that, simple 
majority would suffice in the second tour. While in the past the President 
selected all fifteen judges, the new arrangement would allow “only fourteen 
                                                          
472
 Actually the text of the draft law was submitted twice. First draft included the signature 
of the Speaker of the Parliament as well as other Deputies from the governing party—AKP. 
Since this was against the Rules of Procedure, a second text was submitted, this time 
without his signature. But it included a new article and a change in one other article, 
reflecting the haphazard and the loosy way this critical text was developed. See; Notes of 
Dissenting Opinion by the opposition parties in the Report of the Committee on the 
Constitution, dated 14 April 2010, pp. 41-63.  
473
 Venice Commission Report on Turkey, 13-14 March 2009. 
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of the seventeen judges” be selected by the President. The term of service in 
the Court would be “limited to twelve years so that membership profile of 
the Court could renew itself to reflect the new social conditions and new 
perceptions”.  
     The Venice Commission strongly supported the reform process, 
particularly the 12 September Constitutional referendum, from the outset 
and throughout. However, it was said during the campaign for the 
referendum that the government had “forgotten” to ask for an official 
opinion—on the constitutional amendments package—from the 
Commission. This was hardly a hidden criticism and, with the benefit of 
hindsight, it is not difficult to guess why the AKP government refrained 
from asking for an opinion from the Venice Commission on such a critical 
package—they probably knew what the opinion would be like. 
     Immediately after the referendum, on 27 September 2010, Venice 
Commission provided opinions—in response to the request already made by 
the Ministry of Justice—on the draft law on the Supreme Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors and on the law on the Establishment and Rules of 
Procedure of the Constitutional Court.
474
 This means that, even before the 
time of the Referendum, the drafts of these laws, actually intended for 
implementing the expected constitutional changes, had already been 
prepared—in ‘anticipation’ of a positive result from the Referendum—and 
submitted to the Commission for opinion. 
     If there was any involvement on the part of the civil society in the 
‘drafting’ process, it has not been possible to trace any such ‘participation’.  
     The constitutional package was debated in the Committee on the 
Constitution on 08 April for the first time and it took only three meetings to 
‘debate’ such a critical and comprehensive package as a whole. It came to 
                                                          
474
 Concerns raised by the Venice Commission in these ‘opinions’ were clearly reflecting 
the SIGMA Peer Review Team’s earlier findings (See; SIGMA Report, Chp. 3 and Chp. 4). 
They had already visited Turkey four times, last one being in June 2010, and witnessed the 
lack of any cooperation or dialogue between the governing and opposition parties, and with 
the public and civil society at large.  
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the Plenary on 19 April. It was a painful process, far from any resemblance 
to any kind of a search for a consensus or compromise between the political 
parties represented in the Parliament, let alone the wider public or stake-
holders, so to speak. It never received the non-partisan political backing 
which constitutional amendments are—ideally—supposed to secure. At the 
end, the legislated text
475
, which was to be put to referendum, was the 
product of the governing party and was passed only based on the majority 
enjoyed by the governing party in the Parliament. This aspect of the 
‘reform’ would be sharply criticised by the European Commission’s Turkey 
2010 Progress Report
476
 which was released less than two months after the 
September referendum took place.  
     None of the proposed articles for amendments received the required two-
third majority—which was 367 votes—to be passed directly, as a 
Constitutional amendment, without a referendum. All except one, just 
passed the threshold of 330 votes needed to be put to referendum. The only 
proposal that failed this threshold—and dropped—was the one on the 
prohibition of political parties—Art. 69. The ‘package’ was approved by the 
President and submitted to a referendum set for 12 September 2010.  
     Although the President’s signature is not a ‘condition’ for policy 
outcomes in the form of a law, his or her constitutional authority to 
influence policy outcomes and both the chance and the administrative 
capacity to carry out this authority are significant. However, the Office of 
the President did not made an effective use of this opportunity particularly 
during the judicial reform process when it was most needed because the 
                                                          
475
 Law No 5982 was passed by the Parliament on 07 May 2010 and published in Official 
Gazzette on 13 May for referandum. 05 January 2013. http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/5982.htm.  
476
 “Concerns about the administative capacity of Turkey’s Parliament persist in several 
fields, including executive-legislative relations and parliamentary oversight and scrutiny. 
The Turkish Grand National Assembly plays a limited role in the formulation and 
implementation of Turkey’s accession strategy” (EC 2010: 9). “Attention needs to be paid 
on the establishment of an effective dialogue with all stakeholders and the civil society at 
large, and on implementation of these reforms in line with European standards” (EC 2010: 
80). 
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whole society was deeply divided over the proposed amendments and the 
whole legislative—and referendum—process turned into a fiercely waged 
political pitched battle.  
     There were some initiatives to involve the President of the Republic, as a 
last and evidently only resort, by the civil society—as well as the political 
opposition—to become instrumental for arriving at a compromise over the 
constitutional amendment package of 2010. There is evidence that civil 
society and academia did attempt to urge the President to intervene as his 
constitutional authority—and responsibility—required. However such 
attempts to make their views/concerns be known by the President turned out 
futile. The package arrived at the Office of the President on 7 May 2010. 
Fourteen prominent academics, all experts in the area of constitutional law, 
submitted a comprehensive report on the amendment package, to be taken 
into consideration by the Office of the President, on 12 May 2010. But the 
very same day—immediately after the receipt of this report was 
acknowledged—the package was signed and sent for publication in the 
Official Gazette, although the Constitution allowed the President ten more 
days for a thorough review.
477
 
     The Constitutional Court, over the application by the main opposition 
party—CHP, annulled only ‘minor’ elements of the articles related mainly 
to the election methodology of members to the Constitutional Court and to 
the HCJP
478
 and the referendum process went ahead. 
                                                          
477
 ‘Kazan’dan Anayasa paketinin bes günde onaylanmasına tepki’, 13 May 2010, 
Cumhuriyet. 6 March 2013. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=139602.   
478
 These seemingly and relatively minor elements would prove extremely critical in 
determining the election results, allowing the majority—reportedly orchestrated by the 
Government—to eliminate the opposing minority. This was criticised by the EU 
Commission only in 2011 Progress Report; “Judges and prosecutors or members of a body 
nominating candidates for members of the Constitutional Court can cast as many votes as 
the number of candidates for full and substitute members to be elected […] excluding those 
supported by voters from a minority. The process of selecting the Bar candidates does not 
ensure that the list of candidates is adequately representative of the overall membership of 
the Turkish Bars, while at the same time not completely dominated by the large 
metropolitan Bars” (EC 2011: 85). 
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4.3.2. Referendum 
     An extensive and sweeping debate on the ‘package’ had already started 
even before it was passed by the Parliament. It just got a new boost as the 
package was enacted early May. The political environment simply became 
extremely heated and polarised, making any involvement by the civil 
society painfully difficult.  
     Nevertheless, in the period leading to the constitutional referendum of 12 
September 2010, civil society did make an attempt to become involved in 
the process and inform the public. However, it was hardly a success in terms 
of attracting wide publicity. The polarisation was so intense that it did not 
allow any reasonable, cool-headed argumentation or deliberation. At the 
end, the debate, no matter how intense and sometimes extremely emotional 
and confrontational it was, remained restricted to a small circle of 
‘stakeholders’. The EU 2010 Report which was released on 9 November—
two months after the referendum—did criticise this situation and warned 
that “the implementation of the amended constitutional provisions through 
legislation, in line with European standards, (was) key”.479  
     The media, as was the case, applied self-censorship and largely remained 
outside the debate.
480
 In spite of that, there were some civil society 
                                                          
479
 “The drafting and adoption of the constitutional reform was not preceded by a 
consultation process involving poltical parties and civil society. […] broad public 
consultation involving all political parties and civil society,  with their full engagement, is 
needed to strengthen support for constitutional reform. The implementation of the amended 
constitutional provisions through legislation, in line with European standards, is key” (EC 
2010: 8). 
480
 European Commision 2010 Turkey Progress Report criticised the political pressure on 
the media: “Regarding freedom of expression, including freedom and pluralism of the 
media, there was limited progress while open and free debate has continued and expanded. 
However, Turkish law does not guarantee freedom of expression in line with the ECHR and 
the ECtHR case law. […] Undue politial pressure on the media and legal uncertainties 
affect the exercise of freedom of the press in practice” (EC 2010: 78). The EP was more 
vocal in their criticism of the censorship; “[…] concerned about the deterioration in 
freedom of the press, about certain acts of censorship and about growing self-censorship 
within the Turkish media […] calls on the Turkish government to uphold the principles of 
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organisations that were really active. YARSAV prepared booklets, as early 
as April 2010—even before the package came to the Plenary—to convey its 
views, but was even unable to distribute them to Deputies because the 
Office of the Speaker of the Parliament obstructed this initiative. “Even 
pizza-sellers can distribute ads in parliament, but not YARSAV” 
complained one senior official.
481
 YARSAV also briefed the political 
opposition—parties—including Abdullatif Sener, leader of the Türkiye 
Partisi which was not represented in the Parliament. However, the 
governing party—AKP—and the Minister of Justice even refused to give an 
appointment. “We tried to reach the public through the media, indirectly 
only” said one other YARSAV official.  
     The polemical row between TÜSIAD President Boyner and Prime 
Minister Erdogan over ‘taking sides’ about the ‘package’ which was put to 
referendum occurred in this process. Because TÜSIAD’s position—on the 
way all the amendments were wrapped up together—was identical to that of 
the opposition CHP, it was taken as opposing the Government. Actually, 
TÜSIAD—like opposition parties—did want the controversial two items 
related to the Constitutional Court and the HCJP be removed from the 
package and voted on separately. There was a concern—which would soon 
prove true—that these two items could further polarise the society and 
hamper the impending work on a new constitution and frustrate the 
motivation for compromise and consensus-seeking which were considered 
essential for such a gigantic endeavour. However, Prime Minister was 
emphatic in his words: “Whoever did not take a side, would be doomed to 
be eliminated.” This widely publicised quarrel did have a very discouraging 
effect, not only on TÜSIAD but on the civil society as a whole. 
                                                                                                                                                   
press freedom; stresses that an independent press is crucial for a democratic society […] 
decides to closely follow the cases of […] journalists facing police or judicial harassment” 
(EP 2010: Art 8). 
481
 Interview, January 2012. This complaint was raised by more than one member of 
YARSAV as well as some other civil society organisations.   
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     The whole ‘package’ was put to the voters with one single choice, either 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ alternative.482 The constitutional amendments gained the vote 
on 12 September 2010. Turnout was 74% and 58% voted ‘Yes’, while 42% 
voted ‘No’. Soon after the referendum, the Government took further 
legislative initiatives in order to implement the Constitutional amendments.  
     The key provisions of the package changed the composition, structure, 
membership and election methods of the Constitutional Court and of the 
High Council of Judges and Prosecutors. Soon after, the government 
prepared an action plan for legislation necessary for the implementation of 
these constitutional amendments.  
     Immediately after the referendum, on 27 September 2010, the Minister of 
Justice Ergin, requested an opinion of the Venice Commission on four draft 
laws implementing the constitutional amendments: the laws on the High 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the Organisation of the Ministry of 
Justice, the Organisation of the Constitutional Court and the Law on Judges 
and Prosecutors.  
 
4.3.3. Law on the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors 
     The constitutional amendment package brought about some fundamental 
changes to the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors.
483
 Its composition 
                                                          
482
 See; Law No 5982, dated 07 May 2010, Art 27.  
483
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (as amended on 07 May 2010). “Art. 159 – 
[…] The Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors shall be composed of twenty-
two regular and twelve substitute members and shall comprise three chambers. The 
President of the Council is the Minister of Justice. The Undersecretary to the Minister of 
Justice shall be an ex-officio member of the Council. For a term of four years, four regular 
members of the Council […] shall be appointed by the president from among academicians 
in the field of law, and lawyers; three regular and three substitute members shall be 
appointed by the plenary assembly of the High Court of Appeals […] two regular and two 
substitute members shall be appointed by the plenary assembly of the Council of State […] 
one regular and one substitute members shall be appointed by the plenary assembly of the 
Turkish Justice Academy […] seven regular and four substitute members which are first 
category judges […] shall be selected by civil judges and public prosecutors […] three 
regular and two substitute members which are first category judges […] shall be selected by 
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became more pluralistic and more representative of the judiciary as a whole. 
The number of full members was increased from seven to twenty-two. In 
addition to representatives of the Court of Cassation and the Council of 
State, the representatives of first-instance courts, the Justice Academy, law 
faculties and lawyers were also included as new members. The Inspection 
Board which was under the Ministry of Justice was transferred to the High 
Council. 
     The Government, before long, took initiative for the implementation of 
these changes and forwarded a bill
484
 to the Parliament on the ‘High Council 
of Judges and Prosecutors’ on 27 October 2010 and it was referred to the 
Justice Committee on 01 November 2010 by the Speaker’s Office.  
     The general rationale in the bill included first a listing of shortfalls in the 
existing law to include Justice Minister being the sole authority for 
inspections and investigations, membership of the Minister and 
Undersecretary in the Council, absence of Council’s its own Secretariat, 
premises, and an independent budget. The need for a “more democratic, 
transparent and broad-based structure” for the HCJP was emphasised. The 
rationale had nothing to do with specific articles of the text in hand, but was 
just a repetition of general principles which came to appear in many 
legislative texts in the course of judicial reform: “[…] requirements of the 
country, general consensus on the need for a constitutional change […] 
some draft texts for a new constitution already prepared by various civil 
                                                                                                                                                   
administrative judges and public prosecutors for four years […] They may be re-elected at 
the end of their term of office. […] The administration and the representation of the 
Council are carried out by the President of the Council. The President of the Council shall 
not participate in the work of the chambers. […] The president may delegate some of 
his/her powers to the deputy president. […] Supervision of judges and public prosecutors 
with regard to the performance of their duties […] investigation […] inquiries […] shall be 
carried out by the Council’s inspectors […] with the permission of the President […]. Apart 
from the decisions regarding the prohibition of the pursuit of the profession, there shall be 
no recourse to any judicial remedy against the decisions of the Council.” 
484
 Government Bill for the ‘High Council of Judges and Prosecutors’ replacing the Law No 
2641; dated 27 October 2010, based on the Cabinet decision dated 25 October 2010. 
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society organisations and political parties, extensive debate which took 
place in the society involving experts on the subject”.485  
     It clearly stated that “the Inspection Board—previously part of the 
organisation of the Ministry of Justice—was subordinated to the Council 
and the prerogatives of the Minister related to inspection of judges and 
approving requests for investigation were largely transferred to the Council” 
(emphasis added). Secretary General for the High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors would also “be appointed by the Minister from among the three 
candidates proposed by the Plenary of the Council”.  
     The rationale for Art. 6, made reference to the concern raised earlier in 
the Venice Commission’s report486 that “the Minister should not attend all 
meetings of the Council, particularly those related to discipline”. The draft 
increased the authority of the Acting President extensively. He/she would be 
elected by the Plenary with simple majority. The rationale given for Art. 11, 
for the selection process of the HCJP Secretary General from among three 
candidates by the Plenary, and his/her appointment by the Minister was that 
“a harmonious working relationship was aimed between the Secretary 
General and both the Council and the Minister” (emphasis added). 
However, critically, Art. 6 clearly stipulated that the President—i.e. the 
Minister of Justice—would have the final say for “approval of inspection, 
examination, investigation and prosecution proposals, forwarded by relevant 
departments of the Council, for judges and public prosecutors.” 
     A preliminary version of the draft had already been sent to the Venice 
Commission early October 2010. The two rapporteurs tasked by the 
Commission transmitted some immediate ‘individual’ comments to Turkish 
authorities in mid-November—when the bill was in the Committee. A 
Venice Commission delegation—rapporteurs—travelled to Ankara for a 
two day visit late November 2010. They met with Deputy Undersecretary of 
the Ministry of Justice, the Vice President of the Court of Cassation, the 
                                                          
485
 Clearly this was the product of a copy-paste which took previous work on the 
constitutional package as the basis.   
486
 Venice Commission 2007 Report, Art. 33. 
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President of the Constitutional Court, the President of the Council of State, 
the President of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, representatives 
of the Turkish Bar Association and political parties.  
     On 20 December 2010, Venice Commission provided an interim opinion 
on the draft law
487, still based on the original ‘preliminary’ version of 27 
September text. In this opinion the Commission observed that the draft law 
was primarily a text implementing the Article 159 of the Constitution which 
laid down the basic principles for HCJP and making them operational, and 
that the constitutional ‘reform’ package—as it was already passed by the 
referendum—could not be changed following the Commission’s advice. The 
Commission stressed that its opinion “should be seen as input in the broader 
and longer process of constitutional reform” and hoped that “further 
reforms” would be “made in the years to come”. In this, once again, there 
was a hardly hidden criticism, dissatisfaction with the general results of the 
constitutional ‘reform’ package, clear warning about a need for further—
and deeper—(constitutional) reforms and a manifestation of a lack of faith 
in this respect. These messages were further clarified and spelled out in the 
‘opinion’.  
     The Venice Commission repeated its earlier offer of 2009 to provide 
assistance to a constitutional reform process, “should the Turkish authorities 
make such a request”. There was a general observation that “the 
institutionalisation of the HCJP would be at least as important for its future 
role and function as the formal rules”. Much would be depend on “the 
institutional culture, dynamics and context”. The tone adopted by the 
rapporteurs was indeed clearly—and unusually—pessimistic for the future: 
“It is to be hoped that it will develop in an independent, impartial, 
professional and efficient way”. Nevertheless, the Commission welcomed 
several steps taken: increase in the number of members, the more pluralistic 
                                                          
487
 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) ‘Interim 
Opinion on the Draft Law on Judges and Prosecutors (of 27 September 2010)’. 20 
December 2010. Opinion No. 600/2010. 27 August 2012. 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-AD(2010)042-e.asp.  
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composition, the wide transfer of power from the Ministry of Justice to 
HCJP, institutionalisation as a separate entity, reduction in the power of the 
Minister of Justice, creation of an internal appeals and judicial review 
system.  
     However, there were “some issues that still required attention”. The 
appointment of four members who were not judges “did not establish the 
link between the HCJP and the Parliament and did not ensure the presence 
in the HCJP of different cultural and political orientations”, leaving the 
conduct of the relationship between the world of politics and the HCJP to 
the Minister of Justice. The Commission recommended, as the best solution, 
at least four members, appointed by the President “be elected by the 
Parliament, preferably with a qualified majority”. There was reference to a 
TESEV publication (Yazici 2010) in the paragraph addressing this subject.  
     The Commission noted that the Minister for Justice, as the president of 
the HCJP, retained “substantive powers” with regard to the setting the 
agenda, the appointment of the Secretary General, approving all 
investigations which gave “the power of veto over investigations of judges 
and prosecutors”. It would be “preferable” that the power of the Minister 
“be further limited”, in particular veto power over investigations “be 
eliminated”. Finally, Turkish authorities were encouraged to “broaden the 
process by inviting the active participation of the opposition parties, civil 
society, non-governmental organisations, and the general public—in a 
process that should be as inclusive and transparent as possible.  
     However, the Law on the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, Law 
No 6087, was passed on 11 December 2010—about a week even before the 
Commission’s interim opinion was rushed.488  
     Venice Commission’s ‘opinion’ on the draft Law on Judges and 
Prosecutors
489
 was made available late March 2011. This was not only an 
                                                          
488
 The EU Commission in its 2010 Report had already reminded the Government the need 
for a consultative process for implementation, to no avail: “[…] indicated its intention to 
consult stakeholders. Consultations are also ongoing with the Venice Commission of the 
Council of Europe for those constitutional amendments regarding judiciary” (EC 2010: 7). 
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opinion on this law per se, but also an opinion on whether the previous 
opinions offered were taken into consideration by the Turkish authorities in 
reform efforts. The Commission concluded that “the recommendations 
made by the Venice Commission in its opinion on the ‘HSYK (HCJP)’, 
which contained several critical remarks, (did) not seem to be reflected in 
this draft law (on Judges and Prosecutors )”. This observation led to even 
more straight-forward remarks throughout the text:  
          […] it remains largely unchanged and the amendments cannot be  
     regarded as a comprehensive or fundamental reform. […] it can therefore  
     not be considered as being a new codification, nor has it introduced a  
     new type of ‘philosophy’ for regulations and it does not introduce any  
     new ways of protecting judicial independence, at least not as far as  
     appointments, promotions, supervision and disciplinary sanctions are  
     concerned. […] there are certain fundamental problems within the  
     system, mainly centring on the role of the Ministry of Justice and its  
     relationship to the judiciary, which are not addressed in the amendments  
     in any fundamental way.  
 
     The Commission, once more, remarked that “the relationship between 
the executive—in the form of the Ministry of Justice—and the judiciary and 
prosecutors, which in some respects too close in a manner which may pose a 
risk to independence”.  
 
4.3.4. Law on the Organisation of the Constitutional Court and Trial 
Procedures 
     The amendment package voted in the referendum introduced important 
changes also to the Constitutional Court.
490
 The Government introduced a 
                                                                                                                                                   
489
 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) ‘Opinion on 
the Draft Law on Judges and Prosecutors of Turkey’. 29 March 2011. Opinion No. 
610/2011. 27 August 2012. http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2011/CDL-AD(2011)004-e.pdf.  
490
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (as amended as of 7 May 2010). Art. 146 - 
The Constitutional Court shall be composed of seventeen members. Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (TGNA) shall elect two members among the presidents and members of 
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bill for the ‘Organisation of the Constitutional Court and Trial 
Procedures’491 on 11 January 2011. It was referred to the Committee on the 
Constitution on 11 January 2011—the same day—by the Speaker’s Office. 
The law, Law No 6216, was adopted on 30 March 2011. A Venice 
Commission delegation, in September 2011, held meetings in Ankara with 
the Constitutional Court, the Council of State, the Court of Cassation and 
the Ministry of Justice. However, when the Commission gave its opinion
492
 
                                                                                                                                                   
the Court of Auditors, […] and one member […] from among three candidates nominated 
from among self-employed lawyers by the heads of the Bar Associations. […]. […] In this 
election to be carried out in the TGNA, two thirds majority of the component members for 
each vacant position shall be required for the first ballot, and absolute majority of 
component members shall be required for the second ballot. If an absolute majority cannot 
be obtained in the second ballot, a third ballot shall be held between the two candidates 
who have received the greatest number of votes in the second ballot […]. […] The 
President of the Republic shall choose three members from High Court of Appeals, two 
members from Council of State, one member from the Military High Court of Appeals, one 
member from the High Military Administrative Court […] shall choose three members 
from among three candidates to be nominated for each vacant position by the Council of 
Higher Education […] shall choose four members from among high level executives, self-
employed lawyers, first category judges and public prosecutors or rapporteurs of the 
Constitutional Court. […]. […] To qualify for appointments as members of the 
Constitutional Court; academicians shall be required to possess the title of associate 
professor or professor; lawyers shall be required to have practiced as a lawyer for at least 
twenty years; high level executives shall be required […] to have worked for at least twenty 
years in public service, and first category judges and public prosecutors with at least twenty 
years of work experience […] provided that they are all over the age of forty five […]. Art. 
147 - The members of the Constitutional Court shall be elected for a term of twelve years. 
A member shall not be re-elected. The members of the Constitutional Court shall retire on 
reaching the age of sixty-five. […] 
491
 Government Bill for the ‘Organisation of the Constitutional Court and Trial Procedures’ 
replacing the Law No 2949; dated 11 January 2011, based on the Cabinet decision dated 08 
November 2010. 
492
 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) ‘Opinion on 
the Law on the Establishment and Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court of 
Turkey,’. 18 October 2011. Opinion No. 612/2011. 27 August 2012. 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2011/CDL-AD(2011)040-e.pdf.  
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in October 2011, the law, again, had already been adopted and it was after 
the fact.  
     The Commission criticised the voting procedures in the Parliament: “[…] 
the threshold of two thirds can easily be circumvented. A qualified majority 
in all rounds of voting can lead to situations of blockage. However, 
requiring such a qualified majority ensures that the majority will seek to 
find a political compromise, ideally settling on neutral candidates rather 
than simply waiting for the third round of voting for electing candidates 
close to the majority”. However, it was also noted that “the effect of this 
deficiency (was) limited by the fact that the Grand National Assembly (was) 
only free to vote among the candidates presented” by the respective high 
courts and the Bar Associations”. 
     It is noteworthy that although the Commission listed some thirty 
recommendations “to improve the law”, this list did not include anything 
related to the dominant position of the President of the Republic maintained 
in the selection process of the judges of the Court. Perhaps this was due to 
the fact that this aspect had already been stipulated in the Constitution and 
the ‘opinion’ was related to the law only.   
 
4.3.5. Court of Appeals and the Council of State  
     As the final episode of the long-running judicial reform process, the 
Government forwarded a bill
493
 for amending the Law on the Court of 
Appeals
494
 and the Law on the Council of State
495
 on 21 January 2011. It 
was referred to the Justice Committee on 24 January 2011 by the Speaker’s 
Office. The rationale included references ranging from Magna Carta 
Libertatum of 1215 to the Court of Appeals web-site, to speeches by 
presidents of the high courts—but nothing from the civil society work or 
                                                          
493
 Government Bill for amending some laws and government decrees; dtd 21 January 
2011, based on the Cabinet decision dtd 20 January 2011. 6 February 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem23/yil01/ss610.pdf.  
494
 See; Law No 2797 adopted on 4 February 1983. Official Gazette No. 17953. 
495
 See; Law No 2575 adopted on 6 January 1982. Official Gazette No. 17580. 
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input in any form. Basically, the number of departments and the personnel 
rosters in the Court of Appeals and in the Council of State were increased. 
496
  
     The debate in the Justice Committee on the intended changes in 
respective institutions was typical and symbolic of the ‘spirit of the time’—
extremely confrontational. The main opposition party—CHP—members 
resigned from the Committee, and MHP members, having failed in either 
obstructing the debate or making any amendments, abstained and lodged a 
statement of opposition. The debate in the Committee was completed in 
three days, thanks to ‘sufficiency of discussion’ motions regularly made by 
the ruling party MPs and seconded/adopted again by themselves. The bill 
was passed by the Plenary on 9 February 2011.
497
  
 
4.3.6. Military courts 
     The Constitutional changes of 2010 also included reaffirmation of limits 
of the military courts’ authority.498 Crimes related to “state security, 
constitutional order, and its proper functioning” covered in Sections Four 
and Five of the Turkish Criminal Code
499, “even if they are committed by 
military personnel” were excluded from the jurisdiction of the military 
courts. This change would have far-reaching effects on not only civil-
                                                          
496
 In the Court of Appeals, the departments were increased from 32 to 38, personnel from 
250 to 387; the Council of State had 15 departments with two increase and personnel roster 
was increased by 61. There were also some changes in the State Forensic Institute. 
497
 See; Law No 6110 adopted on 9 February 2011. Official Gazette No. 27846.  
498
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey; “Art. 145 – Military justice shall be 
exercised by military courts and military disciplinary courts. These courts shall have 
jurisdiction to try military personnel for military offences committed by them against other 
military personnel or in military places, or for offences connected with military service and 
duties. Those cases of crimes committed against state security, constitutional order, and the 
proper functioning of this order, under any circumstance, shall fall within the jurisdiction of 
criminal courts.” 
499
 See; Law No 5237, Turkish Criminal Code. Volume Two, Part Four, Section 4-Art 302-
308; Section 5-Art 309-316. 7 February 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html.  
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military relations in Turkey but also on the general political climate. 
Because, extensive trials in Special Criminal Courts
500
 involving hundreds 
of high-ranking military officers—which were made possible by this single 
amendment—soon became a major point of contention between the 
governing party and the opposition on one hand and their constituencies on 
the other. The fact that such trials had already started as early as mid-2007, 
i.e. initially lacking real legal jurisdiction, made this development even 
more important and contributed to the already high polarisation and 
confrontational attitude in Turkish politics and in society in general. 
 
4.3.7. Aftermath 
     Unlike the Venice Commission, the European Union, initially, seemed 
satisfied with the constitutional changes which received a clear endorsement 
by the Turkish people. The only concern the 2010 Progress Report 
registered was about the ‘military’ judges in the Constitutional Court. Even 
the limited number of judges who were to be elected by the Parliament or 
the simple majority required in the Parliament—which eliminated any 
possibility for compromise between the majority party and the minority 
opposition—‘escaped’ the attention of the rapporteur.501 In the HCJP, only 
the unchanged position and authority of the Minister of Justice within the 
HCJP was raised as a point for concern.
502
 
503
 However, the European 
                                                          
500
 These controversial courts were finally closed in February 2014 and the case files they 
were holding were transferred to Crimial Courts. 
501
 “There are three voting rounds in Parliament. In the third voting round the candidates 
are elected by simple majority. No alternate members are envisaged. The involvement of 
the Turkish Parliament in the election of Constitutional Court judges brings Turkish 
practice closer to that of EU Member States. However, two of the judges are still military 
judges. […] As constitutional jurisprudence in a democratic system is a civilian matter, the 
presence of military judges is questionable. In addition, […] military judges might return to 
the military justice system when their term in the Constitutional Court expires, which could 
raise questions about their impartiality as Constitutional Court judges” (EC 2010: 13). 
502
 “Overall, there has been progress in the area of the judiciary. […] However, the Minister 
of Justice still chairs the High Council and has the last word on investigations” (EC 2010: 
14). 
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Parliament was more straightforward in their assessment of the referendum 
results. EP Resolution
504
 welcomed the amendments “as a step in the right 
direction”, called on the Government “to ensure that all political parties, as 
well as civil society, are closely involved in the whole process”, 
recommended that “the Venice Commission also be invited to participate”. 
EP also made a very critical assessment as to the perception of the general 
nature of recent changes:  
          […]judicial independence and impartiality are among the keys to the  
     functioning of a pluralistic democratic society; is concerned that Turkish  
     judicial arrangements have not yet been improved sufficiently […] asks  
     the government to implement the constitutional amendments adopted in  
     this area, with full observance of the separation of powers between the  
     executive and the judiciary, and of judicial independence and  
     impartiality, in accordance with European standards. (EP 2010: Art 13) 
 
     The elections for the HCJP were held on 17 October 2010—in less than a 
month following the referendum. Ten full and six substitute members of the 
HCJP were elected by first-instance judges and prosecutors with almost 
total turnout. Candidacy was open to all judges and prosecutors, including 
those working at the Ministry of Justice. The vote was secret, but 
campaigning was prohibited by the Law No 6087.
505
 An appeal by 
YARSAV to the Supreme Election Board alleging unfair elections and 
                                                                                                                                                   
503
 YARSAV was also vocally critical of the political influence of the Ministry of Justice in 
the HCJP: “Under Secretary of the Ministry of Justice is always under the administrative 
control and political influence of the minister himself and this has not changed. The number 
of HCJP members was increased but, in practice, decisions are still made by a small 
group—of 3 or 4—still not democratic, nor representative” said one senior official. 
Interview; 3 January 2012. 
504
 “Welcomes the adoption of constitutional amendments as a step in the right direction, 
and urges their  proper implementation […] underlines at the same time, however, the 
pressing need for overall constitutional reform transforming Turkey into a fully-fledged 
pluralistic democracy […]” (EP 2010: Art 6). 
505
 See; Law No 6087 adopted on 11 December 2010. Official Gazette, 18 December 2001, 
No. 27789. Art. 25.  
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undue influence by the Ministry of Justice
506
 was rejected, on 24 October, 
unanimously. The newly formed HCJP held its first meeting the next day, 
on 25th.  
     In 2011, the views in EU—based on the way constitutional amendments 
were actually implemented and the Venice Commission’s input was largely 
ignored—had already started to change, coming much closer to the Venice 
Commission’s earlier observations:  
          […] the system imposed by the Constitutional Court leaves no room  
     for election of minority candidates, […] candidates who are elected by  
     the majority of the voters could take all the seats. Nomination of the four  
     non-judicial members of the High Council is left to the discretion of the  
     President of the Republic, whereas the Grand National Assembly is not  
     involved. The current provisions do not ensure permanent representation  
     of members of the Bar in the High Council. The Minister can veto the  
     launching of disciplinary investigations against judges and prosecutors  
     by the High Council. (EC 2011: 84)  
 
     The changes implemented in the Constitutional Court, through the Law 
on the Organisation of the Constitutional Court and Trial Procedures in 
March 2011, were also subject to criticism: 
          […] Constitutional Court is insufficiently representative of the  
     Turkish legal community as a whole and still over-dominated by the high  
     courts. The influence of the Grand National Assembly over the  
     composition of the Constitutional Court is also inadequate, in terms of  
     both the number of members it elects and the choice of eligible  
     candidates. […] The current election process in the Assembly does not  
     fully guarantee the Court’s impartiality. At the same time, the President  
                                                          
506
 One YARSAV senior member explained the rationale behind their appeal to YSK: “In 
HSYK (High Council of Judges and Prosecutors) elections; justice minister—due to his 
prerogative to authorize investigations on any wrong-doings by judges and prosecutors, 
judicial investigators—and Heads of Judiciary Commissions in Court Houses—decided the 
outcome, through intimidation and through a mixture of coercion and promises.” Interview; 
3 January 2012.  
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     of the Republic plays an over-dominant role in the appointment process.   
     (EC 2011: 85) 
 
     Also EU was disappointed and certainly dissatisfied with the way the 
whole process was handled, i.e. complete lack of ‘public consultation’, 
transparency and inclusiveness.
507
 It clearly stated that; “[…] further steps 
are needed for the independence, impartiality and efficiency of the judiciary 
[…]” (EC 2011: 18). 
 
4.4. The outcome: Turkey after the ‘reform’ 
     Despite the ‘rather gloomy’ picture of the political scene after the 
reforms, both the Turkish public and the international community—above 
all the EU—although intuitively sceptical, was nevertheless hopeful of a 
change. After the intense and wide-spread polarisation over the September 
2010 referendum, ongoing court cases—Balyoz, Ergenekon, KCK 
prominent among others—involving thousands of arrests, the so-called 
‘Kurdish opening’ which came to dominate the public debate from mid-
2009 on, and the Syrian crisis with direct and deeply felt effects on Turkey 
and Turkish domestic politics, the wishful- thinking was about emergence of 
a ‘Turkish spring’. Actually, it was generally felt that this confrontational, 
zero-sum politics was not sustainable. In the period leading to the general 
elections of 2011, some sense of reconciliation, compromise—and in the 
face of the developing dire situation in the Middle East—an attempt for 
national unity, easing of political tension along with some loosening of the 
restrictions on the media and greater respect for fundamental freedoms—
                                                          
507
 “[…]the adoption of legislation implementing the September 2010 constitutional 
amendments was not accompanied by broad and effective public consultation involving 
stake holders in the country, despite government commitments to this” (EC 2011: 7). “The 
upcoming review of the judicial reform strategy needs to be carried out with the 
participation of all stakeholders, the Turkish legal community and civil society” (EC 2011: 
19). “There is a need to review the existing (judicial reform) strategy in a transparent and 
inclusive fashion, so that the revised strategy will be owned by the Turkish legal 
community and the wider public” (EC 2011: 86). 
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freedom of expression and freedom of press being prominent—were 
wishfully anticipated. The onus, it was felt, was on the Government and the 
leadership of the governing party as they came out of the referendum, 
politically, extremely powerful—to an unprecedented degree in the modern 
Turkish history.  
     In January 2011, as the general elections were looming over the horizon, 
TÜSIAD, wiping out the unpleasant memories of the previous year, 
launched yet another ‘opening’ to politics and political parties. A TÜSIAD 
team led by Ms. Boyner visited the parties and former president Demirel, in 
Ankara.
508
 Boyner expressed hope for “collaboration with all parties and 
exchange of views during the election process”. She stressed 
‘democratisation, new constitution, economy, judicial reform’ as priorities 
and said that they were expecting “refined and civilised debate”. However 
such expectations proved false and major confrontations between the civil 
society and the Government—partly involving also MHP—dominated 2011 
and 2012. This unfavourable state of affairs, gradually expanded to involve 
also EU institutions and authorities, eventually having an indirect but 
powerful negative effect on the democracy enhancing functions of civil 
society organisations.   
    Prime Minister Erdoğan himself participated in the opening ceremony of 
the Open Government Partnership (OGP) Initiative in September 2011.
509
 In 
OGP Action Plan (2012), the government declared that for the ‘objective’ of 
‘active participation of citizens, non-governmental and private sector’—in 
the policymaking process; “the aim (was) to increase the level of public 
                                                          
508
 “TÜSIAD Baskani Boyner’in son duragi MHP oldu”. 12 January 2011. Milliyet. 22 July 
2012. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/tusiad-baskani-boyner-in-son-duragi-mhp-
oldu/siyaset/sondakika/12.01.2011/1338459/default.htm.  
509
 ‘Erdogan Obama ile gorustu’. 20 September 2011, Haberturk. 25 March 2013. 
http://www.haberturk.com/dunya/haber/671456-erdogan-obama-ile-gorustu, and; 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/acik-yonetim-ortakliginin-acilis-torenine-
katildi/13156. 
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participation in policymaking and implementation processes”.510 Also there 
were pledges regarding the freedom of the press, “to enhance the access of 
all citizens to such information, so as to ensure that public oversight of 
officials is made possible and easier, thereby providing for greater 
democratisation and a free press regime” (OGP Action Plan: 2). But such 
cliché statements did not make much difference in terms of implementing 
even the basic principles associated with the concept of ‘open government’.  
     The decision-making, law-drafting and the legislative process for the so-
called Third Judicial Package presented yet another opportunity to test what 
really changed—if any—in Turkey and in particular in the political system 
and the political behaviour. In January 2012, Justice Minister Ergin 
announced government plans to amend Art. 250 and Art. 251 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (on organised crime and the authority and procedures to 
investigate such crimes) , within the scope of the Third Judicial Package.
511
 
Earlier, a split between the judiciary, or ‘parts’ of the judiciary—i.e. 
Criminal Courts with Special Powers—and the National Intelligence 
                                                          
510
 For example, during the preparation of laws and other regulatory processes, “the 
information (would) be shared with the public over www.regulation.gov.tr” (OGP Action 
Plan: 5). http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/turkey/action-plan. 
511
 The Third Judicial Reform Package, consisting of some 88 ‘articles’, included 
amendments in four different and mostly unrelated areas: Bankruptcy and Enforcement 
Law, civil judiciary, criminal judiciary and freedoms of press and expression. Those 
amendments were mainly related to Law No 2004, twentyseven articles; to Law No 5521, 
one article; to Law No 5683, two articles; to Law No 1618, one article; to Law No 2575, 
five articles; to Law No 2576, two articles; to Law No 2577, nine articles; to Law No 4054, 
one article; Law No 2802, one article; to Law No 3402, one article; to Law No 3713, two 
articles; to Law No 4301, one article; 5187, two articles; to Law No 5237, twenty articles; 
to Law No 5252, one article; to Law No 5271, four articles; to Law No 5320, one article; to 
Law No 5326, one article; to Law No 5352, three articles—nineteen laws, in one single 
‘bag of laws’. Plus, one article amended Government Decree 190—dated 13 December 
1983, and various articles of eight different laws. For details see the government bill dated 
30 January 2012 “Yargi Hizmetlerinin Etkinlestirilmesi Amaciyla Bazi Kanunlarda 
Degisiklik Yapilmasi ve Basin Yoluyla Islenen Suclara Iliskin Dava ve Cezalarin 
Ertelenmesi Hakkinda Kanun Tasarisi”. 26 March 2013. 
http://www.adalet.gov.tr/duyurular/2012/ocak/kanuntasarisi/tasari.pdf.  
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Agency, that is the Under Secretary for MIT, had prompted the government 
to provide a shield to the Under Secretary in office against a criminal 
investigation launched by one of these courts—by passing a single-article 
amendment to the Law on MIT. From then on, two differing views 
emerged—and were hotly debated—not only within the governing party but 
also in the wider political stage in Turkey in general. If and when enacted, 
new articles would make it difficult for Special Courts and Prosecutors to 
issue detention  orders. In the face of serious resistance and unhappiness 
about a change—in different circles and for various reasons—government 
declared that this issue would not be included in the Third Package and gave 
repeated assurances. This continued until the government forwarded the 
draft bill—as promised—to the Parliament on 30 January 2012.  
     The bill was referred to the Justice Committee—and to the Plan and 
Budget Committee and the Committee on the Constitution, as secondary 
committees—on 2 February, then to the sub-committee of the Justice 
Committee—on 15 February. The Justice Committee, after a long interval 
of four months, completed its report in mid-June.
512
 The bill eventually 
came to the Plenary, on Saturday 30 June 2012.  
     The most critical and controversial amendment—on abolishing the 
Special Courts, so-called Art. 250 courts—was presented as a motion by the 
governing party deputies, tabled only on the second and the last day of the 
debate on this comprehensive package, on Sunday 1 July, thereby bypassing 
the Committee—and effectively, also the Plenary—stage of the legislative 
process. The law was adopted, at the end of a legislative marathon
513
, on 2 
July and was signed into law by the President on 5 July 2012.
514
 Because of 
the way, such a major change was imposed on the Parliament, clearly 
avoiding any debate not only in the Parliament but also in the general 
public, academia, media and civil society, there occurred an immediate 
                                                          
512
 Justice Committee Report, dated 12 June 2012. 26 March 2013. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss278.pdf.  
513
 Two sessions from mid-30 June to mid-2 July took about 40 hours.  
514
 Law No. 6352.  
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reaction, violent anger which prompted physical fight between the deputies, 
followed by a short break by the Acting Speaker and then, the article was 
passed by the governing party majority in a minute time. Since this 
amendment was never debated—even the nature of it was not known—until 
it was tabled in the Plenary
515
, the debate started immediately after—not in 
the Parliament because it went into summer holiday for three months 
starting next morning, but in its absence, outside the Parliament, further 
heightening the already very high political and ideological polarisation in 
the country.
516
  
     Another test bed was the new education law which restructured the 
Turkish education system radically. When the governing party introduced, 
in February 2012, the so-called ‘uninterrupted education’517 draft law, 
TÜSIAD objected to it and said that “the submission of this law proposal to 
the Parliament—not even by the Government, but by a group of Deputies—
without initiating a participatory and comprehensive negotiation process, 
had proven to have several shortcomings”.518 Prime Minister Erdogan519 
reacted aggressively and said: “These reactions are stale, out of date and 
                                                          
515
 One opposition MP, A. Rıza Öztürk—spokesperson for the CHP in the Justice 
Committee—said in a live interview that; “this article of the draft law did not come to the 
Committee. They (CHP) sought the text, before the Plenary session, from the governing 
party officials to review and offer their views, but this was refused on the ground that ‘it 
would be distributed when it was tabled in the Plenary’ anyway”. Habertürk Tv. 03 July 
2012, 14.20. 
516
 The EU 2011 Progress Report had warned, about nine months ago, that “the upcoming 
review of the judicial reform strategy needs to be carried out with the participation of all 
stakeholders, the Turkish legal community and civil society” (EC 2011: 19). 
517
 Although it was called ‘uninterrupted’, in fact the new system introduced a system of 
interruptions in the form of 4+4+4 years. It went into affect starting from 2012-2013 
academic year. 
518
 “TÜSIAD’dan ‘4+4+4’e tepki”. 24 February 2012. CNN Turk. 21 July 2012. 
http://www.cnnturk.com/2012/turkiye/02/23/tusiaddan.4.4.4e.tepki/650396.0/index.html. 
519
 “Erdogan TÜSIAD’i fena fircaladi”. 28 February 2012. Milliyet. 21 July 2012. 
http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-tusiad-i-
fenafircaladi/siyaset/siyasetdetay/28.02.2012/1508808/default.htm.  
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ignorant of the facts of Turkey” to which Boyner responded by stating that 
she
520
 was “surprised by his reaction“ and that it was “only normal for 
TÜSIAD to work on this subject and express opinions”. Erdogan521 hit back 
by even harsher words: “We are not the government of the gentry, elites or 
bosses. Nobody should behave with the reflexes of the old Turkey. The will 
of the nation is above all. Everybody should be living with this and have to 
stomach it”. A potential contact was avoided when Prime Minister cancelled 
attendance to a previously planned opening in the city of Mardin, at the last 
minute, early March.  
     Later on 8 March, during a ceremony
522
 when Ms. Boyner was awarded, 
by Economist, for the second time, the title of ‘Civil Society Leader of the 
Year’, she said:  
          Civil society institutions are absolutely indispensable institutions of  
     democracy for us—the citizens—so that we can participate in  
     governance and have a relative say in the process of making rules that  
     govern our lives. On the other hand, unrestricted mediums for public  
     debate are certainly needed so that participants are encouraged, and civil  
     society organisations can exist, take initiative and work productively.  
 
     After this unusually coarse and abrasive exchange of salvos of 
extraordinary nature, there started yet another stand-off between the two 
parties. In less than four months time, mid-June 2012, yet another crisis, this 
time over the Government attempts to reregulate the practice of ‘abortion’ 
came about.
523
 Again, as was the case the year before, Dpty. Prime Minister 
                                                          
520
 “Basbakanin tepkisine sasirdim”. 01 March 2012. Cumhuriyet. 21 July 2012. 
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=319010. 
521
 “Patronlarin hükümeti degiliz”. 02 March 2012. Milliyet. 21 July 2012. 
http://ekonomi.milliyet.com.tr/patronlarin-hukumeti-
degiliz/ekonomi/ekonomidetay/02.03.2012/1510058/default.htm.  
522
 Manset. March 2012. 19 July 2012.  http://manset.tusiad.org/index.php/mart-2012/137-
uemit-boyner-yilin-sivil-toplum-lideri-oedueluenue-aldi.  
523
 “Bulent Arinc’tan carpici aciklamalar”. 15 June 2012. Sabah. 22 July 2012. 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2012/06/15/bulent-arinctan-carpici-aciklamalar.  
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Arinc—appearently because of their opposing views—directed hardly 
concealed threats against TÜSIAD. He said that “her careless outbursts” 
were “disregarding (the interests of) her organisation”. They had just shaken 
hands, only eight days ago—after a year-long resentment and lack of 
communication.  
     Also, allegations about German foundations in general and Heinrich Böll 
Stiftung Turkey in particular did not stop. In February 2012, one ‘witness’ 
said that there was a connection between the members of alleged terrorist 
network ‘Ergenekon’ and German foundations in Turkey and Heinrich Böll 
did make some payments at least to one of the accused in the case
524
. Head 
of Heinrich Böll in an interview said that “the real problem they (Heinrich 
Böll) were concerned about was the fact that courts took this individual and 
his allegations seriously”.525 
     On the other hand, despite repeated assurances from the Prime Minister 
and from the Speaker of the Parliament
526
 himself who has been leading the 
effort for drafting a brand-new and ‘democratic’ constitution, in mid-2013, 
this aim looks like a bridge too far. The work of the Parliamentary 
Conciliation Committee on the Constitution seems to have stuck in 
fundamental disagreements over the articles, related—potentially—to a 
‘Kurdish’ national identity and a regional home-land with autonomy granted 
to a ‘Kurdish people’ within Turkey, relations between state-society-
                                                          
524
 “Perinçek ve avukatına duruşmadan men cezası”. 21 February 2012. Radikal. 25 July 
2012.http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=107947
5&CategoryID=77&Rdkref=6.  
525
 “Ulrike Dufner: ‘AKP, AB reform sürecini devam ettirmek istiyorsa, bizi ve 
Türkiye’deki sivil toplumu desteklemek zorunda’. Ümit Sahin. 23 February 2012. Yesil 
Gazete. 23 July 2012. http://www.yesilgazete.org/blog/2012/02/23/ulrike- 
dufner-akp-ab-reform-surecini-devam-ettirmek-istiyorsa-bizi-ve-turkiye%e2%80%99deki-
sivil-toplumu-desteklemek-zorunda/.  
526
 ‘Yeni anayasayi halk yapacak’. 13 January 2011, Sabah. 25 March 2013. 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/01/13/yeni_anayasayi_halk_yapacak.  
and; ‘Cicek: Basin özgürlügü geriye gitmez’. 14 July 2012, NTVMSNBC. 25 March 2013. 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25366461/.  
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religion, and—partly connected to others—replacing the parliamentary 
system with presidential system, as well as many other details.  
     Relations between Turkey and ‘Europe’ are also not giving any signs of 
progress. To the contrary, immediately after the referendum of 2010 and 
following the enacted laws critical for the judiciary, the EU adopted a 
distinctly disapproving and critical posture towards Turkish government. 
The main areas of concern have been freedom of the press, freedom of 
expression and the independence of the judiciary, i.e. separation of powers 
and accountability.  
     First, during a planned visit to Brussels in March 2011—before the 
general elections—Prime Minister Erdogan was ‘unable’ to secure 
rendezvous with the President of the European Council Herman Van 
Rompuy and President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso. 
This visit was postponed twice and then cancelled altogether. When EU 
Commissioner—for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy—Stefan Füle, 
after the elections, came to Ankara in July 2011, this time both President 
Gül and Prime Minister Erdogan were too ‘busy’ to receive him.527  
     Discontentment and criticism were not restricted to the EU Commission 
only. Venice Commission President Gianni Buquicchio, in an interview to a 
Turkish daily
528
 in August 2012, said that the Commission was not 
consulted by the Turkish government in the drafting process of the new 
constitution, despite earlier announcements to do so. He stressed that “the 
involvement of the Commission in this process would contribute to the 
                                                          
527
 ‘Devletin zirvesinden AB’ye ince mesaj’. 12 July 2011, Sabah. 25 March 2013. 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/07/12/devletin-zirvesinden-abye-ince-mesaj.  
528
 ‘Venice Commission was not consulted by the Turkish government’. Selcuk Gültasli, 07 
August 2012, Today’s Zaman. “The power of the military has certainly been reduced to a 
considerable extent. […] The Venice Commission has not followed the Ergenekon case and 
similar trials. While they have undoubtedly led to a decrease in the role of the military, we 
are well aware about the concerns regarding the wide scope of the prosecutions, including 
with respect to journalists and writers.” 17 August 2012.  
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=288848.  
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domestic as well as international credibility of the process”. Furthermore, in 
the context of presidential system debates in Turkey, he said:  
          […] this would seem to be a risky step to take. Strong presidential  
     powers in countries that do not have a strong liberal tradition often lead  
     to an authoritarian government. The purpose of the new constitution is,  
     however, to move the country away from authoritarian structures. This  
     step would therefore run counter to the very purpose of this reform. 
 
     Although the government and the Minister of Justice had announced on 
more than one occasion that the Venice Commission would be consulted 
during the drafting process of the new constitution, this never happened. 
When the Venice Commission took initiative and offered assistance in early 
2013, the Parliamentary Committee simply refused it. However, President 
Buquicchio continued to be vocal in his council—and warning—about the 
current and, potentially, future shape of Turkish democracy.
529
  
     It seems that the EU’s future focus will be on institutions directly 
concerned by political reforms in the judiciary and law enforcement 
services, i.e. the police, on adoption and implementation of the acquis in 
priority areas. The revised IPA, Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document 
(MIPD) 2011-2013 for Turkey was adopted by the Commission in June 
2011. It followed a sector-based approach and aimed to better focus 
assistance on political priorities in order to achieve a greater impact.
530
 
European Parliament Resolution on the 2011 Progress Report on Turkey--
dated 29 March 2012—gave clear indications of this focus:  
          Expresses its full support for the drafting of a new civilian  
                                                          
529
 ‘Turkey’s democracy not up to strong presidency: Venice Commission head’. 16 
February 201, Hürriyet Daily News. 25 March 2013. 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-democracy-not-up-to-strong-presidency-venice-
commission-head-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=41239.  
530
 Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) Multi-annual Indicative Planning 
Document (MIPD) 2011-2013 Turkey. 10 July 2012. 
http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/2_turkiye_ab_iliskileri/2_2_adaylik_sureci/2_2_7_turki
ye_ab_mali_isbirligi/2_2_7_1_ipa/2_2_7_1_11_diger_belgeler/mipd_2011_2013.pdf. 
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     constitution for Turkey as a unique opportunity for true constitutional  
     reform, promoting democracy, the rule of law, guarantees for  
     fundamental rights and freedoms (in particular freedom of expression  
     and freedom of the media), pluralism, inclusiveness, good governance,  
     accountability and unity in Turkish society […] welcomes […] the  
     decision to ensure equal representation of all political forces in the  
     Constitutional Conciliation Committee and the pledge to base the  
     drafting process on the broadest possible consultation of all segments of  
     society as part of a process which genuinely engages Turkish Society,  
     stresses that the new constitution […] guarantee the separation of  
     powers, ensure the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, secure  
     full civilian oversight of the military […]. (EP 2011: Art 8) 
 
     This was clearly a road-map for democratisation and “true constitutional 
reform” in Turkey. The European Parliament also directed the Commission 
to include “a detailed analysis of the progress of the implementation process 
[of the 2010 constitutional reform package]” and “to closely follow the 
aforementioned cases [investigations of alleged coup plans] and to publicise 
the findings in more detail in an annex to its 2012 Progress Report”.  
     Commissioner Füle, during a speech531 in May 2012—soon after the 
publication of EP Resolution—against a background of the ongoing work 
on a new constitution, highlighted the need for “transparency”, an integrated 
process that would “allow a compromise”, respect for “diversity of 
opinions”. He expressed ‘hope’ for a “swift adoption of the Third Judicial 
Reform Package” and that the Fourth Judicial Reform Package—in the area 
of freedom of expression and the media—would soon follow. “These issues 
(would) have (their) particular attention when preparing this year’s (i.e., 
2012) progress report” he warned.  
                                                          
531
 Commissioner Stefan Füle speaking in Brussels. 15 May 2012. Speech 12/360. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/360&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
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     2012 Turkey Progress Report, in terms of the political criteria, 
particularly ‘democracy and the rule of law’—not surprisingly—was the 
worst report card of all-times. According to this report: 
- Political life is characterised by limited dialogue and frequent tensions,   
- Concerns persisted over the rights of the defence, lengthy pre-trial 
detention, excessively long and catch-all indictments, wide scope and 
shortcomings in judicial proceedings, 
- Investigations tend to expand rapidly; the judiciary accepts mainly 
evidence collected by the police only or supplied by secret witnesses, 
- (Constitution drafting) There are some limits on transparency, with 
submissions to the committee by civil society and others removed from or 
not published on the internet, 
- Few of the capacity concerns identified by the 2010 Parliament/SIGMA 
Peer Review have so far been addressed; proper functioning of the 
Parliament yet to be ensured; due attention needs to be paid to reform of the 
Parliament’s rules of procedure; oversight of the executive, 
- Key legislation was adopted with insufficient preparation and consultation. 
- Members of the government reacted virulently to criticism voiced by the 
media or civil society and brought court cases on a number of occasions.  
- Consultation of civil society remains the exception rather than the rule.  
 (EC 2012: 5-10) 
 
     The European Parliament’s Resolution on the Progress Report just 
paraphrased these observations and expectations, and reiterated that “the 
rule of law at the heart of the enlargement policy, and confirmed the 
centrality in the negotiating process of Chapter 23 on judiciary and 
fundamental rights, and Chapter 24 on justice, freedom and security” (EP 
2012). 
     The Fourth Judicial Package was submitted to the Parliament on 11 
March 2013. It aims to strengthen human rights, fair trial, freedom of 
expression, freedom of press, prevention of long detention and trial periods. 
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If it will serve its stated purposes or will remain as ‘window-dressing’ 
remains to be seen. 
     In terms of the specific expectations of the civil society, the policy 
outcomes related to the judicial reform have mostly met those originally 
prescribed and advocated by the civil society as a whole. Both the 
Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors have 
been restructured, a role—albeit less than significant—has been given to the 
Parliament in the selection of the Constitutional Court judges (but not 
members of the HCJP), the authority of the President in the selection of the 
Court judges has been reduced—albeit symbolically, the term of duty of the 
Court judges has been limited. Looking at this outcome ‘only’, it can be 
argued that the civil society has been largely successful in its quest for a 
reform in the Turkish judicial system by having an influence on the policy 
outcomes related to this reform. However, looking into details, the general 
picture is rather bleak. Two questions stand prominent here: first, if this was 
the result of civil society’s success or of ‘other’ factors; if so, what was the 
part played by the civil society, if any. Secondly, as the reform package was 
taken as a complete whole, what was the effect of some details—that were 
overlooked or excluded—on the whole package? 
     The evaluation, on the part of the civil society, of success or performance 
so to speak, confidently, or the share of the civil society work within the 
overall ‘success’—in relation to others—is not easy. TESEV, for example, 
in their 2010 Report
532
 which covered the period leading to and including 
the constitutional referendum and other developments related to the judicial 
reform, included some ambitious, pretentious and even ostentatious 
remarks: “a communication strategy planned in detail for reaching the 
public […] interest in and the use of TESEV documents/publications by the 
media, academia, politicians, bureaucrats and diplomats as a reference […] 
                                                          
532
 See; TESEV Board of Trustees 24 February 2011 meeting, , 2010 Activity Report, 2011 
Programme and Budget. 11 January 2012.  
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/Genel/TESEV%202010%20Faaliyet%20Raporu.p
df.  
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developing partnerships with civil society organisations and other 
institutions, individuals”. TESEV also aimed for “increased visibility […] 
reaching wider audience inside and outside of Turkey through the use of 
new means of communication such as social media” and “new partnerships 
on common projects”.  
     To what degree such self-evaluations of the civil society are reflecting 
the reality and if the judiciary in Turkey is now independent, impartial and 
efficient—as anticipated at the outset are difficult to judge. In other words, 
civil society did not aim democratic reforms in the judiciary simply for sake 
of reform, but for improving and advancing the independence, impartiality 
and efficiency of the Turkish judiciary. If the policy outcomes aimed by 
civil society have been mostly materialised but nevertheless the practical 
outcomes aimed at the outset have not come about, then we are faced with a 
problematic situation. There are some clues to this fundamental question in 
some critical details of the reform package.  
     The presence of those, in HCJP, coming from the executive branch has 
continued, a mixed model—for the election of HCJP members—in which 
the Parliament would play a role has not been materialised, and the 
Parliament elects Constitutional Court judges—in effect—with simple 
majority. Also, a holistic approach—need for a democratisation package, 
rather than a piece-meal approach—and consensus and compromise in the 
Parliament and elsewhere in the political system, as advised by the civil 
society, have certainly not come about. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 342 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Findings and Conclusions 
 
“Whoever knows he is deep, strives for clarity; whoever would like to appear deep 
to the crowd, strives for obscurity. For the crowd considers anything deep if only it 
cannot see to the bottom: the crowd is so timid and afraid of going into the 
water.”533  
 
     This thesis aimed to determine and explain the role and the relative 
influence of civil society on policy outcomes. In this chapter, civil society’s 
input, role and the resulting influence on issue articulation, political 
decision-making, drafting of texts and legislation are discussed against other 
actors, factors, influences and put into context vis a vis policy outcomes.  
     In validating the findings some other key studies as well as EC Reports 
and EP Resolutions were also consulted. SIGMA Peer Review Report of 
2010
534
 and STGM Impact Evaluation Survey (2005-2010)
535
 Report among 
them are prominent.  
     The reform process, particularly after mid-2007, progressed along with 
an intensive political debate over the general direction the political regime 
in Turkey is heading and an unprecedented scale of court cases based on 
allegations of coup attempts. These court cases of historical importance and 
of extreme political sensitivity involved not only hundreds of high-ranking 
military—active and retired alike—but also others in bureaucracy, 
academics, journalists, civil society leaders and opposition politicians—to 
include even some former AKP MPs, members, supporters.
536
 They 
                                                          
533
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil.  
534
 SIGMA Report of 2010, took an x-ray of not only the TGNA but also—perhaps more—
of the Turkish political system with all its shortcomings, flaws and illnesses. 
535
 STGM Impact Evaluation Survey (2005-2010) Report, provides a comprehensive 
assessment of the needs of civil society in Turkey for development.  
536
 The amendments to Art 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code which entered into force in 
May 2008, introduced a ‘permission’ by the Minister of Justice in order to launch a 
criminal investigation on the basis of this particular article. This led to a significant decline 
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contributed to further deterioration of the already problematic state of 
freedoms of expression and the media. 
     The legal framework—which was too ambiguous anyway—was often 
interpreted in a restrictive way by public prosecutors and judges and this led 
to frequent prosecutions of journalists for breaches of the confidentiality of 
investigations or for attempting to influence a fair trial. As such 
prosecutions became common for journalists who were critical of the 
government policies and extended to cover other forms—and groups—of 
political opposition, the media became too concerned with its own survival, 
applied self-censorship and distanced itself from any initiative that could be 
interpreted by the Government—and public prosecutors—as interference in 
politics, i.e. political opposition. This included civil society and its 
‘democratisation’ programmes.537   
     Particularly during the period from mid-2009 through mid-2011 was 
important in terms of the timing and concentration of civil society’s effort in 
this respect as they directly participated in the debate related to the overall 
reform process. 
     Under such circumstances, to make a rational and objective evaluation of 
the success of civil society in supporting democratisation in Turkey in 
general and its effective role in the decision-making, legislative processes 
and on policy outcomes in particular is a real challenge. Generally, it is 
difficult to detect stable patterns in relations between civil society and the 
‘society’ as a whole, in those between civil society organisations 
                                                                                                                                                   
in prosecutions compared with previous years. However, the main problem—restrictive 
interpretation by prosecutors—hence legal uncertainties due to misuse of judicial authority, 
along with the political pressure on the media continued. 
537
 EU authorities while admitting the importance of these investigations, nevertheless 
voiced some concerns from the beginning. Commission, in 2009 Report, indicated that 
certain media outlets “were discriminated against” and “senior political leaders”—in an 
open reference to the Prime Minister himself—“called for a boycott of newspapers and 
television channels” (EC 2009: 17-18). The European Parliament also accused the Turkish 
government of allowing “legal proceedings to be used as a pretext to exert undue pressure 
on critical journalists, academics or opposition politicians” (EP 2009: Art 11).  
 344 
themselves, and their relations with the state, i.e. for all practical purposes 
the government.  
     A recent study focusing on the same subject as this paper, found that 
“[…] the contribution of civil society to democratic consolidation in Turkey 
is limited, but not totally absent” (Torus 2010: 166). However it limited this 
contribution to ‘agenda-setting’, in other words ‘issue articulation’. The 
same study suggested that “[…] for a more comprehensive evaluation of 
civil society in Turkey as a contributor to democratic consolidation one 
should consider the complexity of social change and mobility among the 
Turkish society” (Torus 2010: 167). 
     Morlino (1998) calls this so-called complex social change and mobility, a 
‘crisis’. ‘Crisis’ is the opposite of ‘institutionalisation’, “the process by 
which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability” 
(Huntington 1968: 12).  
     In such a crisis environment the EU Turkey Progress Report of 2011 
found the inclusion of civil society organisations in policy processes “still in 
a nascent stage” (EC 2011: 28). Against this background, below are the 
findings of this thesis which largely confirmed this observation. 
 
5.1. Main findings 
     Civil society’s contribution or participation in policy-making, i.e. 
decision-making, drafting and legislative processes, is not sanctioned in 
Turkey neither by the Constitution nor by the Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedure or any specific law. Furthermore, legal, administrative, political 
and mental/cultural infrastructure for civil society ‘participation’ is largely 
absent. Therefore civil society’s effort for getting a foothold is an uphill 
battle fought with a lot of sweat and toil, against various actors and 
overwhelming odds. 
     This thesis has concluded that; the influence of civil society on policy 
outcomes—particularly on those primarily of political nature—in Turkey 
is negligible. In terms of having an impact—any impact—on policy 
outcomes through direct or indirect participation in decision-making 
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mechanisms, it is difficult to talk about a clear-cut success of the civil 
society in Turkey, that would justify the resources dedicated. However, in 
terms of capacity building in civil society, improving networking, 
cooperation with the media, adopting a more assertive posture, international 
cooperation, learning to work through the state apparatus and reaching out, 
clearly, there have been important developments that can be considered, 
with a long-term perspective, success. The results of such successes will 
only be seen and better measured or qualified in coming years.  
     It can only be argued that there is a ‘start’ or a ‘beginning’ for the civil 
society to have an influence, if anything, on policy outcomes. It is simply a 
modest positive step, slowly moving forward, occasionally with some 
important setbacks and against major political, institutional and cultural 
challenges, even extremely strong attitudinal resistance at the individual 
level.  
     The Turkish political system and the dominant political culture is not 
prepared to relinquish a place to civil society, let alone a role as an actor in 
politics or to accommodate civil society otherwise. Civil society is not 
recognised nor respected as a legitimate partner. It must be noted that there 
is a huge difference between ‘political’ topics (in other words, those 
primarily related to politics and political balance of power) and others—e.g. 
economic, social, financial, technical—in terms of accepting or tolerating 
civil society input in the decision-making or legislative processes. In the 
latter case, political tolerance—but still not participation per se—is more 
forthcoming.  
     In 2001, there was an advocacy coalition—to include civil society—for 
security sector reform, but in 2010, during the judicial reform process this 
had been replaced by a two-level game symbolically—and typically—
involving the EU, but excluding civil society (even the Venice 
Commission). The political leadership, i.e. Prime Minister, the governing 
party’s programme/political aims and the EU accession process—as far as 
its requirements overlap with the former two—have largely determined the 
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policy outcomes. One senior civil society official described the ‘selective’ 
nature of consultation in a sarcastic way:  
          Taking and accepting inputs from the civil society is rather arbitrary  
     (tur. keyfi); it all depends on if policy alternatives offered are in line with  
     the intention and aims of the Government or not. If they are in line with  
     the already established policy, then, they are ‘taken’ into consideration.  
     Otherwise, our reports are utilised as ‘flower-pots’.538  
 
     Consequently, civil society is only influential and ‘inspiring’ as its aims 
coincide with those of the political leadership and only when strongly 
supported by the EU accession process and or global civil society, i.e. 
because of their ‘instrumental’ quality—as perceived by the Government 
and other key decisionmakers, NOT because of the intrinsic value of 
recommendations or suggestions offered by civil society. The ‘selective’ 
nature of heeding the requirements of the EU accession process can 
typically be seen in the absence of any progress in some fundamental areas, 
repeatedly advised by respective EU authorities, such as the law on political 
parties, electoral law, 10% minimum electoral threshold for representation 
in parliament.
539
  
     One of the two main problems faced by civil society in Turkey is the 
opportunity to participate in legislative and political decision-making 
processes—the other being stable funding, i.e. financial survival, not 
necessarily in this order. Because of the pre-eminent position of the 
executive and the resulting—fundamental—question of separation of 
powers in Turkey, as well as the increasingly deteriorating state of freedoms 
of expression and the press
540
 civil society has had but one choice of 
                                                          
538
 Interview; October 2011. 
539
 “[…] reiterates, yet again, the importance of a reform of the law on political parties and 
of the electoral law, with the lowering of the 10% minimum threshold for representation in 
parliament […]” (EP 2011: Art 4).  
540
 EP emphasised these aspects in March 2011; “[…] the crucial role of a system of checks 
and balances in the governance of a modern democratic state which must be based on the 
principle of separation of powers with balance between the executive, legislative and 
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approaching the executive. Civil society, dedicated its already scarce 
resources primarily at seeking to influence the executive stages of law-
making. Civil society efforts on political parties—other than the governing 
party—were based on a sense of democratic ‘politeness’ rather than 
practical expectations for support to current legislation and/or basic political 
decisions. The Parliamentary stages of the legislative process—Committees 
and the Plenary—were largely ignored. In the face of a clear ‘conflict of 
interest’, this brought with it an inevitable conflict with the executive, 
alienated the political opposition and resulted in a few, if any, ‘allies’ for 
civil society.  
 
5.2. Processes and actors 
     The main problem of ‘participation’ is about the ‘nature’ of participation 
or what is understood by the word ‘participation’ by various actors: one-
time, one-way consultations without a dialogue. When even this 
occasionally happens, it is when essential policy decisions are already made, 
policies formulated, legislative texts are drafted. One civil society 
representative explains how it should be: “Restructuring built-in 
mechanisms at each level of policy formulation, rather than simply taking 
views in a perfunctory fashion with indifference” (Agduk 2010: 120). “Only 
then, “participation could possibly contribute to the legitimacy of political 
decisions taken through such processes” she explains.  
     Furthermore, this opportunity for ‘consultation’ is extended or granted to 
civil society—in the form of groups, individuals or organisations—
representing similar or closer views to the already formulated policy rather 
than to those of differing position.  
     Turkey and the Turkish political system is a showcase—and a test bed—
for what Smith (2005) discusses as ‘barriers to participation’ by civil 
society, particularly; “conflicting policy imperatives for public authorities, 
                                                                                                                                                   
judicial functions, on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms—in particular 
freedom of expression and the freedom of the press—and on a participatory political culture 
truly reflecting the plurality of a democratic society” (EP 2010: Art 4). 
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organisational and professional resistance to participation, a failure to 
respond to the outcomes of participation, lack of cultural change in public 
authorities, lack of trust in authorities or scepticism that participation will 
make no difference” (106-08).541 
     The tendency what one interviewee described as “What people want 
versus what people should want”542 overrules and overrides personal 
attitude, controls the behaviour. One other interviewee, a senior civil society 
official sounded frustrated with the way civil society was received: “The 
main problem is that political actors, government, parliament are 
disinterested (tur. ilgisiz) in (our input). They—in the Parliament—invite 
civil society and listen to them but then do not mind at all. They listen to 
and then forget whatever civil society says, even say ‘shut up’. This is 
unacceptable. It’s a show, it is artificial (tur. yapay) (not sincere a search for 
input or participation from civil society)”.543  
     Opportunities for civil society participation did exist, sometimes were 
encouraged, even sought after.
544
 However the differentiation between 
politically more sensitive and less conflictual subjects at hand is of extreme 
importance. ‘Political’ items, questions are simply no-go areas for civil 
                                                          
541
 Others: “Poorly executed participation, lack of dedicated resources for participation, a 
lack of clarity about the aims of participation at national and local level, a lack of creativity 
and imagination in designing engagement strategies, a tendency towards ‘incorporation’ of 
citizens into official and bureaucratic ways of working, a tendency to engage ‘natural 
joiners’, often no incentive for citizens to participate, lack of awareness of opportunities to 
participate” (Smith 2005: 106-08).  
542
 Interview; March 2012. 
543
  Interview; October 2011. 
544
 For example the Law on the Committee on Equality of Opportunity for Women and 
Men, Art. 4 calls for consultation from a wide range of institutions, public and private alike, 
including civil society institutions. Art. 4 - […] (2) The Committee may benefit from the 
studies of public body and institutions, universities, civil society organisations and public 
professional organisations which are active in the field of interest of the Committee. (3) The 
Committee may, if needed, consult relevant experts. […]. Law No. 5840, adopted on 25 
February 2009. Official Gazette 24 March 2009, No 27179. 03 March 2012. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/kefe/act.htm 
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society and can easily turn into political mine-fields where politicians would 
like to navigate without ‘company’ or ‘council’.545 One senior member—
and one of the original founders—of TÜSIAD, recently illustrated this 
major obstacle to participation by the civil society in cynical words: “One 
may fight for the economy with governments, but shall not fight a political 
battle. Politician does not like who talks too much, but he likes whoever 
likes him.”546   
     While ‘none’ of the civil society organisations in Turkey pursued an 
aggressive media campaign, the media was also less than eager for such a 
role in support of civil society. 
     There are four ‘black boxes’ in the legislative process into which civil 
society has very little chance to enter to have an influence on policy 
outcomes: ministries, political parties, Office of the Prime Minister, Office 
of the President.  
     Black Box 1: Although drafting of laws in ministries is the first and—in 
terms of the ‘quality’ of the law-making—the most critical phase of the 
legislative process, civil society is almost completely excluded from the 
work in ministries. Even naming or deciding potential ‘partners’—in civil 
society as well as academia, private sector and state institutions—in an area 
which is being regulated by a draft legislation at hand is a challenge because 
there is no such a ‘list’ regularly updated, nor is there an office for 
managing communication with such partners.  
     Black Box 2: Civil society in Turkey has very few, if any, systematic, 
institutionalised links to political parties, hence very little effect on the 
                                                          
545
 “For example in the area of ‘energy’ there was so much enthusiasm to such a degree that 
we could not possibly meet expectations and demands. But in the area of ‘democratisation’ 
they neither demand nor support.  When we attempted to send a copy of our report on the 
Kurdish Question—and the work on the new draft Constitution—to each MP, about 150 
were returned from the Parliament”. Interview; October 2011. 
546
 Halit Narin; “ Hükümetlerle ekonomi kavgasi yapilir, siyasi kavga yapilmaz. Siyasetci 
cok konusani sevmez, kendisini seveni sever.” 10 February 2013. Haberturk. 10 February 
2013. http://ekonomi.haberturk.com/is-yasam/haber/818680-720-milyon-dolarimiz-var-
veremiyoruz.  
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policy outcomes formulated or initiated by parties or their MPs—to include 
the ruling party. Each political party has its ‘own’ civil society which is 
considered an extension of the party organisation. Other parties’ civil 
‘societies’ are mutually considered hostile and any contact is strictly 
avoided. As for the ‘independent’ civil society, i.e. that is not closely and 
openly associated with any one political party—like those four civil society 
think-tanks studied in this paper—a safe distance, the best, is carefully 
maintained. Parties try ‘very hard’ to stay clear of any open contact let alone 
cooperation with them, unless they are really obliged for face-saving 
purposes. “We do not aim to influence political parties’ central 
administrations. We try to talk to those MPs who value our work and eager, 
at least prepared to talk to us” explained one senior staff in a civil society 
think-tank, in desperation.
547
   
     Black Box 3: Office of the Prime Minister is as impenetrable as other 
black boxes—bureaucracy in ministries, and political parties. The 
initiatives which governments have pretended to have taken, have not 
resulted in any real change that would facilitate civil society’s access to 
decision-making mechanisms, even at this office. Prime Minister’s Office is 
also a black-box otherwise. Once the draft bill comes from the ministry, it 
can change completely, before being forwarded to the Parliament for the 
committee work. And most of the time, there is very little that can be done, 
then.
548
 
     Black Box 4: Although the President has constitutional authority to 
influence policy outcomes he has not made an effective use of this 
opportunity particularly during the judicial reform process when it was most 
                                                          
547
 Interview; September 2011.   
548
 For example; Collective Labour Relations Act (Toplu Is Iliskileri Kanunu) was prepared 
by a joint commission composed of representatives from the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security, labor unions and employers’ unions. But the draft sent by the Government to the 
Parliament was completely different in important aspects such as the 3% membership ratio 
threshold required from labor unions to enter into labor negotiations. See; Government Bill, 
dated 31 January 2012. 13 February 2013. http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/1/1-0567.pdf.  
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needed. The attempts made by civil society and academia to urge the 
President to intervene were unsuccessful. 
     A fifth ‘box’, Parliament, represents a box open, but ‘closed’. The forms 
and conditions under which civil society can present their views to 
Parliamentary committees, how these views can be capitalized on and are 
reflected in committee reports are not regulated in the Rules of Procedure. 
One way is to make their reports and other publications available to 
committee members, individual MPs, particularly to Committee chairmen, 
ideally by personal visits. Some civil society organisations did try this. 
However, as usual; there was limited time, it was one-way—i.e. in the form 
of offering input, not engaging into a dialogue. Besides, both sides, i.e. civil 
society and parliamentarians, were fully aware of the inability of the 
Parliamentary committees to challenge Government policy. The logical 
assumption that their value is properly appreciated and they are given 
priority for a reading and/or are summarised for the MPs—by their advisors, 
or committee members—by staffers, does not hold. One senior staffer in a 
‘key’ committee, when questioned, exclaimed: “There are no documents 
arriving from civil society organisations. Members in the Committee even 
do not read what WE prepare for them. There is no interest (in any 
publication)”.549 
      Therefore, unless a general cultural transformation of the understanding 
on ‘participation’ occurs and some legal measures for civil society 
participation—to cover the whole process starting, particularly, from the 
drafting stage in ministries—are introduced, partial improvements and 
palliative measures would simply make civil society participation more 
complicated and cumbersome, but not improve it. 
 
5.3. Cultural hurdles and civil society 
     Since key political decisions on politically sensitive subjects such as 
‘reform’ were made in small, closed groups, civil society did not have a real 
chance or opportunity to involve in any form in the judicial reform process 
                                                          
549
 Interview;  March 2012. 
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in 2010-2011. However when the matter in hand was not politically too 
sensitive and the general sentiment in the public was in line with 
Government’s political aims, as was the case during the NSC reform 
process of early 2000s, there was some chance for the civil society to 
participate. Even then the participation was mostly symbolic, in the form of 
‘offering’ input. 
     Since civil society—threat to absolute political power—was not 
recognised as a legitimate actor in Turkey, politicians, i.e. key actors in the 
legislative process, were also restricted and restrained by the anticipated 
public perception of the legislative initiatives if they involved civil society. 
This was more of the case when issue articulation was led by the civil 
society or the political initiatives were supported by them. During the 
judicial reform process in 2010-2011 ‘distancing’ was mostly the preferred 
form of relation with civil society. There was a complete air of ‘secrecy’. 
When access was possible, it was limited and restricted, when information 
was made available, it was sporadic and inconsistent.       
     The dominant culture of the Turkish elite, ‘looking’ self-reliant, 
confident of his/her competence, in most cases did not lead to a real interest 
in civil society products, inputs, alternative approaches, even when they 
were made available and/or accessed.   
     As the tendency of ‘avoiding clash’ with the executive , i.e. governing 
party, became a common feature of the political system, participation 
‘allowed’ in a particular legislative business was simply aimed for 
‘legitimising’ the already decided upon outcome rather than benefitting 
from civil society input. 
     Advisory dynamics are formalistic, composed of small nucleus of close 
and permanent advisors. Political appointments have politicised and 
devalued bureaucracy. As a predominant leader becomes the ultimate 
decision unit, group-think dominates the decision-making environment. 
Shared-images, analogies and metaphors play a strong role in political 
decision-making. In such an environment, individuals—bureaucrats in 
ministries, MPs in parliamentary committees or political parties—when 
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even faced with a moral dilemma, that is a conflict between their own 
values and utilitarian demands of daily ‘politics’ or expectations of a 
predominant leader, choose to violate their own standards.  
     The obsession with ever speeding up the legislative process rendered any 
involvement—that would slow down the legislative process—from outside 
‘actors’, but particularly from civil society, unwarranted and unjustified.  
     On the other hand, civil society itself, in most cases, was the major 
obstacle to its own success. Absence of development in civil society 
networks was a major shortcoming. Inter-agency interaction and 
cooperation remained limited to interpersonal relations between ‘friends’. 
Real, systematic, effective cooperation with other civil society 
organisations—for the purposes of democratisation reforms—was 
negligible. ‘Networking’ with international civil society organisations—and 
others—was largely one-way and mostly restricted to providing or receiving 
funding to various projects.  
 
5.4. Role of the European Union and global civil society  
     The EU aid to civil society in Turkey has not enjoyed the much needed 
political support and synergy that could come from better coordination and 
‘serious’ work. There was almost no real ‘political’ ownership of the reform 
projects supported. They have been implemented in a piecemeal fashion and 
the results, naturally, have not been too impressive. 
    Lack of a proper understanding of the ‘EU’ and EU accession process—
coupled with the mistrust traditionally associated with the West—has given 
rise to a general suspicion in Turkey. There was very little, if any, that was 
done to ensure correct perception of the EU and this publicity problem 
directly and indirectly hampered civil society’s effective functioning in 
reform process.   
     The suspension of negotiations with the EU and the perceived 
indifference on the part of the Turkish government also had a negative 
effect on civil society and its democratisation efforts. 
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     Global (international) civil society’s principle of ‘dealing with 
governments’ worked against the very purpose of such projects—
encouraging the government to reform. Their views were taken but not 
always implemented. In the absence of the ‘ownership’, national 
counterparts often represented the main obstacle to efficient 
implementation. There was a complete lack of cooperation even 
communication between the international civil society organisations and 
Turkish ones and even among themselves, making partnership and 
networking very difficult.  
     Foreign civil society organisations (foreign embassies) and the EU in 
general, being well aware of the extremely polarised political climate in 
Turkey were—understandably—reluctant to adopt a more assertive stance. 
They shied away and generally maintained a physical and emotional 
distance from the reform process—until after it was ‘completed’. 
 
5.5. ‘Cemaat’550 
       The seemingly eternal cultural conflict in Turkey has always been 
between the secular and the religious—centred around the role and place of 
religion in politics and in society as a whole. As the overwhelming majority 
in Turkey today—85%—defines themselves as ‘religious’, gives priority to 
their Muslim identity over national identity, 60% believes that ‘having a 
strong leader’ is a ‘good’ thing and this trend is on the increase, is worrying 
for democratic consolidation.  
     This study has focused on a particular aspect of civil society—the role 
and influence on policy outcomes related to democratisation—in a relatively 
short period of time. However, the influence of increased religiosity and the 
                                                          
550
 ‘Cemaat’, meaning ‘community’, particularly religious community—congregation—in 
Turkish, is associated with a religious order called ‘Nurculuk’. It has a long and 
controversial history in Turkey and is sometimes referred to as ‘Gülenist Movement’ after 
the name of its current leader, Fethullah Gülen. For two different views of the movement 
and its political ambitions see; (Yavuz & Esposito 2005) and (Sharon-Krespin 2009); for an 
outsider view of the current developments related to the Gulenist network’s alleged 
involvement in domestic politics and influence in judiciary and police see; (Jenkins 2012). 
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long-term cumulative effects of those organisations—claiming the status of 
‘civil society’ but representing less than democratic a culture, denying 
"voice" and "exit" to their members—on the overall democratisation process 
and political decision-making, hence policy outcomes in Turkey requires 
thorough and separate studies.     
     The influence of ‘Cemaat’, its claims to civil society status, and the depth 
of its penetration in state institutions—particularly, but not exclusively, in 
the judiciary, police, army and certain state bureaucracy—is a commonly 
expressed view and this view has not been challenged by even one single 
interviewee. It is argued that this independent and autonomous network, 
allegedly infiltrated into all major state institutions—until recently in 
cooperation with the Government and under its protection, but increasingly 
in conflict with it—controls all major policy decisions551 and has largely 
decided the policy outcomes throughout the 2010-2011 reform process, 
especially in the area of judicial reform. This suggestion and its examination 
go beyond and outside the scope of this research. However, this 
phenomenon may be the missing link or the Higgs boson of the Turkish 
politics—predicted to exist, but not confirmed with certainty yet—as 
touched upon in parts of this study, without which one cannot explain many 
political developments, including some of the policy outcomes in security 
sector and judicial reforms, as well as the court cases or endless 
investigations, some still without any conviction or acquittal, for over five 
years now. The fact that almost no debate—particularly on bills/drafts of 
major importance—in the Parliament goes without frequent reference to 
‘Cemaat’ by the political opposition—and is never denied by the governing 
party representatives—is testimony to this weird and extraordinary 
phenomenon of Turkish politics
552
 which requires a separate study.  
                                                          
551
 Those who talked on the subject of ‘Cemaat’ indicated that “the relative weight and 
control of Prime Minister (Erdogan) personally and the ‘Cemaat’ on the policy outcomes 
related to the judicial reforn (was) 9 and 10—over 10—respectively”. 
552
 Debate on the Third Judicial Package. TGNA, Minutes of Session 129. Sunday 1 July 
2012.  27 March 2013. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
     Civil society’s council and advise on democratisation in general and 
reform of the security sector and the judiciary in particular have been in line 
with those of the European Union. In terms of legal measures, transparency 
and accountability for improved political oversight, there has been 
considerable progress. However, this ‘oversight’ has remained mainly 
restricted to that of the Government. The Parliament—and the society as a 
whole—are still far from being able to provide any meaningful input to 
policy-making or to have a real supervisory role over the execution. Failing 
to adopt a holistic approach, the interconnection between various 
dimensions of the democratic ‘reform’ process in seemingly separate areas, 
such as accountability, transparency, pluralism, participation and 
separation of powers, above all rule of law, has been overlooked in Turkey. 
Also overlooked, has been the concept of good governance, in other words, 
the ‘technical’ nature of policy-making process—that is efficient and 
effective policy-making. 
     The Army has effectively—and seemingly irreversibly—withdrawn from 
politics and come under political control. The judiciary has been almost 
completely restructured. However, the security ‘model’ still remains the 
same. The NSC no longer has the executive power, but still Turkey does not 
have a properly working national policy decision-making system, involving 
the Parliament—as a vital player, transparent, open to inputs and criticism 
from civil society, media and the public in general. The key issue—an 
integrated MoD and general staff—is still missing from the political agenda. 
The potential risk awaiting Turkey, then, is a symbolic move making the 
military ‘subordinate’ to the political authority, but leaving the decision-
making system as it has always been—inefficient.553  
                                                                                                                                                   
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=21215&P5=H
&PAGE1=2&PAGE2=231.  
553
 The Parliamentary Conciliation Committee on Constitution, drafting a new constitution, 
agreed on an article that would make the Chief of the General Staff answerable to the 
Minister of Defense rather than directly to the Prime Minister. ‘Genelkurmay Savunma 
Bakanligina baglaniyor’. 21 February 2013, Radikal. 5 March 2013. 
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     In terms of a significant role given to the Parliament in the selection of 
the Constitutional Court judges and the members of the HCJP
554
, reducing 
the authority of the President in the selection of judges, ending the presence 
of those, in HCJP, coming from the executive branch, much action are still 
to be taken. So the current picture, in terms of the cases studied in this 
paper—reforming the National Security Council and the high judiciary—in 
mid-2013—is a mixed one, in other words, the glass is barely half full.  
     The security sector reform period of 2001-2006 witnessed a kind of elite 
settlement and created an air of optimism. However, weak commitments to 
democracy, general lack of social trust and civic competence did not allow 
this settlement develop into a convergence and a political stasis settled. One 
outcome of this development was the almost complete replacement of elite 
by a ‘counter-elite’. As a result, during the judicial reform process half a 
decade later, paradoxically, majority rule suppressed the opposition and 
minority views. This was followed by an elite disunity and frequently 
shifting pacts excluding certain groups. 
     With regard to overall democratisation, the picture is rather gloomy. 
Civil society’s central message ‘holistic’ rather than a piece-meal approach 
to democratisation, the need for a democratisation ‘package’, advise for 
consensus and compromise in the Parliament in particular and in the 
political system in general notwithstanding, the Turkish political system—as 
reflected in both the European Commission Progress Reports and the 
European Parliament’s Resolutions—has turned more authoritarian, 
                                                                                                                                                   
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1122329&Ca
tegoryID=77.  
554
 Both CCEJ and Venice Commission argued that “the method employed to select the 
members (of HCJP) is as important as the composition of the judicial council in terms of its 
autonomy, and ultimately on judges’ and prosecutors’ security of tenure” (CCEJ, para 18; 
Venice Commission: para 29). It was announced by the Minister of Justice during the 
meeting he held on 5 September 2009 with the press that some members of the HCJP were 
to be elected by the National Assembly. But this never happened and even not included in 
the ‘Judicial Reform Strategy’. 
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polarised and confrontational.
555
 Typical of delegative democracies under 
personalistic rule, executive-type policy-making has taken over the 
functions and responsibilities of the legislature.   
     It is strikingly ironic that the European Parliament has even come to 
warning the Turkish government about maintaining the operational 
capability of the Turkish Armed Forces, in other words, the Parliament has 
offered protection to the Turkish army, traditionally the only and the most 
powerful ‘guardian’ of the political system in Turkey. This example alone 
offers a telling clue of the state of affairs and turn of events in Turkish 
politics in terms of relative power relations to judge the situation from civil 
society’s perspective and its ability to have an influence on policy 
outcomes.
556
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
555
 “[…] in practice, freedom of expression is undermined by the high number of legal 
cases and investigations against journalists, writers, academics and human rights defenders 
and undue pressure on the media. […] Turkey’s legal, and judicial practices, legislation, 
criminal procedures and political responses are obstacles to the free exchange of 
information and ideas.” (EC 2011: 26-27). “[…] deplores the disproportinate restriction of 
the freedoms of expression, association […] recalls that freedom of expression and media 
pluralism are at the heart of European values and that a truely democratic free and 
pluralistic society requires true freedom of expression […]” (EP 2011: Art 20, 23). 
556
 “Welcomes the continued efforts to improve civilian oversight of the military […] 
emphasises the need to ensure armed forces operational capability, given the importance of 
Turkey’s NATO membership” (EP 2011: Art 11). 
 359 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
Questions for Directors of Democratisation Programmes 
 
MISSION AND AIMS 
- How can you define (X)’s democratisation programme’s mission and 
aims?  
- What distinguishes (X) from other civil society think-tanks running a 
democratisation programme?   
- Which aspects of democratisation is (X) focusing on primarily? Why this 
selection? 
- Do you consider (X) as part of an epistemic community or an advocacy 
group? 
 
ROLE 
- Do you believe civil society think-tanks have a leverage in supporting 
democratisation? 
- How favourable, permitting, encouraging the overall environment in 
Turkey for your work?  
- Do you think there is demand for what you are offering? Who demands? 
 
OPERATIONS 
- Think-tank world is described by some as “marketplace of ideas”, do you 
agree with that? Do you market your ideas? Aggressively? 
- Who are your target audiences – mass people, elites in general, 
policymakers in government/bureaucracy, other political actors? Primary 
target audience?  
- Do you give priority to educating the public (indirectly influencing the 
policy process) or to (directly) influencing key policy-making actors? Why? 
(..at what stages of policy cycle do you prefer to participate in: issue 
articulation, policy formulation, policy implementation? 
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FUNDING/NETWORKING 
- How are (X) projects funded—private donations, state, international, 
membership fees, contracts? What is the influence of funding source on the 
impact of your work, if any? 
- Who produces your ‘products’ - in-house experts, outside academics, 
combination of the two? 
- Do you support the idea of networking? Which other organisations/persons 
do you work/cooperate with – academia, opinionmakers, 
politicians/legislators, media? Are you happy with the results?   
 
MEDIA 
- Are you happy with the media coverage of/support for (X) work? 
- Are ‘institutional’ views given better coverage than views voiced by some 
‘celebrities’? 
 
IMPACT 
- It is difficult to quantify a think-tank’s impact. (“War of ideas”; are you 
winning this war for democratisation?) Do you believe (X) has had and is 
having an impact on / role in public policy and in public policy debates - 
little, significant, moderate?  
- Do you regularly measure the impact of your programmes? How? Satisfied 
with the results (and the methodology used for measurement)? 
(Would you consider (X) successful? Why—based on what criteria?) 
 
FEEDBACK 
- Do you receive any feedback – if at all - from your target audience? 
..inputs, requests, reactions, protests? 
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Appendix B 
Questions for Those in the Policy-making and/or Legislative Processes 
 
BACKGROUND/ORIENTATION 
- What is your actual role (as policy-advisor, MP, member of a 
parliamentary commission, minister in the cabinet) ?  
- ..in decision-making process related to democratisation:  
- strengthening judicial independence, impartiality, efficiency 
(judicial reform), 
- improving political oversight of the security sector (security sector 
reform),  
- How, in what ways, to what degree does civil society have an influence on 
policy outcomes related to democratisation? 
 
PERCEPTION AND INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
GENERAL 
- Have you ever heard of civil society think-tanks (TESEV, Heinrich Boell 
Stiftung, CESS, TÜSIAD) democratisation programmes (products, activities 
etc.)? Others? 
- Do you think civil society ‘disseminating viable policy alternatives’, 
among others, is the proper way a democratic political system operates? 
- Did you participate in any civil society activity (conference, panel, 
workshop, press-conference, film-screening etc)? (In what capacity – guest, 
panellist, moderator, delivering key-note?) 
- In your opinion, do civil society think-tanks in general play a role in or 
have an influence on decision-making process related to democratisation 
(improving political oversight of the security sector, strengthening judicial 
independence, impartiality, efficiency) as reflected in policy outcomes? 
- What are the most effective ways, in your opinion, civil society has played 
or is playing a role in the process related to … ? (improving political 
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oversight of the security sector, strengthening judicial independence, 
impartiality, efficiency) 
- At what stage(s) of the policy cycle, if any, does/should civil society 
participate in: issue articulation, policy formulation, policy 
implementation? 
 
INVOLVEMENT IN THINK-TANK ACTIVITY ON 
DEMOCRATISATION 
- Have you ever heard about civil society think-tanks’ democratisation 
programmes? 
- Did you ever receive personally any of their products? (Who passed them 
to you? For what purpose?) (Did you personally read them? Did you use 
them in your work?) 
- Do you believe this is the way policymaking process should develop? (or, 
do you believe policy outcomes should take shape that way? Why do you 
think so?) 
- Do you think it is useful (and legitimate) for civil society think-tanks to 
play a role (or become an actor) in political decisionmaking? (Why?) 
- Did you ever quote (TESEV, Heinrich Boell Stiftung, CESS, TÜSIAD) 
views/proposals/positions on (improving political oversight of the security 
sector, strengthening judicial independence, impartiality, efficiency)?  
Why? (Personal conviction/belief, public opinion, media coverage, because 
voiced by a celebrity, inclusion in EU reports, party leaders/friends said so, 
political opposition’s rhetoric, party programme, other reasons..). 
Such proposals; are/were they relevant and useful for the work you 
were handling?  
 
PERCEPTION OF THINK-TANKS’ ACTUAL ROLE AND IMPACT 
- Is civil society more effective at elite level or at mass level? Why? 
Civil society’s influence; is it direct or rather indirect?  
Do civil society think-tanks affect cultural transformation (or just 
behavioural)? Elite/mass.. 
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Is civil society a ‘factor’ to be taken into consideration or an ‘actor’ 
to be dealt with? 
- In the final analysis, do you think civil society (TESEV, Heinrich Boell 
Stiftung, CESS, TÜSIAD) initiatives “positively/negatively” affecte(d) the 
process of democratisation and policy outcomes?  
- How would you evaluate and score the role of civil society in affecting 
policy outcomes related to specific areas of democratisation? (improving 
political oversight of the security sector, strengthening judicial 
independence, impartiality, efficiency) 10 - extremely effective; 1 -no effect 
at all.  
- If you had a chance, what would you like think-tanks to focus on more? 
- Did you ever provide feedback to civil society organisations and/or ask for 
further input? 
 
OTHER FACTORS 
- Do policy decisions, related to democratisation, involve an initiative or a 
reaction to something in the environment? 
- (Based on your personal experience) What other factors have/had an 
influence on the outcome? How would you order them in terms of the 
degree of influence?  
- “What pressures”, if any, do (did) you feel or feeling in ….? 
- Who makes the final decision(s) in the area of ….? 
- Did you ever feel obliged to make certain statements just because you 
represented a certain office? 
- Do you think that real democratisation is possible without an established 
democratic mass culture? (Do you think civil society has a role toward 
that?) 
 
EUROPEAN UNION 
- Do you believe Turkey’s EU integration process helps democratisation? 
(..facilitating policy moves that are otherwise infeasible, internally) 
(Distinguishable from domestic players?) 
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- Do you think EU-integration process helps civil society work in a more 
favourable and/or permitting environment in Turkey? (How?) 
- Did you have a chance to read the parts (of) EU Turkey 2010 Progress 
Report, EP March 2011 report, EU Turkey 2011 Progress Report? 
 
MEDIA 
- What role(s), if any, does/should the media play in supporting civil 
society?  
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